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ABSTRACT
CARE OF THE SEXUAL SELF:
ÁSKĒSIS AS A ROUTE
TO SEX EDUCATION
Shaun D. Miller, B.A., B.A., M.A.
Marquette University, 2019
In adolescent sex education, the contemporary debate has developed into two
camps: the paternalistic view and the liberal view. I argue that both sides of the camp
have been too focused on actions and behavior and are assuming a heteronormative
background. This dissertation argues that the way to take care of the self is through
exercises, techniques, self-discipline, and self-cultivation—what the ancient Greeks
called áskēsis. By applying áskēsis to sex education, students will gain the character of
taking care of the sexual self and have a robust outlook of themselves via sexuality.
After looking at countless syllabi, I reduce three different moral foundations that
underlie existing sex education programs. The first are paternalistic sex education
programs. However, empirical research shows that gender discrepancies and
heteronormativity are presented as inevitable.
The second model is what I call liberal-consequentialist sex education, which
emphasizes avoiding negative consequences such as unwanted pregnancies and STIs.
This model is an improvement since it empowers students with essential knowledge such
as anatomy and sexual mechanics. But this model is still limited because it fails to discuss
many forms of sexuality and gender while embracing heteronormativity.
The third model is what I call liberal-deontological sex education, which teaches
sexual consent. While this model definitely improves on the previous two models, there
is still something lacking. Most importantly, this model fails to address the gender
inequality at the root of the problematic power dynamics. For example, if to receive
consent is to garner a yes, then all men have to do is manipulate woman to get that yes.
These three models focus on a person’s behavior, but sexuality is much deeper.
Therefore, we need another model that implements áskēsis. For simplicity, I analyze
áskēsis to three components: the sexual emotions, the sexual mind, and the sexual body.
A comprehensive sex education program helps students train the moral sexual character
by disciplining whether those components are coming from their authentic character, or if
these ideas were simply societal expectations. This model, thereby, helps students
question their own social mores and help formulate their sexual subjectivity.
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Introduction

As of this writing, there is no federal standard for sex education in the United States in
public K12 schools. Of the 22 states that require mandated sex education, only 13 of
those states require that the information be medically accurate.1 Considering that sex
education is also health education, these facts show that sex education in the United
States is a travesty. One of the aims behind current sex education programs is to prevent
unwanted consequences such as teenage pregnancies and STIs. However, with the United
States leading teenage pregnancies in the world, current sex education programs do not
adhere to this aim. A major problem is not only the incorrect education program, but also
the cultural attitudes that people have regarding sexuality in general. My investigation
will look at US cultural and social influences of peoples’ beliefs regarding sexual norms,
and how to improve our relationship to sexuality. Sexual norms influence the way people
interact not only in sexual and relationship matters, but in daily living. Sexuality has
intimate connections with our gender, our bodies, our looks, and portions of our identity.
If we have the incorrect attitude toward sexual norms, then we will have incorrect
interactions towards those that do not correspond to the sexual norms of gender, bodies,
looks, and factors regarding our identity. What is the incorrect attitude toward sexual
norms? This dissertation will defend the idea that sex education programs ought to
undermine heteronormativity and uplift those with all genders, body types, identities, and
sexual expressions as legitimate. Furthermore, sex education programs ought to develop
1

“Sex and HIV Education.” Guttmacher Institute. October 03, 2018. Accessed October 26, 2018.
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/sex-and-hiv-education.
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techniques and skills for students to regard their sexuality in a healthy way as well as
fighting heteronormative attitudes. My overall goal in this dissertation is to provide an
educational method that will not only attempt to undermine heteronormativity by
educational means but also help students formulate a sense of their sexual subjectivity.
Learning about and embracing sexuality can inform people about their own sexual
subjectivity, which I take from Tolman: “a person’s experience of [oneself]2 as a sexual
being, who feels entitled to sexual pleasure and sexual safety, who makes active sexual
choices, and who has an identity as a sexual being.”3 Without sexual subjectivity, people
will be passive to social forces and could live heteronormatively where they could be
taken advantage of or take advantage of others simply because they did not know any
better or because it was expected of them.

1. The Problem of Heteronormativity

One major problem is heteronormativity—the belief that heterosexuality is the only
proper sexual orientation, and that people ought to stay within prescribed gender roles
because these roles are considered natural. It is a norm throughout the world that
heterosexual practices are not just normal, but necessary for the moral health of society.4
It does not mean that heterosexuality, heterosexual relationships, or heterosexual
practices should be disvalued. Rather, I am challenging the notion that heterosexuality is
the centered norm and other expressions of sexuality and gender are perversions,

2
Tolman discusses adolescent women. However, I find her classification of sexual subjectivity
applicable to all genders.
3
Tolman, Dilemmas of Desire, 5-6.
4
Cf. Charles Lemert. Social Things: An Introduction to the Sociological Life. Third edition
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 193.
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deviations or, at best, derivatives of heterosexuality. Heteronormativity is the idea that
what is considered socially common regarding sexual and gender roles is the presumed
universal rule. Heteronormativity is a way to “regulate youths’ bodies by forcing
adherence to sexual expressions which have already been determined by the
controllers...If individuals reject heterosexuality, in a heteronormative social setting, they
can expect to be silenced and set aside.”5 These cultural expectations are so ingrained in
young people that once they begin to think about sex and gender presentation, they are
already doing so through the categories and concepts given to them by society. What
follows from heteronormativity is that people ought to look, behave, think, value, know,
and feel their presumed sex which includes what sort of gender, body, identity, and
thoughts individuals ought to have. By growing up and participating in these cultural
norms, people act and unconsciously impose these sexual norms and gender expressions
onto themselves and others through rules, shame, appeals to various responsibilities, and
praise- and blameworthiness. It may be true that same-sex relationships are slowly
becoming acceptable in society. However, our gender presentations and expressions—
even if lessened than the past—are still reigned in from heteronormativity. Indeed, using
shame to attempt to get people to conform to the social norms is what philosopher Jason
Stotts has called “shamenorming.”6 The ultimate goal is for individuals to internalize the
beliefs where their own behavior is self-controlled through guilt if they do not follow the
social conventions. The sexual expectations are already set in place before they start to
have a sex life, and their sexual experiences are fed by these concepts, usually without

5

Pamela K. Smith, “The Prom as a Spectacle of Heteronormativity,” in The Sexuality Curriculum
and Youth Culture, ed. Dennis Carlson and Donyell L. Roseboro (NY: Peter Lang Publishing, 2011), 158.
6
Cf. Jason Stotts. Eros and Ethos: A New Theory of Sexual Ethics. (Ontario: Erosophia
Enterprises, 2018), 183-185.
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the people realizing it. People often do not consciously think about the forces that shape
their lives or their beliefs; rather, they live passively accepting these norms. Even though
more expressions are starting to be acceptable (e.g. same-sex relationships, transgender
people), people must still follow certain heteronormative ideas in order to be accepted in
society. Assimilation to heteronormativity is part of the process for sexual minorities to
fit in mainstream culture. Gender intensification, the pressure to conform to gender
stereotypes, typically happens around ages 12-16.7
If heterosexuality is perceived as the norm where being a heterosexual is the
default form of sexuality, what follows is that each gender must fall into certain
“natural,” hierarchical roles, and that anything outside the convention and/or “natural”
roles is deemed strange, perverse, or wrong. To be considered prescriptively “normal”
(e.g., opposite-sex attraction) implies that those who are not part of the prescriptive norm
are deemed abnormal by default (e.g., same-sex attraction). Going outside these
conventional norms puts restrictions on people’s behavior to the point where they
become—to use a Foucaultian term—“normalized,” i.e., they either practice
heterosexuality or become a heterosexual to stay in line with the “natural” role. If people
cannot be heterosexual, then they should at least perform and present themselves as
heterosexual so that they can “pass” as heterosexual and cisgender. Anything outside the
norms produces what is considered abnormal. Moreover, even if people follow the
norms, their feelings may not be fully expressed because they may want to act or look a
certain way, but must keep it secret for fear of being stigmatized. The norms our society
holds tell us what we should do, and are strong enough where we have to change our

7

Cf. Andrew P. Smiler. Dating and Sex: A Guide for the 21st Century Teen Boy. (Washington,
D.C.: Magination Press, 2016), 244-245.
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selves to be part of the culture and fit in, even if it is as at odds with our self. We take the
norms as the universal standard and they become so compelling that we not only take
them for granted as the default, but we also live them out and feel as if this was what is
true and real of our human sexual experience.8 Because there are certain roles that are
considered more appropriate than others, a sexual hierarchy is formed.
To illustrate the sexual hierarchy, Gayle Rubin points out that certain sexual acts
form a hierarchical system of sexual value: the first is marital, reproductive
heterosexuals, followed by unmarried monogamous heterosexuals. Next would be the
solitary heterosexual. It is possible that the promiscuous heterosexual would be next in
this hierarchy. Stable, long-term lesbian and gay male couples are gaining respectability,
but promiscuous lesbians and gays are barely above the bottom of the hierarchical
pyramid. The bottom of these sexual castes are transsexuals, transvestites, fetishists,
sadomasochists, porn models, and sex workers. As one goes upward on the hierarchy,
people are considered more mentally, emotionally, and socially stable. They gain
institutional support and reap in the benefits of such support. As one goes lower on the
scale, there is a presumption of mental illness, crime, economic sanctions, and
disreputability.9 These activities are considered self-destructive patterns, emotional
aggression, or immaturity. This discourse forms the idea that sex within the confines of
marriage, love, and reproduction is considered “good” and “normal” sexual activity. The
higher people are on the scale, the more “complete” those people are. Any sex that is
unmarried, promiscuous, nonprocreative is deemed “on the fringe,” “abnormal,” or
8
Cf. Deborah L. Tolman Dilemmas of desire: Teenage girls talk about sexuality. (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 14.
9
Cf. Gayle S. Rubin “Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality.” In
America’s Feminist Thought at Century’s End: A Reader. Edited by Linda S. Kauffman. (Cambridge, MA:
Blackwell Publishers, 1993), 14-15.
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“unnatural.” In today’s times, unmarried or nonprocreative sex may be permissible, but I
would still contend that it is taken as “non-serious” or “not the final culmination of”
sexual expressions.
We often think that after the sexual revolution in the past, people are free to
pursue their sexual interests and desires without sanction. However, our sexuality is
regulated even if we think we are free. These regulations can also filter into what is
appropriate or inappropriate pleasures, actions, and identities. Nowadays, most of US
society has accepted same-sex relationships, but if they “fit” more into the norm, the
more they are accepted. Rachel Hills illustrates this perfectly in her qualitative research
as she interviews numerous people for her project:
It is relatively easy to embrace a pair of conventionally attractive, conventionally
masculine men who also happen to enjoy middle-class domestic pursuits like
dinner parties, barbecues, monogamy, and the beach. But what about gay men
who are naturally more effete, or lesbians who eschew the markers of
conventionally femininity? What about the same-sex-attracted people who don’t
want marriage or monogamy, or who build their families around the communities
they choose rather than the people who raised them? Same-sex relationships may
be more accepted than they used to be, but the relationships that are embraced
most are the ones that most closely mirror the old standards. 10
The standards that Hills refers to are the heteronormative standards. Even if relationships
are accepted in society (both culturally and legally), the relationship is considered
legitimate if it mirrors a heterosexual mold, and the more it does so, the more
“successful” the relationship is. Heterosexual norms are still the standard, even if people
are in same-sex relationships.
Being criticized for not following the heterosexual norms is harmful to everyone
because one cannot fully express one’s identity, or one may develop feelings of guilt or
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shame by having certain desires that are not part of the heterosexual norms.11 Therefore,
either falling outside the heterosexual norms is seen as a problem, or heteronormativity
itself is a problem. I argue that heteronormativity itself is the problem for society. The
harms and damage can range from people being stigmatized for not fitting in to bullying
to death. Not only does heteronormativity cause harm, but it can stifle and restrict those
who do not express their sexual potentials (outside of harm, of course).
Heteronormativity, in other words, restricts people’s sexual expressions that go beyond
the typical heteronormative paradigms which can stifle their well-being in general. And if
people cannot achieve a sense of well-being, they are not going to lead a flourishing life.
Because heteronormativity is a problem, a solution is to undermine
heteronormativity. The way to undermine it is to dismantle the assumption that
heterosexuality is the only proper sexual orientation, and that people ought to stay within
prescribed gender roles. To accomplish this task, one must educate society about the
possible heterosexual norms they are holding and assuming. Since people learn about
norms through their upbringing, a way to educate people about the problem of
heteronormativity is through a rigorous sex education. Therefore, the aim of this project
is to investigate various perspectives of sex education in the US and find an educational
common ground where one learns not only sexual activity, hygiene, and avoiding
negative consequences, but about sexuality and gender as a whole. In short, to undermine
heteronormativity, one must teach the students that heteronormativity is incorrect. Again,
undermining heteronormativity does not mean a criticism of heterosexuality, heterosexual
acts, or heterosexual relationships. Undermining heteronormativity is to show why the
11
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hegemonic value of heterosexuality—heterosexuality as the prescriptive norm—should
be disvalued. And to do that, one must give the students a rigorous sex education
program that is very different from the programs that has been done and is currently in
use. For simplicity, I will be focusing on public schools, but this discussion could easily
transfer to private or alternative schooling.
Because I am focusing on public schools, my sex education program focuses on
young students, particularly adolescents. I am defining adolescence as the World Health
Organization (WHO) does: the stage from 10 to 19 years of age.12 There has been a
discussion as to whether this stage should be lengthened because of the decreasing age of
puberty as well as adulthood being fully achieved by age 24. I will, however, stay with
the WHO’s definition since I am primarily focusing on sex education in the formative
years. Ideally, sex education should not stop, even after adolescence. However, students
need the basic tools and skills to understand sexuality in general so that they can apply it
to themselves and others and the setting for this to work is in a formal school setting.

2. The Sex Education Debates
To provide context, we must look at the historical background of sex education in the US.
Briefly, the history of sex education in the United States started after World War I. The
major focus, at that time, was controlling STIs, especially for the soldiers fighting in the
War, which made the federal government get involved in sex education. These programs
were considered successful in controlling STIs and inspired the federal government to
12
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expand sex education programs as a way to control STIs to secondary schools through the
1920-1960s. Over time, sex education evolved from preventative measures to
understanding sexual mechanics and anatomy. By the 1960, the sexual revolution was in
full swing and learning about sex helped people fulfill their sexual desires. In response to
the sexual revolution of the late 1960s-early 1970s, sex education shifted from a health
issue to a political issue where religious conservatives attacked sex education as lacking
morals. In the 1980s, the AIDS and HIV epidemic propelled defenders of sex education.
By the mid-90s to the present, every state passed mandates for AIDS education. As a
result, opponents of sex education reformulated the curriculum to deal with the AIDS and
HIV epidemic by reframing the issue from health to morality: abstinence education.
Throughout this development, sex education has focused on sexual activity,
health, and reproduction. Over time, however, various assumptions and norms have crept
in unquestionably through various discourses. There have been few philosophical studies
about sex education,13 but most of them do not offer suggestions how to undermine
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heteronormativity through sex education.14 Since there are not many philosophers who
have made arguments concerning sex education, I will also look into various proposals by
politicians and policymakers. By investigating these perspectives and their philosophical
underpinnings, I uncover what implications these educational programs have for forming
sexual identities. Most philosophical discussions about sexuality deal with metaphysical,
epistemological, conceptual, or ethical questions. In short, with a few exceptions, sex
education has been a missing element in most philosophical literature. Those who make a
claim about what sex education ought to be often do not rely on philosophical support for
their justification. Therefore, this dissertation will investigate claims concerning sex
education, and analyze what philosophical justifications they are presuming. By focusing
on what proponents of sex education say, I can distinguish which arguments, and thereby
which philosophical assumptions, they hold.
Currently in America, there are two types of models of teaching sex. The first
type, which I call the paternalistic model, focuses on abstaining from sex until the right
time; the right time usually being marriage. The reasoning behind this model is that
awareness of one’s sexuality begins around adolescence. Since this is the age where one
is coming into adulthood, the stresses of life can be too much to handle. This discourse
focuses on the idea that any form of sexual activity involves deeply embedded emotions
and that young people cannot handle them. Thus, it is best for adolescents to withhold sex
until the proper time.15 Moreover, any sexual activities are morally permissible for adults.
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Since adolescents are not yet adults, it is impermissible for them to engage in any sexual
behavior.
The second model is what I call the liberal model, which focuses on abstinence as
a choice, but not the only choice. Other choices include ways to prevent negative
consequences (such as unintended pregnancies and STIs), which means the curriculum
includes preventative measures, such as condoms or the birth control pill. The typical
justification behind this model is that since adolescents are likely to engage in sexual
activity, it is best to teach adolescents how to prevent unintended consequences so that
they can continue their lives uninterrupted throughout their teenage years and live a
successful adult life.16
These are just two broad discourses on how to view adolescents as sexual beings
and how to teach sexuality.17 Nevertheless, these two discourses, I argue, have a narrow
outlook on what it means to be a sexual being. Both discourses focus only on the sexual
act, specifically how to prevent unintended acts, which is a very limiting approach. One’s
sexual attitude toward others and oneself is much more encompassing and richer than
what one should avoid doing, and therefore should be taken into consideration when
teaching a sexual education course. For example, most sex education programs in the US
focus on the consequences of the sexual act, or on an agent who is value-neutral when it
comes to sex. While these are important, there is an essential component that is missing:
all of these qualities look toward an external feature about sex, meaning that they focus
on the behaviors. With the focus away from the sexual self and toward sexual behaviors,
16
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consequences, or certain thoughts external to the agent, sex education has made the
person into a being who is divorced from one’s sexuality rather than a being who is a
sexual subject.
By showing that both of these models are flawed, I open up a new avenue for my
proposed ethics. Instead of focusing on behavior, I will argue that sex education should
also focus on character and the self. Part of my project is to develop an ethic of sexuality
and thereby speculate about what a sex education program would look like under a new
ethics which I will call “care of the self.” Why care of the self? Both the paternalistic and
liberal models argue that one should not engage in sexual activity until one is ready,
mature, or “feel it is the right moment.” These features, to me, seem to be a central
feature of being a sexual subject: knowing who one is as a sexual being gives insight on
how to handle sex or what type of sexual activities to engage in. Many novices in sex
start with a confused state of mind, which is partially because of lack of experience, but I
argue that it is also because they are not sure what kind of sexual desires they have or
could have. Thus, they partake in sexual practices mainly through external pressure or
social expectations.18
Both the paternalistic and liberal models say that sexual activity is for those who
are ready, but that issue is side-stepped quickly, as if it were a footnote in sex education. I
suggest that by focusing on an ethic that concentrates on understanding the care of the
self, the focal point would concentrate on the subject and thereby produce subjects taking
care of their sexual selves. By developing this line of thought, care of the self would be a
18
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new avenue in sex education, providing a new discourse on one’s sexuality instead of
teaching the avoidance of something in sexuality. Could teachers use the idea of a sexual
being as the focus of sex education? What would sexual education look like if “care of
the self” was the primary thing to teach? What if intersubjective sexual subjects were the
main discourse rather than isolated subjects who just happened to be sexual?
Chapter one looks at educational paternalism as a philosophy. Since I am arguing
against a paternalistic sex education program, one possible implication is that my
proposed sex education has no paternalistic features. However, I am arguing against
heteronormativity because—as it will be developed by the end of the dissertation—
heteronormativity hinders well-being. Therefore, I have an account of at least one value
that should be disvalued and that it should be taught as a disvalue. It seems that I have at
least a type of paternalistic sex education: namely, that heteronormative values should be
disvalued. How can I hold these two opposing ideas? The philosophy of paternalism is
multifaceted so I can only focus on a few aspects of paternalism. I uphold what I call
“thin” paternalism: giving students agency in their educational choices, and also to instill
and realize values that will help them flourish. Since heteronormativity detracts from
flourishing, heteronormativity is a value that will not be endorsed in sex education
programs. After this, I will investigate various paternalistic reasons for abstinence-only
sex education programs based on the immorality of adolescent sexual behavior. In the
end, I argue these arguments fail and that there is nothing essentially wrong with
adolescent sexual behavior.
Chapter two analyzes what I call the paternalistic model of sex education. This
perspective typically endorses an abstinence-only-until-marriage sex education
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framework. Within a paternalistic framework, I investigate possible arguments that
proponents could use to support a paternalistic sex education (hereafter PSE). Various
arguments come from deontological, consequentialist, and virtue theorist justifications. In
the end, I argue that these justifications fail and show that this model also endorses
heteronormativity.
Chapter three investigates a comprehensive sex education coming from a liberal
and consequentialist tradition, what I call liberal-consequentialist sex education (hereafter
LCSE). Proponents of LCSE find it more preferable than PSE because exercising
freedom is better than not. The assumed premise behind LCSE is that exercising freedom
means that one must presumably be autonomous, which requires, among other things,
being competent in one’s actions and behaviors. The question, then, is whether
adolescents are competent or not. Legally, adolescents depend upon their adult guardians
for economic, emotional, and existential support. Because of this dependence,
adolescents are considered “extended children.” Since children are not considered
autonomous and competent, so too, are adolescents. Moreover, these adolescents, under
this paradigm, are seen as constant risk-takers and sensation-seekers.
This chapter will rely on J.S. Mill’s On Liberty to build a case for a philosophical
position that combines liberalism and consequentialism in which LCSE is relying on to
argue for their perspective. I will also consider objections to LCSE from proponents of
PSE and defend LCSE. One major feature of this chapter will make the argument that, in
general, adolescents are competent enough to make sexual decisions and the sex
education will be a benefit to enhance their competency and decision-making. Finally, I
will consider the advantages and disadvantages of LCSE and conclude that the
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disadvantages outweigh the advantages and that another perspective of sex education is
wanting.
Chapter four details a comprehensive sex education coming from a liberal and
deontological ethical tradition, which I call liberal-deontological sex education (hereafter
LDSE). This chapter will discuss the intricacies of autonomy and consent. I will look at
the advantages and disadvantages of this perspective and conclude that this perspective is
wanting. However, I consider consent and autonomy an essential component of sex
education, but not the foundation. Therefore, I embrace a type of autonomy and consent
whereby a virtue ethic is the foundation.19
In all three perspectives, there is not much emphasis on sexual identity. Knowing
about oneself in terms of one’s gender, race, ethnicity, religion, or national identity has
gained prominence in terms of how these issues are integral to one’s life. One may think
that sexual orientation is only sexual identity, but sexual orientation means what sex one
is attracted to, whereas sexual identity includes what sort of sexual attitudes one has
toward others and oneself. Moreover, current sex education focuses on the mechanics of
sex and how to avoid various sexual problems. However, sex education can be more than
that. I attempt to offer a viable sex education that educates students about sexuality as a
whole—what it means to be a sexual person, to own one’s sexuality, and to foster and
empower one’s sexuality through one’s identity, feelings, and attitudes. Thus, the project
is to not only raise new questions concerning heteronormativity but to offers a theoretical
perspective to adequately address and answer the problem of heteronormativity and to
formulate a concept of sexual subjectivity, which leads me to chapter five.
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In chapter five, I focus on taking care of the sexual self. The way out of the
problems of the previous models is to incorporate the advantages and expunge the
disadvantages. The advantages from the previous perspectives incorporate ways of
understanding the consequences of one’s actions, taking responsibility for one’s actions,
and having self-determination and understanding consent. The students must be aware of
how to reason ethically and justify their ethical behavior. Students are taught how to
develop their own views of what is right and wrong. This does not entail relativism;
rather, the ethics-based curriculum is to help the students develop a character that has
certain virtues such as compassion, fairness, courage, responsibility, humility, loyalty,
and generosity. This fourth perspective will also focus on the students’ well-being and
undermine the assumed heteronormativity in sex education. A key component of this
perspective is to form a sexual subject. The philosophical foundation I use is áskēsis.
Antonoccio describes áskēsis best:
Askesis can refer to a wide range of practices that human beings undertake in
order to form themselves in relation to an ideal good. In the history of Western
thought, for example, askesis has been associated with practices related to
education or intellectual formation, athletic and military training, spiritual
formation (as in the famous exercises of Ignatius Loyola), and even the process of
artistic creation. In each case, the root meaning of askesis denotes some sort of
formation discipline, an attempt to shape or form the self according to an ideal of
goodness or excellence.20
To develop this, I will use three components of the self: emotions, the mind, and the
body. Each of these three components will be investigated by incorporating áskēsis. A
way to distinguish the moral foundations between the áskēsis model and previous models
is that the latter focused on moral failures and overcoming those failures, as if one had
lowered oneself morally so that the way out is get back to a normal stasis. Incorporating
20
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áskēsis, however, is to go further than simply staying at a normal stasis. Rather, being
moral under áskēsis is to improve and better oneself.
In chapter six, I provide methods to apply áskēsis in sex education programs and
offer examples of what an áskēsis model of sex education could offer that goes beyond
preventing unwanted consequences and information about consent. My new model would
focus on how to take care of the self—a comprehensive sex education program that helps
students train the moral sexual character by disciplining whether their sexual mind, body,
and emotions are coming from their authentic character or simply from societal
expectations. This model, thereby, helps students question their own social mores and
understand various forms of sexualities and genders. The upshot is to implement this into
public policy where the ethical considerations are to not only focus on avoiding
assaultive behavior, but also cultivating a character where they would not want to in the
first place
Moreover, they will not challenge the sexual social conventions and possibly
shame those who do not socially fit in the sexual norms. Learning about sexual
subjectivity, however, will help students and embrace their sexuality and help undermine
heteronormativity. For example, a study has shown that embracing one’s sexuality can
make one more resistant to sexual double standards21 and have positive attitudes toward
sexuality, which would be a great consequence of the áskēsis model.
To give an example of positive attitudes toward sexuality, the Netherlands has an
excellent sex education program. The Dutch have a much more comprehensive sex
education program than the United States in that the Dutch have a more open discussion
21
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in the classroom. Sexuality is seen as a positive light and they focus not only on
responsibility and encourage students to think about what they want in advance, but they
also focus on pleasure and ways to communicate to potential partners how to achieve
pleasure.22 Schalet has observed that many American adolescent women have a harder
time integrating their sexual subjectivity than adolescent Dutch women. Moreover,
American girls are bombarded with cultural messages that they cannot handle sexual
activity, even within a relationship, but Dutch girls are assumed to be able to fall in love
and form steady sexual relationships. By analogy, if a similar program were instituted in
America, then Americans may have a better understanding of sexuality. By expanding on
this observation, I propose that adolescent education fosters sexual subjectivity to not
only be more self-reflective and integrate people’s own sexuality into their identity, but to
also understand the different forms of sexualities so that people will not be averse to
possible sexual encounters with which they may not be familiar. Instead, the people
involved can engage in a reflective dialogue to understand the behavior, or to query
certain cultural practices that could endorse inequality. Respecting sexual and
relationship practices in all of its different forms is key to living in a better society.

3. The Educational Background

Empirically, I will be using different sex education programs that I find helpful as either
an example or portions of a foundation for such a program. First, I consider the sex
education program in the Netherlands to be encouraging. Their program starts in
kindergarten and it goes beyond the discourse of avoiding negative consequences.
22
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Effectively, their program seems to be working since they have the lowest teenage
pregnancy rates in the world. My program would emulate the Netherland program in
many ways. What I would like to contribute to the program is to offer philosophical
justifications by emphasizing áskēsis as the source of shaping a sexual self.
One possible objection to my project is that sexuality is a mature subject, so the
topic must be reserved for adults. My response is two-fold: one, formal education ends at
the beginning of the adult years. If young people do not have a sexual education before
then, they will not be prepared nor understand their own sexuality. They may be taken
advantage of, or unknowingly take advantage of others. Considering that one aim of
education is to prepare young minds for their adult life, sex education must be part of
education. Second, it is nearly impossible to lack knowledge of sex before one becomes
an adult. That is, sexuality is not something that merely “appears” in adulthood. Through
media, peers, and especially the Internet, society is constantly being bombarded with
different notions of sexuality. To sift through the information and figure out what is
factual and what is not requires an education to distinguish fact and fiction. People learn
about different genders, sexual orientations, sexual activities, consent and coercion, and
various desires toward people as they grow older. To make sense of this content, sex
education categorizes the content into meaningful discourse.
To understand the aim of sex education, I must include an aim of education in
general. The foundation for education I will be using is John Dewey’s philosophy of
education, with the focus on sex education as formulated by psychologist Sharon Lamb
and sexuality educator Al Vernacchio. For Dewey, the educator is not just giving content
to the student where the student passively retains the information; rather, there is an
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engaged exchange among the students where they interact to learn the content which
would open them up for new views, new experiences, and understanding new ideas.
These experiences contribute to becoming a democratic citizen. For Dewey, then, the aim
of education is to produce democratic citizens, which means that education and
democracy are intimately connected. The student grows for the purpose of further
growth. This insight makes education both a means and an ends. To achieve this aim,
Dewey emphasizes experience—which comes from a mixture of continuity and
interaction—as the key to education. Through students’ experiences, they will not just
obtain knowledgeable content, but also know how the content contributes to their wellbeing, and to the extent that they could contribute to the good of society.
To have certain knowledge about something is so that we can prepare ourselves
and apply the knowledge if needed. However, having knowledge does not simply mean
one is educated. One can memorize answers and even understand the reasoning behind
the answers, but to be educated, one must also be part of a democratic society where one
can engage with the rest of the community in an open way. Each individual student’s
experience, therefore, will be different. The educator’s job is to take into account of these
differences and provide the students with experiences that will help them access future
experiences that would contribute to their own growth, which, in turn, would help them
contribute to society.
Integrating these aims with sex education, Lamb argues that since citizenship
cannot be separated from the particularities of the students life, so too, “sex ed curricula
must not focus primarily on the individual student’s health and decision making, but on
his or her participation in a culture in which sex is had, seen experienced, and
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represented.”23 Lamb presents guiding principles for a democratic education that is in the
spirit of Dewey, after which she uses these principles to formulate a sex education
curriculum, which in turn will constitute a democratic sexual citizen. In short, a
democratic education must be non-restrictive, non-dogmatic, inclusive, and dedicated to
teaching deliberation rather than simply critiquing ideas.24
The curriculum that Lamb demonstrates is a collaboration between her colleagues
and students for five years, and it has been approved by the Association for Moral
Education. I will highlight some features of her curriculum and either supplement or
apply the features. Certain features for a sex education curriculum include lessons that
contribute to a classroom atmosphere where there are joint discussions, respect for each
other, and an openness to all moral questioning. Sex education is not simply a lesson in
advice or a list of how-tos. Because the foundation is a democratic education, the setup is
to let the students lead the class while the teacher is the facilitator, but the teacher makes
sure that the students have understood what their education entails to make sure that
everyone is included by querying the students to help the students realize potential harms,
and honing in on what the students want to know. In relevance to Dewey, the teachers
must start where the students are and know something about the students’ prior
experiences in order to help them continue in their experiences by having open
communication.
The next highlighted feature from Lamb is the need for an ethics-based
curriculum. Being inclusive not only means having an open dialogue with those who do
not share your ideas, but to fight oppression and the social injustices along with it. Doing
23
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so means that the students will recognize that others may struggle with their own identity.
Focusing on the guiding principle of being inclusive, a democratic education would
discuss sexuality as it is expressed within the community, which includes but is not
limited to students who identify as LGBTQ. However, the community is not limited to
the classroom. A democratic education means that they may encounter other citizens that
have different sexual identities that they may not currently experience in the classroom.
Vernacchio will be used as case studies and examples of what he does in the
classroom to teach sexuality. He has the educational wisdom to make the students feel
comfortable and open to discuss a sensitive topic like sex. I find Vernacchio’s teaching
style, subject matter, and healthy approach to sexuality refreshing and enriching. I will
use Vernacchio’s work as a launching pad to contribute to what a good sexuality
education program looks like.
With the foundation of the aims of education in place, specifically geared toward
sex education, I will proceed by investigating different perspectives of sex education, the
assumed moralities behind them, investigate the advantages and disadvantages, and settle
on a perspective which I find the most beneficial.
To discuss sex education from a K-12 education would require more than this
dissertation requires. Indeed, it may require more than one book as many sex education
curricula have divided their criteria and course requirements for different grades. Thus,
for the purposes of this dissertation, I solely focus on sex education in high school though
the various issues may be applied to different grades as well.
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Chapter One: The Scope and Character of Paternalistic
Sex Education
Abstinence-only sex education programs in the United States have greatly expanded
since the 1980s. Although these programs are slowly being replaced, they still have a
powerful influence and the remnants of their ideology still reverberates in our society.
The major piece of legislation that solidified abstinence-only sex education was the
Social Security Act, Title V, Section 510 of 1996, which instituted federally funded
abstinence-only sex programs. The relevant section in the Act states: “The purpose of an
allotment under subsection (a) to a State is to enable the State to provide abstinence
education, and at the option of the State, where appropriate, mentoring, counseling, and
adult supervision to promote abstinence from sexual activity, with a focus on those
groups which are most likely to bear children out-of-wedlock.” Furthermore, “abstinence
education” means a sex education which:
(A) has as its exclusive purpose, teaching the social, psychological, and health gains
to be realized by abstaining from sexual activity;
(B) teaches abstinence from sexual activity outside marriage as the expected standard
for all school age children;
(C) teaches that abstinence from sexual activity is the only certain way to avoid outof-wedlock pregnancy, sexually transmitted diseases, and other associated health
problems;
(D) teaches that a mutually faithful monogamous relationship in context of marriage
is the expected standard of human sexual activity;
(E) teaches that sexual activity outside of the context of marriage is likely to have
harmful psychological and physical effects;
(F) teaches that bearing children out-of-wedlock is likely to have harmful
consequences for the child, the child’s parents, and society;
(G) teaches young people how to reject sexual advances and how alcohol and drug
use increases vulnerability to sexual advances; and
(H) teaches the importance of attaining self-sufficiency before engaging in sexual
activity.
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The goal of the Act was to help those on welfare to become more independent.
Given that people rely on welfare to support their children, the supporters of the Act
argued that there ought to be a reduction in the number of pregnancies so as to relieve
poverty and hence dependence on welfare. The solution was to educate people about an
abstinence-only sex education. Over time, the purpose of the bill evolved from the ends
of the bill (viz. “helping those on welfare”) to the means of the bill (viz. the individual
provisions from (A) to (H)) as ends in themselves.25 The reason given was that there is
too much risk of adolescents having sex due to potentially negative consequences, such
as unwanted pregnancies and STIs. Thus, a sex education program should be formulated
to advocate for abstinence until marriage as the key ethic. While inexperienced
adolescents may have sexual urges and desires, it is best for them to wait until marriage.
This claim has already formed two norms.
First, marriage is considered the ideal model to engage in sexual activities. In
turn, marriage is seen as the ideal relationship where children can be raised properly,
where an authentic relationship can grow, and where sexuality is considered more moral
and ideal than any other type of relationship.26
Second, a standard narrative has formed surrounding adolescent sexuality and this
narrative has become ingrained in our culture as the truth about adolescent sexuality. The
narrative suggests that since adolescents have had no prior experiences with hormones or
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The American Public Health Association is more forceful: “These program requirements [of the
above mentioned Social Security Act Title V] have little to do with public health priorities; instead, they
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program's authorization.” Quoted in American Public Health Association. “Abstinence and U.S. Abstinence
Only Education Policies: Ethical and Human Rights Concerns.” November 8, 2006. Accessed October 14,
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sex education as a response to a moral, and not a public health, crisis.
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their sexual urges and because their biology is so powerful, they may need help sorting
out their feelings. As psychologist Bay-Cheng puts it: “This biologically deterministic
perspective saturates dominant theories of sexuality and presents sexuality as an intense,
instinctual drive that is overpowering if left unchecked by civilizing social mediators
such as laws and morality.”27 The assumption from this narrative is that adolescents go
through intense emotional upheaval, and they struggle by having an “inner war” with
these new emotions.28 Thus, adolescents are seen as mainly driven by their want, desires,
and their hormones. Therefore, because adolescents are driven by these internal
hormones, adolescents need to be controlled externally through specific values, even if
the adolescent does not currently or temporarily hold those values at that time.
This view of trying to control adolescent sexual behavior based on the controller’s
values is what I call paternalistic sex education. This view states that because adolescents
are going through puberty without any experience of their hormones or increased sex
drive, it is the parents’, schools’, or the state’s duty to determine what the right course of
action is to help adolescents while they are going through a hormonal and stressful
situation. The best course of action, according to paternalistic reasons, is to teach an
abstinence-only program as it is the best option to prevent any negative consequences,
such as preventing unwanted pregnancies, STIs, and possible harmful effects of sexual
activity that do not fit the mold of a heterosexual, monogamous marriage. Anything
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Bay-Cheng, “The Trouble of Teen Sex,” 62.
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outside of that boundary is considered wrong. The result is paternalistic sex education
(hereafter PSE).
In this chapter, I will investigate paternalism in connection with the purposes of
sex education. In Section 1, I will first introduce paternalism as a philosophical theory
and apply it to sex education. I bring up two notions of paternalism: “thick” and “thin”
paternalism. I am critiquing “thick” paternalism as applied to sex education because I
consider it infringing on adolescents’ right to sexual information whereby not getting the
sexual information can cause damage to their sexuality. Moreover, the damage has
informed and reinforced a system that endorses and privileges traditional gender roles, a
hierarchy of loving relationships, and the restriction of other expressions of sexuality that
are not the norm. I will thereby defend “thin” paternalism and accept “thin” paternalism
throughout the rest of this dissertation. In Section 2, I will use a general definition of
paternalism that will undergird the remainder of this chapter. In Section 3, I will
investigate three popular foundations for PSE. Despite all of the problems PSE has, there
are a few benefits. In Section 4, I will consider both the advantages and disadvantages of
PSE, but I will in the end reject “thick” PSE because of the damage it does to the
recipients.

1. Paternalism in Pedagogy
In all forms of education, there is bound to be some influence of the educator on the
students. When I discuss paternalistic education, I mean educational paternalism, or
paternalistic pedagogy, which is the idea that those in authority are expected to limit the
choices and autonomy of the students so as to help the students achieve purported
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educational goals. Fundamentally, paternalistic pedagogy occurs when the educators act
in a way that is assumed to be in the best interest of the students, even if the students
cannot (presently) see that it is in their best interest. Any sex education program endorses
the idea that students must learn self-control, health consequences, and some form of
morality in regards to sex. However, PSE does not teach students how to have selfcontrol; it brings up health consequences in terms of scare tactics or at best risk
management, and it holds a universal and strict form of morality that is heteronormative.
My focus is on moral paternalism in sex education. Therefore, I am not focusing on state
paternalism, otherwise known as legal paternalism, which holds that the government can
limit the freedom of its citizens for the sake of the citizens’ good.
1.1. “Thick” Paternalism

In terms of the scope of paternalism, there are two types: “thick” and “thin” paternalism.
“Thick” paternalism involves an authoritative body interfering with the agent’s autonomy
for the sake of the agent.
The argument behind “thick” paternalism can be structured thus:
1. People’s non-rational faculties (e.g. inclinations, emotions, drives, desires) have
an extremely strong sway over one’s life, particularly if one experiences such
non-rational factors (e.g. sexual inclinations) at a particular time or occasion.
2. If people’s non-rational faculties (e.g. inclinations, emotions, drives, desires) have
an extremely strong sway over one’s life, particularly if one experiences such
non-rational factors (e.g. sexual inclinations) at a particular time or occasion, then
the non-rationality controls people’s life.
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3. If the non-rational faculties controls people’s life, then people lead a life that is
not good.
4. Thus, if people’s non-rational faculties (e.g. inclinations, emotions, drives,
desires) have an extremely strong sway over one’s life, particularly if one
experiences such non-rational factors (e.g. sexual inclinations) at a particular time
or occasion, then people lead a life that is not good.
5. In order to have a good life, people need direction so that they can become good
humans later in life.
6. To give people direction so that they can become good humans later in life, their
autonomy needs to be interfered with for their sake.
7. Thus, in order to have a good life, people’s autonomy needs to be interfered with
for their sake.
8. Interfering with someone’s autonomy for their sake is “thick” paternalism.
9. Thus, in order to have a good life, we must apply “thick” paternalism.
The argument behind “thick” paternalism starts with the first premise that the agent’s
non-rationality (e.g. inclinations, emotions, drives, desires) has an extremely strong sway
over one’s life, particularly if one is younger or experiences a mode of non-rationality
(e.g. sexual inclinations) as a novice. Because non-rational factors could very well
control one’s life, one could consistently follow them until they become habits. These
habits would inform people which would make them live a life that is not good. Children
cannot, for example, do whatever they want. They need guidance so that they can be
good humans later in life as adults. As an analogy, parents are naturally “thick”
paternalists about their children’s food habits when the children are very young. While
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many children would like to pursue sweet things, the parents limit their choices so that
the children will eat whatever the parents make or purchase for them. The parents do not
give the children options to determine what to eat. Rather, the parents make the choice
for the child. The children’s choices are whether or not to eat the food, otherwise the
child goes hungry. They have to eat healthy food so that they can gain the habit of eating
healthily, which will thereby encourage them to have healthy eating habits as adults.
Applying this premise to education, a “thick” paternalist would require the student
to learn certain things for the sake of the student. The student may be required to learn
about various information because in the eyes of the school knowing the material will
benefit the student in the long run. Applying this to sex education, the student is a novice
when it comes to these new sexual inclinations, desires, and emotions. Acting on them
without fully understanding them can lead a life that is not good. In the same way as a
child consistently wanting sweets is not healthy, so too, constantly following or even
demanding that one’s sexual desires be fulfilled is not healthy, and it contributes to a life
that is not good.
Is this argument sound? I argue that it is not by bringing up three objections. First,
specifically with the sixth premise, while it may be true that constantly following our
desires is not healthy, the proper response is not to have an external authoritative figure
constantly interfering to stop ourselves. Rather, we are able to self-regulate ourselves,
which is done through educating ourselves about how to control our desires. It is true that
children do need more regulation because of their youth, but as they get older, they
should receive more responsibility so that when they become adults, they are not
consumed by their desires and instead know how to control their inclinations. We may

30

have non-rational moments, but the best way to combat them is through emotional
training, to have internal regulation, rather than an external will leading our lives.
The second objection with “thick” paternalism is that we do not know what
“good” means here. “Thick” paternalism claims that if one is not living a good life, then
interference is justified. Exactly what do “thick” paternalists mean by “good”? In the
context of sex education, “good” specifically means a heterosexual, monogamous
marriage that should apply to everyone universally once they get married. In other words,
“thick” paternalists presume a universal ethical norm when it comes to sex education. I
will discuss the problems with identifying “good” with a heterosexual marriage later in
the chapter, but for now, I want to critique the notion that this ethic can be applied
universally.
Considering that the world is becoming more secular, more globalized, and more
focused on rights and autonomy, pluralistic views of the good are simply inevitable.
Holding onto one idea without being exposed to other ideas could possibly mean one is
holding onto either a false belief or beliefs that can be detrimental to the self or others.
Moreover, holding onto an idea and declaring it to be the correct view closes off other
possibilities to other values that could also be deemed good. And to restrict other good
values is to limit goodness. It may work in an isolated community where the people can
have insulated community values. However, through technology, we can travel the world
more easily, we can access information simply at our fingertips, and the secularization of
the world makes it virtually impossible for a community to be closed off. John Lachs puts
it nicely: “In the United States the pluralism of values, religions, lifestyles, characters,
customs, and preferences is a fact to be dealt with, not a choice to be made. It makes no
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sense to ask if we should opt for a homogeneous or a widely diversified society;
pluralism is simply unavoidable.”29 Since pluralism is unavoidable, it would therefore be
wise to adopt pluralism within sex education. Trying to push conformity to a single value
or just a handful of values would undermine not only what many people might value, but
their autonomy would also be undermined since the hallmark of autonomy is that people
pursue their own good in how they see fit. We must, as John Lachs puts it, learn to leave
people alone.30 With pluralism in place, it would be best not to push for a monolithic
ethic but simply let people develop their own good based on their autonomy, which leads
to my third objection.
A third objection with “thick” paternalism is that it is too strong to say that
people’s autonomy needs to be managed. The “thick” paternalists focuses on interference
for the sake of the agent. While the agent could be advised to avoid an action, why not
offer some guidance, slight pushes, nudges, etc. to help the agent decide what to do rather
than simply restrict the agent’s options? Autonomy is one of the hallmarks of being
human and flourishing. Undermining one’s autonomy would undermine one’s potential
to flourish, which would undermine one’s humanity. At the same time, guiding or helping
someone is not undermining their autonomy as long as the guidance is based on the
agent’s terms, not on the paternalist. For example, if the student wants to know how to
avoid unwanted pregnancies or STIs, the educator would give all of the relevant
information and help the student develop skills based on the student’s values and desire.
The educator overreaches by only giving the student information on abstinence and only
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by informing the student on how to say “no” instead of giving the students skills on how
to communicate effectively to one’s partner.
Moreover, one of the benchmarks to be autonomous is to have the right
information. Deceiving someone is one way to make sure that people do not get the right
information. If Corey lies to Rania about his HIV status, Corey has manipulated Rania’s
autonomy by not giving her true information such that she can make a decision on her
own accord. Withholding information is also another way to manipulate autonomy. If
Raphael secretly records Juliet, Raphael has manipulated Juliet's autonomy because her
privacy is violated and she may not have consented to being recorded had she known that
was happening. I claim that “thick” paternalism is withholding information such that
even when students are outside of the classroom, they may not be under the supervision
of the school, but they still may not know what to do sexually because they lack the right
information. Hence, the school has still violated the students’ autonomy by withholding
relevant information.
1.2. Open Education

Before I bring up “thin” paternalism, I want to bring up another form of education that is
the opposite of paternalism in general and one that is entirely free of paternalism. Let us
call this a loose guidance or open forms of education.31 This loose guidance lets the
students choose whatever topics they would like to learn. The argument for this position
states that if there should be interference with what the students want to learn, then it
could interfere with their motivation to learn about something in particular. Moreover, if
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there are interferences with their motivation to learn about something in particular, their
desire to learn may diminish and they will not want to learn in general. To give an
example, take a biology class. If the students desire to learn about cells, the teacher
teaches them about cells. If the students want to learn about blood circulation, the
teachers teach the students blood circulation. The students decide the curricula and the
teacher teaches based on what the students want. If the teacher takes away the students’
choices, then the students may not be motivated to learn because the education is not
based on their terms, but on the educator’s terms. Continuing with the argument, then, if
there are interferences with their motivation to learn about something in particular,
meaning that they are learning about things that they may not have much interest, they
are restricted in an education based on their terms. The proponents of a loose guidance of
education would claim that there are indeed interferences with students’ motivations to
learn about something in particular if the curriculum is based on an external figure rather
than based on the students’ own terms. Therefore, there should not be interferences with
what the students want to learn.
This argument is not sound, however. I bring up four objections. First as there is
no structure in a loose guidance of education, students may not know what to do with this
information. If I simply learn Einstein’s famous equation E = mc2, I do not know what
the equation means, what it entails, why it is important, or how useful it is. A structure
helps the students see what the equation does and why they are learning the equation.
Moreover, having a structure means that the educator has to guide the student to help
reveal the meaning behind the equation rather than letting the students figure that out on
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their own. In other words, the students need a context for learning, which leads me to my
second objection.
The second objection is that having knowledge about something is not just an
isolated piece of data. There is always a context in where the data fits and where it can
lead. For example, one simply does not learn E = mc2. There is a context for that
equation, and so one must learn about mass, energy, and speeds at high velocities. One
will benefit by learning about the history as to why physicists at the time had trouble
explaining the physics of light and how Einstein’s equation was a culmination of that
history. Learning about this works under a structured format where the educator can
frame the context into a certain light and direct the students to a general picture. Without
the structure and context, the students will just see certain trees but miss the forest.
The third objection questions the idea that providing any structure means some
sort of interference. We can certainly have structure without interference. A good
educator will make sure that students receive the relevant information, but a slight
structure is necessary to make sure that the students receive the education. If the students
are off track, for example, the teacher must reign the students in so that the students gain
the proper information, learn how to be a proper listener to fellow students, or help the
students reveal more about the information by prodding the students to discover what
they may have missed if they learned it on their own accord. The structure is beneficial to
the students, and they can still have the motivations to learn about the material.
The way to help students see what the issues are can come from the educator,
which leads to my final, and most important, objection: sometimes people become
interested in a topic after the teacher brings it up as part of the discussion, and the student
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may not even realize that the issue could be categorized in thought unless it was given a
name. For example, when one is learning about different sexual orientations or about
different relationship preferences, one may get a clearer picture of who one is because the
teacher has brought up the topic. Someone can now say to oneself, “Oh, these feelings
and desires I have make sense because I am homosexual,” or “the feelings of ethical nonmonogamy have a personal connection to me because I learned what polyamory was.”
They may not even be aware or realize other possible ways of living without the teacher
mentioning other sexual or relationship values.
If people have inclinations to perform an activity, or their thoughts drift toward a
persistent desire, and these inclinations and desires are not part of the norm, then people
may immediately try to suppress or ignore them. Other times, people try to adhere to an
activity, but they do not feel at ease doing the activity because it does not feel right to
them, or they may feel restricted in their pleasures. They try to fit the mold of social
conventions and norms, but they do not feel comfortable doing so. If the cultural norms
restrict a group of people from doing a certain practice, but if they still have an
inclination to do the practice, then various people may have an inner conflict within and
they may not be able to express why. One example is same-sex relationships. PSE
displays heterosexual relationships as the defaulted norm and those who have same-sex
inclinations may feel left out of the conversation. They may feel like they do not fit in
with the rest of the group. Sometimes, the educators may stigmatize homosexuality,
which can make adolescents who are beginning to discover their homosexuality
alienated.32
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At other times, people may try to fit into the standard mold of sexual and gender norms and
expectations, but they may not feel like themselves, yet they cannot explain why because they do not have
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1.3. “Thin” Paternalism

There is a middle ground between “thick” paternalism and a loose guidance of education.
This middle ground is what I call “thin” paternalism. “Thin” paternalism values
adolescents having a sense of agency, thus giving them responsibility. And yet, they must
have a foundational structure to account for the social/political injustices that they are
missing since they may parrot heteronormative claims. A good sexuality education
program is not just learning about the theoretical content, but to also about learning the
practical skills. Agency is important here. After all, if young people want to learn about
how to avoid unwanted pregnancies and STIs, to properly break up with a person, or to
receive and give pleasure, then adolescents need to learn about and have a sense of
agency. To suggest that adolescents cannot give an account of what they want or prefer
suggests that their agency is limited. “Thick” paternalism does not value the agency of
the person. “Thin” paternalism has three features: first, the paternalism guides the student
to the directed goal of becoming a more educated person by being more aware of the
proper information, by learning how to be a proper listener to fellow students by
accepting and respecting various viewpoints, or by helping the students reveal what being
the language or terms to describe what they are feeling. The cultural and social environment is set up in
such a way where various activities and identities can readily be named and described. Various topics and
questions are not brought up because the norms of society have categorized various ideas but not others, or
at least legitimated some ideas but not others. “Homosexuality,” “heterosexuality,” and “bisexuality” are
terms that were invented in the late 1800s, and now these terms are readily used by virtually everyone in
the United States to describe their sexual orientation and their sexual identity. Other terms, however, are
fairly new and most people have not heard of these terms such as “polyamory” or “queer identity.” By
hearing these terms “in the open,” students may not even realize that a certain subject had a name, even if
students had various feelings that they did not fit in with the social circumstances. They may not even be
aware of the practice because society may favor various institutions over others (e.g. monogamy, marriage,
gender binaries), and the favored institutions are ingrained in the culture and social discourse that any
deviation from these favored institutions are either suppressed, not thought of, or felt as if they were
deviant for having non-favored desires. Without being familiar with the other topics, students may simply
acquiesce to the cultural norm: monogamous, heterosexual marriage-like relationships are the norm and
questioning those norms are either taboo or unthought of. In both cases, non-traditional inclinations and
ideas are silenced.
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healthy and overall well-being is rather than simply following their inclinations. In terms
of sex education, “thin” paternalism will help the students accept and respect various
sexual or relationship orientations and styles, or help the students reveal what a healthy
lifestyle is rather than simply following their inclinations. Therefore, sex education
should be a required class in public education to help the students reach this directed
goal. What makes this paternalism “thin,” however, is that the educator is not forcing the
students to have particular values, but is helping to guide the students discover what sort
of values the students have, honing in why the students already have the values they
have, or assisting them to change their values. While the students are required to take a
sex education class to have a fuller understanding of sexuality in a healthy way, it will
ultimately be the student’s choice to determine which values correspond to that student’s
identity.
There is a directed goal for sex education: the ideal is that students should be
taking care of the sexual self and students should best approach this ideal, which will be
explained in the fifth chapter. However, there are multiple ways to reach that goal based
on individual preferences, inclinations, fulfillment of needs, and desires. For example,
each individual may have different preferences for food but presumably individuals aim
to be healthy and different foods can objectively help achieve that goal.33 Moreover,
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In a way, my suggestion for sex education could be applied to other different kinds of classes.
For example, a university may require their students to take a philosophy class. The educator, however, can
structure the class where the students pick the various topics. Students may choose the topic based on an
initial idea of what the topic is. Subsequently, the educator designs the course based on what the students
wanted, but also makes sure that the students fulfill the requirements and course objectives in the syllabus.
If there happens to be a time where the student does not desire the rigorous work, the student effectively
can be reprimanded or have the grade lowered. Or if the student is making an invalid argument, the teacher
will intervene and correct the student, even if intervention is not comfortable. The goal, in this example, is
to help the student become a student, philosopher, and thinker and achieve the end of being a bit wiser.
What makes my example different than sex education is that students may not initially know what topics
there are in philosophy, so they may need more guidance. In contrast, students typically have many
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students may parrot social expectations and only say they have values when they really
feel otherwise. Therefore, a good instructor will not only help the students develop their
values, but also challenge their values as well.
The leads me to my second feature: when it comes to required classes which
include values, the values are going to vary from student to student. These different
values can still be good values to have, even if particular students do not personally
endorse them. And yet, the students can still acknowledge those values and understand
why particular people would hold specific values. With a plurality of values encouraged,
students may gain more insight into what they value, and also respect those who have
different values. A plurality of values, however, does not mean that anyone can hold any
value. The ultimate goal is for the students to take care of their sexual self which will
include autonomy, listening to others’ sexual and relationship needs and preferences, and
avoiding risky behavior. Thus, students must respect other students’ autonomy, critically
engage with other students, be aware of their desires and how acting on them can affect
others, avoid risky behavior (such as unwanted pregnancies or STIs), and also care for the
sexual self. Teachers, therefore, can still intervene, but this would not be interference
where the presumption is that there is only one good to achieve. Interference is not
acceptable; intervention is fine. Interference is when authoritative figures purposely
direct the agent toward a specific goal because the authoritative figure does so to benefit
the student irrespective of the students’ determination of their good. If the student has a
specific goal to aim toward that counters what the authoritative figure wants, then the
authoritative figure obstructs the student’s goals (either by saying the goal is wrong,

questions regarding sexuality because they have some idea of what sex and relationships are, but they want
more information.
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misguided, or unnecessary). Intervention, on the other hand, is when someone
constructively gets involved with a conflict or to enhance another to help that person
reach a goal of the one who is intervened. The educator may see many goals that the
student has, and if the student has trouble reaching the goal or may not realize what to do
with this information, the educator can guide the student by bringing up some ideas,
helping the student coming to terms with various feelings, and encouraging each student
to listen to other students’ concerns and values. Each student will have their own idea of
what their good is, even in a rudimentary form. The intervention is to help the students
hone in on what is considered a good sexual subject starting with their values, rather than
imposing values. This becomes important since students may not know what their values
are, but they might be found once they learn the material. Certain values can be reshaped,
however, or even critiqued if those values interfere with other’s autonomy, or diminishes
students’ flourishing for example. If students are not clear about their goals, or realize
what sort of goals to have, or changes goals in the process of being educated, the educator
can teach the basics of what a good sexual being ought to do: respect consent, take
responsibilities for their own actions, and respect other’s sexual values. Once the student
has these basics, then students may hone in and have specific values and aims. If they
change their mind, then the educator can accommodate that and even give the students
tools on how to deal with a change in their sexual values later in life.
The third feature of “thin” paternalism is to encourage the development of
autonomy. As children get older, they may obtain more responsibilities and more leeway
for making their own decisions. When they become adolescents, they may be given more
autonomy than when they were children. Applied to sex education, students ought to
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develop sexual autonomy, which has two features. The first is to understand that one can
self-determine what one does in the sexual realm, which not only means to follow one’s
sexual desires, but to understand that there are other self-determining beings in the world
and that these self-determining beings must also be respected. We can base this idea
simply on the Kantian notion that violating people’s autonomy is morally wrong.
Individuals cannot infringe on another’s sexual autonomy, meaning that all people
involved must consent to the sexual activities because that would be a moral violation.
The second feature of sexual autonomy is to not only recognize that one cannot infringe
on another person’s sexual autonomy, but to also give a positive account in which the
person(s) involved shows some sense of care and mutual respect for the other. For
example, instead of solely focusing on one’s own pleasure, one takes into account of the
other’s pleasure and mutually helps the other achieve this pleasure. If one person values
abstinence until marriage, then others ought to critically respect that decision. Likewise,
if one wants to avoid sexual infections, then one also makes sure to tell the other if one
has sexual infections so that one does not infect the other person. There are many more
examples, but the point is that the development of sexual autonomy and sexual selfhood
feeds into sexual flourishing, which in turn feeds into the development of sexual
autonomy and sexual flourishing. From here, we can see that the moral hard boundary is
consent. Infringing other people’s consent would be immoral.
The upshot is the teacher gives the course a structure. By doing so, the teacher
helps mold and shape the student. However, the key issue is in the way the course is
shaped. The teacher helps the students develop an understanding of sexual flourishing,
which includes risk assessment (discussed in chapter three), sexual autonomy (discussed
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in chapter four), and care for the sexual self (discussed in chapter five). Other than that,
the teacher does not give students specific values, but helps the students hone in on what
type of values they have and to recognize that other students may not share the same
values. “Thin” paternalism will be developed throughout the dissertation. As I progress
through these chapters, I endorse the benefits and eschew the problems of “thin”
paternalism. I will explain what these benefits and problems are as I discuss them in the
chapters, but for now, “thin” paternalism applied to sex education will endorse risk
assessment, developing autonomy, and enrichment of care for the sexual self. Beyond
these ethical prescriptions, however, the students’ values will vary.
In this dissertation, I am assuming and accepting “thin” paternalism as applied to
sex education. In this chapter and chapter two specifically, I reject and argue against
“thick” paternalism as applied to sex education. For simplicity, when I discuss PSE, I
mean to say “thick” PSE, and when I discuss paternalism, I mean to say “thick”
paternalism.

2. Characterizing Paternalism

There are many definitions of paternalism.34 Here are a few characteristics:
i.

X regards Y as incapable of making good decisions for herself.

ii.

X limits options as to what Y can do or sets up obstacles so that doing Z is harder
to obtain.

34

For a good overview of many definitions of paternalism, see Gerald Dworkin. “Defining
Paternalism,” in Paternalism: Theory and Practice. Ed. by Christian Coons and Michael Weber, 25-38.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
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iii.

X acts paternalistically for the sake of Y, meaning that the paternalistic act
somehow improves Y or it does not diminish Y.
Because autonomy is the default of human interaction, paternalism typically

needs to be justified to limit Y’s options. Applying these characteristics to sex education,
what are the justifications for paternalism?
For characteristic i: X may consider Y too immature to make decisions which
bear a lot of responsibility or where one should not make rash and risky behaviors. One
possibility is that X may have a broader view of what an adult life is like, whereas Y has
only a limited view. Thus, X believes she has a better grasp than Y of Y’s ends, values,
and/or interests. Keeping this in mind, X believes she is justified in being paternalistic
towards Y because X has some expertise in determining which actions to take and Y
lacks life experiences, which may contribute to making mistaken choices. The expertise
can be about the topic (in this case, sex) or on about deliberation (i.e., X’s superior
deliberative powers).
For characteristic ii: X may inhibit Y from doing certain activities by using legal
means, revoking privileges, restricting Y’s space to move about, or restricting
information that Y could potentially obtain.
For characteristic iii: X acts paternalistically presumably for benevolent purposes,
to help Y. But what does it mean to “improve” Y? There are three possibilities: (1)
improving Y could mean to restrict Y to make sure does not engage in immoral behavior,
which usually means that Y does not go against traditional norms of society, such as
sexual, gender, and relational norms. (2) acting paternalistically toward Y could mean to
improve Y’s moral well-being. If Y were to engage in the risky activity, there is a
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possibility that Y’s well-being would be diminished or Y’s moral character could be
corrupted. Finally, (3) improving Y could mean improving Y’s circumstances and
making sure that the risky activity does not hinder Y’s opportunities. The next section
will go over (1). The next chapter will talk about (2) and (3) by looking at paternalistic
reasons through various ethical theories.

3. Paternalistic Grounds for the Immorality of Adolescent Sexuality
Based on Breaking Social Norms

The proponent of PSE may defend PSE by arguing why any other form of sexuality
would be wrong. Different forms of sexuality would be wrong simply because they break
social norms such as being in a monogamous, heterosexual, two-parent married
household. Therefore, any premarital, same-sex, or single-parent or multiple-parent
sexuality or relationship framework is wrong. Because same-sex relations are becoming
more and more acceptable and are now legal in the United States, I will not focus on that
issue. Rather, there are three issues that proponents of PSE consider threatening if
adolescent sexuality were to become prevalent which will have a subsection for each
issue: non-traditional families, poverty, and premarital sex.
3.1. Adolescent sexuality threatens to undermine an important social institution: the
traditional, nuclear family
For our purposes, the traditional nuclear family is defined as a heterosexual, legally
married couple plus their dependent children. The starting point is that gender differences
are natural and that traditional gender norms are essential to have healthy individuals,
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families, communities, and states.35 These traditional gender roles mean that men are
meant to be leaders, active, aggressive, and strong. Females are meant to be passive,
quiet, sexualized, and weak. In a religious context, the norms give forth a basis in which
the man is the leader of the household and the woman is meant to be his subordinate
helpmate. The children are under control of the parents.36
The community is supposed to follow these standards because without them the
foundation of the community is lost and, hence, the foundation of society would be lost.
Familialism is designed to keep social order without which there will be chaos; and
civilization will be, at best, regressed, or at worst, fallen. If these features are the goal of
PSE, then one entailment is that PSE endorses the nuclear family as the normative family.
Thus, proponents claim that the basis of sexual education is that the traditional family is
an institution of major importance to the well-being of society. Therefore, the school has
a responsibility to import the value of a traditional model of the family, and upholding
this model means teaching that one should not engage in sex until marriage. Proponents
of PSE argue that any sexuality that does not fall into these norms is not only deviant, but
socially destructive. If this destruction becomes widespread, it can befall not only to the
wrong-doer, but to society and the nation. Sex education, through this argument, is meant
to preserve social stability. Anything less than familialism is seen as a promiscuous
lifestyle that goes against the familial foundation.37 The way out of this problem is to
teach young people correct values and morals—which is what PSE offers—in order to
35
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restore the social framework and to cure “social ills.” The intention, then, of the
paternalistic model is not primarily to offer public education on health, but a moral
education.
We can see these ideas being promulgated in various sex educational teaching
curricula such as Choosing the Best JOURNEY which promotes one type of relationship:
marriage. In one example, the curriculum presents a story of Jerome and Ashley, two
young adults who had known each other in high school and had ran into each other “after
taking jobs in the same city.” Eventually, they started having “a whirlwind of romantic
weekends together” and “sexual involvement.” Two months later, they decided to get
engaged. Eventually, they get married but Ashley is disappointed because Jerome would
rather go to sports bars and hang out with his friends rather than “cultural stuff” like
museums and plays, things that Ashley likes.
The point of this story suggests that Ashley and Jerome’s particulars in the
relationship came about in the wrong order. Their order was attraction, hanging out, first
dates, sex, get married, discover compatibility, then discover character. The author
suggests that the appropriate order would have been attraction, hanging out, having their
first date, discovering compatibility, discovering character, getting married, then
engaging in sex. Moreover, the curriculum suggests that the sex distracted the people in
the relationship so as to not realize that they were actually incompatible. Moreover, they
could have been compatible in all kinds of ways and fundamentally sexually
incompatible which they would not have discovered until after they got married.38
Choosing the Best JOURNEY also references sexual activity and relationships as
male-female couples. A particular lesson on “Developing the Best Relationships” starts
38

I thank Dr. Jones for bringing this to my attention.

46

with videos about heterosexual couples. The lesson then asks students “what qualities
were these young people looking for in relationships with the opposite sex?” Students are
then divided into separate groups of guys and girls and the instructor is told to “Ask the
guy group to write down the top five qualities they are looking for in a girl and what they
think the girls are coming up with [top five qualities they are looking for in a boy].”39
There is no room for those who are attracted to member of the same sex, or those who
may be bisexual. By not being inclusive, the curriculum has a bias against those who are
attracted to members of the same-sex.
The curriculum only sponsors one type of relationship and values only one route
to get there. Many people, however, form different types of relationships and different
routes to get there. Some people do want to get married, others want to remain single.
Some people want to date around until they finally settle on someone, others simply want
to date simply for the sake of dating. The ways on how people have relationships are
multifaceted and do not reflect what is given in Choose the Best JOURNEY. There are
many ways to achieve a relationship and the nuclear-family norms should not be
endorsed as the only legitimate type of relationship.
Is there any merit that other alternative familial structures do not work? This
question is analogous to Mill’s question in The Subjection of Women. In that work, a
possible rebuttal against Mill is that social patriarchy is the best out of alternative options.
Here is Mill’s response:
the opinion in favour of the present system, which entirely subordinates the
weaker sex to the stronger, rests upon theory only; for there never has been trial
made of any other: so that experience, in the sense in which it is vulgarly opposed
to theory, cannot be pretended to have pronounced any verdict. And in the second
39
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place, the adoption of this system of inequality never was the result of
deliberation, or forethought, or any social ideas, or any notion whatever of what
conduced to the benefit of humanity or the good order of society.40
In other words, how can we know that social patriarchy is the best unless we have tried
the alternatives? If we say that out of all the theories, we pick the social patriarchal
theory, then we must have looked at other theories to compare it with. Mill points out,
however, that no alternative social hierarchies, such as placing women above men, have
been tried to see which organization of society maximizes the happiness of society. We
have never had these options in history so we cannot say that other options are wrong if
they have never been tried.41
Likewise, we cannot know which familial structure is the best unless we have
looked at the other options. Indeed, there may not simply be “the best” for that implies a
hierarchy of which familial structures are deemed worthy and valuable which are not.
The proponents of PSE may be thinking that sex outside of marriage could result in
unwanted pregnancies, which could increase the abortion rate or single parentage. Since a
child is more successful if raised by two parents, being raised by a single parent will be
more challenging for the child. Indeed, the child will have more obstacles and burdens
because the single parent may not have the time or dedication toward the child. This can
have a psychological effect on the child which could make adulthood unsuccessful.
However, we would have to investigate the other options and then we can determine
which is the best, and look at the psychological effects it has on the child. Luckily, we
have some empirical data to investigate alternative familial structures.
40
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While single parenting has many challenges, sociologist Bella DePaulo has
analyzed the arguments regarding single parenthood and finds them flawed. Rather than
putting the blame of social ills on single parents, one should look for families that are
filled with aggression, conflict and unsupportive, cold, and neglectful relationships.42 The
strain can be debilitating in families, but the problem stems from poverty, not from the
fact that a child was raised in a single household. As DePaulo puts it, “[i]f you really
want to help children, go after poverty, not single parenting.”43 Thus, she regards the
blame on single parents as an unfounded stigma. It is as if proponents of PSE are taking
the traditional family as the default normative family. But why is the traditional family
considered so important for proponents of PSE? Is it holding onto a nostalgic form of the
family? Is it because the traditional family is considered the best type of family and the
alternatives fall short? DePaulo argues that holding onto the traditional nuclear family is
simply holding onto the structure of the family without considering what is taking place
within that structure. She notes that with everything being equal, a study of thirty-nine
nations found that children were emotionally better off if they were raised by a single
mother rather than staying in a home with two married parents who were constantly
fighting. Children also did better if they were raised by a divorced parent rather than
being raised remarried parents, even if there were no major conflicts between the
remarried parents.44 Contrary to what proponents of PSE state, there can be stability in
single parent homes or homes that do not have the traditional familial structure.
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Overall, holding onto the traditional nuclear family and embracing traditional
gender roles feeds into a main problem that been a thread through this dissertation:
heteronormativity. Embracing traditional gender roles is an essential component of
heteronormativity. By embracing the ideals of the nuclear family, the norms include
holding onto traditional gender norms. Holding onto traditional norms feeds into
heteronormativity. Thus, embracing the ideals of the nuclear family would not only feed
into heteronormativity, but heteronormativity would also embrace the ideals of the
nuclear family. The two ideas are part of the structure to keep both ideals in place.
We can see this expressed in many PSE curricula. In Choosing the Best
JOURNEY, the curriculum presents the stereotypical view that men desire casual sex
from any woman whereas women only agree to sexual activity to obtain love. In a section
entitled, “Avoiding Relational Traps,” one young woman remarks: “I thought sex equaled
love…so if we had sex, then we must be in love. I had the emotional tie, but he didn’t.”45
Later in the curriculum, a story of Ashanta and Terrell, a high school couple, had a
relationship where at the beginning “the dates were fun and innocent. They went to the
movies, walked around the mall and he even took her on a picnic. However, by the fourth
date it was clear that Terrell had other things on his mind.”46 There is no challenge to this
stereotype, nor a way to show how these stereotypes can affect all types of relationships.
These stereotypes make the presumption that this is the only way to interact with
different genders. If it is the only way, then it is the normal way. Those who do not fit
within the gender binary will be left out of the discourse; the stereotypes can limit and
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influence people’s behavior by displaying behavior that they think is appropriate, or they
may expect certain behavior from others.
So why is the nuclear family the best type of family according to the paternalists?
Their answer seems to be negative: because the alternative frameworks are immoral.47
The traditional roles are what is best according to this line of thinking. However, is there
any justification for these traditional roles as exclusive, or is it because that is simply
what they value? Luker answers this question nicely:
the debate over sex education is really a debate about sex and marriage, and that
debates about sex and marriage are also debates about gender, about how men and
women (and boys and girls) should relate to one another, sexually and otherwise.
This brings me to my immodest proposal, bound to offend both sides. Since the
debate about sex education gets its passion from deeply felt ideas about gender,
and women’s roles in particular, why not tell young people that? Why not put the
hidden agenda on the table and tell young people and their parents that Americans
today hold two very different views about sexuality, views rooted in very
different notions of the relationship of sexuality to marriage? Bringing marriage
back into the conversation means addressing views about the nature of gender and
about women’s roles…the debate about sex education is a debate about whether
the gender and sexual revolutions of the 1960s and 1970s have not entirely
fulfilled their promises or were based on empty promises to begin with. Where
you stand on this issue marks you as what I have called a sexual liberal or a
sexual conservative.48
As Luker notes, embracing traditional gender roles may not be about what gender
naturally is (which I will cover in the next chapter), but about what people think gender
ought to be. In that sense, if embracing traditional gender roles simply comes down to
what people value, then it is another way of uncritically embracing heteronormativity.
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3.2. Having out-of-wedlock babies is correlated with poverty

There is another unwanted consequence that proponents of PSE have to offer: poverty.
Proponents of PSE point out that more out of wedlock babies will lead more people into
poverty.49 Since adolescents are usually unmarried, proponents of PSE argue that it is
best for adolescents not to be engaged in sexual activity.
It is true that there is a correlation between teen births and poverty.50 Worse still,
children raised in impoverished conditions have a higher likelihood of getting pregnant as
teens themselves. However, this correlation does not mean that we know whether
premarital sex is the cause or the effect. Proponents of PSE would argue that teenage
births would cause poverty. Yet, how do we know it is not the other way around? Indeed,
there is some evidence suggesting that poverty is not the effect but the cause. “Rather
than teen pregnancy leading to a life of poverty, the evidence shows that poverty comes
first.”51 Poor adolescents who bear a child are poor before, rather than because of, the
pregnancy. Early childbearing in poor communities may not be abandonment of the
values of responsible parenting but an expression of them under adverse conditions.52
Indeed, recent data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth also showed that a
teen mother is no more likely to participate in welfare programs, have her labor market
earnings reduced, or experience significant losses in spousal earnings than if she was not
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to get pregnant.53 It is possible that their participation and earnings may have been greater
if they did not get pregnant, but the argument from the proponents of PSE claim that
adolescents who bear a child causes poverty whereas the evidence suggests otherwise.
Having higher earnings may help them somewhat to get out of poverty but the route to do
that is to fix the social inequalities of society and not simply teach young people to
remain abstinent.
The proponents of PSE could respond by saying that if we allow adolescents to
engage in sex, this will increase the likelihood of out-of-wedlock pregnancy which could
result in single mothers having children. This, in turn, will lead to poverty because single
mothers will use up their resources faster than her peers in order to keep the new infant
somewhat stable and alive. However, studies have shown that single-motherhood does
not lead to poverty. In fact, single-parenting did not have a huge negative effect on
children. Rather, growing up in a low-income household had a larger negative impact.54
Perhaps the proponent of PSE is worried that an adolescent having a baby while
in school will inhibit her chances of graduating, and thereby make her likely to drop out.
However, sociological evidence shows that a female student already at high risk of
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dropping out is more likely to become pregnant. Indeed, “the majority of girls who give
birth while still in school are at the bottom academic quartile of their class before they
become pregnant.”55 From an economic point of view, economists Melissa S. Kearney
and Phillip B. Levine have suggested that income inequality is a major component as to
why many teens become pregnant. The reasoning is that “income inequality is associated
with a lack of economic opportunity and heightened social marginalization.”56 Moreover,
poor outcomes are a continuation of a low economic trajectory. Indeed, being in an
environment where there is limited economic and social advancement can lead young
women having babies outside of marriage.57 Sociologists Mary Patrice Erdman and
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Timothy Black concur that the assumption of gaining social mobility and acquire
resources to raise children only if they postpone having children is false:
In the past 30 years, however, the so-called opportunity structure has been torn
asunder by dramatic increases in economic inequality, the redistribution of
income and wealth upward, the retrenchment in public expenditures and social
welfare, and the restructuring of the tax burden away from the wealthy and
corporations. Recent mobility studies indicate that movement across income
groups, particularly at the higher and lower ends, has become more stagnant in the
United States.58
Indeed, their qualitative research focuses on young teen’s life and their experiences
before they became pregnant and they all were victims of structural inequality that
manifest through gender, class, and racial hierarchies.
“Those embracing the ‘up and out’ model of poverty ignore the ‘stickiness’ of
being located at the bottom of the income ladder” and that “large numbers of people at
the bottom of the class structure cannot and will not ever achieve economic stability. If
poor women have little chance of going to college, getting married, and securing a wellpaying job, then the proscription to wait is a de facto statement to stop reproducing.”59
Sex educators rarely talk about the issues of choice and social context. To fight teenage
pregnancy, closing the income gap seems to be the appropriate action according to the
latest studies.60 This is not to say there are no negative consequences of having a child so
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young, but many scholars now admit that the age of the young mother is not the most
significant factor.61 Ermans and Black contend that
[Teen mothers’] opportunities were cut short by child sexual abuse, impoverished
neighborhoods, undiagnosed illnesses, and inadequately funded schools—all of
which preceded the early births. Every one of the costs of early childbirth to the
mother, the child, and the taxpayer corresponds to the costs of an economic and
social system that creates and exacerbates inequality. And while researchers point
out that our teen birth rates, while declining, are still significantly higher than they
are in comparable countries, it is also the case that the level of inequality in the
United States is greater than in those countries. The focus on adolescent mothers
serves merely to distract us from more systemic problems that will not be solved
by a campaign to prevent teen pregnancy.62
To solve the cycle of teenage pregnancy in impoverished circumstances, we must change
and dissolve those that keep the structures of poverty in place.
3.3. There is a problem with adolescent sexuality

Finally, we come across an argument that suggests that adolescent sexuality is a problem
itself. In other words, the proponents might argue that there is something inherently
wrong with adolescent sexuality. However, I argue there is nothing inherently wrong with
adolescent sexuality, rather the problem is socially and culturally informed; it is not in the
nature of adolescent sexuality as proponents claim.
Looking at three countries specifically (the Netherlands, Germany, and France),
researchers found that these countries looked at adolescent sexuality from a health angle
rather than as a moral issue.63 These other countries also saw adolescents as responsible
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and expected adolescents to behave responsibly, that is, adults viewed these adolescents
not as overgrown children, but as emerging adults who are expected to take on more
responsibilities as they mature.64 They are empowered to have information about
sexuality to make better decisions. Thus, these other countries view adolescent sexuality
as part of life, not as a problem.
If we look at the Netherlands specifically, sociologist Amy T. Schalet provides a
cross-cultural study between American and Dutch adolescents. The common narrative
surrounding American adolescents is that adolescent sexuality is seen as hormonal,
impulsive, and irrational where there is a noted external peer pressure, especially from
males to females. This discourse is not the case in Dutch culture. The Dutch culture
emphasizes that sexuality is normal—gewoon, a Dutch word that means “normal”
“ordinary,” “acceptable,” and especially in the context of sexuality, without any notion of
shame or discomfort. Instead of sexuality being seen as impulsive and hormone-filled, the
Dutch culture sees adolescent sexuality as a result of a romantic connection, where
adolescent sexuality is already relationship-based. Americans, by contrast, are typically
skeptical of adolescents falling in love because the construction of the adolescent is seen
as “dangerous, conflicted, and deeply polarized.”65
Finally, American adults typically do not see others—especially adolescents—as
proper sexual beings unless they are fully autonomous, meaning having less parental
control and being mature, which would also entail having less parental control in the first
place.66 Autonomy, therefore, entails that one is legitimately sexual. The more authority
one has over an adolescent, the less autonomy—and therefore, the less sexuality—the
64
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adolescent has. Since adolescents are not legitimately sexual, their sexuality is regulated
by the parents. The Dutch culture, however, sees adolescents as self-regulating sexual
actors. Dutch adolescents engage in sexual activity when they feel that they are ready and
that they are aware of potential risks and taking precautions to mitigate those risks. Thus,
Dutch culture emphasizes sexual self-knowledge through sex education, and give
adolescents the opportunity to plan ahead and to be responsible. The culture encourages
adolescents to be prepared by offering them readily stigma-free contraception and
encouraging them to visit their family doctors, who also provides contraception to
adolescents. 67
From what was stated above, the problem of how one treats adolescent sexuality
is cultural. There really is no a priori “problem” with adolescents; the problem is how
one views adolescents, which suggests that the narrative of impulsive sexuality is a
cultural phenomenon and not simply a biological explanation. The hormonal discourse
makes parents and schools restrict adolescent sexuality rather than acknowledge or
normalize adolescent sexuality. With this discourse comes the idea that adolescents may
engage in sex out of irrational desire or external pressure. In situations where one treats
adolescents as having no full competence or autonomy, where one sees adolescents as
inferior in order to have an unfair advantage over them, such a view is what Flasher has
termed “adultism.”68 Adultism is the view that because adults have authority over
children, their power gives them an unfair advantage, which results in the adults
considering themselves superior in skills, virtues, and talents. Any minor is seen as
inferior until she reaches adult age and not as a unique, competent being. Typically,
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adultist behavior results in overprotecting the adolescent where the adolescent is not
encouraged to think, act, or talk on her own. If adolescents are seen as more autonomous
and in control of their own sexuality, then a culture is produced where adolescent
sexuality is something that is a given and not a problem to be solved. The comparison of
American and Dutch culture point out the idea, as Schalet points out, that “teenage
sexuality…is the product of our cultural constructs and institutions.”69 Of course,
adultism can take many modes.
PSE discourses deny access and information to youths about contraception, sexual
diversity, or sexual pleasure and they are replaced with inaccuracies.70 If they cannot
have access to sexual information, they may not be able to think critically in an informed
way, or they may be taken advantage of.
When it comes to sexuality, the PSE position looks questionable as I have shown
throughout this chapter. If, however, proponents still support PSE but cannot offer any
justification for it, I suggest they are being adultist with regards to adolescent sexual
behavior and will not allow the adolescent to gain autonomy as they develop. “While
they [the adults] might best constructively help a child modify his or her potentials and
directions when indicated, it is adultist when they use that extra power to mold a child
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Schalet, 3.
Some of the examples of the inaccuracies taken from Laurie Mintz. “Abstinence-Only Sex Ed:
Harmful? Unethical?” Psychology Today. September 5, 2017. (Accessed February 14, 2019.)
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/stress-and-sex/201709/abstinence-only-sex-ed-harmfulunethical:
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Programs are scientifically flawed.
●
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●
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●
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●
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●
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●
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with whom they come into contact in their own image.”71 This argument is not saying
that adults should not take charge over children; rather, adults should not abuse their
power even if they take charge. There is a difference between being authoritative and
being authoritarian. The former means to take charge and to direct, yet allowing those
being charged to have responsibilities and duties for self-direction (what I would call
“thin” paternalism); the latter means to have full charge and direction where those being
charged have no say in the matter (what I could call “thick” paternalism). In other words,
the adultist is authoritarian by abusing their power. PSE, in the way I have defined it, has
an authoritarian streak. But to teach adolescents properly, the adults in charge of the class
must be authoritative in that they must correct the students on misinformation, but the
adults should not withhold information.
To put a limit on a really strict, authoritarian style, we would have to show some
reasons why strict, authoritarian parenting could inhibit the children. One study shows
children who have parents that are authoritative, meaning that they have certain
guidelines but these are communicated to the children and the children are able to give
input with the decision-making process, reported more positive outcomes through their
adolescence than if parents were authoritarian. If the parents have a more authoritarian
style of parenting, meaning that the parents set strict rules and boundaries without any
input or negotiation from the children, then this leads to more developmental problems
for the children, including risky sex.72
How adults treat their children could be seen in the different cultural views
between the US and Europe. Even if parents still have authority over the adolescents, the
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adolescents have the right to be heard if they feel that the parents do not have good
justification for their paternalism. Both parents and adolescents will benefit by listening
to each other and understanding what interests the other has.

4. Advantages and Disadvantages of PSE

By looking at various arguments for PSE, I have shown that PSE has many flaws and
should be rejected. PSE instills a top-down approach of instilling values into the students,
which does not completely work because the students are not critically engaged in what
sort of values they want or have. The discourse involved in the thick paternalistic model
of PSE is to inculcate certain sexual values, beliefs, and practices into the students, and
prepare them to fit the social and civic sexual conventions of society. Moreover, the
assumption behind PSE is that sex and gender are fixed polar opposites of male and
female, and these fixed genders are natural where certain gender norms are essential for a
healthy couple. Anything different than the “traditional” gender norm is considered a
pathology or a mistake. The teachings of PSE are always located within a heterosexual,
reproductive model and within marriage. In other words, PSE is monogamous and
heteronormative. Any sexual desire is only appropriate expressed within marriage.
Pleasure and eroticism are ignored, and the main focus is abstinence until marriage,
otherwise people are harming themselves or society.
Despite all this, there are two benefits to gain from the paternalistic model: the
people involved in sexual practices are viewed as relational in that there is a mutual
reciprocated shared self rather than atomistic individuals where they are solely looking at
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their own egoistic ends. The second benefit of the model is adolescents need to have
guidance in their sexual education. I will go over them in each subsection.
4.1. Paternalistic View of the Self

Instead of seeing people as just purely isolated individuals, we can see that our actions do
affect other people. Unless we are living like hermits, we are connected with other
people, especially in a sexual context. If we start with the idea that we are in a
relationship73 with others, then we can see that the sexual partner is not just there to have
sex with, but is part of a mutual and reciprocal shared experience, whatever the sexual
experience may be. One benefit of PSE is that it emphasizes a relationship with another
person as relational rather than as interactions between two atomistic individuals. This
view of seeing two separate individuals, usually called the “atomistic” view, states that
individuals are like atoms: individual beings who are completely autonomous from one
another. The self is like an atom: it is self-contained and independent of other atoms. It is
an autonomous individual with its own unique inner qualities. The things I go through,
the people I meet, and things I witness can touch and move me. They can also injure and
hurt me. But the real me, the core of my self, can always rise above these and remain
independent and different from all that it meets.
According to this view, then, the real me is internally self-contained and
independent of externalities. I can discover this self by thinking and looking within. I am
the only one who can judge who and what I am. And most importantly, I do not need
others to be who I really am. We look at other people as “everyone else,” as an “abstract
73

By relationship, I mean the way how people regard and behave toward one another and not
necessarily an emotional and sexual bond between the people.

62

other.” People define themselves in terms of “internal” characteristics: features of
individual personality, private beliefs, desires, and aspirations. Our conception of a self is
both internal and individualistic: the modern individual is defined in terms of the interior
self.
The overall problem with this theory is how one interacts with others. The
atomistic self implies that we have to deal with “abstract others.” Yet, we do not concern
ourselves with “abstract others.” The “others” are not just “everyone else.” Rather, they
are actual people for whom we have actual feelings and have real ties. Thus, we cannot
just be individuals atomistically; we are people who have ties to our parents, our families,
and our friends. When we think about our relationships, we do not think of them as a one
separate individual that may merely interact with me. Rather, there is a mutual
relationship, a dynamic self-development. The self, then, is social, not individualistic.
Our sociable experience tells us that when we engage with others, our interactions form a
connection that may last even when we are no longer interacting with each other. We are
not just simply part of a world where we happen to see others and we form contracts.
Rather, we are part of a social world where we have social roles, institutions, and various
systems in place. The social world can enhance the people, or unfortunately they can be
oppressive. They can range from friends, sexual encounters, acquaintances, enemies, or
even people we have briefly met. It is not as if when we see them again, we just merely
pick up where we left off. The history that we have formed with other people creates an
interactive mutual subject, an intersubjectivity.74 It is a relationship of mutuality in which
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self and other both express intersubjectivity. So rather than a closed self, such as the
atomistic view where there are autonomous boundaries, the self is open and the
boundaries form a connection with others.
Since the self is relational rather than an isolated atom, we can easily explain how
the self is the center of a vast web of relationships with family, community, nation, and
the world. One’s moral duties shift as one adopts various roles in life, of which there will
always be several in accordance with one’s various relationships with different people. I
am who I am because of my relationships with other people. Thus, to see who I am, I do
not merely engage in introspection, but I see who I am through my dependence on my
relationships with other people.
Applying this to the sexual domain, most of our emotional and psychological
needs can only be met through relationships. For the most part, we do not learn how to
care for others through rules or rewards and punishments. Instead, we care by actively
participating in caring relationships. The same should be true with sexual relationships.
Notice that with the atomistic self, we view others as an independent atomistic individual:
I surmise that this person is similar to me because I use myself as the standard of what the
self is. However, I do not see any fundamental connection between myself and another
person. This could be disastrous in some sexual relationships. If the feelings mismatch,
the atomistic self would try to investigate (by looking within) and surmise that one’s own
feelings are correct and that the other is misguided. If there is any connection between the
people involved, the connection is where the sexual partners try to show some sort of
concern for the other’s sexual interests and attending to the other’s desires.
sadism, masochism, indifference, or hate. Nevertheless, he cannot deny that there is still an intersubjectivity
even if it is negative. In terms of interacting with others, forming an intersubjective identity can be fruitful
(such as Aristotle or Heidegger), but it can also be detrimental and become “hell” (as Sartre mentions).
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On the other hand, viewing the self as relational instead of atomistic gives
important notions of engaging with someone sexually so that one can be in tune with the
sexual partner, rather than simply surmising what the other wants. One would get a feel
of the other by not looking from within, but by being with the other person. In the
atomistic view, there is no connection; there is, instead, a person alongside another
person. Ann Cahill describes how sexual interactions are intersubjective and that sexual
agency emerges from interactions with others:
A robustly intersubjective sexual interaction is imbued with each person’s sexual
agency, while at the same time it constructs that sexual agency (not from scratch,
of course; but the interaction makes a contribution, whether slight or substantial,
to the ongoing becoming of that agency). A sexual subject does not merely have
sexual agency prior to any given sexual interaction, as a kind of freestanding
capacity or resource; rather, both the existence and the quality of that sexual
agency emanates from sexual (and other) interactions….For me, agency in
general is both deeply embodied (and thus profoundly affected by bodily
interactions with other subjects, specific environments, objects, and discourses of
inequality) and fundamentally, not peripherally, intersubjective. Agency, then,
always occurs in the context of overlapping relationships with a wide range of
entities.75
Cahill’s description suggests that our subjectivity is not a given, but socially informed.
To give a case study of this, Schalet gives varying differences on how American and
Dutch culture view “individualism”—another way in which to describe autonomy—
which, in turn, plays a role in how they regard sexuality. For example, Americans regard
individuality as adversarial: the way to gain full self-sufficiency is to live on one’s own,
which many adolescents and adults endorse. Therefore, parents regard their adolescent
children as needing external control since most adolescents live with their adult parents.
Dutch culture, on the other hand, regards individuality as interdependent: they presume a
mutual dependence of individual and relationships, which makes fostering autonomy a
75
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matter of encouraging self-determination and self-regulation within ongoing but changing
relationships of interdependence, maintained through consultation.
How do these different ideas of individuality play a role with decision-making
and being an adult? In American culture, parents see their adolescent children as not
having self-control of their inner passions and external peer pressure can be
overwhelming.76 Thus, external control from the parents is necessary. Becoming an adult
requires attaining economic and emotional self-sufficiency, which is measured by making
one’s parents superfluous. Dutch parents, however, assume that young people can and
will control their alcohol intake and that drinking is within the context of participating in
social conventions. Dutch parents measure adulthood for financial and emotional selfregulation to hold one’s own and express oneself within a sociality.77 With this case
study, the Dutch community has a stronger sense of relational autonomy than American
culture, which suggests that the Dutch has a healthier view of sexuality and the mutual
interdependence than our American counterparts.
4.2. Guiding the Sexual Adolescent

The second benefit of PSE suggests that students need guidance in their sex education.
While the paternalists’ intentions are in the right place, the aim is misguided. First, they
offer ways to help the adolescents improve their well-being. However, the reach is going
too far. Adolescents need the tools to understand what it means to be a healthy individual
for the sake of being healthy. Adolescents do need direction because they are
experiencing complex emotions and pressures from their culture, but rather than shutting
76
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down those emotions, the proper guidance is to help them understand their emotions. At
the very least, people can be aware of the emotion and see what this emotion means. If
people learn that simply having this emotion is bad, then adolescents may learn that
having this emotion makes them a bad person. Thus, people should start with
investigating the emotions and see what having that emotions means, which does not
mean that they should act on their emotions, but by the same token, this also does not
mean to suppress the emotion either. Whatever the case may be, investigating the
emotions is a starting point on the sexual development of adolescents. By allowing
adolescents to be aware of their emotions and not shutting them down, they will slowly
understand what it is like to be a sexual subject without sexual activity and that these
feelings do have legitimacy.
These are only some small advantages to the paternalistic model. However, there
are many flaws such that it starts with the assumption that all forms of adolescent sexual
behavior and premarital sex are morally suspect. Of course, there are many ways the
paternalist could suggest how we could improve the adolescent’s welfare through other
means. In the next chapter, I will investigate what these other means are by looking at
various ethical theories and how the proponent of PSE could use these ethical theories to
justify PSE.
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Paternalistic Sex Education

In the previous chapter, I framed paternalism through a certain scope and principle. The
scope was distinguishing between “thick” and “thin” paternalism and I framed PSE as
“thick” paternalism while embracing “thin” paternalism. The principle of paternalism
was to improve Y’s moral well-being by making sure Y follows the traditional societal
norms. In this chapter, I continue to argue that PSE is a flawed sex education program by
looking at various ethical theories proponents of PSE could use as justification: new
natural law, deontological, consequentialist, and virtue ethics. Each of these justifications
are flawed because PSE not only intrinsically denies adolescents accurate sexual
information but also because it socially governs and endorses heteronormativity.
Additionally, I analyze “thick” paternalism and offer a charitable reconstruction
of various arguments for it as applied to sex education in PSE-type programs. To evaluate
this, I look at the states with the highest rates of teen pregnancy:78 New Mexico, Texas,
Mississippi, Arkansas, and Oklahoma.79 These states all use an abstinence-only program
supplemented with various curricula for their particular PSE program. By going through
their curricula, I extract a moral theory from their PSE program and argue that these
ethical considerations to formulate PSE are not adequate.
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I understand that teen pregnancies do not necessarily lead to a non-flourishing life either for the
child or for the teenaged parents. However, many studies show that most teenage parents have to put a hold
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In section 1, I will analyze New Natural Law arguments for PSE. What makes
New Natural Law arguments complex is that it shares many features with “thick” and
“thin” paternalism. What makes New Natural Law arguments “new” is that they amend
and somewhat depart from previous natural law theorists, such as St. Thomas Aquinas.80
I will refute the “thickness” in section 1 by refuting specific New Natural Law’s
arguments for PSE by showing why they fail. Next, I will investigate deontological
considerations for PSE and argue that they are inadequate in section 2. Then in section 3,
I will investigate consequentialist considerations for PSE and argue that they are
inadequate, too. Finally, I will investigate virtue ethical considerations for PSE and argue
they are inadequate as well in section 4. In order for me to adequately extract the moral
theories from PSE, I use case studies of various PSE programs in the United States.

1. New Natural Law Considerations

Among other applications, New Natural Law (NNL) theorists like Robert P. George and
Pope Francis have argued that sex outside of a heterosexual marriage is wrong since sex
does not fulfill their notion of the basic good of marriage, which is a complementary
union.81 Thus, any expression of sexual desire outside of marriage is only an illusory
80
Cf. Raja Halwani. Philosophy of Love, Sex, and Marriage: An Introduction. Second Edition.
(NY: Routledge, 2018), 330.
81
This is not to say that there are philosophers and thinkers who argue for a strict sexual ethic. For
example, Immanuel Kant and the New Natural Law theorists argue that sexual behavior is only morally
proper when (1) it is done within the confines of marriage, and (2) it is procreative. However, the focus of
this dissertation will not be on when sexual behavior is morally proper—although that will be a peripheral
issue; rather, the focus is on what type of sexual education is proper. Indeed, John Finnis, a New Natural
Law theorist, allows sexual behavior within the two conditions mentioned above, but not through the law.
Governments should maintain a society “conducive to virtue” but governments may not coerce virtue or
punish vice through criminal law. Furthermore, in 1996, Finnis argued that the United States Supreme
Court should overturn criminal prosecutions of private homosexual acts in Bowers v. Hardwick,
distinguishing these private acts from public promotions of homosexual activity. In a way, Finnis has a
stance that is similar to the “don’t ask, don’t tell” stance adopted by the military in the United States until it
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good. However, my concern is what proponents of NNL say about sex education. In the
first subsection (1.1), I examine the curriculum of different schools using New Natural
Law Theory as their foundation for sex education classes in order to investigate their
learning outcomes, the values the educators presume, and the reasons behind their claims.
In the second subsection (1.2), I look at various philosophers who sponsor sex education
from New Natural Law Theory and analyze their claims. In the end, I argue their
justifications fail.
1.1. Case Study: Curricula from New York, Fort-Wayne-South Bend, Lincoln, and
Pittsburgh

Several Roman Catholic schools throughout the United States have roughly the same sex
education curriculum in what they teach, their learning outcomes, and the reasoning
behind their claims. They all presume New Natural Law Theory as their assumed ethic.
Indeed, Fort Wayne-South Bend in Indiana explicitly stated their foundation is on the
natural law, since it dictates morality. Perhaps the first thing to notice at these schools is
their description of chastity. All of the curricula describe chastity to mean all forms of
sexual activity must be open to new life, meaning that all sexual acts must be oriented
toward the good of procreation. This norm entails that homosexual acts and artificial birth
control are inherently wrong.82 Additionally, under this definition of chastity, fornication

was repealed in 2010. See John Finnis. “Is Natural Law Theory Compatible with Limited Government?”
Edited by Robert P. George. In Natural Law, Liberalism, and Morality, (NY: Oxford University Press,
1996), 1-26. See especially pages 6-9.
82
For example, Pittsburg went so far as to say that “safe sex” is a myth as part of their eighth
grade curriculum. See Diocese of Pittsburgh. The Catholic Vision of Love. (Pittsburgh, PA: Roman
Catholic Diocese of Pittsburgh, 2011), 76. (Accessed Aug. 18, 2018.)
https://diopitt.org/documents/2017/9/CVOL%208%202012.pdf
New York stated that chastity entails that masturbation is wrong. See Archdiocese of New York.
Guidelines for Catechesis: Grade Seven and Eight. (NY: Archdiocese of NY, 1998), 48. (Accessed Aug.
17, 2018). https://nyfaithformation.org/documents/2014/12/Guidelines7-8.pdf
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would not be permissible. Most curricula, however, did not offer reasons to support this
view except to claim that God would not approve of such relations, which tends to be a
fideistic response rather than the argued response from a consideration of human nature
which one would expect from a NNL view. New York was the only Catholic education
program that offered reasons suggesting sex outside of marriage is morally wrong and
fundamentally dishonest since sex is meant to be within the confines of marriage.
Furthermore, since marriage is considered a public commitment, sex outside of marriage
denies public commitment to total self-giving.83
Another common feature of NNL is biological essentialism. Most of the curricula
suggested it by saying that God made humanity in His image and it was good. Though
the sexes are different, they are meant to complement one another. Because of this, NNL
claims we should accept our biology as it is. New York curriculum has gone so far as to
add a prayer portion for the students after learning about the biological sex unit in which
they thank God that they were made male or female.84 The curriculum in Lincoln,
Nebraska has further stated biological sex and socio-cultural gender roles are not clear
cut distinctions, but intimately intertwined.85 However, if transgender, queer, intersex
students are taught binary biological sex and gender roles are natural, these students may
perceive themselves as outside the norm and therefore not natural. Moreover, biological
essentialism reinforces stereotypical gender roles where biological males must act in
masculine ways and biological females must act in feminine ways.
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Yet, there are some features of NNL with which I agree. One feature is stated
explicitly in the New York curriculum, although all of them implicitly suggest it:
understanding bodily integrity and dignity. The Catholic curriculum of New York states
that people have the right to refuse sexual advances. We are being immoral by treating
people as mere objects—pressuring them into sex disregarding the consequences of our
actions.86 In other words, students must consider the other person’s sexual desires and
feelings.
This leads to the other feature that I agree with: understanding our sexual feelings
are normal. Despite the importance of learning how to control our internal sexual urges,
NNL programs only offer solutions which seem to focus exclusively on external
behaviors and distractions: be modest in our dress and speech and engage in sports,
volunteerism, or other hobbies and interests to avoid temptation. While these solutions
are possible, there are multiple ways to control sexual urges other than just external
behavioral distractions which are typically meant to provide a space in which people can
get over the hump of temptation. Once the temptation has passed, then the distractions are
no longer necessary.
However, I want to suggest that a better solution is not just distractions, but a
change of attitude so that people can function without a disrupted temptation. One
possible change in attitude is for the parents to play a role in shaping their children’s
values, including sexual values. In fact, this aspect features in the curricula from
Pittsburgh which places the primary responsibility of teaching sex education on the
parents.87 From this perspective, the schools are simply meant to assist the parents and
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not be a substitute for their teachings. This reasoning is the major foundation for the
arguments of philosophers Robert P. George and Melissa Moschella’s argument.
1.2. New Natural Law Theory and the Parents as the Foundation for Educating
Students
George and Moschella argue that the responsibility for educating values solely belongs to
the parents. “They [the parents] are ultimately responsible for their children’s intellectual
and moral maturity, so within broad limits they must be free to educate their children,
especially on the deepest matters, as they judge best.”88 We can start with this premise:
Parents are responsible for teaching their children the deepest values which they judge
best (within broad limits). Indeed, they have the right to teach whatever values they judge
best (with the exception of abuse or neglect). That is, to George and Moschella, the right
of parents as to which “deepest values” to teach are religious and moral rights. Since the
parent has the full moral space to teach whatever values they wish to their children, any
interference in this teaching is considered wrong. Therefore, if the state intervenes by
introducing different or opposing values, such as introducing contraceptives,
masturbation, or homosexuality, then the state has undermined the teachings of the
parents, which is akin to taking away the right to parent. Thus, George and Moschella are
opposed to teens being introduced to different values from what they learned from their
parents when it comes to sexuality. Moreover, if the school teaches something that is
contrary to the parents’ professed values, the parents have the right to object.89 Therefore,
George and Moschella consider public sex education violating the right to parent because
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sex education may violate and undermine the values that the parents have given to their
children.
Though it may be true sex education programs can conflict with parents’ values,
even George and Moschella admit that the state has legitimate interests in curbing
unwanted teen pregnancies and STIs. However, it seems difficult to teach students how to
protect themselves without discussing sexual acts, contraception, or STI testing. The most
practically responsible and best way to curb unwanted teen pregnancy and STIs is to
teach the students sexual health, and reproduction. Moreover, teaching students sexual
autonomy and consent could empower students with the ability to make sexual decisions
once they engage in sexual activity. For example, suppose there is a student who is
ignorant of sexuality. She could be exploited if she does not know how to prevent any
sexual coercion. Thus, it would be fruitful and practically useful to teach students the
details of consent. In the end, however, George and Moschella conclude that it is the
parents’ job to teach values to their children, and that includes all aspects of sexuality.
One significant problem with this approach, however, is that several studies show
that many parents generally have a hard time communicating about sex—whether
educational or informal—to their children, particularly fathers toward their daughters.90 If
the parents did get involved, most of the talking was done by the mother.91 Additionally,
a study showed half of adolescents felt uncomfortable talking to their parents about
sexuality. Indeed, some young people and many parents do not communicate about
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sexual matters at all because both groups believe that the other group does not want to
discuss the issues.92 As Shrage and Stewart explain:
One reason why schools may need to do part of the job of sex education is that
many parents are not sufficiently informed about sexual health and policy to
educate their children properly. Also, many parents may feel uncomfortable
discussing sex with their children, and therefore they may avoid the topic. In
addition, there is the important issue of parental bias. For example, because racist
parents might teach their children that people who look different from them are
inferior, formal schooling is needed to challenge such biases and ignorance.
Similarly, formal schooling is needed to address irrational social prejudices and
ignorance about sexual behavior.93
Not only do many parents lack knowledge about sexuality, but both parents and children
are uncomfortable talking about sexuality. Now there are many informative sex education
websites, such as scarlateen.com, that are helpful for young people since they can get the
information they need without any awkwardness. Moreover, parents generally repeat
what their culture has given them, which could simply reinforce the exclusive
heterosexual norms and the problems therein. Compounding these problems, a study
shows that the messages that children hear from their parents are somewhat different for
daughters than for sons.94 Indeed, both sons and daughters heard cautionary messages
from their parents regarding sex, but messages for daughters usually stress their sexual
vulnerability and emphasize the dangers of sex more whereas sons get more leeway. For
example, when parents discuss sexuality with their adolescent children, men are typically
portrayed as potentially dangerous and sexually predatory once they find someone
sexually attractive. Interestingly, parents also saw their own children as sexually
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innocent, even asexual, and the rest of the teens as hypersexual.95 Thus, as Shrage and
Stewart point out, formal schooling is needed to address and challenge various biases;
simply looking at sex progressive or sex positive websites is usually a lone enterprise.
Challenging social biases may need an authoritative figure (like a teacher) to challenge a
whole group of students. The group dynamic would help overcome or at least question
these biases rather than doing so by oneself. For these reasons, most adolescents report
that they could discuss any concern about sex with their friends as opposed to their
parents. Indeed, many studies show that adolescents get most of their (mis)information
about sexuality from their peers.96
Finally, there is a major flaw in the discussion of rights from George and
Moschella. While they mention the rights of the parents, they ignore the rights of the
students. Corinne Packer, a researcher at the University of Ottawa’s Institute of
Population Health, has noted that “[a] number of provisions in international and regional
human rights instruments both directly and indirectly guarantee children the right to seek
and obtain information” in which some provisions “can be interpreted to include the right
to children to freedom to education about sex.” Moreover, “a number of provisions
clearly illustrate that information and health are two sides of the same coin and cannot be
separated one from the other.”97 Moreover, the United Nations (UN) Convention on the
Rights of the Child states:
Effective HIV/AIDS prevention requires States to refrain from censoring,
withholding or intentionally misrepresenting health-related information, including
sexual education information, and that, consistent with their obligations to ensure
95
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the right to life, survival and development of the child (article 6), States parties
must ensure children have the ability to acquire the knowledge and skills to
protect themselves and others as they begin to express the sexuality.98
There is also an advocacy movement at the global level within the UN which states
comprehensive sexuality information and education is a basic human right.99
Based on NNL Theory, people have a positive human right to an education since
this human right is based on natural law.100 Moreover, people have a natural right to be
healthy, which includes ways of understanding their identity. Therefore, people have the
natural right to health education, which includes easy access to the education. Sex
education is an element of health education where one does not just learn about the
mechanics of sex but also about gender identity, healthy relationships, and an enriched
understanding of one’s own sexual desires. Taken together, appropriate sexual
information and education informs people how to be sexually healthy. Contra George
and Moschella, if the students have a right to information which pertains to their overall
health, identity, and well-being,101 access to sexual information could indirectly be a
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natural right. Therefore, having access to sex information and a sex education is a natural
right, at least indirectly.
Does this right to sex education interfere with the parents’ right to guide and
educate their child in the way they see fit, as George and Moschella argue? Packer who
appeals to the Convention on the Rights of the Child that “gives ultimate weight to the
child,” would disagree since the rights of the parents with regard to upbringing their child
has limits.102 I would go further and suggest since adolescents have the moral right to
health information for the sake of their well-being, having sexual health information is
also a moral right too. Prohibiting children’s access to sexual information based on
“protection” is dubious. Indeed, George and Moschella may not realize that their
argument leads to that conclusion as well: if the state has a legitimate interest in
preventing unwanted sexual consequences, and since the studies and data support the

Likewise, the APHA (American Public Health Association) holds that “individuals have rights to
accurate and complete information from their health care professionals, and that health care providers and
health educators have ethical obligations to provide accurate health information. While good patient care is
built upon notions of informed consent and free choice, APHA holds that AOE [Abstinence-Only
Education] programs are inherently coercive by withholding information needed to make informed
choices.” Indeed, this dissertation agrees with the guidelines provided by APHA but also adds to it which
will be shown in chapter five. Taken from American Public Health Association.
Human Rights Watch also states: “Federally funded abstinence-only programs, in keeping with
their federal mandate, deny children basic information that could protect them from HIV/AIDS infection
and discriminate against gay and lesbian children. In so doing, these programs not only interfere with
fundamental rights to information, to health and to equal protection under the law. They also place children
at unnecessary risk of HIV infection and premature death. In the case of HIV/AIDS, what they don't know
may kill them.” Quoted from Human Rights Watch. “Conclusion.” 2002. (Accessed November 05, 2018.)
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/usa0902/USA0902-08.htm#P796_199849.
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view of comprehensive sex education as the better option, then the conclusion must
support a comprehensive sex education.103
In order for the state to achieve its goal of preventing unwanted sexual
consequences, the state needs to give its citizens the necessary tools, skills, and
education. This is not to say that this is the state’s only goal when it comes to sex
education but, without the correct sexual information, people’s education is incomplete at
best. Not only do adolescents have the right to sexual information, but it must be sound
and based on fact to prevent the prevalence of negative consequences
However, if one is serious about endorsing sexual health to students, one cannot
simply discuss how to avoid consequences like STIs and unwanted pregnancies. It is also
imperative that positive aspects be discussed as well. The World Health Organization
(WHO) provides a description of sexual health that not only discusses avoiding
undesirable consequences but also takes into account of healthy sexual relationships and
access to pleasure:
Sexual health is a state of physical, emotional, mental and social well-being
related to sexuality; it is not merely the absence of disease, dysfunction or
infirmity. Sexual health requires a positive and respectful approach to sexuality
and sexual relationships, as well as the possibility of having pleasurable and safe
sexual experiences, free of coercion, discrimination and violence. For sexual
health to be attained and maintained, the sexual rights of all persons must be
respected, protected and fulfilled.104
Therefore, to really protect students, they must be informed so they can make healthy and
critical choices in their lives as they become adults as well as understand other people’s
sexual choices and values that are different.
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See footnote 100.
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Notice the teacher does not need to endorse these values. One can talk about
slavery or totalitarian regimes in history without endorsing these institutions. So too, one
can gain information—about contraceptives, for example—even though one may choose
not to use them because it may go against one’s values. However, students will
nevertheless be informed. Sex education is a way to prevent the risks that George and
Moschella want to avoid. More importantly, denying students information may not
prepare them for negotiating sexual relationships and leave them vulnerable to
contraction of an STI or exploitation. Therefore, students need to be educated on many
aspects of sexuality which includes different perspectives, determining when an act is
consensual, and the responsibilities entailed by sexual relationships.105
A common idea in support of PSE presupposes adolescents should not even have
the knowledge because the knowledge could encourage them to engage in sexual activity.
The idea, I presume, is that if students having knowledge about x, then they will do x.
The fault in this logic, however, is the entailment. Just because one knows about x does
not mean one will do x. At best, it means one has the necessary tools and skills to engage
in x when the appropriate time arises. People may know how to use weapons, but that
does not mean that people will use weapons. The skills and tools people learn help them
engage in the activity by ensuring they are prepared if and when they need to execute the
skills and tools they learned. In general, people should not fully engage in any activity for
which they may not feel ready or have the necessary knowledge or skills to do the
activity. People need knowledge and skills in order to make an educated decision on their
own readiness. This is a matter of prudence and not a matter of morality. The solution is
not to forbid the adolescent from knowing about the activity.
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A good sex education produces some practical guidance on determining what it
means to be ready, which is what abstinence-only sex education fails to do. One slowly
develops sexual preparedness over time. When sexual preparedness is developed, people
have a better understanding of what they are doing sexually, which can enhance their
pleasure, cause them to be more in tune with the sexual engagement, provide a better
sense of who they are sexually, and understand the associated risks such as possibly
conceiving a child. Having the knowledge can empower students to make informed
choices, even if the information is not relevant to what the student values. Moreover,
comprehensive sex education does not mean it replaces the family context or familial
values. Rather, it is a way to open up a conversation about values and the issues regarding
sexuality. The teacher can provide the impetus for the conversation by bringing up
different values and issues to give the students an opportunity to discuss as well as an
opportunity for the students to investigate their own values.
Another theorist in the NNL tradition to consider is Pope Francis, who in April
2016 released an apostolic exhortation, Amoris Laetitia, which addresses sex education
for children and adolescents. Here, Pope Francis offers two arguments against “safe sex”
education. The first claims it undermines natural law; the second claim is it denies our
humanity. Regarding this first argument, Pope Francis states:
Frequently, sex education deals primarily with “protection” through the practice
of “safe sex”. Such expressions convey a negative attitude towards the natural
procreative finality of sexuality, as if an eventual child were an enemy to be
protected against. This way of thinking promotes narcissism and aggressivity in
place of acceptance. It is always irresponsible to invite adolescents to toy with
their bodies and their desires, as if they possessed the maturity, values, mutual
commitment and goals proper to marriage. They end up being blithely encouraged
to use other persons as an [sic] means of fulfilling their needs or limitations. The
important thing is to teach them sensitivity to different expressions of love,
mutual concern and care, loving respect and deeply meaningful communication.
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All of these prepare them for an integral and generous gift of self that will be
expressed, following a public commitment, in the gift of their bodies. Sexual
union in marriage will thus appear as a sign of an all-inclusive commitment,
enriched by everything that has preceded it.106
The Pope’s position is that sexuality has a natural finality. Procreation and the notion of
“safe sex” undermine this finality. According to NNL theory, if anything undermines a
natural finality, that activity is unnatural. Therefore, “safe sex” is unnatural. Specifically,
what makes “safe sex” unnatural is how it focuses more on people’s desires and needs in
relation to the activity rather than the finality of the activity. The Pope further argues by
taking the focus away from the “natural procreative finality” of sexual activity, “safe sex”
education “promotes narcissism and aggressivity in place of acceptance.” If “safe sex”
will make people narcissistic on their designated desires, then—by using the other person
as a means—they will only focus on their desires and not another’s, thereby “safe sex” is
unnatural because the teachings of “safe sex” programs will inevitably promote the
practice of using another as a means to reach one’s personal end.
I find this argument flawed since focusing on one’s own needs and desires does
not necessarily mean one will ignore the partner’s needs and desires. It is true that
treating someone as a mere means is unethical, but what the Pope misses is the mere in
his argument. Just because people have sex as a way to fulfill bodily desires does not
mean that people will focus solely on their own desires. Though I agree with the Pope’s
charge to teach students “sensitivity to different expressions of love, mutual concern and
care, loving respect and deeply meaningful communication,” I would also add that this
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message is equally important to teach to those who do not want to procreate. Instead, it is
important to teach students not to solely focus on simply their own pleasures in sexual
engagement, but that sexual activity is a mutually pleasurable experience, which would
mitigate the Pope’s worry that people would “blithely [...] use other persons as an [sic]
means of fulfilling their needs or limitations.”
While this first argument is problematic, there are some benefits to Pope Francis’s
exhortation that a sex education should offer information, provided the information
comes at the proper time,107 and that sex education should include respecting differences,
accepting others, and accepting one’s body. Yet, Pope Francis holds an essentialist view
of gender and sex differences as demonstrated by the second argument in which he states:
Sex education should also include respect and appreciation for differences, as a
way of helping the young to overcome their self-absorption and to be open and
accepting of others. Beyond the understandable difficulties which individuals may
experience, the young need to be helped to accept their own body as it was
created, for ‘thinking that we enjoy absolute power over our own bodies turns,
often subtly, into thinking that we enjoy absolute power over creation... An
appreciation of our body as male or female is also necessary for our own selfawareness in an encounter with others different from ourselves. In this way we
can joyfully accept the specific gifts of another man or woman, the work of God
the Creator, and find mutual enrichment. Only by losing the fear of being
different, can we be freed of self-centredness and self-absorption. Sex education
should help young people to accept their own bodies and to avoid the pretension
“to cancel out sexual difference because one no longer knows how to deal with
it.”108
So far, Pope Francis is saying sex education should include teachings to respect and
appreciate the differences between males and females and accept their bodies as it was
created. As a self-esteem issue, this type of teaching is a good educational tool, yet the
Pope suggests it is necessary for people to accept their biological body even if they
perceive themselves as having the wrong biological body to fit with their gender identity.
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In short, this philosophy is heteronormative in that it presumes cisgender people as the
norm.109
Indeed, earlier in the exhortation Pope Francis brings up an ideology of gender—a
variation of which is included in “safe sex” education—which he believes
denies the difference and reciprocity in nature of a man and a woman and
envisages a society without sexual differences, thereby eliminating the
anthropological basis of the family. This ideology leads to educational
programmes and legislative enactments that promote a personal identity and
emotional intimacy radically separated from the biological difference between
male and female. Consequently, human identity becomes the choice of the
individual, one which can also change over time ... It needs to be emphasized that
“biological sex and the socio-cultural role of sex (gender) can be distinguished but
not separated”[...] It is one thing to be understanding of human weakness and the
complexities of life, and another to accept ideologies that attempt to sunder what
are inseparable aspects of reality. Let us not fall into the sin of trying to replace
the Creator. We are creatures, and not omnipotent. Creation is prior to us and
must be received as a gift. At the same time, we are called to protect our
humanity, and this means, in the first place, accepting it and respecting it as it was
created.110
Expanding on this argument, we can say a good sex education111 would not endorse an
ideology which “denies the difference and reciprocity in nature of a man and a woman
and envisages a society without sexual differences.” If sex education includes or endorses
this ideology, then there is a promotion of personal identity and emotional intimacy that
radically separates the biological differences between males and females. In other words,
a good education would uphold the view that the sexes are biologically and essentially
different, yet complementary to each other.
However, the Pope argues that if there is a promotion of personal identity and
emotional intimacy which does not radically separate the biological differences between
109
Someone could feel like she was a woman but they are in a man’s body. This person may
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orientations, but also gender expressions as well.
110
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males and females, then human identity becomes the choice of the individual, which can
change over time. Because biological sex and socio-cultural roles of gender cannot be
separated in reality, we must accept our biology otherwise we would not accept our
created bodies, which is, in a way, a denial of our humanity. And since “safe sex”
education “denies the difference and reciprocity in nature of a man and a woman and
envisages a society without sexual differences,” it entails “safe sex” education denies our
humanity since we are seen to be choosing what identity to have rather than accepting our
biological bodies. According to this belief system, it is important to accept our humanity,
which means accepting our biological bodies as they are.
I find two problems with this argument. First, it seems very unlikely that we can
simply choose our identities in regards to our sexuality and our gender voluntarily.
Second, there is a complicated explanation of the biological sexes, and by looking at the
science, we can see the sexes are not fully demarcated as the male/female binary as we
have been taught. In addressing the first problem, we can look to more recent scientific
reports indicating people do not choose to be homosexual, asexual, or transgender, for
example.112 Instead, many of those who experience gender dysphoria are cognizant of
their gender identity conflicting with their biological body. Frequently, this culminates

112
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with some sort of change to their body, whether superficial or surgical, to fit with their
gender identity.113
Yet if it came down to choice, why not choose to simply have the body one
already has, or choose to engage in various activities to be heterosexual? Many of those
who are gay or asexual claim that they did not choose to be attracted to those of the same
sex or not to be attracted to any sex.114 They simply have this predisposition and therefore
cannot help having these desires. Thus, human identity does not seem to be something
people choose; rather, we have labels and terms to describe experiences and feelings we
already have. In most cases, we cannot help having these desires; it is as if they were just
“part of the person’s identity” which is invariable, meaning a person does not choose
what identity to have; rather, they choose to accept their identity by accepting their sexual
attractions or by changing their body to fit their identity. This is not to say that we have to
act on these predispositions. A biological disposition is not a license to perform that
disposed action. For instance, suppose pedophilia is a condition which is not chosen but
experienced nonetheless. 115 From a moral point of view, they ought not act on these
113
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desires since children are unable to consent to sexual activity. Here we see there are
certain parameters which restrict us from acting, even if we desire to act, with the hard
boundary being the consent of the other person involved. With consent being the hard
boundary, pedophilia actions are morally impermissible, but same-sex acts are morally
permissible.
As for the second problem, our biological sexes are complicated meaning they
cannot simply imply biological essentialism as Pope Francis suggests.116 From a
biological point of view, the genitals of both sexes are biological homologues—“traits
that have the same biological origins, though they may have different functions.”117 In the
fetal stage, males and females have the same proto-organs—undeveloped genitalia—and
protogonads—gonads that could develop into ovaries or testes. How these are developed
depends on the hormones that the blastocyst receives during the gestation period. If the
blastocyst receives masculine hormones, the blastocyst responds by transforming the
proto-organs into standard recognized male genitalia—penis, scrotum, and testicles. If
Neuroimage 41, no. 1 (2008): 80-91; Kolja Schiltz, Joachim Witzel, Georg Northoff, Kathrin Zierhut, Udo
Gubka, Hermann Fellmann, Jörn Kaufmann, Claus Tempelmann, Christine Wiebking, and Bernhard
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related diencephalic structures.” Archives of General Psychiatry 64, no. 6 (2007): 737-746; and Christian
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not, then the proto-organs develop into the default standard recognized female genitalia—
clitoris, vaginal lips, and ovaries.118 The genitals are developed from the same fetal
tissue, but the presence of the masculine hormones transforms the proto-organs into
recognizable male genitalia. “Each embryo has bipotential, which is defined as the ability
to develop either male or female external and internal sex organs.”119 In short, “[e]very
body’s genitals are the same until six weeks into gestation, when the universal genital
hardware [i.e. proto-organs] begins to organize itself into either the female configuration
or the male configuration.”120 For the most part, everyone’s genitals developed either into
the female or male configuration.
Intersex individuals, however, are people whose genitals are not obviously male
or female at birth. They have proto-organs, but the genitals are developed and organized
in such a way that is not recognizable as standard male or female genitalia. Somehow
along the gestation period, there was “some slight variation in the hugely complex
cascade of biochemical events involved in the growth of the fetus.”121 However, these
variations do not mean that there is anything wrong with their genitals; they just
happened to develop differently though they have all the same tissue. There is a wide
range of variety and modern medicine has considered thinking of sex dimorphically
inadequate.122
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I argue there is nothing normatively wrong with the genitals being developed in a
different way, even if they are very different than the recognizable standards of male and
female, and “[a]s long as the genitals don’t cause pain and aren’t prone to infection or
other medical issues, they’re already healthy and don’t require any kind of medical
intervention.”123 In general, all genital configurations are biologically unproblematic,
particularly when it is understood all genitals are like fingerprints in that they are unique
to each individual. We start with the same proto-organs and there is no differentiation
until about the seventh week of gestation. If we all started with proto-organs, and the
development varies depending on the biochemical events happening in the gestation
period, then there are no essential characteristics that can fully differentiate between male
and female except for what we socially recognize as the standard male and female.124 The
standard notions of male and female are not biological essences, but part of a spectrum of
a male/female division. There are those that fall into the standards male configuration and
those that fall into the standards of female configuration. What is uncommon are those in
the middle whose genital makeup does not fit the standards of either. But this is not
evidence of a defect or a problem that needs to be fixed; rather, it is a statistical
infrequency. But just because something is statistically infrequent does not mean that that
there is a defect. Einstein’s genius is a statistical infrequent phenomenon, but there is
nothing defective about Einstein’s genius. Much like Einstein’s genius is at the edge of
the intellectual bell curve, intersexuals are in the middle of a sexual inverted bell curve.
hence must be assigned to one of them. Ethical issues in the management of intersex conditions came
about, in part, because the discredited dimorphic conception of sex persisted” (McCullough, 497-498).
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There is no definitive mark where one side is definitively and essentially male and
the other side definitively and essentially female. Therefore, if there are no essential
differences, then biological essentialism is faulty. If we are all biological homologues to
each other—where we have the same proto-organs but just configured differently—then
what really matters are how our individual bodies work, which includes the way we think
about our particular sexuality, our particular relationship style, our particular gender,
and our particular desires. This means people’s sexual classifications exist on a
continuum along which there are those who are have typical male characteristics and
typical female characteristics, as well as those who are intersex, indicating they have
elements of both. In fact, it is estimated that .02 to 1.7 percent of the population are
intersex. 125 For comparison, it is possible that there are more intersex folks than there are
redheads.126
Genital variation is benign unless it impedes some underlying health problem. Sex
atypical bodies are construed as abnormal and need treatment. We often think that
because genitals do not look like standard, typically recognizable male or female, then we
must intervene and “fix” the genitalia to form into typical sex characteristics not only for
the sake of health, but also for the sake of psychological well-being for those who are
intersex. However, looking different does not equate being unhealthy. Yet, defenders of
corrective surgery will often say that non-conforming genitals that do not form into the
standard typical male or female characteristics will not function normally, specifically in
the sexual way. However, these defenders are coming at this from a heteronormative
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point of view. Just because a feature is uncommon does not mean there is something
problematic:
The bio-medical treatment paradigm has long presumed a connection between
being male or female and the ‘correct’ form of erotic behavior, namely penilevaginal intercourse between a man and a woman. As a consequence, decisions
about sex assignment and genital surgery have drawn on normative cultural
frameworks about sex, gender, and sexuality—and their relationships—to produce
norm-abiding gendered subjects. For example, when a child is born with a phallus
that is considered too small for vaginal penetration, physicians have made a
female sex assignment owing to the assumption that penile-vaginal intercourse is
required to sexually function as a man. Similarly, reducing what is perceived as a
too large clitoris for enlarging what is deemed a too-short vagina has seemed
appropriate although for different reasons: whereas the former is used as too
similar to a penis to be left on a female, the latter is deemed necessary for sexual
coupling (with males via penile-vaginal intercourse). As another example, girls
born with testes can undergo gonadectomy early in childhood to make their
bodies more female typical. In so doing, doctors have often unwittingly sterilize
these girls because they have failed to consider that their testes may allow them to
reproduce. Socio-cultural perspective have challenged the notion that sex is
naturally dimorphic, that genitals are the essential sign of gender, that gender and
sexuality derived from biology, and that physical sex traits, gender identity, and
gender roles in an individual should align to either masculine or feminine
norms.127
This raises the question, are there inherent psychological problems that intersex people
have? I argue not.128 As an analogy, many people have been worried that having gay
children would be problematic because of the social stigma against them. Thus, they
would not want to have gay children. However, the problem is not the homosexuality, but
the social stigma against homosexuality. The same could be said with intersex
individuals. Instead of “fixing” them, critics of corrective genital surgery advocate peer
support for intersex individuals and their families to adjust and accept their intersex
condition. “[R]ather than change bodies to fit social norms, social norms should shift to
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accommodate sex and gender variance.”129 Intervening before the child can consent is
mainly done for cosmetic reasons but it does not ameliorate feelings of shame, stigma, or
abnormality. Indeed, it could exacerbate it.130 As Warnke states:
Because we have insisted that there are two and only two sexes, we have either
reclassified intersexed individuals as really males or really females and/or have
surgically eliminated them completely. Because we have insisted that there are
two and only two genders, we have had a difficult time acknowledging the
variations in how people experience their own genders and the unique uses people
make of them. We erect phobias against possibilities of transgenderism, gawk at
it, and/or medically treat it as a disease or “dysphoria.” Worse, we often deny
legal and medical protection.131
Warnke notes that maybe it would be best to conceive of both sex and gender as a bell
curve rather than as absolutes.
One question we can ask is why should students learn about intersexuality in a
sexuality education class? After all, if, at most, intersexuals make up at most 1.7 percent
of the population, why discuss the issue at all? There are two main reasons why we
should teach intersexuality. One, just because they are a small minority, their experiences
are nevertheless important. By leaving out their experiences, there is a worry that the
default sexuality education program may become heteronormative by focusing on a
male/female division. There has been a strict association between sexual identity and
gender identity. If the male/female division is assumed and not questioned, then it may
form gender roles and identities as rigid too. By including intersex people in sexuality
education, it helps students see that biological sex is not entirely natural, but that it is also
a social construct which will help decouple sexual identity with gender identity. I will
129
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discuss why having gender identity on a spectrum is beneficial in a following point, but
let me get to my second point.
Second, discussing intersexuals may intrigue students because intersexuals have
ambiguous genitalia. But students may make the mistake that the appearance of
intersexual genitalia are uncommon, the standard male and female genitalia are common.
And yet, the appearance, shape, and size of many male and female genitalia do not fit the
standard look. Thus, students may get a sense that if their own genitals do not fit into the
standard, then they are also not part of the standard of what genitalia are “supposed” to
look like. The students may even accept intersex people and not see them as abnormal.
And yet, the notion of trying to look normal and fitting in with social expectations
especially among peers is strong. If, however, educators teach intersexuality, then
students may benefit to understand that the appearance of their own genitalia is not
something to be ashamed of, even it does not fit into the norm of what it is “supposed” to
look like.
The take away message is that we all started with proto-organs, and through the
gestation period, we start to develop our own particular genitalia. Now males may
develop into standard male genitalia (i.e. penis and scrotum) and females may develop
into standard female genitalia (i.e. vulva). Their own particular development will have
their own particular shape and size. And if they do not fit into the standard appearance of
what they are “supposed” to look like, then the students will begin to see that the
appearance of their own genitals is not the problem, rather the problem is the notion of
the standard of what genitals are “supposed” to look like.132 With these two reasons,
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What is at stake by not following the standard? On the male side, many are obsessed with penis
size and that the larger the penis, the more they fit into the standard of masculinity or being male. Anything

93

discussing intersexuals is important not only to normalize them, but also to show the
development of intersexuals so that those who are not intersexual will also feel normal
based on the appearance of their genitals. Our culture is bombarded with messages that
intersex individuals—as well as transgender people—have bodies that are atypical or that
they have bodies that are “not normal.” These messages can be harmful to intersex and
transgender people because not only will they experience negative sexual experience
based on experiencing negative body and genital images, but their well-being will be
diminished since they will see themselves as not normal and that there is something
wrong with their body and their genitals. If, however, sex education classes normalized
different bodily variations, the students can see that a standard of what the sexual body
and genitals should look like is questioned. The students may then see their own body as
something that they are comfortable with and that different bodies are not considered
deviant or wrong. One way to do this is that teachers can embrace and show different
variations of bodies having different sizes and shapes of vulvas and penises as well as
showing different races of these bodies.133

short of that exemplifies that really being male. Thus, those with micropenises are usually the brunt of
jokes. For example, despite what the reader may think of his politics, there were many statues of Donald
Trump displaying a micropenis and tourists can pose with the statue making fun of the size of the
micropenis. See Brittany Vonow. “Donald Trump Micropenis Statues Are Erected All over America to
Prove He Isn't Well-equipped.” The Sun. August 19, 2016. (Accessed November 05, 2018.)
https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/1638408/donald-trump-micropenis-statues-are-erected-all-over-america-inattempt-to-prove-he-isnt-well-equipped-to-run-the-country/
On the female side, the standard appearance is what is usually known as the “porn star” look: not
having large labia minora, the color is either fleshy or pink, and the pubic hair cannot be around the vaginal
lips. Any look that does not fall into this standard is considered not feminine enough.
133
Cf. Seattle and King County Public Health. Family Life and Sexual health, 3rd ed. Seattle, WA:
Seattle & King County Public Health, 2013. Koespel also points out that health textbooks for sex education
classes show vulvas as white, pale pink, hairless, and symmetrical which are quite often not the real
representation of what vulvas look like which can contribute to a lack of self-confidence if they see think of
what vulvas are “supposed” to look like in a health textbook. Koespel suggests instead of “using one image
to portray an idealized depiction of genitals,” sex education classes would improve if they could show a
variety by displaying a multitude of vulvas and penises to acknowledge their differences which is what the
FLASH curriculum does by displaying “an array of genital images including erect and flaccid penises,
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Pope Francis makes the assumption that biological sex and gender are tightly knit
and that they not only go hand-in-hand, but that they are parallel and naturally do so. The
only argument he offers in this regard is that our humanity was created in a specific way
and we must accept this: “Creation is prior to us and must be received as a gift. At the
same time, we are called to protect our humanity, and this means, in the first place,
accepting it and respecting it as it was created.”134 Again, any separation is not natural
and that it is important to accept our humanity, which means accepting our biological
bodies as they are including our gender. This position is known as gender essentialism:
the idea that if one is male, one ought to be masculine; if one is female, one ought to be
feminine. The problem with the Pope’s argument is that his argument for gender
essentialism is similar to his argument for biological essentialism. Since I have
mentioned before the flaws of biological essentialism with my discussion on intersex
folks where sex dimorphic traits can vary, the same is true for gender traits thereby
showing flaws with gender essentialism. The various gender traits (e.g. masculinity and
femininity) are traits that we learn through our culture and environment. For sex, it is a
collection of sex dimorphic traits such as chromosomes, genitalia, secondary sexual
characteristics. The same is true with gender. Gender identity is the internal feeling that
someone is a man or a woman, or somewhere in between. Moreover, if men and women
ought to fit together, then masculinity and femininity ought to fit together. But why
should we accept that gender essentialism is true?

extended and petite labia minora, various pubic hair arrangements, asymmetrical labia and testicles, racially
diverse skin colors, and generally different sized penises, clitorises, and vulvas. (Cf. Koepsel, 230).
134
Pope Francis, 46.
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To get a better understanding of this phenomenon, we can devise a test.135 Think
about who you are. What gender are you? At first, the answer seems simple. Perhaps we
think of our gender identity (i.e. what makes you think you are a man or a woman) is
because of the physical anatomy. However, let us say there is an unfortunate accident
where your sex organs are now gone. Would you still identify as either a man or a
woman? Perhaps we would say that it has to do with the amount of testosterone levels in
your body. Men traditionally have more testosterone than females. But what if tomorrow
your testosterone levels dropped significantly and never reached back to its original
point? What if you met a woman who had more testosterone than an average male?
Chromosomes also do not seem to be the essential deciding factor either since intersex
people may have different chromosomes that the standard male and female. It seems,
then, that identifying as a certain gender is not completely reliant on biology. Rather,
gender identification is not just biological but also in that person’s mind as affected by
social categories of what constitutes gender, gender, masculinity, femininity, etc.136
People may identify as a certain gender: they have an internal sense of who they are in
terms of gender. People may also express as a certain gender: externally representing
their gender identity which is usually through masculine or feminine behaviors. The
traditional view sees sex and gender and parallel:
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I am indebted to Nicholas Teich. Transgender 101: A simple guide to a complex issue.
(Columbia University Press, 2012), 1-28 from which most of this information comes from.
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Could someone be wrong about their gender identity? This gets into controversial territory
which is beyond the scope of this dissertation. But the short answer is that there some theorists of gender
who suggest that if gender has some metaphysical basis, such as Barnes and McKinnon, then people may
be wrong about their gender identity: people may think that they are one gender, but they are actually
another gender, depending on the metaphysical picture.
It may also be possible that first-person authority gender identity has limitations. See Burkay
Ozturk, “The Negotiation Theory of Gender Identity and the Limits of First-Person Authority in The
Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings. Seventh Edition ed. by Raja Halwani, Alan Soble, Sarah
Hoffman, and Jacob M. Held, 139-160, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 139-160.
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Table 1.1: Traditional View of Sex and Gender
Sex (Labeled at Birth)

Gender Identity

Gender Expression

Female

Woman

Feminine

Male

Man

Masculine

Now it is possible to have a different combination of sex, gender identity, and gender
expression. For example, Teich mentions that we may see someone with a short haircut
with a shirt and tie and men’s dress pants. Since the short haircut and the clothing
typically are signs of masculine gender expression, we automatically assume that the
person is male and identifies as a man. But what if this person is holding onto a secret for
many years? This person may be born as male, but has felt like a woman for many years
and just cannot express it. Thus, this person may have this configuration:
Table 1.2: Transgender View of Sex and Gender
Sex (Labeled at Birth)

Gender Identity

Gender Expression

Male

Woman

Masculine

In table 1.2, this person’s sex and gender are opposite of the standard that we see in table
1.1. Suppose there is a female who identifies as a woman but usually wears men’s
clothing on a daily basis. This person may have this configuration:
Table 1.3: Gender Expression
Sex (Labeled at Birth)

Gender Identity

Gender Expression

Female

Woman

Masculine
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With these possibilities (and numerous others), to say that someone is “really a man” or
that “he is really a woman” are false statements because we can separate sex and gender.
Thus, those that are transgender, genderqueer, or those who do not fall into what is
known as the gender binary spectrum can easily be explained through the charts above
and by separating gender and biological sex. To say that they are not separable entities is
either ignoring the vast amount of data where many people do not fall into the gender
binary categories, or they are holding onto an ideology that sex and gender must be
completely essentially together in kind.
There are a number of routes to take to respond to the Pope. I cannot dedicate too
much on this issue since it is beyond the scope of my project, but briefly I can mention
two.137 One strategy is to say that if we get the metaphysics of gender right, then the
accounts that the Pope give are inaccurate. In other words, we would have to show that
the Pope’s metaphysical views of gender are wrong. Elizabeth Barnes and Rachel
McKinnon take this route. Barnes, for example, says that if our theory of gender relies
only on ethical and political theories but we are missing a metaphysical picture to explain
the world, then we have failed in an important way: “A successful account of gender
ought to say that trans women are women; it would be unjust not to classify trans women
as women. But at least part of that injustice, on most accounts, consists in failing to treat
trans women as what they are. That is, it’s unjust to say that trans women aren’t women
because trans women really are women.”138 Likewise, McKinnon states that when we
misgender someone, it is not just disrespecting that person (which it is), but also
metaphysically false:
137
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It’s not a matter of respecting someone’s sincere self-identification—insofar as
this connotes that we’re doing this person a favor, or that it’s a righteous act on
our part. Rather, I’m increasingly preferring that we talk about what gender the
person is: that is, it’s not about respecting their self-identification, but about
getting it right when we attribute a gender to someone. So when we misgender a
trans woman (and call her a man, for example), the issue isn’t one of
respect/disrespect (although it’s certainly disrespectful!): it’s that we’re getting
something wrong about who she is. So not only do I “identify as a woman,” I am
a woman, dammit. When someone says otherwise, they’re not simply
disrespecting my “self-identification,” but they’re getting something wrong about
who I am. That is, they’re getting the truth wrong: they say something false, not
just disrespectful. So, for example, trans women are not those who “identify as
women” but were assigned a male gender at birth; rather, they’re women who
were assigned a male gender at birth.139
As mentioned with the thought experiment earlier, sex/gender terms are not
reduced to genitalia, but to worldviews and practices (e.g. how people take up, live as,
and embody genders) that define sex/gender and transgender identity.
It seems from an empirical perspective that our bodies do not give us gender, at
least in the strict sense that the Pope suggests. Rather our gender traits are acquired or
learned. The nurturing care, which is considered a feminine trait, does not seem to come
naturally to women because of their biology. Likewise, the lack of nurturing care in men
does not seem to a natural phenomenon due to their male bodies. Rather it seems that we
are in a culture that endorses and reinforces various traits as either masculine or feminine
and that these traits are instilled in us throughout our lives. We therefore accept and
partake of these roles partially because that is what is expected of us, but also because we
desire to have a social standing without scrutiny or stigma, which entails that we act out
our gender so that we can fit in with our group.
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Rachel McKinnon. January 27, 2016 (10:06 am), comment on “Ethics Discussions at PEA
Soup: Katharine Jenkins’ ‘Amelioration and Inclusion: Gender Identity and the Concept of Woman,’ with
précis by Talia Bettcher,” PEA Soup: Philosophy, Ethics, Academia (blog), January 27, 2016,
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Finally, the second strategy is a medical argument that suggests that being
transgender is not problematic. For example, the Kaplan and Sadock’s Synopsis of
Psychiatry, which is considered a main resource for many psychiatrists states that “No
drug treatment has been shown to be effective in reducing cross-gender desires per se.
When patient gender dysphoria is severe and intractable, sex reassignment may be the
best solution.” If this medical resource considers sex reassignment as the best solution,
that is a clue that being transgender is not an illness.140 And yet, Gender Identity Disorder
is considered a real diagnosis based on a misalignment of sex and gender: those who
were assigned a sex at birth but the individuals identify as the contrary gender are said to
be suffering Gender Identity Disorder. This disorder, however, reflects the
heteronormative attitude that there is a natural and tight relationship between sex and
gender. Indeed, Seidman considers the disorder having the “social effect of enforcing a
gender order that renders heterosexuality a normal expression of what is generally known
as human nature.”141
To defend the gender binary thesis endorses and reinforces heteronormativity.
“There can be no norm of heterosexuality, indeed no notion of heterosexuality, without
assuming two genders that are coherent as a relationship of opposition and unity.” ...
“heterosexuality is anchored by maintaining a gender order through either celebrating and
idealizing gender or by stigmatizing and polluting gender nonconformity.”142
Before I leave this section, I must mention one final problem with NNL theory
overall: its notion of striving to realize the good of sex and that this good is universal in
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everyone. The good of sex, as they theorize, is procreation because it fulfills the specific
function of the genitals. If people are not fulfilling this function correctly, then they—or
at least their genitals—fall short of their proper aim. This notion assumes, however, there
is one and only one function to fulfill. However, I take sexuality to be multiply
realized:143 there are multiple ways to obtain sexual pleasure, experience sexual arousal,
identify as a sexual being, or desire different relationship styles (which are mental states)
when implemented by different physical bodies. What may be pleasurable, desirable, or
sexually arousing for one person can be totally different for another.
Let us recall when I discussed people who are intersex. Nagoski explained that we
all have the same genitalia but organized and developed differently. As an analogy, we
can say that men’s and women’s sexualities are the same and different. We may see
obvious differences between male and female bodies. But there is at least as much
variation within male bodies and within female bodies. Nagoski offers an analogy to
explain how: an adult woman’s average height is five feet four. An adult man’s average
height is five feet ten. So the average difference between these groups’ averages is six
inches. Now consider the variation in within these groups. Suppose we randomly
measured a thousand people—five hundred men and five hundred women. Nearly all the
women would be between five feet and five feet eight, which is an eight-inch difference
within the group. Nearly all the men would be between five feet four and six feet four,
which is a twelve-inch difference within the group. The point of this analogy is to
demonstrate there is more of a difference within each group (eight or twelve inches) than
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between the two groups (six inches).144 Nagoski explains the same is true for sexuality.
“Within each group we find a vast range of diversity—and I don’t mean just
anatomically. I mean in sexual orientation, sexual preferences, gender identity, and
expression, and …sexual functioning: arousal, desire, and orgasm. We also find overlap
between the two groups, and we find folks who vary wildly from the ‘average’ while still
being perfectly normal and healthy.”145 “From our bodies to our desires to our behaviors,
there are as many ‘sexualities’ as there are humans alive on Earth. No two are alike.”146
Indeed, variety may be the one and only truly universal characteristic of human
sexuality. If sexuality is multiple realizable, then there are multiple ways to flourish via
sexuality, which I call taking care of the sexual self. When it comes to sexuality, there is
a plurality of sexual values, desires, preferences, and arousals, and these values are varied
among individuals; yet, we can all understand, in general, what arousal, desire, and
preferences are even if these specific activities or thoughts are not personally causing
arousal, desires, or preferences to a specific individual. By doing so, we universally all
have bodies, but because they are all developed differently, we each have specificities in
how the universal body functions for each individual to obtain well-being via sexuality.
New Natural Law theory, on the other hand, excludes other approaches by
suggesting there is only one value to fulfill only one function. Yet, one can fulfill one’s
particular function by honing in what sort of sexual values one has based on one’s own
individual preferences and taking care of the sexual self, as long as the activities are
consensual and non-exploitive. In the next section, I will see what deontological
arguments there could be to justify PSE.
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2. Deontological Considerations

Deontological views of paternalism focus on the autonomy or consent of the adolescent.
The paternalist argument is that one ought to be paternalistic toward adolescents
regarding sex education because adolescents cannot fully consent to sexual activities.
However, it is believed if they had the right information, they would not consent to
engage in sexual activity. Moreover, since adolescents are not yet adults, they do not
have full autonomy which means, since consent is based on autonomy, they cannot fully
consent to sex. 147 There are two possible justifications for PSE under deontological
considerations: (a) protecting those who cannot consent, and (b) Y could either be
exploited or take advantage of someone as a result of not understanding the full
ramifications of sex. I will take up these topics in turn.
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Psychological consent is different than the age of consent, which is legal consent. Since PSE
programs focus on psychological consent, I will follow suit. An interesting question is why PSE argues for
abstinence until marriage but the laws suggest that one can consent to sex from ages 16-18, depending on
the state. Age of consent was formulated by the early 20th century; abstinence-only programs did not come
about until the 1970s and became prominent in the 1980s onward. It could be that those who endorse PSE
may say that just because sexual activity is legal once the people involved reach the age of consent, it does
not mean that it would be a good idea to do the activity. Some who endorse PSE would like to raise the age
of consent to 29, the average age when women get married. Wade Horn, assistant secretary for children and
families at the Department of Health and Human Services under G. W. Bush’s administration, said the
revision of abstinent-until-marriage sex education is aimed at 19- to 29-year-olds because more unmarried
women in that age group are having children. Therefore, to fix the problem of children out of wedlock,
Horn advices to push for abstinence-until-marriage programs until the age of 29. See Sharon Jayson.
“Abstinence Message Goes beyond Teens.” USA Today, October 31, 2006. (Accessed August 8, 2018.)
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-10-30-abstinence-message_x.htm.
On the other hand, the focus of PSE may be outcomes: unwed mothers having children. Therefore,
they may legally consent, and they may even psychologically consent, but there are social ramifications if
one has children before marriage. These are consequentialist considerations which I will touch upon in
section 3.
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2.1. Protecting Those Who Cannot Consent

First, we must define our terms. Jan Steutal makes a distinction between children,
adolescents, and adults. The distinctions are complex considering we can look at them
biologically, psychologically, cognitively, socially, or culturally. To reduce the
complexity, he focuses on the status of childhood, adolescence, and adulthood. By saying
someone has a certain status term, we are implicitly saying this person does or does not
have certain duties and responsibilities. For example, if we say someone has the status of
a parent, we are not just talking about how the parent is biologically related to the child,
but insinuating the parent has certain duties and responsibilities toward the child such as
raising it and taking care of it.148
Moreover, “someone with the status of an adult has certain rights and duties that
cannot be ascribed to or imposed on someone with the status of a child, and the other way
round.”149 How do adults gain the status of adulthood in the sexual realm? Steutal
remarks that they have two features: self-determination and competence. Selfdetermination is the ability to act autonomously. Competence means to have “capacities
that are needed for exercising rights of self-determination in a proper or sensible way
(including the capacity for judging and acting prudently in the sexual sphere of life).”150
In short, Steutal’s argument equates being an adult in the sexual realm with having selfdetermination, for which sexual competence is the foundation. Children and adolescents
do not have sexual competence. Therefore, they do not have the ability for sexual self-
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determination.151 This broad definition will lead to some problems, specifically ascribing
adolescents the status of children, which Steutal admits.
Next, in order to ethically engage with another person sexually, a necessary
condition to consider is consent. Only adults can consent to sexual activity and children
cannot. Why is that? The heart of consent requires three conditions:152 (1) voluntariness
(consent cannot come from coercion or intimidation), (2) information (consent does not
come from being misled or manipulated), and (3) competence (consent is not possible if
someone lacks capacities to make decisions and understand the ramifications, results, and
the responsibilities those decisions entail). Children are not considered competent for
sexual activity because they lack capacities to make higher-order decisions. If
competency means the capacity to make decisions in light of evidence, knowledge,
experience, or retrospection, and only adults have the capacity to make these type of
decisions, then only adults are competent. Therefore, only adults can consent to sexual
activity. Since children are not adults, children therefore cannot consent to sexual
activity.
The problem is how to categorize adolescents. Proponents of PSE suggest
adolescents are not adults. Since only adults can consent to sexual activity, adolescents
cannot therefore consent to sexual activity. Steutel takes this position exactly since he
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“The claim that a person should be regarded as an adult, in the status meaning of that term,
implies the claim that this individual should have the right of sexual self-determination and is based on the
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claims that adolescents have the status of children.153 Steutel remarks: “[s]ince their
[adolescents] capacity for acting and judging prudently is still underdeveloped, their
consent cannot meet the criterion of consent.”154 Steutel’s position posits adolescents
have competency similar to children: they are incapable of making prudent judgments
about their interests. Thus, authoritative figures must look over their interests and help
them achieve those interests in the right way. This responsibility lies primarily with the
parents, who have at least two responsibilities. First, since the parents ought to look out
for their children’s interests, “parents have the duty to intervene in the child’s life, or to
abstain from intervening in the child’s life, if they believe that such interventions or
intentional non-interventions are required in view of the child’s interests.”155 The second
responsibility—which informs the first since the parent could be mistaken on whether
these interventions would be for their child’s interest—involves “the duty to make sure,
to the best of their ability, that these beliefs are accurate or at least well-justified.”156
However, these arguments would be detrimental to the interests of adolescents.
Steutal finds a way where adolescents can engage in sexual contact but with restrictions.
Adolescents may fulfill the first two conditions of consent—voluntariness and being
informed. However, because Steutal considers adolescents having the same status as
children,157 adolescents cannot fulfill the third condition—competence. For adolescents
153
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According to this much broader meaning of ‘childhood’, an adolescent is by definition still a child. To
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to fulfill this third condition, an added feature helps compensate for their lack of
prudence. Steutal states that “the third condition of morally permissible sexual contacts of
adolescents can be specified as follows: the parents have given their consent to the sexual
contact on the basis of their considered belief that the sex will not harm the welfare
interests of the adolescents involved.”158 This third condition involves two problems.
First, why is it determined adolescents cannot have the mental capacity to engage in sex?
One could say it is because of a lack of experience, but Steutel’s view is different.
Throughout the article, he claims that adolescents have the same status as children. By
comparing adolescents with children, who it is generally agreed cannot consent to sex
because of their mental immaturity, Steutel’s view suggests adolescents must also be
unable to consent because of their mental immaturity. This view grossly underestimates
adolescent mental capacities by lumping adolescents with children. Obviously,
adolescents still need to be protected and have some of their interests looked after by
their parents because they are still developing. However, as children get older and enter
adolescence, we can begin to allow them more rights, responsibilities, and autonomy than
children, though not as much as adults. Indeed, the fact we even have the term
“adolescence” where we designate them as a different category from children and adults
indicates this separation.159 We must then ask at what point one gains mental maturity to
have the capacity to judge prudently whether or not to engage in sexual activities. What
age would be appropriate for one to be mature enough to engage in sexual activity?

mark off childhood, in this comprehensive meaning, from adulthood, I introduced a status criterion:
someone with the status of an adult has certain rights and duties that cannot be ascribed to or imposed on
someone with the status of a child, and the other way round.”
158
Steutel, 194. My emphasis.
159
Another way to tackle the argument is to show that adolescents can fulfill (3): they could be
competent to engage in sex. I will present this argument in chapter three.
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Steutel suggests that sixteen years of age is a good number,160 but this is only giving us a
legal definition of adulthood and not a moral one. Moreover, it seems odd that from
Steutel’s view one is (legally) a child until the age of sixteen, at least sexually. This view
suggests there is no gradual movement from childhood, to adolescence, to adulthood. To
categorize adolescents as children because of their mental or mature status as not adultlike is too restrictive. If education is meant to help young people become autonomous
adults, then part of the educational process is to teach them the gradual steps toward
competency and maturity.
The second problem has to do with Steutel’s view that parents should have the
authority about whether their adolescent children should have sexual engagement, and
that the parents ought to have good reasons to do so. By this standard, as long as the
parents have good justifications to interfere with their adolescent children’s sexual life,
then paternalism is justified. I understand parents do have the legal authority to take their
children’s interests into consideration, but suppose we hear some of the parents’
justifications, and we are able to argue they are not good reasons. What then? Would
Steutel still allow the parents to have authority, or would the lack of justification be
enough to justify the parents losing their paternalistic authority over their child’s sexual
life? He does not say. It seems, if justifications are important, we should go straight to the
justifications themselves instead of waiting to see what the parents would say. As
Tellings suggests, “if Steutel’s criterion were to be preserved perhaps there should be
defined criteria for when parents are considered to be able to judge the competence of
their children.”161 What sort of justifications could parents give? Would their adolescent

160
161

Steutel is using this from Dutch criminal law, which is where he resides.
Tellings, 207.
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children stay within the bounds of parental rules?162 Again, Steutel does not say but, as
suggested above, Steutel is in a bind either way he answers.
2.2. Protecting the Adolescent from Sexual Exploitation

The paternalist could argue that adolescents must be protected because they could be
potentially sexually exploited or coerced. Of course, the paternalist must consider that
this could happen at any age, not just to adolescents.
Sexual assault has a detrimental effect on one’s well-being. Studies suggest that
someone will be sexually assaulted every 98 seconds.163 Most of these encounters are
from someone they have known, loved, or have previously been involved with sexually.
The paternalist presumably could suggest the younger adolescent is immature and naive
and, because of this naïveté, another person could take advantage of them. Robert Van
Wyk argues for this position and suggests implementing sexual abstinence programs,
claiming all teenagers (especially boys) violate Kant’s principle of respecting another
person’s autonomy, thereby exploiting that person. Let us take a look at his argument that
he offers:
1. Most acts of sexual intercourse between teenagers are morally bad.164

162

Tellings is dubious about a parental ban: “I think, first, that this [Steutel’s] guideline works
better in a framework of advice to the adolescent than under the wider framework of either a moral ban or
consent. I feel that for the many young people who are not inclined to do any of these forbidden things
[sexual activities that parents forbid] the parental ban is immaterial, whereas for those young people who
are inclined to do these things it is questionable whether a parental ban will prevent them from doing
them,” 205. Presumably, it seems very unlikely that adolescents would ask for their parents’ permission to
engage in sexual activity. They usually do it secretly and without regard to the law.
163
Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network (RAINN). “Statistics.” (Accessed November 14,
2018.) https://www.rainn.org/statistics.
164
One thing to note is that Van Wyk should make premise one say “Most acts of heterosexual
intercourse…” if his argument is to critique heterosexual adolescent sexual relations.
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2. Therefore, any particular act of sexual intercourse between teenagers is morally
bad unless there is some good reason to believe it is the exceptional case.
3. It is highly unlikely that any particular teenager has good evidence that his or her
situation is exceptional, or, given the strengths of sexual desires, lack of maturity,
and the general track record of teenagers, that he or she is in a good position to
make such a judgement.
4. Therefore, this particular act is probably morally bad.
5. A morally bad act is also morally wrong and a policy approving such acts is
morally wrong, unless there is some powerful consideration on the other side
which would outweigh its badness (e.g., that refraining would involve some great
deprivation or sacrifice, or some harm to another person).
6. A policy of postponing sexual intercourse while one is a teenager does not
involve any great deprivation or sacrifice or harm to another person.
7. If a person has good reasons to believe that an act or a policy he or she is
considering is probably morally wrong (in the objective sense), then it would be
wrong (in the subjective sense) for that person to perform the act or adopt the
policy.
8. Therefore sexual acts between teenagers are morally wrong and very permissive
policies of sexual behavior for teenagers are undesirable.
The entire argument hinges on premise one. Why is premise one true? Van Wyk argues
that people who are in the first or second stages of psychosexual maturation violate
Kant’s categorical imperative of respecting persons.165 He also states that most high

165

Van Wyk is relying on Viktor Frankl’s four stages of psychosexual maturation. The first stage
is to reduce tension. The second stage is where one searches for a partner, but an interchangeable partner

110

school boys are in the first or second stages of psychosexual maturation. Therefore, most
acts of sexual intercourse between teenagers are morally bad, which is what premise one
states. First, we can ask about the truth claim about whether high school boys are in the
first or second stages. He offers “pieces of evidence” for his case:
One recent study discovered that approximately 70 percent of older teens believed
that it was morally permissible to have sexual intercourse with a woman who was
too drunk to have much of an idea what she was doing. Another study discovered
that 70 percent of high school boys thought there was nothing wrong with a boy
lying to a girl and telling her that he was in love with her when he was not, if that
would get the girl to have sexual relations with him.166
This is a very telling about how young teenage boys treat teenage women
whereby the women are treated as mere sex objects. However, teaching abstinence-only
does not solve the problem. After all, if these young men have these same attitudes now,
why would they change just because they abstained from sex? Suppose that they were to
abstain from sex until after high school. These same young men may still have these
same attitudes toward women. Simply getting older and refraining from sex does not fix a
faulty mindset. Rather than fixing the problem by telling them to abstain, their attitudes
must change. Admittedly, this is harder, but an abstinence-only program hardly talks
about attitude changes regarding a healthy sexuality, meaning to not see people as mere
sex objects. Moreover, abstinence-only programs ignore the complexities of how culture
informs one’s attitudes about sexuality, which includes permissiveness and restrictions.
Young boys have a more lenient attitude when it comes to sexuality, but is this part of

where the partner is used as an object. The third stage is where the sex partner is not seen as an object, but
as a human being. The fourth stage is when the sex partner is seen as a unique human being and loved for
his or her uniqueness.
Frankl offered a sketch of his four stages to connect love and meaning. I have not found any
professional sources to determine whether Frankl’s ideas are accepted or contestable. There has not been
any traction with Frankl’s sketch. But even if it were accepted, Wan Wyk’s position is suspect as I show in
the rest of this section.
166
Van Wyk, 45-46. Unfortunately, Van Wyk never cites where he got these sources.

111

their nature and their psychosexual development, or is it a reflection of how culture
informs young men about how they ought to behave sexually? Our society reflects
various sexual/gender norms and these current norms predominantly reflect
heteronormative attitudes: men are the sexual aggressors, women are the sexual
gatekeepers, masculinity presents dominant and powerful features, femininity presents
passive and timid features. If these features are reflective of what society considers the
norm, then the attitudes of young men (and women) are not inborn, but instilled. Thus,
Van Wyk’s explanation speaks about how boys treat and view women. Contrary to what
he argues, his argument does not suggest that there is something intrinsically wrong with
adolescent sex. In short, Van Wyk is speaking about a cultural phenomenon, not a natural
or inherent psychosexual one.167
As an example, there is still a double standard when it comes to men and women
as sexual beings, especially as teenagers. There is a tension between the idea that a
majority of people find no problem with premarital sex, 168 yet our culture still shames
people—especially women—for being sexual before marriage. Young women have to be
“the good girl” whereas there is no such equivalent for men. “Sexuality and the desire to
be attractive as a dating partner present conflicting ideals for women. Girls learn to look
sexy but say no, to be feminine but not sexual, and to attract boys’ desire but not to
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Schalet points out that American adolescent women rather than Dutch adolescent women
experience “a conflict between their role as good daughters and their sexual selves” (p. 112). Indeed, the
cultural presumptions are so strong that “for American girls, it can be difficult to reconcile sexual
maturation with parents’ expectations of them as ‘good girls,’ while American boys confront the
expectation that they will be ‘bad’” (p. 155).
168
Jean Calterone Williams. “Battling a ‘sex-saturated society’: The Abstinence Movement and
the Politics of Sex Education,” in Sexualities. vol. 14 no. 4 (August 2011): 422. See also Pamela C. Regan
The Mating Game: A Primer on Love, Sex, and Marriage. 3rd Edition. (London: Sage Publications, Ltd.,
2017), 239-240 where she cites many studies.
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satisfy their own.”169 To give empirical data, polls show people’s full acceptance of
premarital sex has moved from 26.5 percent in 1972 to 56 percent in 2012. When asked if
premarital sex is “always wrong,” the numbers show 34.2 percent believed it was in 1972
while only 21.3 percent believed that in 2012.170 However, the double sexual standard is
still present in that premarital sex is no longer a taboo, but men and women may be
judged differently if they engage in various sexual activities.171 Perhaps people may
accept premarital sex in the abstract, but deep down, they reveal their moral tendencies
when they apply it to different genders. As an example, an abstinence-only-untilmarriage sex education program in Florida—which has slowly gained prominence in its
“It’s Great to Wait” campaign—claims:
[w]hen it comes to sex, men are microwaves and women are Crock-pots. Unlike
women, men can be ready to have sex in just seconds, without any of the ‘slow
heating’ that women need for their emotions to become engaged. Men do not need
emotions to have sex. We are visual, and visual stimulus is all it takes for us to be
there, ready to go. Women cannot enjoy sex without emotions, though, because
it’s through their emotions that they become stimulated. For men, the emotional
follows the physical. For women, it’s the other way around.172
By following this norm, men and women have certain expectations that one must follow
and if women seem interested in emotionless sex or if men want emotional sex,
something is wrong.

169

Crawford, Mary Crawford and Danielle Popp. “Sexual double standards: A review and
methodological critique of two decades of research,” in The Journal of Sex Research, 40:1, 2003, 24.
170
Tom W. Smith and Jaesok Son. “Final Report: Trends in Public Attitudes About Sexual
Morality,” (NORC at the University of Chicago: April, 2013), 9.
171
“Currently, premarital sex and sexual intercourse outside of committed relationships are more
widely accepted for women and men. Nevertheless, evaluations of other sexual behaviors and situations—
such as being active in the expression of sexuality and having nontraditional relationships or partners—
continue to be based on different criteria for men and women,” Gabriela Sagebin Bordini and Tania Mara
Sperb. “Sexual double standard: A review of the literature between 2001 and 2010.” Sexuality & Culture
17.4 (2013): 702.
172
Kendall, 156.
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Moreover, assuming this narrative means that if men cannot control their sexual
passions, then anything can trigger their sexual impulses which seems to undermine one’s
autonomy. From here it follows, to keep one’s autonomy in check, there ought not be any
triggers which could stimulate men’s sexual arousal. If women are the cause of this
sexual arousal, then women’s sexual expression ought to be contained and controlled in
order to reduce a man’s temptations. These controls could include the way women dress,
the way women act, the way women talk, the way women drink, the way women walk, or
simply the way women see other people. If she falls into his temptation, then she is to
blame because she lost the power. Her responsibility is to maintain these relationships
and make them stable. Thus, teen pregnancy, rape, and sexual abuse become more female
failures, which is why there are still young women who blame themselves after being
raped or sexually assaulted. Therefore, even by teaching autonomy alone, gender roles
may not be challenged which could thereby suggest the responsibility lies on women to
dress and behave in permissible ways so as to not arouse men. This narrative also silences
men and denigrates their choices and capacities. He is an animal and unaccountable.
Boys’ ultimate decision is to find and search for a potential partner; girls’ ultimate
decision is to make sure that boys make better decisions later in life.173
Finally, the hidden assumption in Van Wyk’s argument is that teenage boys will
never think beyond the first or second stages, perhaps because they are teens. As
mentioned before, this problem is not an inherent psychosexual one but a cultural one.
The solution is to break out of this cultural background. What this means is a shift in how
one treats others, and also oneself, and people deserving dignity and respect regardless of
sex/gender. As a potential way out, education is the key, but not of the PSE kind. PSE
173

Cf. Kendall, 165.
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ensures that the status quo continues, which means the culture of exploitation is still
upheld, including purity culture and victim-blaming as I will show in section 4. Changing
the culture of exploitation would be the solution but to do so, adolescents must have
information regarding sex and relationships. They must be taught about sexual consent
and realize anything less than a “yes” is not consent. Changing the cultural expectations
requires an educational process. The solution, however, is not to restrict information
about sexuality. For one, adolescents need the proper tools to know what is considered
consensual sex as opposed to coerced or manipulated sex. Therefore, teaching consent
and how to give and receive consent is a better educational route than simply teaching to
abstain from sex. A fuller discussion of consent-based sex will be taken up in chapter
four.

3. Consequentialist Considerations

Paternalists could use consequentialist considerations to justify paternalism in PSE,
which would improve the welfare of the adolescent. To start, Dworkin gives some
conditions of paternalism which I consider from a consequentialist perspective:
X acts paternalistically towards Y by doing (or omitting) Z:
1. Z (or its omission) interferes with the liberty or autonomy of Y.
2. X does so without the consent of Y.
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3. X does so just because doing [or omitting] Z will improve the welfare of Y
(where this includes preventing his welfare from diminishing), or in some way
promote the interests, values, or good of Y.174
This argument states paternalism is justified if it improves the welfare of the recipient.
Let us apply this definition to PSE. For condition one, X interferes with the liberty or
autonomy of Y (typically the adolescent) by withholding sexual information. However, I
have argued that the adolescent has the right to have sexual information, as explained in
section one. For condition two, X acts paternalistically towards Y without Y’s consent.
My main focus will be on the premise that discusses consequences: condition three.
Applying this principle to sex education, how does PSE improve the welfare of Y? There
are two ways to answer this question: (a) ensuring a form of protection because Y is not
emotionally mature enough to handle sexual encounters and could therefore be
emotionally harmed if Y did engage in sexual encounters, or (b) imposing a specific
value onto Y to improve Y’s behavior. I will take each of these in turn.
3.1. Ensuring a Form of Protection

This justification stems from the fact that Y ostensibly does not have the rational or
mature capacities to have sexual encounters. Thus, X does Y a favor by encouraging Y
not to engage in these sexual encounters for the benefit of Y, or at least discouraging Y
from engaging in sexual activities. For this to work, we must ask what is X protecting Y
from? Presumably, protection means one is averted from harm. Obvious harms from
sexual activity are unwanted pregnancies and STIs. If protection is a way to avoid
174

Gerald Dworkin. “Paternalism.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. February 12, 2017.
(Accessed November 14, 2018.) https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paternalism/.
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unwanted pregnancies and STIs, and the best way to ensure protection is to encourage
abstinence (PSE), then PSE is justified. Thus, as a way to ensure protection from riskyyet-protected sex such as a comprehensive model would provide, the PSE plan would
promote abstinence as the only way to prevent STIs and unplanned pregnancies.175

175
See Office of Disease Prevention and Health Promotion. “Family Planning.” (Accessed
November 14, 2018.) http://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/topicsobjectives2020/overview.aspx?topicid=13.
Most PSE curriculum focus on being abstinent for avoiding unwanted consequences. There is a notable
exception: Sex Can Wait curriculum. Sex Can Wait is a different type of abstinence-only curriculum. They
do not follow the ideology of faith-based programs. The book comes from the Center of Evidence-Based
Programming. The curriculum has won the US Department of Health and Human Services Award five
times for outstanding work in Community Health Promotion. The Waxman Report on Abstinence
Education gave a devastating critique to thirteen most frequently used in federal grants, major abstinencebased programs in 2004, (See US House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform-Minority
Staff. (2004). “The content of federally funded abstinence-only education programs.” Dec. 2004. (Accessed
Nov. 23, 2018.) http://spot.colorado.edu/~tooley/HenryWaxman.pdf). There were only two programs that
did not contain major errors and distortions of public health information. Sex Can Wait was one of those
two programs. The curriculum frequently adapted with permission curricula from another sex education
book from Pamela Wilson and Douglas Kirby. Wilson has later written Our Whole Lives curricula based on
Unitarian Universalist values, which is based on comprehensive sex education. Kirby is a major researcher
who has evaluated sex education programs and mainly endorses comprehensive over abstinence-only sex
education programs.
The authors plan on updating their textbook, which will include contraception. The book’s
message will be abstinence is the best value. By doing so, the curriculum may no longer be considered
abstinence-only, but abstinence-plus. One of the authors has stated that most people on the right do not
consider this abstinence enough (personal conversation). University of Arkansas health science professor
Michael Young, co-author the “Sex Can Wait” curriculum, has been targeted by conservatives because he
argues that abstinence education be medically accurate and neutral on religion and abortion. Young was
vilified by Focus on the Family and the Abstinence Clearinghouse for conducting a university-approved
survey asking state abstinence coordinators how they define “sexual activity.” “I’ve been involved in
controversy forever,” said Young, a Southern Baptist deacon, “but I never before felt I could lose my job”
(Lara Riscol. “Sex, Lies and Politics.” The Nation. June 29, 2015. (Accessed November 14, 2018.)
https://www.thenation.com/article/sex-lies-and-politics).
Here are some other examples to make this curriculum standout compared to other PSE
curriculum:
• They do not endorse gender stereotypes and challenge double standards. They challenge the notion
that women are the gatekeepers of sexuality (it is the woman’s job to say “no”) and that men must
test these limits.
• Both sexes will experience pressures. Men will have the pressure to “prove” masculinity and keep
their feelings inside. Females will have the pressure to have children one day and to be sexy but
nonsexual. The educator’s job is to examine these pressures but also maintain the social value of
abstaining from sexual activity until they are in a marital relationship.
• The emotional expenditures they consider is when a teenager has a baby, through extra
responsibilities and being overwhelmed. There was no mention of emotional loss from simply
have sex without marriage.
• The curriculum focuses on decision-making, building self-esteem, and understanding their values.
When it comes to sexual decision-making, the authors argue that abstinence is the best choice
because of the overall benefits and consequences.
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Undoubtedly, unplanned pregnancies can have a detrimental effect on a young
person’s life. Eighty-seven percent of female teens report they would either be very upset
or a little upset if they became pregnant. Yet each year, almost 750,000 young women
from the US become pregnant (ages 15-19). Eighty-two percent of teenage pregnancies
are unplanned, and fifty-nine percent of teenage pregnancies end in birth. In 2011, there
were 31 births per 1000 women aged 15-19.176 Besides taking on new responsibilities,
one’s goals and life aspirations may be shortened or eliminated because one must now
take care of another. Likewise, having STIs can have a detrimental effect on one’s life as
well. Most STIs can be treated with antibiotics. However, depending on the infection, the
severity could be lifelong and have a debilitating effect on Y’s life such as HIV. Again, in
this scenario, X intervenes for the welfare of Y’s life.
Since I am focusing on adolescents, I will argue there are better ways to prevent
these unwanted consequences for this age group. To start, I offer empirical research
findings showing the best way to prevent these unwanted consequences is a more
approachable sex education. Many of these studies indicate that a non-PSE has reduced
unwanted pregnancies and STIs, which indicates that a more comprehensive program has
decreased these unwanted consequences.177 In fact, if states endorsing abstinence-only

•

They offer different theories as to how people make sexual decisions such as poverty, expectancy
of achieving their goals, and learned helplessness. These discussions can help students achieve a
sense that simply choosing to be abstinent is already assuming a type of person.
Despite these great benefits, they do not include contraception in the current edition.
176
Guttmacher Institute. “American Teens’ Sexual and Reproductive Health.” May 2014, 1-4.
(Accessed November 13, 2018.) https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/pubs/FB-ATSRH.pdf.
177
Williams, 418; Mabray and Labauve, 35-36; Temple-Smith et. al., 26. And Christopher
Trenholm, Barbara Devaney, Ken Fortson, Lisa Quay, Justin Wheeler, and Melissa Clark. “Impacts of Four
Title V, Section 510 Abstinence Education Programs.” Mathematica Policy Research. April 30, 2007.
(Accessed November 18, 2018.) https://www.mathematica-mpr.com/our-publications-andfindings/publications/impacts-of-four-title-v-section-510-abstinence-education-programs are more specific
by focusing on Title V of the Social Security Act of 1996 that was mentioned in the last chapter. They
argue that “youth in the [abstinence-only] program group were no more likely than control group youth to
have abstained from sex and, among those who reported having had sex, they had similar numbers of
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sex education resulted in adolescents becoming abstinent, then the obvious result would
be those same states having lower teenage pregnancy or unwanted pregnancy. This is not
the case, however. Stanger-Hall and Hall show that “[t]he level of abstinence
education…was positively correlated with both teen pregnancy indicating that abstinence
education in the U.S. does not cause abstinence behavior. To the contrary, teens in states
that prescribe more abstinence education are actually more likely to become pregnant.”178
Part of the reason is because students in an abstinence-only program are taught
abstinence is the only way to prevent unwanted consequences and that common
preventative measures, such as contraceptives, have exaggerated high failure rates. Thus,
students get the impression these methods do not work that well and end up not using
them, nor do they know how to use them. However, if adolescents do not learn about
contraceptives, then they will not know how to use them when they will be sexually
active. Therefore, a good sex education ought to teach about multiple forms of
contraception and how to use them properly. If education is all about abstinence, then
students will not know how to use contraceptives, which could have disastrous
consequences, such as unwanted pregnancies and STIs—things that proponents of PSE
want to avoid in the first place.

sexual partners and had initiated sex at the same mean age. Contrary to concerns raised by some critics of
the Title V, Section 510 abstinence funding, however, program group youth were no more likely to have
engaged in unprotected sex than control group youth” (p. xvii). Indeed, the report also showed that the
students in the abstinence program and the control group had the same rates of unprotected sex. On
average, the students had their first sexual intercourse at 14.9 in the program and control group, as well as
having the same number of sexual partners. They both had the same level of knowledge of STDs, however
the program showed that the students thought that condoms were less effective at preventing STDs than the
control group.
178
Stanger-Hall, Kathrin F. Stanger-Hall, and David W. Hall. “Abstinence-only education and
teen pregnancy rates: why we need comprehensive sex education in the US.” PloS one 6, no. 10 (2011): 4.
My emphasis. Moreover, Trenholm et. al. concluded that “the programs had no effect on the sexual
abstinence of youth. But it also finds that youth in these programs were no more likely to have unprotected
sex, a concern that has been raised by some critics of these programs.”
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Moreover, if the focus is on abstinence because of the worry of pregnancy
primarily, then the discussion sets an assumption of heterosexual interactions which
excludes LGBTQIA issues. There are no discussions of LGBTQIA identities and any
discussion of pregnancy is heteronormative, where the default is that sexuality is all about
heterosexuals.179 A good comprehensive program must be sure to not endorse
heterosexual or gender norms, which makes any sexual diversity invisible. However, as
of this present writing, twelve states require discussion of sexual orientation, nine states
require that discussion of sexual orientation be inclusive, and three states require only
negative information on sexual orientation.180
3.1.1. Protecting the Adolescent from Emotional Harm

X could also aim to protect Y from emotional harm. Since Y cannot fully comprehend the
ramifications of some sort of sexual engagement, Y will eventually experience emotional
harms or, worse, Y could be taken advantage of by sexual exploitation if Y experiences
sexual engagement. Thus, X must protect Y for Y’s welfare. Is this the right action for X
to do? I argue no. X’s paternalistic overreach goes too far.
To get federal funding, sex educators are required to teach that nonmarital sex “is
likely to have harmful psychological and physical effects” as suggested by the Social
Security Act of 1996.181 Thus, the starting premise is that if nonmarital sex “is likely to
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Another thing to note is that there is no discussion of pleasure, masturbation, or intimacy. If the
paternalistic model suggests that adolescents are hypersexual beings that need to control their instincts,
perhaps a better way to help them release some of this sexual tension is to help them engage in a sexual
activity that is free of unwanted consequences: masturbation. This would be consistent with PSE’s goals.
Yet, this is hardly ever discussed in PSE, which makes sexuality centered around male pleasure. See Peggy
Orenstein. “When Did Porn Become Sex Ed?” New York Times, March 19, 2016.
180
“Sex and HIV Education”
181
Social Security Act, Title V, Section 510. Maternal and Child Health Bureau, U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services, 1997.
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have harmful psychological and physical effects,” then PSE is justified to protect
adolescents from harmful psychological or physical effects. As evidence for the
antecedent, the paternalist would cite research which has indicated a correlation between
teenagers being sexually active and emotional harm, such as depression,182 shame, or
guilt. Because these feelings could affect Y’s well-being, X needs to intervene in order to
protect Y.
A person who specifically focuses on these negative consequences is Robert
Rector, a senior research fellow at The Heritage Foundation who drafted the definition of
abstinence included in the Social Security Act of 1996. He claims to have shown a
correlation between adolescent sexuality and depression,183 and the solution, therefore, is
abstinence-only sex education. Johnson et. al. argues that “[t]eens should be told that
sexual activity in teen years is clearly linked to reduced personal happiness. Teens who
are depressed should be informed that sexual activity is likely to exacerbate, rather than
alleviate, their depression. Teens who are not depressed should be told that sexual
activity in teen years is likely to substantially reduce their happiness and personal wellbeing.”184 But why? Johnson et. al. do not say, but to be generous to their argument, we
could say it is because teens are not fully emotionally mature for sexual activity and
engaging in sex while they are not emotionally ready leads to emotional problems like
182

Kirk Johnson, Lauren Noyes, and Robert Rector. “Sexually Active Teenagers Are More Likely
to Be Depressed and to Attempt Suicide.” The Heritage Foundation. June 3, 2003. (Accessed November
16, 2018.) https://www.heritage.org/education/report/sexually-active-teenagers-are-more-likely-bedepressed-and-attempt-suicide. The study also took into account of gender, race, income, and age as control
variables. Regnerus & Uecker also mention this on page 148-149: “emerging adults who engage in shorter
and more frequent sexual relationships exhibit lower self-esteem and more guilt than those who are either
abstinent or sexually active only within the confines of a sustained romantic relationship.” (See Mark
Regnerus and Jeremy Uecker. Premarital Sex in America: How Young Americans Meet, Mate, and Think
about Marrying. (NY: Oxford University Press, 2011).)
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Johnson, et al.
184
Johnson, et al. My emphasis. Evert and Butler also repeats the study, 69-70. See Jason Evert &
Crystalina and Brian Butler. Theology of the Body for Teens. (West Chester, PN: Ascension Press, 2006).
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anxiety, guilt, shame, or depression which could come about because of shame and/or
guilt, because the adolescent is not ready for sexual encounters or may feel pressured to
have sex.
The curriculum, Choose the Best JOURNEY, also agrees implying “sexually
active teens will never have a happy future, and implies that only teens with low selfesteem and poor judgment become sexually active.”185 The consequences of non-marital
sex include “guilt, disappointment, worry, depression, sadness, loneliness, and loss of
self-esteem.”186
The main problem with this line of reasoning is that it begs the question when it
comes to emotional harms. Exactly why does teenage sex lead to depression, guilt, and
lack of self-esteem? It cannot be simply because teens are unmarried. If so, we would see
a substantial number of depressed adults who have engaged in premarital sex, but this
does not seem to be case.187 Indeed, the majority of adults in the US have nonmarital sex
and there is no scientific evidence to support the claim that premarital sex causes
depression.188 Johnson et. al. assume that depression comes after one engages in sex.
They would need to construct an argument for that. After all, the adolescent could have
already had depressive symptoms such that engaging in sex was a way to unsuccessfully
cope with the depression. Moreover, to say that all types of adolescent sex causes
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depression is too universal of a claim without looking at the context of the relationship in
which sex occurs.189
If the reason why adolescents should not engage in sex is because they may not be
emotionally ready, what about adolescents who are emotionally ready? As Grello et al.
indicate, sex in a committed relationship—a relationship that is emotionally and
romantically invested where the partners involved can declare they are each other’s
boyfriend or girlfriend—was not associated with problematic functioning, such as
depression, delinquent behavior, or exposure to physical violence. Moreover, any
problematic behavior (such as depression) could have existed before the adolescent
engages in sexual intercourse.190
A better solution to alleviate depressive adolescents engaging in sexual activity
would be to make them aware of what it means to be emotionally ready so they can reach
readiness on their own terms. Moreover, if depression leads to engaging in risky sexual
189
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note:
sexual intercourse in the context of an emotionally committed relationship was not found
to be associated with problematic behavior or functioning, but casual sex was associated with
problematic functioning [depressive symptoms, delinquent behaviors, and victimization], and the
problems existed before the adolescents ever engaged in sexual intercourse. Sexual behaviors
have been strongly linked with depression, especially in younger females; accordingly, depressive
symptoms may be a salient factor, especially for females who engage in casual sex (256-257, my
emphasis).
They also note that there is a link between early initiation of sexual intercourse and depression in
females in regards to casual sex, but no causal connection is to be found. If there is a correlation, the
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activity, the solution is to get to the root of the problem and help the adolescent with the
depression. To simply discourage the adolescent from engaging in sex or forbid them to
have sexual information does not address the problem, but only a symptom of the
problem.
What about other negative emotions that proponents of PSE declare many
adolescents may experience if they engage in premarital sex, such as anxiety, shame, or
guilt? Empirically, the data is mixed as to who is receiving the negative emotions, and at
what stage one has the negative emotions. For example, a study shows both men and
women became more anxious after the first instance of intercourse in a serious
relationship rather than a casual encounter.191 On the other hand, guilt was experienced
by both sexes when there was a casual sexual encounter rather than in a serious
relationship. Moreover, the longer the relationship, the less one felt guilt after the first
sexual encounter.192 In terms of pleasure, both sexes experienced more pleasure when
they waited until the age of seventeen.193
What causes these emotions? Shame is attributed to the belief one did something
wrong in the eyes of society or some social standard. Guilt comes about because one
internalizes and realizes one did something wrong. One can ask, however, why one does
feel guilt or shame from the sexual act? Perhaps this is because there is already a stigma
attached to adolescent sexuality. If adolescents engage in sex and they are aware of the
stigma, they will feel ashamed if others know about the sexual behavior. Moreover, they
may feel guilt by internalizing the shame or from the associated stigma. As an example,
191
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Choosing the Best JOURNEY had a video where a young woman, Sarah, explains
“[e]very time I had sex I was giving away a piece of my heart. I was giving away
something I could never get back…”194 Each character in the vignettes had different
variations, but students were asked what sort of emotion (e.g. worry, guilt, depression,
feeling used, lower self-esteem) a character would have due to premarital sex. The
curriculum is set up where sex is shameful, and those who engage in it should be
ashamed of not only the act, but of themselves. It may be true that adolescents having sex
may lead to depression; it does not follow, however, that adolescent sexuality is the
source of this depression. If anything, the correlation could be a function of society’s
treatment of adolescent sexuality, such as the unfounded stigma attached to adolescent
sexuality.195 Arguments from Johnson et. al. and curricula such as Choosing the Best
JOURNEY reinforce the stigma of adolescent sexuality and that if they express their
sexual desires, they would feel shame and guilt. In other words, their arguments that
premarital sex leads to shame, guilt, or depression is a self-fulfilling prophecy: depression
could be because of the consequences of our sexual culture and not the activity of sex
itself. Furthermore, Regnerus and Uecker show sex is not the culprit in causing
depression: “Nonvirgin women’s emotional health is better when they are in a
194
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Orenstein remarks: “it may be the shaming of sexually active teens rather than sex itself that is
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subsequently regret sexual activity” (Girls & Sex, 86).
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relationship than when they are not.”196 Indeed, their research shows that it does not
matter how many partners one had. As long as they are in a relationship, they typically
exhibit better emotional health. “The story, then, is not so much about avoiding sexual
relationships but sustaining a relationship rather than cycling in and out of them.”197
Premarital sex, then, is not always the problem. If someone does engage in sexual activity
with the latent guilt already within, one will eventually feel depressed and ashamed. In
order to escape the shame, adolescents sometimes engage in the same behavior to escape
the shame, but then feel even more ashamed. The cycle can repeat itself falling into what
clinical psychologist Gershen Kaufman has called “the shame spiral.”198 Thus, there is a
possibility that the shame and guilt caused the sexual activity, and not the other way
around. Rector et al. do not mention the possibility of this shame spiral.
What are the reasons why sex and depression are linked, especially for
adolescents? Grello et. al. note that one possible explanation is that already depressed
females may seek validation and sex is a way to get the validation.199 There is a double
standard when it comes to sexuality, especially at the expense of females:
social norms and expectations continue to define casual sex encounters as
acceptable for males and objectionable for females…and females have been found
to be less tolerant of other females who participate in such relationships…Males
have been found to experience more pleasure and less guilt than females when
they engage in sexual behavior with partners who are casual.…Guilt, regret, and
the violation of societal expectations may contribute to female psychological
distress.200
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In short, while paternalists draw the conclusion is that being sexually active at a young,
undeveloped age leads to depression, the story is more complicated as suggested by the
studies mentioned by Grello et. al., Regnerus & Uecker, Sabia and Rees, and Sprecher et.
al.: depression does not necessarily stem from being sexually active. Rather, depression
could have been the consequences of a culture that already stigmatizes against adolescent
sexuality. Thus, it is the cultural effect of adolescent sexuality, the stigma against
adolescent sexuality—particularly on young women—and not sexual activity itself that
could lead to depression. If, as these studies suggest, depression leads to casual sex, 201
then the solution is to target the depression. To target casual sex does not focus on the
problem, and casual sex may be morally permissible. Some parents, however, would be
against this because it goes against their values. As part of our liberal democracy, we do
allow the parents to have a say in what values they can teach the child. However, what if
certain values do not help Y? This then leads us to the last possibility of how PSE is for
the welfare of Y: imposing values on to Y.
3.2. Imposing a Specific Value Onto Y to Improve Y’s Behavior.

One way to protect the welfare of people is to make sure they act in such a way on their
own. To do so, they would have the value (whatever that value may be) instilled in their
America (Williams, passim). Their arguments stem from the fallen state of society led by secular values
and the loss of “family tradition.” Part of bringing back these values is to enforce abstinence-only sex
education. It is instructive to see how people view this issue, especially those within the religious tradition.
81 percent of Evangelicals say that premarital sex is immoral while only 33 percent of the general
population agrees (Williams, 422). Moreover, 78 percent of Evangelicals believe that premarital sex can
lead to emotional or psychological distress while 46 percent of the general population agrees (Ibid.).
This view explains how proponents of PSE view sexuality within this religious context. Premarital
sex is “a temptation,” something that can entice the spiritually or mentally weak, which is a sin. By
associating premarital sex with other sins, premarital sex becomes perceived as something worse and
worse.
201
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character so that they would act from self-determination. On the surface, it seems that it
is for good consequences: protection from unwanted consequences and to have the value
for their own benefit. While teaching students to remain abstinent has good
consequences, the major problem is that even if we have good consequences and even if
Y is avoiding Z because of X’s interference, Y’s character is not changed. Y may still
have the disposition to do Z. VanDeVeer makes an analogy:
in cases of affecting third parties, we might prevent the protoraptist from raping
by forcing him to take anti-androgen treatments, or by castrating him, but his
consequent nonviolation of the duty not to rape is hardly a basis for attribution of
moral worth or merit. Hence, there seems little reason, if any, to assume that we
can succeed, from some paternalistic concern for a person’s moral good, in
preserving or increasing a person’s moral good by presumptively wrong and
nonconsensual interferences.202
In other words, we may succeed in making sure that Y avoids Z, but there is something
inauthentic if Y cannot internalize the value X has imposed upon her. X may prevent Y
from doing Z, but Y may still prefer to do Z. Y may not understand why refraining from
Z is for her own good. Furthermore, Y may not have the value(s) of X, which was one
possible justification for being paternalistic toward Y in the first place. This is where
paternalism does not fully help Y, but only teaches Y to adhere to a value which Y may
not hold, or at least does not give Y the opportunity to express a value that X considers
negative. The motivation not to do Z is really from X, and not from Y. However, the goal
was to have Y’s motives coming from within, rather than coming from without. In other
words, why have this value in the first place? What makes this value valuable?
Sher has an interesting response to this. Governments can promote a valuable
form of life by non-rationally causing the citizens to acquire a preference for it. “[I]f C’s
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[citizen] preference for W [way of life] is not grounded in a good reason to adopt W, that
preference itself may provide C with such a reason.”203 The initial choice may be
nonautonomous, but further choices may be autonomous. He offers an example: students
are influenced by teachers, which may make their studying a part of their life’s work.
Another example is how children start acting truthfully and fairly to avoid punishment
from parents but, as they develop, they continue to act truthfully on their own. Thus, by
analogy, justification for PSE is permissible so that the citizens will have a preference for
it. As an example of this program, professor of educational policy studies Nancy Kendall
reports an abstinence-only-until-marriage sex education in Florida where they focused on
physical outcomes (STIs and teenage pregnancies) not as unhealthy or irrational choices,
but immoral ones.204 Thus, to change these outcomes, the sex education curriculum
would include ways to change the adolescents’ values concerning sex outside of
marriage. Proponents of PSE state that premarital sex, especially among adolescents, is
simply immoral. Thus, any comprehensive program, even if effective, would legitimate
immorality. Because of the immorality, adolescents should be told what to think and what
to do by being given strong messages about behavior with adequate moral support for
what type of behavior is appropriate.
My response is that proponents may argue premarital sex is wrong, but they do
not give any reason why it is wrong. To determine the immorality of any activity, there
must be a justification for it. Simply saying in general that Z is immoral is not sufficient.
So the question still remains: why is avoiding Z moral, or alternatively, why is engaging
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in Z immoral? Kendall suggests that one answer is that sex before marriage is inherently
immoral:
Reduction of STI and pregnancy rates is not a reasonable concept to AOUME
[abstinence-only-until-marriage education] supporters, because it is the sex act
itself that is immoral. All sex before marriage is inherently dangerous and wrong,
and the moral risk can never be reduced. In contrast, all talk of sex after marriage
was glowing and full of pleasure; no AOUME program presented any information
about the risks of STI transmission or unwanted pregnancy after marriage because
such discussion would be ideologically flawed. Since sex within marriage is
morally acceptable, these unwanted health outcomes are not in and of themselves
a problem.205
Hence, if sex before marriage is inherently wrong, the paternalist appeals to reasons that
are not consequentialist as proponents of PSE thought: simply having the value of
abstaining sex before marriage is itself good. These values help one as a person rather
than focusing on certain actions that one would do. As a thought experiment, suppose that
birth control was 100% effective and that STIs were completely eradicated. Still, as
Kendall has shown, proponents of PSE would argue that sex before marriage is wrong
and that abstinence before marriage is the value to uphold. This argument, then, appeals
to traits or qualities that a person must have rather than simply having them for better
behavior. These values are good for Y as a moral being and it would help one’s
character. This leads me to a greater category, and another form of paternalism: PSE
based on virtue ethics.

4. Virtue Ethical Considerations

Suppose we had perfected technology for preventing unwanted pregnancies and STIs,
and even devised some test where we could instantly see whether adolescents were
205
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mentally mature, rational agents. Would those who support PSE be satisfied of ridding
“thick” paternalism in sex education? If not, the issue of adolescent sexuality ultimately
comes down to how proponents of PSE value sex and the possibility of any moral harms.
These moral harms, however, would not come down to empirical consequences or
through the immature rationality the adolescent. The only possible reason is that
premarital sex results some moral taint to a person’s character. This is where virtue ethics
can come into play where the focus is improving the person rather than just improving
behavior. Put it another way, “we are not trying to make the person’s life go better for
her. What we are trying to do is make her life morally better,”206 or we are trying to make
her a better person.
Virtue ethics has gained credence as an alternative ethical theory. The virtue
ethicist bases ethics on good character and how to live the good life. Traditionally, the
way to do this is by forming habits. How could the proponent of PSE use virtue ethics as
a way to justify PSE? There are two possibilities: (a) instilling the character trait of
purity, and (b) instilling basic character traits through abstinence. I will investigate each
of these justifications.
4.1. Instilling the Character Trait of Purity

Have a particular character trait (namely purity) explains one’s sexual worth. If not, then
one’s worth and value as a person diminished. Most of these programs compare a person
who has had premarital sex with a used product, such as gum, tape, or a toothbrush, such
that one would not want to use the product because a previous person had used it. No one
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wants a chewed up piece of gum, a used piece of tape, or a used toothbrush. By analogy,
people who have premarital sex are used, and the next person will be using the used
product. Thus, one ought to stay pure so that one is not used—and thus, having value—
on their wedding night. There is a lot of appeal to fear and shame in this argument, but let
us see if we can genuinely form an argument, which I will extract mainly from the
Choose the Best series, but could easily be extracted from any PSE curriculum that uses
this same analogy.207 Here is the argument that I have extracted:
1. If people are sexually impure, society deems them as morally tainted.
2. One way that people are sexually impure is by having sex before marriage.
3. Therefore, if students have sex before marriage, they are deemed as morally
tainted.
4. No one wants to be deemed morally tainted.
5. If no one wants to be deemed morally tainted, then students ought to remain pure
(unsexed, unused) before marriage.
6. Therefore, students ought to remain pure (unsexed, unused) before marriage.
7. Remaining pure is a virtuous character trait.
8. PSE is the way for students to know that remaining pure is a virtuous character
trait. In other words, without PSE, students do not learn that remaining pure is a
virtuous character trait.
9. If students do not learn that remaining pure is a virtuous character trait, then they
may not realize that they will be deemed morally tainted if they engage in
premarital sex.
207
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10. If they may not realize that they will be deemed worthless and valueless if they
engage in premarital sex, then PSE is justified in training students to have these
character traits (remaining pure).
11. Therefore, PSE is justified in training students to have these character traits.

Let us investigate each premise. Premise 1 is a descriptive claim and it seems true just
based on how our society is structured. We can therefore say that it is true. Normatively,
however, it is problematic in that calling someone sexually impure is used to irrationally
shame people.
How do proponents of PSE argue for premise 2? In a video segment from Choose
the Best, a person who has had premarital sex is compared to pre-chewed gum, and that
no husband would want that wad of gum.208 The teachers then must explain that “Gum
that has already been chewed isn’t as appealing as when it is unwrapped and new.” In
two counties in Mississippi, a sex education curriculum includes a mock wedding
ceremony with a bride, groom, and “guests.” All of the students performed their
respective roles. During the wedding, the bride and groom exchange rings. Moreover, the
bride presents the groom with a dirty sneaker as a wedding gift, which signifies “a
lifestyle of impurity” and that no sock (representing a condom) could ever fully protect
the foot from “dirt and diseases.” The groom, on the other hand, gives the bride a clean
sneaker, which represents his “purity up until marriage.” The whole ceremony represents
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the bride as being spoiled and if she does not abstain, then she is “dirty,” “impure,” and
not worthy of being a long-term partner.209
This message is so damaging that it can have harmful consequences not just in
terms of emotional connections between fear/shame and sex, but also about how to
evaluate one’s life if one had premarital sex. As an example, Elizabeth Smart, a woman
from Utah who was kidnapped from her home, said she was taught abstinence-only sex
education growing up and was taught a person who was not a virgin before marriage was
considered worthless. Smart remarks on a teacher who compared women who had sex
before marriage to chewing gum:
“I thought, ‘Oh my gosh, I’m that chewed up piece of gum, nobody re-chews a
piece of gum. You throw it away.’ And that’s how easy it is to feel like you no
longer have worth, you no longer have value. Why would it even be worth
screaming out? Why would it even make a difference if you are rescued? Your
life still has no value.”210
Smart’s comments are telling in that her culture was comparing her with food. However,
there is a huge disanalogy between food and a human person. Food is to be chewed up; a
human person always has dignity and is never “used up.” Why is it that sex is the way by
which someone becomes “used up?” Perhaps one good example of this is losing one’s
reputation. However, as mentioned before in section 3.1, losing one’s reputation based on
perceived sexuality seems to be the fault of the culture who blames people (especially
209

Sexuality Information and Education Council of the United States (SIECUS). “Sex Education
in Mississippi: Why ‘Just Wait’ Just Doesn’t Work.” SIECUS. (Accessed November 17, 2018.)
https://siecus.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Sex-Education-in-Mississippi-Why-Just-Wait-Just-DoesntWork.pdf, 25.
210
Aliyah Frumin. “Elizabeth Smart: Abstinence-only Education Can Make Rape Survivors Feel
‘dirty,’ ‘filthy’.” MSNBC. September 13, 2013. (Accessed November 17, 2018.)
http://www.msnbc.com/hardball/elizabeth-smart-abstinence-only-education-ca.

134

women) for having sex, not the sex itself. This relates to slut-shaming which I will focus
on in chapter three.
To clarify premise 4, the curriculum thereby shifts and starts focusing on
character and having various character traits such as honesty, self-control, respect,
responsibility, and caring. Not only does abstinence provide relief from unwanted
consequences such as pregnancy, STIs, and emotional consequences, but abstinence also
“establishes a focus on character and compatibility in an atmosphere of trust and
respect.”211 These ideas set up a false dichotomy between those who have good character
traits (e.g., honesty, responsible, self-control) with being abstinent and those who have
bad character traits (e.g., lacking self-respect, worth, value, lacking responsibility) with
being sexually active. In Sex and Character, the authors relay a story of a young woman
who loses her self-respect because she started having sex without getting married. The
consequence of this is when the couple breaks up, she tries to make herself feel better by
having sex with other boys. She therefore loses more respect for herself.212 We must take
into account what the curriculum is saying and what is actually happening. In 2017, 39.5
percent of high school students reported having sexual intercourse.213 Not only is the
curriculum being ideological in its abstinence message, but it is damaging to almost more
than a third of high school students to say they lack value and worth. I will remark more
on this when I get to premise 8.
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For premise 5, what is the connection between being morally tainted and being
abstinent until marriage? The thinking relates to the notion having more sexual partners
equates to being more sexually impure. Conversely, having fewer sexual partners equates
to not being as sexually impure. However, adding marriage into the equation complicates
things. After all, suppose there were two people who were virgins, had sex with each
other before marriage, and then later got married. Under PSE’s framework, they should
technically be safe because they were not “used up.” However, the ideology suggests
they are indeed still used since they were not married at their first sexual encounter, even
if they only had sex with each other and no one else. The ideology of many PSE’s
curriculum points to marriage as the only worthy goal of engaging in sex, regardless if
people had only one sexual partner before marriage and they married each other.
I will be spending more time on Premise 7 because it has a numerous social and
cultural implications, perhaps more than what the proponents of PSE had in mind.214
These implications leads to purity culture, victim blaming, and STI stigmatization. Purity
culture is the idea that people—particularly adolescents and women—ought to refrain
from sex. Otherwise, they have been tainted. The concept and discourse are structured in
a way where adolescents must refrain from sex and it is a shameful act if they do
otherwise, which can cause shame and guilt to those who engage in sex, even if they are
married. Women experience more guilt than men, possibly because women may feel that
there is something wrong losing their virginity, or had exceptionally high expectations for
her first sexual encounter which, when those expectations were not met, resulted in
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feelings of failure, thus leading to guilt.215 Proponents of PSE argue that because of the
guilt, adolescents—particularly women—ought to remain abstinent until marriage. The
problem, however, is not necessarily the activity of adolescents having sex; rather, it is
the culture and the systemic pressure for keeping adolescents away from having sex.
Suppose a proponent of PSE accepts the view that having sexual feelings is a
normal process in life and that sexuality is a positive thing, but that one ought to express
them in a pure way (i.e., being married). Adolescents, however, have sexual feelings and
may want to express their sexual feelings through sexual activities. What is the way out
of this conflict? One solution is to lower the legal marrying age.216 This, however, is not a
viable option. Virtually everyone in the sex education debate would be against it.
Moreover, if people are younger when they are married, the many people worry they are
not competent to understand the full ramifications of relationships or sexuality.
It seems, then, there is only one option left: change the discourse about adolescent
sexual feelings and behavior. The proper education is to let adolescents know that having
these feelings is a natural part of life and that it is normal to have these feelings.
Expressing these feelings to someone is normal and having sexual experiences before
marriage is also an activity that many people do. Notice the teacher is not promoting sex
before marriage, but simply acknowledges having these sexual feelings is something
many people have over the course of their lives and different people have different values
on whether to express those feelings or not. To change the discourse revolving around
purity culture means to help the adolescents make their own choices regarding sexuality.
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One should not decide to have sex based on what some authoritative figure has said.
Rather, one must make one’s own choices and decide because one is willing, ready, and
fully consents to the act. Of course, to do this properly, adolescents must have a right to
the information they need such as accurate information regarding sexual health, birth
control, healthy relationship development, and sexual preparedness.
This is not to say the paternalist is incorrect that engaging in sex could cause
depression or feelings of shame and guilt, but one needs to see what the source of the
problem causing depression, shame, and guilt due to sex is rather than stating the
symptoms of the problem. It is a truism that people ought not to engage in any kind of
sexual activity if they are not emotionally ready, but this is far different than saying no
adolescents are emotionally ready. If proponents of PSE simply want to teach young
students to simply say “no” to all forms of sexual behavior until marriage, students still
need information about when they are ready and how to tell when they are ready. Saying
marriage is the point when they are ready may not match their emotions or values.217
Furthermore, PSE does not help prepare students about what to do when they do
not say “no.” There is more to sex education than saying “no” until marriage. Students
must, at least have the knowledge of sexual mechanics including protection and
prevention, have an awareness of healthy relationships whereby there is mutual pleasure,
and have the recognition of the social and cultural assumptions of relationships and
sexuality so as to be more reflective in participating in various relationships. If saying
“no” until marriage is the goal to lead a good sexual life with good relationships, then
adolescents will not be prepared for their sexual lives or their intimate relationships. If
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young people just “wing it” when it comes to sexuality and relationships, there will be
many who will miss the target of ethical sexual behavior, engaged sexual subjectivity,
and enhanced intimate relationships. A comprehensive sex education may guide them in
an ethical direction.
As an example, in Theology of the Body for Students, the authors present a way to
live modestly, but the advice feeds into purity culture. In the text, the authors state that if
women are tired of being treated like sex objects, then they should dress, dance, and
speak like ladies. Men would very likely want to satisfy their sexual desires than do what
is best for women (respect them). To mitigate this, women ought to dress modestly (do
not wear clothes that are too tight or too short). The only advice for men is to not talk
trashy.218 This advice sets up different standards for men and women to the point where it
encourages and reinforces traditional sexual norms and gender inequalities. If people do
not follow these gender and sexual scripts, then they are to be blamed. All of this can lead
to victim blaming, which is focusing on and blaming the victim for breaking the gender
or sexual norms. If a woman, for example, wears short or tight clothing, then she is not
dressed modestly. Indeed, she may be dressed in a sexual way where she purportedly is
“asking for it,” meaning to be sexually pursued. Any sexual assault that follows from this
is not the fault of the man since he saw the clothing as a sign that she was sexually
available. In Sex and Character, the authors give advice on how to avoid acquaintance
rape. The advice toward young men seem good (e.g., do not get into the mindset in which
sex is the expected goal in a date; the way the date is dressed is not an invitation; and
being aware of one’s emotions before they get out of hand). But the advice toward young
women are much longer. One such example is to “avoid actions that are sexually
218
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stimulating” such as how one is dressing or even acting. One ought to “dress with
respect” so as to not intentionally “arouse your date” because “Men are more likely to
assume that friendliness implies sexual attraction.”219
This leads to the second entailment: focusing on the victim for any sexual
discretions perpetuates victim blaming. The discourse has the presumption that the victim
(usually female) is going to be the passive participant in the exploitation and that the
perpetrator (usually male) is the assumed norm.220 If males are seen as “naturally”
aggressive toward women, this limits the scope of movement that the female could do,
and classifies them as victims. However, the onus is now on the potential victim to try
and be careful, which, thereby, pushes the perpetrator out of the picture and brings the
potential victim into focus. Fear of being a victim prompts women to protect their bodies
by restricting the scope of movement, and this is a posture of submission. They can
become hyper aware of their surroundings, which can cause anxiety. Internalizing this
submission can teach women to have this mentality, which limits one’s autonomy. These
prevention strategies actually restrict choice formation: choices such as where to go,
when to go, whom to go with and in general how to move about in the world are limited
by the threat of violence. Cahill notes that in a patriarchal society, a woman’s mobility is
limited:
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Within the invisible wall she throws up around her, a woman may consider her
space safe; in this space, she has increased control over her body. To go beyond
that space is to enter an arena where her body is in danger of being violated. This
limited, individual safety zone which determines the smallness of a women’s step,
the gathering in of her sitting body, and the daintiness of her gestures mirrors in
fact the larger hampering of her mobility. For a woman, the travellable [sic] world
is a small place. Entire portions of each 24-hour are deemed unsafe, and unless
accompanied by a man (or, alternatively, many women), these hours should be
spent in the safety of one’s home. Geographical areas which may be completely
accessible to men are, for women, sites of possible (or likely) harassment,
molestation, or rape.221
A woman may want to go somewhere, or simply move about around her neighborhood,
but the threat of exploitation restricts her from making that choice. It is not as if all men
are rapists, but rather all women are potential rape victims,222 as if violence against
women was the expected norm.
Focusing on women as a potential sexual victim perpetuates the status quo that
victims need to be on the lookout for potential sexual exploiters. However, we do not do
this for any other crime. Many women cannot walk on the streets by themselves,
especially at night, for fear of being attacked or harmed. Most men do not have this
experience. Women have to carry pepper spray, mace, or are taught to carry their keys a
certain way just in case they do get attacked. Men typically do not need to do this.
Women usually take extra precautions because of the threat of an imminent attack or
harm. Men, on the other hand, do not need to take these extra precautions because it is
significantly less likely they will be attacked or harmed by women. If men do get
attacked, it is most often because someone was provoked and not simply because of his
gender whereas women frequently get attacked simply because of her gender. The
genders are therefore being educated differently.
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Under PSE, the education does not question this gender dynamic. Because this
has been the norm for a long time, the institution of these gender roles is unquestioned
and the gender roles are therefore thought of as natural. Indeed, it seems odd every time
people go out, they would have to prepare themselves to potentially meet someone who
could harm them. To tell them they should have extra precautions and be ready for people
who could possibly harm them shifts the burden onto them rather than onto the problem.
If they somehow get, for example, robbed while shopping, the patrons could blame them
for not being fully prepared to act against potential exploiters. Yet women are blamed for
not preparing to defend themselves, or dressing provocatively causing speculation about
whether they “asked for it.” By ensuring that women are part of the problem, the focus is
still on them223 because women “should know better.” PSE’s motivation to protect Y
(which, in this context, are usually women) is indirectly a way to keep women in their
place which can cause further exploitation. Thus, PSE’s motivation to protect Y from
exploitation could implicitly encourage exploitation since the focus is not on exploitation
as a whole, but only on the exploited. As Temple-Smith et. al. put it, “[f]ocusing on the
male as predator (seeking only pleasure) and female as victim (seeking romance and
intimacy) perpetuates gender inequalities and traditional sexual scripts.”224 Likewise, a
society where women are blamed for not preparing themselves and then told it is their
fault for being attacked is one which embraces victim blaming.
Finally, premise 7 encourages STI stigmatization. The information in most PSE
curricula is usually presented as the worst case scenario of contracting an STI, but which
easily be treated if caught early enough and tested regularly. In Worth the Wait
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curriculum, the lesson points out that people who have an STI do not know it and can still
infect their partners. They then conclude that the best choice is for teens not to have
sex.225 Never in these options is there an opportunity to show how to get rid of most STIs.
From Mississippi, they have rapper Carlos “Los-1” Ramirez who uses hip hop to appeal
to young students. Each lesson has a song in which the students answer questions about
the song. However, the lyrics are based on inaccurate information and shame-based
techniques. For example, the song, “Be Easy,” contains the lyrics: “Little Johnny’s smart
so he wraps it up/ Saw the commercial on tv [sic] and he wised up/Put his life in the
hands of a condom/ Hit that thing and now he has Syphilis.”226 One lyric mentions to
look up cdc.gov, but the CDC actually reports that “[c]onsistent and correct use of latex
condoms reduces the risk of genital herpes, syphilis, and chancroid only when the
infected area or site of potential exposure is protected.”227
Again, many curricula use food analogies to make their point. In a curriculum in
Mississippi, there is a cookie exercise teachers use to show students how STIs are easily
transmitted. Five volunteers go to the front of the classroom and are each handed a cup of
water. Four of the five are given an Oreo cookie. The four who have the cookie are
instructed to bite off a piece, chew it without swallowing, and then spit up the cookie bits
into the cup of water. They then swap cups with the other volunteers and are asked to
drink the water. The chewed-up cookie in the water represents “sexual activity” while the
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fifth volunteer with the clean cup of water “represents purity.”228 The class then chooses
which cup they prefer. Not only does this teach how STIs could be transmitted, but it also
teaches that those who have sex and have sex with multiple partners are seen as dirty.
Furthermore, those who contract an STI are stigmatized as “dirty” whereas those who do
not have sex and are STI free are seen as “pure” and “clean.” If people contracted an STI,
they are no longer pure, but “dirty” and since abstaining is the only way to not contract an
STI, they must have deserved to contract the STI since they did not abstain. In Sex and
Character, the authors state that guilt, embarrassment, worry, and shame can come about
due to contracting an STI. They ask whether you would want all of your friends to know
about an STI you have contracted, and that contracting an STI could result in guilt
because they see themselves as dirty and unclean. The guilt can result into shame that
came from contracting an STI.229
There is no information on how to prevent, test for, or treat STIs.230 While having
an STI can be serious and life-threatening, most STI’s can be treated with antibiotics and
antivirals and cured if caught early. Yet, our society demonizes those who have these
infections. If someone had a flu and spread it (usually unknowingly and without malice),
we may blame that person, but that person is more or less forgivable. The person herself
is still judged independently of the infection. When it comes to someone having an STI
and that person spread it (unknowingly and without malice), we demonize that person to
the point where that person herself is judged because of the STI. The same is true with
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the person who contracted the infection. Contracting an STI evolved from a health issue
to a moral issue, where the person is seen as having a sick moral defect.
Instead, we should—as Ella Dawson has titled her TEDTalk—see STIs not as a
consequence, but as inevitable, which just happens to be the title of her TEDTalk.
Dawson contracted herpes in May 2013 and she discovered that two out of three people
in the world have the strain of herpes that she does. Rather than stigmatizing the
infection, she embraced it, has made this a part of her life, and refuses to be ashamed of
it. She writes and speaks on STIs and proclaims that the stigmatization is not part of her
ideal world:
in the world that I want, and in the world that I’m hoping all of you help me build,
telling someone that you have an STI should not be brave or shocking. It should
be normal, and kind of boring. Because I do not care how you got herpes. I don’t
care if you got it because you had a ton of fun your freshman year of college—
more power to you. I don’t care if you got herpes because your aunt who always
had cold sores kissed you on the mouth when you were a little kid (which is
actually how a lot of herpes is spread, it’s in family moments like that). And I
really don’t care if you lost your virginity to a woman who lived a life before she
met you. Because an STI, especially herpes, is not a reflection of your character
or a consequence of a bad decision. It is an inevitability of being a human being
on this planet who comes into skin contact with other human beings. Period, end
of discussion.231
Dawson’s remarks normalize STI discussions. Doing so will lessen the stigma and help
people discuss their status as a regular health feature. Without the stigma, people will
have a better understanding of their partners’ situation and have better care to take care of
themselves and others without a sense of demonizing or demoralizing themselves and
others.
STI status has transformed—and I would say relegated—from a health issue and a
moral one which explain why many people regard STI status as riskier and judged more
231
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harshly than other diseases that are transmitted non-sexually. A study by Conley and her
team gave vignettes to a large number of participants. The vignettes gave examples of
someone transmitting a disease sexually to a partner. The disease could be “mild” (the
example was chlamydia) or “serious” (the example was H1N1, otherwise known as swine
flu). Each participant read the vignette and they had to say what they thought about the
person transmitting the disease and rate transmitter on how risky and selfish each
participant was, as well as how dirty, dumb, bad, and immoral their behavior was. The
results showed that the participants who read the vignette about someone transmitting
chlamydia was judged more harshly than participants who read about H1N1.232
4.2. Instilling Basic Character Traits Through Abstinence.

Besides instilling the virtue of purity, there are other virtues which are worthy such as
self-discipline, respecting others, care, and courage. Abstinence is a way to develop these
virtues. Therefore, abstinence-education ought to be promoted so that people will have
these basic character traits. This line of reasoning comes from developmental
psychologist Thomas Lickona.233 He argues that if teens become sexually active, they
may begin to ignore other aspects of their lives. To clarify, he argues instead of devoting
their time to sex, teens should make friends, join sports teams or service clubs, develop
their hobbies and talents, and take civic responsibilities. If they ignore other aspects of
their lives, they will stunt their personal development. In other words, they may miss out
232
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on experiences important for personal development which may cause them to never
develop their potential. People’s individuality may be thwarted. Therefore, Lickona
concludes, if teens become sexually active, they will stunt their personal growth. To
prevent a stunt in their personal growth, teens need to remain abstinent: “[w]aiting until
marriage to have sex is an excellent way to develop self-discipline, respect for others,
caring, courage, and other important qualities of character.” Since PSE is the program
that teaches to remain abstinent, PSE needs to be implemented to prevent a stunt in
adolescents’ personal growth.
The quote given above is the striking feature of this argument. Not that there is
anything wrong with remaining abstinent in itself, but it seems odd that abstinence itself
develops any of those virtues. Indeed, it seems that one could be sexually active and have
those virtues. Conversely, it also seems true that one could be abstinent and not have
those virtues. Unfortunately, Lickona does not explain further what he means. To be
generous, he could mean that being abstinent may help develop those character traits over
time. But again, there is no necessary connection between remaining abstinent and
developing the virtues that Lickona describes. It seems that the moral harm, then, is the
devaluing of marriage by allowing sex outside of marriage. But again, he needs to argue
for this position.

Conclusion

I have looked at paternalism applied to sex education and found them wanting.
Proponents of paternalism (the theory itself, not applied to sex education) justify
intervention when:
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1. the subject is prevented serious harm and
2. the subject is unaware of the relevant circumstances (because the subject lacks
relevant information), OR
if the choices were not substantially voluntary (because the subject was coerced or
heavily pressured, or because the decision-making skills were diminished).
In all of these reasons, I have argued against paternalism when applied to sex education
because the subject can—and needs—to be informed about sexuality and the decisionmaking skills need to be honed and crafted. The discourse surrounding PSE gives rise to
unjustified reasons for instilling a stifling morality of shame and guilt into adolescents,
which unjustly endorses heteronormativity, purity culture, and gender norms. Moreover,
we need to have a transformation of our social perceptions to see young people as sexual
agents and that their sexual activity is a normal part of growing up, which brings with it
responsibilities to them and to others. An education must also be aware of this. Without
it, young people cannot make an informed decision about sexual activities. In the next
chapter, I will investigate another model—the liberal-consequentialist model—and argue
that it has better features than the paternalistic model of sex education.
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Chapter Three: The Liberal-Consequentialist Model

With the paternalistic sex education234 model rejected, I will now focus on models that
are more centered on the individual. This chapter will focus on what I call the “liberalconsequentialist” model. As the name suggests, it is liberal (as opposed to paternalistic)
in that the focus of the action is based on the agent’s choice rather than someone else
making the choice for that agent. Moreover, liberality denotes the idea that the agent
makes the choice because the choice reflects the agent’s desires, needs, and values. The
model is also consequentialist in that actions are considered good if and only if there are
overall good consequences from that action. Of course, we may need to further define
“good” to see exactly what “good” consequences could come about. For our purposes, we
can say “good” is characterized benefiting or promoting well-being, or at least does not
lower well-being, for those who are affected from an action. Liberal-consequentialism
does not necessarily equate utilitarianism, but is compatible with it.
Combining liberalism and consequentialism entails that the best society is where
the people are educated to independently choose good actions which produce good
overall consequences for everyone affected from an action. Since these choices reflect the
desires, needs, and values of people, the education does not intend to change the desires,
needs, and values of people, but that their choices may need to be trained or focused so
that the actions would produce the best overall consequences. They cannot just simply get
the knowledge once they reach adulthood, nor should they wait until they are adults. For
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example, many times we learn as children that certain actions are wrong because it does
not produce the best overall consequences for everyone involved.
In terms of sex education, the liberal-consequentialist model focuses on a
comprehensive program where abstinence is a positive choice, but this model also
focuses on ways to prevent negative consequences when one engages in sexual activity as
adolescents need to learn how to protect themselves from abuse, to have proper sexual
relations, and to be sexually healthy including how to take preventative measures such as
using birth control and avoiding risky behavior. Because the model is liberal, the shift is
focused more on people’s choices—as opposed to an authoritative figure imposed
choices—where one obtains information through all avenues, yet it is up to people to
make their own choice based on personal preferences, stances towards pleasure and
desires, readiness, engagement in the type of relationships one wants, and values. And
yet, the choices should still produce overall good consequences for everyone involved.
Because of these liberal features, I will argue that the liberal-consequentialist
model is a better model than the paternalistic model since the liberal-consequentialist
model is more permissive than the paternalistic model. However, while the latter has a
false understanding behind the purpose of sex education, the focus of the former is
misguided. In section 1, I will begin with the foundation of liberal-consequentialism,
which mainly comes from the work of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty. Other philosophers
could have been used, but I use Mill because I consider him a paradigmatic figure
representing liberal-consequentialism and he represents a classic representation of both
liberalism and consequentialism. However, I do not fully embrace his philosophy in this
chapter. I am using his ideas to show what various reasons there are to justify liberal-
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consequentialism. In other words, section 1 is a foundational explanation of liberalconsequentialism using Mill, but liberal-consequentialism is not necessarily the Millean
type. In section 2 I will apply liberal-consequentialism to sex education and the
justifications for this application from a liberal-consequentialist framework. I will also
introduce various sex education curricula offered in the United States which take on a
liberal-consequentialist model from states with the least negative consequences (e.g.
unwanted pregnancies and STIs): New Hampshire, Vermont, Minnesota, Massachusetts,
Maine, and Utah.235 They may have something in common to avoid negative
consequences.
Considering the main debate is between PSE and liberal-consequentialist sex
education (hereafter LCSE), the paternalist could offer some flaws to LCSE. In section 3,
I will show how the liberal-consequentialist could respond to these counterclaims to
strengthen LCSE and thereby dispel the potential clout of the paternalist. However, since
LCSE does have many commonalities with PSE, which I will demonstrate in section 4,
LCSE must also be abandoned because the latter follows the same rubric and pattern as
the former such as ignoring internal aspects of people’s sexuality, and keeping the
heteronormative structures in place. Furthermore, I recommend abandoning LCSE due to
additional assumptions and flaws within the model itself, which I will show in section 5.
In the end, I argue in section 6 that although LCSE is better than PSE, neither model is
appropriate for a holistic adolescent sex education program.
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1. Overview of Liberal-Consequentialism

Descriptively, liberalism is the idea that people choose what sort of life they want based
on their desire, needs, values, goals, and preferences. The main foundation behind
liberalism is autonomy, which shapes what people are to become based on their
autonomous decisions. Hence, the formation of the individual’s ability to make choices
has primary importance rather than focusing on how the individual should act based on
some ideology. Moreover, the education and formation of the individual is primary rather
than focusing on how an individual is subsumed to a social collective. Normatively,
liberalism is the idea that people ought to lead their lives based on their values as long as
they, at minimum, respect other people’s rights to lead their lives according to their
values.
Consequentialism is the idea that one ought to produce actions that produce the
best overall consequences. In other words, consequentialism holds that the consequences
of an action carry the moral weight to create outcomes such as happiness, freedom,
preferences, or needs. Thus, we ought to pay attention to what sort of consequences
would happen based on what sort of actions we do, with an ultimate goal of producing
positive consequences; conversely, we ought to avoid negative consequences.
The best representative promoting liberal-consequentialism is John Stuart Mill’s
On Liberty. I will focus on five aspects of Mill’s and how they can be used as modes of a
liberal-consequentialist sex education program.
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1.1. Freedom to Live Our Lives However We Wish as Long as Our Actions are SelfRegarding.

For Mill, the only justification for interfering with liberty, whether individually or
collectively, is self-protection. Otherwise, we are free to live our own lives based on our
own plan to do what we want. Moreover, Mill outlines justification for collective
interference with an individual’s actions:
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot
rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so,
because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so
would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him,
or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for
compelling him, or visiting him with any evil, in case he do otherwise.236
For Mill, the only justification to interfere with people’s liberty is for self-protection.
Otherwise, we can choose what sort of life plan we want to pursue based on our personal
values and ideals rather than on some authoritative figure as long as we are not harming
others. Nevertheless, we can still influence others to have certain values, though we
cannot force them to internalize those values because: “in each person’s own concerns,
his individual spontaneity is entitled to free exercise. Considerations to aid his judgment,
exhortations to strengthen his will, may be offered to him, even obtruded on him, by
others; but he, himself, is the final judge.”237 Even if someone’s life plan could be
deemed to not have much worth in other people’s eyes, we can try our best to educate and
reason with that person, but we cannot compel, coerce, or force that person to get rid of
that life plan. Mill writes: “If he displeases us, we may express our distaste, and we may
236
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stand aloof from a person as well as from a thing that displeases us; but we shall not
therefore feel called on to make his life uncomfortable.”238 This Harm Principle, or
Liberty Principle amounts to the idea that self-regarding actions, meaning actions that
concerned with only the individual or group of people, are free from interference.239
However, society may interfere with other-regarding actions. Because individuals are
primary in dictating their own life, the individual is the basic unit of society.240 This leads
me to my second aspect.
1.2. Individuals are Prior to Society in Liberalism.

Since the individual is the basic unit of society—and not the family nor society itself as
the paternalistic model has it—each autonomous individual should be as free as possible
so that they can make choices that pertain to their own values and make decisions in
accordance with those values within the limits of Harm Principle. These individuals
define who they are by making decisions about how they want to live their lives, no
matter how eccentric, as long as the action is self-regarding. Mill writes: “[t]he only part
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of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns
others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute.
Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.”241 Each of us is
entitled to govern the domains of our own minds and bodies, free from coercive intrusion.
We are entitled to determine what takes place in our minds, what happens to and in our
bodies, and how to use our minds and bodies for own benefit. Indeed, de Marneffe
expounds further, “We are entitled to determine what to put into our bodies and how to
use our bodies for health, work, and pleasure, to determine what to eat, how to exercise,
how to care for personal hygiene, what positions to sleep in, what sexual acts to consent
to, and whether to have sex at all.”242
Because the individual is sovereign, the best person who knows what interests I
have is me. Even if I am mistaken about this, it is more preferable for me to live out my
life rather than someone else forcing me to have a different good life. Since the Harm
Principle applies to all individuals, everyone ought to have the liberty of tastes and
pursuits so they can plan and frame their life that suits them. Mill writes: “The only
freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so
long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it.
Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual.”243
Everyone lives out their lives how they see fit would benefit society since we would all
learn from each other different ways of living and gaining happiness, and also people will
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be happier living how they want to live instead of a constructed external plan given to
them from the outside.
Moreover, as long we do not harm anyone else, we should live our lives based on
our needs and desires: “[I]f [the individual] refrains from molesting others in what
concerns them, and merely acts according to his own inclination and judgment in things
which concern himself, the same reasons which show that opinion should be free, prove
also that he should be allowed, without molestation, to carry his opinions into practice at
his own cost.”244 Harm to others, though, does not mean merely offending another. For
example, if I live a certain lifestyle or if I am doing a certain activity which I enjoy and
you are offended by that, that does not constitute as harm. And yet, it does not mean you
have to approve of it either. You can educate me if you want. However, your disgust at
what others do is not justification to force them to behave differently. You may judge me,
or think of me as a fool or perverse, and perhaps even warn me on what my actions are
doing regarding myself. You can exercise your opinion that you do not approve of such
behavior. You are entitled to be disgusted. Still you cannot prevent me from living my
lifestyle.
For offensive behavior, social pressure is permitted but only persuasion is
permitted in matters of taste. We have the right to tell people to avoid others, we have the
right to avoid such places. We can say various people are mean, ill-natured, anti-social,
insincere, annoying, prideful, selfish, egotistical, having a bad moral character; however,
we do not have the right to stop their actions regarding themselves. More than that, we
cannot even treat that person as an enemy of society. We cannot make that person
suffer. I live my own life, and each individual lives their own life. The reason we live our
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own lives in our own particular way is because each of us value certain activities that
help each of us flourish and achieve well-being. Otherwise, I am conforming to society’s
standards. This leads me to the third aspect.
1.3. Forming genuine opinions rather than “following the crowd.”

Another condition of liberal-consequentialism is cultivating self-development, an ideal of
what one could be. Mill mentions that we live based on our own choices as the key to
self-development instead of passively living, or because certain actions and behaviors are
what is expected of us:
though the customs be both good as customs, and suitable to him, yet to conform
to custom, merely as custom, does not educate or develop in him any of the
qualities which are the distinctive endowment of a human being. The human
faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative feeling, mental activity, and
even moral preferences, are exercised only in making a choice. He who does
anything because it is the custom, makes no choice. He gains no practice either in
discerning or in desiring what is best. The mental and moral, like the muscular
powers, are improved only by being used. The faculties are called into no exercise
by doing a thing merely because others do it, no more than by believing a thing
only because others believe it.245
In a way, custom has been social censorship. Society can also tyrannize without
using political means as the power of public opinion can be more stifling to individuality
and dissent than any law could be. Although it does not occur to people to have any
inclination except for what is customary or traditional, doing something just because it is
tradition or custom is not really making a choice. The tyranny of custom has captured
individuality such that one may believe that one is doing an activity he or she likes.
However, one may simply do it in order to fit in since people are subject to the standards
and customs of society which pressure them to conform. Rather than blindly follow the
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customs of the majority, without any inclination to consider and experiment with
alternatives, people should desire to make up their own mind and choose for themselves,
at least when harm to others is not involved. Reason is not strengthened if people do not
use their reason.
Mill contends that the Harm Principle and expression of individual’s well-being is
based on utility: “I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it
must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a
progressive being.”246 Thus, it is essential for different people to lead different lives
because of social utility. Free expression of individuality is not just for the individual’s
happiness but for everyone’s happiness by helping each person gain self-development,
which will bring forth greater utility. By creating individuality, people will form their
own opinions through reason instead of following the crowd. By choosing a life-plan,
people would be using their own faculties. The escape from tyranny by forming one’s
own opinions needs to be paramount in order to have a flourishing life. If more utility is
created by encouraging “expressions of living” and creative individuality, then there is a
social obligation to create individuality. This leads me to the fourth aspect.
1.4. Expression of Individuality Improves Well-Being.

In chapter three of On Liberty, Mill discusses individuality specifically by discussing
how individuals’ well-being would be improved—and, vicariously, society’s wellbeing—if everyone lived unique lives: “[a]s it is useful that while mankind are imperfect
there should be different opinions, so is it that there should be different experiments of
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living; that free scope should be given to varieties of character, short of injury to
others”247 Therefore, full expressions of individuality means all members of the
community should be allowed to develop their individuality to the fullest without
interference in whatever they do, no matter how eccentric, unless it violates the harm
principle. If I do an activity and it does not concern other people, then my individuality
should assert itself. Furthermore, choosing your life-plan means people are using their
own faculties rather than someone from the outside implanting those values in them.
Anything that happens in the private realm of people’s lives is their own private business
and the government is overstepping its bounds when they encroach on the private affairs
of people’s lives. Thus, we are never legitimized to interfere in the private sphere of
others so long as people are not harming others.
Furthermore, different people require different conditions for growth rather than a
universal value meant for everyone. There is no single best pattern for how to live life. If
people are sufficiently developed, then their choices on how to live their life are best
precisely because their choices are in accordance with their own unique tastes, pursuits,
goals, and values rather than being dictated by custom. Additionally, people require
different atmospheres in order to develop and reach their potentials and a healthy society
must make it possible for people to follow more than one pattern. Diversity is better than
forced uniformity. We simply have a negative obligation not to interfere.
These five aspects from Mill will provide the foundation for liberalconsequentialism. The next step is to apply this to sex education.
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2. Applying Liberal-Consequentialism to Sex Education

As a way to sum up liberal-consequentialism applied to sex education, Jan Steutel writes:
John Stuart Mill argued convincingly that having the freedom to lead our life in
accordance with our own beliefs about what is valuable in life, serves our own
well-being. This view, I think, holds true for our sexual life in particular.
Regarding the sexual domain, we ourselves know best what our preferences,
aspirations, values and ideals are, perhaps even better than with respect to other
spheres of life. Because of this, we are in the best position to determine whether
or not particular sexual contacts will promote our own good. Consequently, the
general practice of reciprocal respect for each other’s right of sexual selfdetermination, tends to be in the interest of all those concerned.248
So how does liberal-consequentialism apply toward sex education? There are four
features of LCSE program that I see. I will outline them briefly in the following sections.
2.1. LCSE Shifts the Authoritative Figure onto the Individual.

First, a consequentialist view would want to get the facts correct about the topic at hand
to ensure the best overall consequences. If there any falsehoods or biases, then
individuals and society as a whole would be led astray: individuals would not be able to
self-develop in the right way and society could not be happy. To get the facts straight
about a topic, therefore, one would have to use empirical methods, research,
argumentation, and studies to gain reliable information. The shift to a factual-based sex
education would move from morality to that of health. The motivation for the shift away
from discussions the morality of a topic is to focus on the facts of the matter instead of
teaching an encompassing value system. An encompassing value system is risky and
difficult with a pluralistic view of values. The process of gaining facts also includes being
as objective as possible where one should not bring one’s presupposed ideology into the
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picture. Therefore, LCSE typically approaches sex education “value-free.”249 The sexual
information in this model can be wide-ranging as opposed to a myopic message of
abstaining from sex as the only proper choice seen in the paternalistic model.
Sexual anatomy and the mechanics of sex would be covered in LCSE. Moreover,
other topics such as contraception, sexual communication, masturbation, homosexuality,
and relationship development may also be covered. The reason is because the purpose of
sexuality is more than procreation; it includes pleasure, commitment, intimacy, and
expressions greater consequences. For an example of using facts for greater
consequences, consider unwanted pregnancies. Numerous studies show that using some
form of contraceptive is a good preventative for pregnancies. This fact could be presented
to the students who can then use this information based on their values. If students choose
to become sexually active, they could use this information to practice such sexual
behaviors that would ensure lower risks of unwanted pregnancies. The facts are presented
and the students choose what to do with this information based on the students’ values,
beliefs, goals, and desires. Thus, there is a shift of responsibility onto the students to
make their own sexual decisions as opposed to an authoritative figure making decisions
for them.250
With the students making their own decisions, there is a higher certainty the
students make the decision because this choice fits with other values that each individual
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has. If the values come from an authoritative figure, as the paternalistic model has it, then
the students may act in a way that is not genuinely themselves. Any sort of abstinenceonly education aims to restrict the choices of students and confines their decisions
because the students would be choosing abstinence-only not because the choice is based
on their own values, but because it was a value instilled into them. For a genuine
decision, remaining abstinent must come from the students’ choices themselves. Being
educated gives the students the tools they need when faced with their new hormonal
feelings, and how to make informed choices.
The teacher, therefore, acts more like a facilitator and presents different
possibilities in which the students choose what to value. In this way, the students are
treated as educational consumers of sexuality and this brand of sex education is a way for
the students to be better sexual consumers. Thus, LCSE teaches not only that the
individual has autonomy, but that various features of sexuality should be taught as
packets of factual information even though it seems that the educator still has the choice
in what sort of materials are presented to these students to consume. While the students
learn about various ideas from a variety of media including science, sexology, anatomy,
the culture in which they are living, and the religious/moral teachings in which they were
brought up, it is up to each individual to consider what they find valuable when making
their own sexual choices. The thinking behind this shift is that more knowledge given to
the students is beneficial. By promoting sexual knowledge, students can develop their
own style of what they want based on their desires and wants251 which could in turn
enhance their subjective well-being.
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In the class or in daily life, the students can express their opinion that reflects their
values, preferences, and desires. Even if various issues within sexuality could have social
or political ramifications, individual preferences win out because “sexuality is part of the
process of self-actualization; the aim is the weighing of values, possible outcomes and
responsibilities so as to encourage the development of a consistent code of personal
sexuality. Where social issues and structures are critiqued (such as marriage, abortion,
and same-sex relationship status), such consideration reflects an individualistic rather
than a social process”252 provided it is consistent with the Harm Principle. In the end,
however, LCSE has a consequential outlook in that one should learn the facts of sexuality
in order to avoid negative outcomes (such as unwanted pregnancies or STIs).

2.2. Abstinence is not the Default Choice, but Simply a Choice.

Under LCSE criteria, abstinence is a preferred choice but not the sole choice. One such
sex education program, Reducing the Risk—which was mainly used in Vermont—had the
goal of reducing risk of unwanted consequences. This program presented both abstinence
and contraceptives as options. Even when the program had a component on using
contraceptives and even an assignment on where to find contraceptive products,253 the
curriculum still focused on abstinence and stated that abstinence was a better option so as
to assure the reduction of risk. Another sex education program called Teen Health Project
focuses on teaching about abstinence or condom usage to urban, low-income youth.
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Indeed, most LSCE programs present two alternatives in order to reduce unwanted
consequences: remain abstinent or use contraceptives, especially condoms to reduce
STIs.
2.3. Incorporating Negotiation Skills for Better Consequences.

All of the programs that I have researched within LCSE want to teach negotiation skills
to the students so as to convince and persuade their partners to use condoms, to abstain
from risky sexual behavior, or simply learn how to refuse. I would contend that all
negotiation is persuasion—which is not to say that all persuasion is negotiation. In order
to persuade people to do something, we must convince them either by argument or by
emotion. To negotiate with someone is to persuade them to do something, whether that is
a change in perspective or behavior. The educator, however, can only give the students
the tools to negotiate and persuade the other partner to collaborate with what the student
wants. Even though the educator can point out what sort of consequences could happen
given a risky action, it is ultimately up to the students to decide what sort of actions and
ways of living they want. Notice that the purpose of LCSE programs are not meant to
have a discussion, dialogue, or simply communicate sexual wants and desires. Rather, it
is to negotiate or refuse.
Mill points out “society has no business, as society, to decide anything to be
wrong which concerns only the individual; that it cannot go beyond dissuasion, and that
one person should be as free to persuade, as another to dissuade.”254 Thus, while students
are taught how to negotiate, the negotiation is based on what the students want. If the
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participants are negotiating from what they want, then they will either try to persuade the
other or meet in the middle based on what the participants want. As an example, 22 states
have what are known as “refusal skills” education.255 The basis of this education is to
teach students how to refuse sexual advances. There is no discussion of a pure dialogue in
determining what people want or how to express their desires positively. Moreover, since
there is no direct critique of social structures, but only reflecting the values that the
students have, the refusal skills are placed on the those who does not want to engage
(which would typically be women) and the advancer (which are typically men) remain in
the status quo that advancing, even aggressively, and manipulate their refusal into a “yes”
is still in place. This will prove to be problematic as I will show later in this chapter.
2.4. Sex Education is for the Purpose of Risk Assessment.

Finally, and most importantly, LCSE is for the purpose of risk assessment, which means
that sex education is meant to mitigate negative consequences such as unwanted
pregnancies and STIs. By focusing on the consequences of people’s sexual actions, LCSE
is similar to PSE in that it is a method to change people’s sexual behavior; however, it
differs in the way in which it makes the students more aware of the possible risks that
could come about from sexual activity rather than proposing a complete avoidance of
sexual activity altogether such as PSE would have it.
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The common method of LCSE is to teach students to avoid sexual risk by either
remaining abstinent or how to use contraceptives. Here are some examples to capture
LCSE goals. These curricula come from states that have the lowest teen pregnancy rates:
● the Reducing the Risk curriculum had eight course assessments of what they were
teaching, but the health goal was the same in all eight assessments: “To prevent
teen pregnancy, HIV and other STDs.”256
● Teen Outreach Program’s goal is to also mitigate risky behaviors and develop
into healthy adults257 by integrating good life decision skills and volunteering in
the community. The audience is meant for those who have academic problems or
at risk youth and those who need to develop their competence skills such as
communication skills, assertiveness, decision-making, clarifying values.
● Safer Sex is meant for high risk female adolescents who have been diagnosed with
an STI. One of the benefits is that it involves a one-on-one session with a female
clinician in which the student learns how to administer condoms and have the
opportunity to ask questions. The students also come back for a follow-up. The
goal is to change female adolescents’ behavior in order to reach the health goal of
“[p]reventing STI recurrence and unintended pregnancy among adolescent girls
and young women.”258
● Making Proud Choices is meant for adolescents in middle school. Their
curriculum is the same as the previous curricula assessed in that their goal is to
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change students’ behavior so as to reduce their risk of an unwanted pregnancy or
contracting an STI. This program teaches that the best way to reduce the risk—if
students should choose to have sex—is to use condoms. The program tries to
empower students in order to change their behavior to reduce sexual risk. The
exercises in the classroom are to “increase comfort with practicing condom use,
address concerns about negative effects of practicing safer sex, and build skills in
condom use and negotiation.”259
● Becoming a Responsible Teen had eight sessions in their curriculum. The sessions
each had multiple activities. In all of these sessions, they had one (health) goal in
mind: “Decrease HIV infection among African-American adolescents ages 14–
18,” which is done by focusing on abstinence and condom usage.260
● All4You! has a curriculum which focuses on students in alternative high schools.
The aim of this program is to reduce the frequency of unprotected sex among
participants. Like the rest of the curricula, it explicitly states that the goal is
“[p]reventing HIV, other STDs, and pregnancy among young people in alternative
education settings” and the way to do this is to change the students’ behavior by
“reducing the frequency of unprotected intercourse” and “using contraception.”261
● Be Proud! Be Responsible! Be Protective! targets those who are already pregnant
and parenting teens and helps them make healthy sexual decisions and decrease
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risky sexual behavior. To change behavior, adolescents need information about
how risky unprotected sexual activity can be, but also ways to develop skills and
confidence to act safely.
● Be Proud! Be Responsible! is similar to Be Proud! Be Responsible! Be Protective!
except this program is meant for students in general and not just for those who are
already pregnant or parenting teens. The goals and curriculum are virtually the
same.
● Teen Health Project focuses on urban, low-income youth by teaching them to
increase abstinence or condom usage.
● Perhaps the most involved program is FOCUS: Preventing Sexually Transmitted
Infections and Unwanted Pregnancies among Young Women, which targets young
women so as to encourage them to practice healthy behavior and responsible
decision making. The program is mostly used in New Hampshire, the state with
the lowest teen pregnancy rate in the USA. Since the program contains much
mature graphic content, it may not be recommended for those under the age of 16.
What makes the program unique is there is no cost for participating in the
program, and upon completion of the program, each participant receives $50 gift
card. Thereafter, participants can receive another $50 gift card to complete
follow-up surveys at four months and 12 months after their completion of the
program. The FOCUS curriculum grant was written in collaboration with Miami
University’s Department of nursing, which utilizes third year nursing students as
“peer educators.” They teach the program and are role models for the students that
they teach. Moreover, the nursing students will receive credit for their service
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learning requirement and also gain information which will be helpful for their
professional careers.262 Notice the goal of these programs is to change students’
choices such that they have to freedom to choose their preferences. But if they
make wrong choices—meaning choosing an unwanted consequence—then they
ought to be (re-)educated according to LCSE standards.

3. Objections to LCSE and Replies

There are a few potential objections with the LCSE model. I will address them and offer
possible rebuttals from the LCSE perspective.
Objection 1: Teaching Sex cannot be Value-Free. The Facts are still Loaded with
Values.
A paternalistic contention against LCSE is that sex has been so filled with emotions,
traditions, culture, sociological and psychological conditioning, and values that it seems
impossible to simply teach sex without considering the values that sex has had been
given. With a sexual education based on facts, the education would seem “raw” and
emotionless. Even if we could make sex as value free as possible, this would not
necessarily be ideal. Therefore, to properly teach sex, the educator must instill some sort
of values into the student. One who argues for this position is William J. Bennett, former
U.S. Secretary of Education under President Ronald Reagan, who states that sex is a
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quintessentially moral activity and thus cannot be value-neutral because sex is one of the
most value-loaded of human activities.263
From another side, discussing sexuality is not just about the mechanics of sexual
intercourse, but also about identity, relationships, gender norms, and the family.
Discussing the issues means that some of the components will be stressed, skipped over,
or left to the students to figure out on their own. Corngold explains further:
The design and implementation of such a curriculum inevitably involves decisions
about coverage and emphasis—decisions about which facts and bits of
information to stress, which to mention in passing, and which to set aside
altogether. These decisions, in turn, convey value-laden messages to those who
are exposed to the curriculum: they leave students with the impression that certain
questions pertaining to sexuality are worthy of careful consideration while others
are not, that certain behaviors and practices are normal while others are deviant,
that certain identities are privileged while others are subordinate, and so on.264
Corngold also mentions Lamb’s assertion that facts of the arousal response, even with all
of the scientific data, focus mainly on the genital area and neglect other sites or means of
sexual arousal, thereby giving a bias toward reproductive heterosexual intercourse.265
In one sense, this objection is correct. The lack of teaching values in this form of
sex education is problematic, and I will show why later in the chapter by showing that the
content of the sex education program may be problematic in LCSE. However, the
objection is missing the point when it comes to just teaching the facts. On a
consequentialist model, if one looks at the evidence and sees that a comprehensive sex
education brings forth better consequences than an abstinence-only sex education, then
one should implement the comprehensive program. If the abstinence-only program brings
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forth better consequences than the comprehensive program, then one should implement
the abstinence-only program. The should pertains to a normative claim leading to
something valuable. Thus, the liberal-consequentialist does have a value: good
consequences and the lowering of bad consequences for those involved. Therefore, the
substance of a LCSE program does hold onto values (namely the precise criteria of
determining good and bad consequences) even if one just looks at the facts. The liberalconsequentialist does not hold on to a view dogmatically or because of ideological
purposes, but looking at the facts will reveal which program we ought to use because of
what liberal-consequentialists value. Thus, the substance of the model does have value,
but the values come from the framework that liberal-consequentialism assumes. The
content of sex education, however, does need to have more than “just the facts” but not
the values of abstinence-only. Rather, simply having the value of just focusing on the
good consequences is not enough as I will show why later in this chapter.
Objection 2: Applying the Principle of Liberalism Applies Only To Adults.

This objection argues that when it comes to respecting other people’s decisions,
behaviors, and lifestyles, we should leave them alone in self-regarding ways because they
are adults. Adults have reached their maturity in their mental faculties and there is less
risk of them making mistakes. They can see long-term goals and have established what
they want out of life and how to achieve those goals. Anyone younger is still mentally
immature and any major decision, especially bad ones, will affect them, perhaps
permanently. Mill even argues that the Harm Principle applies only to human beings “in
the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children, or of young persons
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below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. Those who are
still in a state to require being taken care of others, must be protected against their own
action as well as against external injury.”266
Applying this to sex, adults in general can choose what sort of sexual behaviors to
engage in without an external authority figure. Children obviously cannot engage in
sexual behavior because they are not physically nor mentally mature to understand the
ramifications of sex. Thus, liberal-consequentialism applies to adults but not to children.
The situation becomes complicated when this is applied to adolescents however. At what
point can people direct their own lives without an authoritative figure? There is no
specific point since humans attain maturity gradually for each individual. Yet, Mill offers
a clue: “as soon as mankind have attained the capacity of being guided to their own
improvement by conviction or persuasion, … compulsion, either in the direct form or in
that of pains and penalties for non-compliance, is no longer admissible as a means to their
own good, and justifiable only for the security of others.”267
There is a minimum that people reach where they are considered mature in certain
activities, where one is “guided to their own improvement by conviction or persuasion.”
In the USA, we have an arbitrary age where people are mature enough to drive at the age
of sixteen, to purchase and partake in tobacco products (in many states) at the age of
eighteen, and to drink alcohol at the age of 21. When it comes to sexuality, what is the
minimum where one is considered mature? Many states set a minimum age of consent
that can range from 16-18. However, legal permission to do something does not mean
that one is mature enough to understand the activity. Being mature entails one is not only
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educated in the activity, but can understand the consequences of the activity and take the
responsibilities of that activity. When we educate children, we expect them to mature
over time. There is no point when one is mature; one rather becomes mature over time by
developing their mental faculties. David O. Brink argues that educating children does not
mean that children will remain in a status of immaturity:
Consider the case of children. Presumably, transitional justice requires that we
provide them with an education—in the broadest sense—that develops their
normative competence. To do so, we really need to recognize both their potential
competence and the scalar character of actual competence. We should not treat
children or other potentially competent individuals the way we would treat the
permanently childlike. We need to try to teach them skills and allow them to
acquire varied experiences safely. Children need to play an active part in their
own development and education. In particular, they need to be given various sorts
of deliberative opportunities and responsibilities, including the freedom to make
and learn from their own mistakes in certain circumscribed ways, which prevent
or minimize the chance of catastrophic outcomes. As they get older and their
competence grows, they need to be given more freedom, opportunities, and
responsibilities. Only in this way will the potentially competent develop actual
competence.268
With children slowly developing the mental faculties, they will slowly gain a
sense of maturity and autonomy. As they age, we give children more challenges,
responsibilities, and opportunities that are appropriate for their age. We do not expect to
teach someone trigonometry until they have gained the mental understanding of the
prerequisites such as geometry, algebra, and mathematics using variables. People must
develop certain prerequisites before they move on to the next level. The same could be
said within sex education. The difference, however, is not just learning new information,
but it is also incorporating the information so as to use the information in their lives not
only in terms of practical action, but of understanding themselves in terms of their sexual
identity. One may not need to teach sexual preventative measures to five-year olds, for
268
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example, but one should teach them information as a prerequisite that is appropriate for
their lack of sexual maturity, but this information would serve them to gain maturity over
time.269
Thus, there is a way for sex education to be congruent with Mill’s notion of
liberty. To gain a sense of maturity is to develop one’s own autonomy and freedom which
means that children and eventually adolescents need to be given various opportunities
and responsibilities in order to develop their maturity.
Different responsibilities and opportunities are appropriate for them at different
stages of normative development. Adolescents need to be given various sorts of
deliberative opportunities and responsibilities, including the freedom to make and
learn from their own mistakes in certain circumscribed ways, which prevent or
minimize the chance of catastrophic outcomes. As they get older and their
competence grows, they need to be given more freedom, opportunities, and
responsibilities. Only in this way will the potentially competent develop normal
adult competence.270
The minimal standard would not be a quantifiable demarcating point, but a gradual
process where one gains more knowledge as it is appropriate for one’s maturity level.
The same could be said within sex education. The education they need is a gradual
process so that they can become functioning adults later in life.
Empirically speaking, there was a “quasi-experimental evaluation” from the
Guttmacher Institute of condom distribution in schools. The study revealed that access to
condoms from schools did not increase rates of sexual activity, and that students who are
sexually active are more likely to use condoms.271 One could say that a comprehensive
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sex education and health resources will not initiate or increase sexual activity, and it may
help those practice healthy sexual practices for those who are already sexually active. It
seems that the education is helping students becoming more responsible in determining
the sexuality.
Objection 3: Adolescent Sexuality is Unsafe.

The proponent of PSE could have this general argument:
1. One can plan out one’s life as long as they are self-regarding actions. (Claim from
Mill)
2. However, adolescent sexuality (such as premarital sex) does harm others.
(Paternalist claim)
3. Therefore, we ought to stop it.
This argument hinges on premise two. How would the paternalist justify premise two?
After all, the liberal-consequentialist could reply that the other-regarding actions—doing
harm to others—must be measurable harm. The paternalist must show that this is harmful
and measurable. At this point, the paternalist could respond by using Mill against liberalconsequentialist views. Mill mentions that if a person is trying to cross a bridge which
was ascertained to be unsafe and there was not enough time to explain to the person the
unsafety of the bridge, then we are justified to seize that person without any infringement
of that person’s liberty.272 Using this as an analogy, the paternalist could say that
adolescents engaging in sex is like the person attempting to cross a bridge which had
been ascertained to be unsafe. There is no infringement of liberty, for as Mill says,
“liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire to fall into the river”
when it comes to the unsafe bridge. Likewise, stopping the adolescent from engaging in
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sex is not a really threat to her liberty either because the adolescent does not desire to be
unsafe or be a victim of unsafe practices.
This objection does not fully capture what Mill says however. Mill says “when
there is not a certainty, but only a danger of mischief, no one but the person himself can
judge of the sufficiency of the motive which may prompt him to incur the risk.”273 Mill
suggests that even if the person is warned about the bridge, we cannot force the person to
get off the bridge after warning her.274 Likewise, since sex does carry some risks, we
ought to warn people about sex and also potential risks. Nevertheless, the point is that
people themselves decide whether to continue the activity or to abstain.
It is obvious that adolescents engage in risky behavior and this risk may cause the
lack of safety, but here the paternalist is at a dilemma: If adolescent sexuality is unsafe
because of the consequences, the solution is to increase the safety, not take away
adolescent engagement in sexuality. However, if adolescent sexuality is in itself unsafe—
which focuses on adolescent sexuality rather than on the lack of safety, then the
paternalist must show why. Otherwise the paternalist is begging the question and we are
back to the starting point of this objection. If it is because of the consequences, then we
are back to the first horn of the dilemma.
Thus, if the problem is that adolescent sexuality is unsafe, the solution is not to
simply move the adolescents away from engaging in sex. After all, they will become
adults some day and many of them will engage in sexual behavior. Rather, the solution is
to make it safe and the way to do that, as Mill points out, is to educate them on potential
risks and ways to minimize those risks. PSE would not try to take away knowledge for
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adults who want to engage in sex because it is for the safety of those involved. Likewise,
the same could be said with adolescents. LCSE is fully compatible with Mill’s view of
liberty even with preventing the agent to “cross the bridge.”
Objection 4: Adolescents are not yet Competent to make Sexual Decisions or
Understand Sexuality Fully.
Recall from Chapter One that Steutal had three conditions for consent: voluntariness,
information, and competence. Voluntariness will be touched upon in this chapter but will
be expanded upon in chapter four. Having more information is better than having less so
that individuals can make informed decision, which has been the goal behind LCSE.
Proponents of PSE may say that LCSE gives too much information, but I have shown
earlier that having more information is actually better. The sticking point, therefore, is
competence. Many paternalists argue for PSE because adolescents are not competent
enough to engage in sex or understand sexuality. I will show that adolescents can be
competent in sexual matters by offering support from many sources: legal, sociological,
socioeconomical, and psychological.
There are two major common assumptions regarding adolescents. The first is that
since adolescents still depend on their parents for economic, emotional, and existential
support, adolescents are not yet mature nor competent enough to do “adult” things.
Therefore, they are “extended children,” and since children are not considered
autonomous and competent, so too, are adolescents.275
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As a side note, the assumption is that as soon as one reaches the age of majority, one has the
full rights of autonomy and personhood. The justification, typically, is that one has reached the age of
reason and competence. There are two problems with this. What about adults who are not competent? They
would have to be excluded from the majority. Second, if the justification for adults to gain autonomy and
personhood is because of competence, then competence—not age—should be the demarcating factor of
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The second assumption is that adolescents are seen as constant risk-takers and
sensation-seekers. They will do dangerous things either to fit in with their peers and/or to
gain some momentary pleasure from these activities. In both of these assumptions,
adolescents are not competent to understand sexuality because they are not yet fully
autonomous and they would be taking too many risks to properly understand sexuality
safely. Thus, the critic would therefore say that adolescents are not competent to engage
in sexual behavior. I will address these criticisms.
First, we need to understand the general idea of competence. A clinical review in
the British Medical Journal in 2005 reveals some guidelines. In England and Australia,
there is what is known as the “Gillick Competency Test,” which comes from a UK trial
Gillick v West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Authority [1985] UKHL 7. The “Gillick
Competency Test” assess whether one is mature enough to decide for oneself and to
understand what those decisions entail in medical procedures. The criteria of the “Gillick
Competency Test” states that to be considered competent a young person should be able
to:
●
●
●
●
●

Understand simple terms, nature, purpose, and necessity for proposed treatment
Understand benefits/risks/alternatives and effect of non-treatment
Believe the information applies to them
Retain information long enough to make a choice
Make a choice free from pressure276

Moreover, competence is not a faculty that is achieved once where one thereby becomes
fully competent. Competence is dynamic and it can fluctuate based on pain, the
environment, and mental states can reduce it. However, experience of illness may
who gets to be part of the majority. To exclude adolescents on the grounds that they are incompetent, then,
to be consistent, one would also exclude others for the same grounds. If, however, one argues that one must
pass a competency test, one must apply to this to adults as well, not just to adolescents. Unfortunately, this
line of thinking never crosses most policymakers or politicians.
276
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actually increase it.277 The test is used in England and Australia, but I do not see why a
similar test could also be used in the United States.
3.4.1. The Legal Source of Competence

Along with the “Gillick Competency Test,” Gillick v West Norfolk also produced the
Fraser Guidelines, which are more specific where they test young people’s competence to
consent to contraceptive advice or treatment. A young person was considered competent
if:
● The young person understands the doctor’s advice
● The doctor cannot persuade the young person to inform his or her parents or allow
the doctor to inform the parents that he or she is seeking contraceptive advice
● The young person is very likely to begin or continue having sexual intercourse
with or without contraceptive treatment
● The young person’s physical or mental health or both are likely to deteriorate if he
or she does not receive contraceptive advice or treatment, and
● The young person’s best interests require the doctor to give contraceptive advice
or treatment, or both, without parent consent278
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Cf. Larcher, 354.
Cf. Larcher, 354. How do we determine “best interests?” Larcher notes that “[i]n deciding best
interests, courts apply the welfare checklist of the Children Act and consider relevant articles from the
Human Rights Act” (353). The checklist entails:
Welfare checklist of the Children Act
The ascertainable wishes and feelings of the young person concerned in the light of their age and
understanding
Physical, emotional, and educational needs
Likely effect of change of circumstances
Age, sex, cultural, religious, and ethnic background
Harm or risk of harm
Capability of parents or others to meet the young person’s needs
And the relevant human rights (UK Human Rights Act 1998):
Article 2—Right to life
Article 3—Prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment
Article 5—Right to liberty
Article 8—Right to respect for privacy and family life, home, and correspondence
Article 9—Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion
Article 10—Freedom of expression and right to information
Article 12—Right to marry and found a family
Article 14—Right not to be discriminated against on grounds of race, sex, etc., in the enjoyment of
other convention rights
278
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Based on case above, the competency test and the guidelines suggest that British and
Australian doctors ought to treat their adolescent patients as they would of competent
adults unless there is a reason to doubt their competence. I see no reason why this cannot
be extended to American adolescents as well.
3.4.2. The Biological Factor

Is risk-taking behavior related to brain physiology? Our current culture considers risky
adolescent behavior due to their brain development. Many biologists are doubtful.
There is an even larger number of young people who might like a bit of
excitement, to challenge the otherwise suffocating domination that pervades their
lives, but do not ever do anything that seriously threatens their lives or
livelihoods. Even the most risk-prone adolescents are not taking risks most of the
time. Most of the time, they are sitting in highly-controlled environments doing
what they are told. As population statistics indicate, young people are mostly
competent about risk.279
Biologist David Dobbs states that “[s]election is hell on dysfunctional traits. If
adolescence is essentially a collection of them—angst, idiocy, and haste; impulsiveness,
selfishness, and reckless bumbling—then how did those traits survive selection? They
couldn’t.”280 From evolutionary biology, every human had to go through adolescence and
they obviously survived. It suggests that “homo sapiens has survived because of
adolescence (including the traits the neuroscience is trying to describe), not in spite of
it.”281 It is worth quoting from Sercombe and Paus in full:
Young people are not passive victims of brains that are out of control. They are
active agents in the design of an adult that meets their needs and enables them to
survive within their environment and make sense of their experience. Youth is not
separate from adulthood. It is the becoming of adulthood. There is no ‘next stage’
279
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of adulthood, which is qualitatively different from being a young person and
adulthood is not itself a destination. You don’t learn what you need for adulthood
by being excluded from it until you can demonstrate that you have got the right
circuits. A smart society would engage young people progressively in adult
processes as they demonstrate the readiness. Our society does this a little but
mostly we exclude young people until a certain arbitrary age is reached and then
bestow the right to participate—mostly without guidance and support. It should be
no surprise that does not work too well...The research tends to be dominated, not
surprisingly, by the century-old view of adolescence as the ‘stage of life
characterized by turbulence’ view.282
In other words, the “biodeterminist” reductionist science of adolescence is over
simplistic. Our interaction with the world is not a simplistic billiard ball cause and effect.
The brain does not just determine experience; experience also determines the brain.283
Our brains are a reflection of our behavioral, cognitive, and emotional states, they do not
cause those states.284 We are more than our brains or neurophysiology. “We are complex,
self-regulating organisms interacting with other such organisms in complex and changing
environments. More generally, wholes are greater than the sums of their parts. Brains are
more than neurons or genes and people are more than brains[…]adolescent risk taking is
seen as a social and cultural problem that needs to be addressed. If we cannot find
anything uniquely wrong in adolescent minds, we look to their brains.”285
Laurence Steinberg, a psychologist who specializes in adolescence, argues that
adolescents and adults assess risk equally,286 and that risk-taking can be broken down into
two components: logical-reasoning abilities and psychosocial capacities. Adolescents are
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lacking psychosocial capacities which makes them prone to risk. However, if the
psychosocial factors are minimized, then the risk-taking factor is the same as adults.
What marks psychosocial factors as non-minimized is if peers are present. In other
words, if peers are present, adolescents are more likely to engage in risk-taking behavior.
Steinberg concludes that risky behavior includes unprotected sex, but instead of trying to
change adolescents’ views of what is considered risky, there instead must be a “focus on
limiting opportunities for immature judgment to have harmful consequences.”287 So
instead of requiring them to be abstinent, Steinberg offers “expanding adolescents’ access
to mental-health and contraceptive services”288 as a better conclusion. Overall this
assessment can help formulate public policy regarding sex education, which may change
adolescent culture regarding unprotected sex to less-risky sex because their peers are
doing that anyways.
3.4.3. The Socioeconomic Factor

Recall that the second assumption regarding adolescents is that they are prone to risk and
they therefore consistently seek out new and exciting sensations. Because of this risky
behavior, they need to be reined in and checked for their own benefit, until they reach
adulthood. However, this assumption is dubious. Sociologist Michael Males brings up
two main points. The first is that empirical evidence does not support the assumption that
adolescents are specifically more likely to engage in risky behavior. Second, he argues
that socioeconomic factors, like poverty, are a much better predictor of risk than age, sex,
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or race. People with dissimilar ages but similar socioeconomic status actually share very
similar risk profiles.289
To start, Males argues that “peer-socialized adolescents are not acting riskier than
their parent-socialized counterparts of the past; the highest rates for most teenage ills
occurred 30 to 40 years ago. Today, the parent generation seems more at risk.”290
Examples include suicides, homicides, and unintentional death. Moreover, high schoolers
consistently report that they could easily get access to firearms, drugs, alcohol, cigarettes,
and sex. Yet, most of them do not bother to access them. Males concludes that it must be
because high schoolers have self-control.291 Indeed, adolescents consistently have lower
rates of suicide, drug overdose, and accidents in general than any other age group. Why
not use this to conclude that teens may be prudent in their cognitive abilities? In an
interesting detail, Males queries a conventional thought from Steinberg, a psychologist
who endorses the idea that adolescents are more prone to risky behavior such as suicide
attempts than adults. Indeed, Steinberg’s argument is that adolescent suicide is higher
than adults due to adolescent risk-prone behavior, which is true.292 However, we must be
cautious with this line of thinking. Males writes to perform his reductio ad absurdum:
[T]he NCIPC [National Center for Injury Prevention and Control] also reports 33
suicide ‘attempts’ per completion for women of all ages versus 6 for men. If we
accept Steinberg’s logic that greater success in committing suicide reflects greater
cognitive competence, then male brains are far more competent at every age than
females’; teenage boys are more competent than women in their 30s and 40s;
Whites’ brains are more competent than those of Blacks; and Black females of all
ages (averaging over 60 attempts for every suicide) are the least biologically
competent of all.293
289
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Defining adolescents may also be part of the problem. In my introduction chapter,
I presumed WHO’s definition which is the stage from 10 to 19 years of age. If different
studies and different theorists use different definitions of adolescents, then the age range
may not reflect reality. Males noticed this when he noted that many theorists have
extended adolescence up to age 25. If so, then this feature artificially boosts the numbers
that adolescents are more prone to risky behavior.294 Moreover, it seems odd that risky
behavior is only applied to adolescents when adults in their middle ages sometimes do the
same or riskier behaviors. Indeed, teenage sex reflects the sexual behaviors of adults
around them.295 Thus, teen sex and adult sex should not be separate issues.
Educational psychologist David Moshman notes that adolescents do not have a
particular feature that makes them different than adults when it comes to risk taking.
On the contrary, adolescents take the same sorts of risks as adults and show the
same rational and irrational tendencies common to human functioning. There is
no empirical basis for distinguishing adolescents from adults with respect to risk
taking. Of course many adolescents repeatedly engage in behaviors (often
involving drugs or sex) that many adults find objectionable, but many adults also
engage in the same behaviors. There is no standard of rational risk taking that is
generally met by adults but rarely by adolescents.296
Moreover, “there is no evidence of any form or level of competence common among
adults beyond some age but rare in young teens. Quite the contrary, on any measure of
294
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competence, rationality, or psychological functioning, many 14-year-olds perform
beyond the level of many 40-year-olds….There is no adult level of executive function or
control that adolescents have yet to attain.”297
Instead of blaming social ills on adolescent risk-taking behavior, Males suggests
that we need to take socioeconomic factors into account. Socioeconomics has
traditionally divided people by class, but it also divides people by age. Adolescents and
emerging adults are two to three times more likely to live below the federal poverty
guidelines. Indeed, many young people live in poverty levels exceeding 20% in 35
countries versus middle-agers. Males’s research argues that studies on adolescents do not
factor in socioeconomic status before pronouncing teens riskier than adults.298 Indeed,
“[p]overty is strongly associated with nearly every risk behavior, regardless of race, sex,
or age.”299 Moreover, “[s]ocioeconomic status predicts risk outcome more consistently
than age.”300 Adolescents and middle-agers rates are similar once poverty levels are taken
into account such as murder, rape, assault arrests, homicide, vehicular deaths, and
external injuries. Indeed, there are some activities where adults exercise more risk than
adolescents such as violent deaths, firearms deaths, suicide, and drug overdose. If the
conventional wisdom is that adults have more self-control and adolescents have not
developed a sense of maturity, Males bluntly asks: “why do adults do dumb things?”301 If
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adolescents are really wired to take risks more so than adults, then we should see this
feature across the board in a general way.302
So why are adolescents presumed to be the troublemakers and risk-takers? Males
argues that it is because adolescents are the scapegoats of society’s ills.303 Since
adolescents are the scapegoats, the adults benefit. If the youth complain, the complaints
can be explained by faulty logic from their youth. To say that adolescents are riskier is to
show prejudice, and ignorance of socioeconomics rather than paying attention to the
science. “When regression variables this strong are found, it is safe to say that teenage
and adult sexual behaviors under similar economic and social conditions are one and the
same. We are not looking at two separate sexualities, the adult version of which can be
302
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accepted and encouraged while the teenage version is deplored and prevented. We are
looking at the same behaviors.”304 And
[m]ore than any other Western society, American grown-ups render youth a time
of poverty and middle age a time of wealth, a political choice exposing our young
to greater dangers. This suggests that claims of innate “adolescent risk” and
“teenage brain” flaws not only reflect “a bias in interpretation that privileges the
age, class, and culture position of the researcher” (Sercombe, in press) but serve
to defend older age groups’ economic privileges as well.305
“Teenage pregnancy” is a misnomer since “[m]ore than 70 percent of births and at
least 60 percent of total pregnancies among girls age 19 and younger involve male
partners age 20 and older. We might as well call it ‘adult-pregnancy’—or, at least, ‘adultteenage pregnancy.’…the presentation of teen pregnancy reflects both traditional sexism
of blaming females for unwanted fertility and America’s disturbing legacy of singling out
society’s least powerful groups—in this case, younger girls—to blame for social and
moral problems.”306 Boys under the age of nineteen accounted for only about 15 percent
of all teenage pregnancies. In terms of actual teenage pregnancies where both mothers
and fathers were both under the age of eighteen, they were responsible for fewer than 5
percent of all teenage pregnancies.307
Preaching ideological values gets us nowhere because the values that young
people learn come from observing adult behaviors. Adolescent behavior mirrors adult
behavior and values. If young people are preached to about remaining chaste until
marriage, but they do not see the adults in their lives practicing that message, then it
weakens the incentive for the young people to practice that message. If different races
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have different methods of contraception and different rates of abortions and pregnancies,
then there is an uneven distribution of education, values, healthcare, and affordable
contraception. Males argues that “the large majority [of teenage pregnancies] involve
racial minorities, marginalized youth, and adult men—that is, realities revealing systemic
failings rather than just a snotty-girl attitude problem.”308
The key, then, to combating risk-taking behavior is not to simply restrict those
who do risky behavior, which is just a symptom of the problem. To directly fight risky
behavior, Males argues, one must tackle poverty. One narrative that Males fights against
is that states with high number of evangelicals are to blame for teenage sex. Males points
out that “states with the biggest share evangelicals also tend to be those with the highest
rates of poverty.”309 Indeed, his analysis found that “states with lots of evangelicals had
lots of poverty (r = 0.50, p < 0.001), states with lots of poverty had lots of teen pregnancy
(r=0.62, p < 0.001).”310
Why not have PSE mandated for adolescents who live in poverty? Unwanted
sexual consequences are a symptom rather than the essence of the problem. Males argues
that teenage pregnancy is strictly an economic problem. So instead of tackling teenage
pregnancy, we ought to tackle poverty. By ignoring socioeconomics, we tend to only see
adolescents involved in risky behavior without realizing that other factors play a role.
Males shows data showing a correlation between the birth rate and the poverty rate:
poorer populations have had babies earlier in life,311 and the higher the rate of welfare
benefits (in real dollars, or as a percentage of the state’s median income), the lower the
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rate of unwed births and births by teen mothers.312 For STIs, the common factor is “not
young age, but the fact that in aggregate and for each race individually, teens and young
adults suffer poverty rates two to three times higher than middle-aged adults.”313 It is not
an adolescent problem: “teenage and adult sexual behaviors under similar economic and
social conditions are one and the same.”314 For different races, the STI rates are higher
for African-Americans and Hispanics than whites as of this writing.315 Table 3.1 breaks
down specific STI with each race and adolescent age groups.
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Table 3.1: Rates of Reported STI Cases per 100,000 Population by Race/Ethnicity, Age
Group, and Sex, United States, 2017
Chlamydia
Age Groups

Gonorrhea

Syphilis

10-14

15-19

10-14

15-19

10-14

15-19

Asian

3.6

274.9

1.1

38.7

0.1

2.7

White

17.3

834.7

2.5

111.6

0.0

2.3

Hispanic

28.6

1,081.1

5.3

170.8

0.0

6.4

Native

100.4

2,378.1

16.5

444.7

0.0

4.9

Black

146.3

4,383.6

46.5

1,347.0

0.4

20.5

Total for
Above
Races316

30.3

1718.6

8.2

282.4

0.1

5.3

Asian

6.5

466.8

1.6

41.7

0.0

0.4

White

33.5

1,433.3

4.6

161.9

0.0

1.1

Hispanic

51.1

1,779.8

1.8

132.5

0.0

2.2

Native

189.1

3,878.3

30.0

640.4

0.0

3.4

Black

247.0

6,485.2

72.0

1,663.1

0.6

13.6

Total for
Above Races

54.8

1907.6

13.7

363.8

0.1

2.5

Asian

0.8

85.3

0.6

35.5

0.2

5.0

White

1.9

266.9

0.4

63.8

0.0

3.5

Both Sexes

Female

Male

316

“Total for Above Races” is my own calculation. Errors are mine if the numbers are not
accurate. I gathered data from the United States Census Bureau.
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Hispanic

6.9

414.0

8.9

210.9

0.0

10.5

Native

14.5

930.0

3.4

255.7

0.0

6.5

Black

47.9

2,337.7

21.6

1,038.6

0.3

27.2

Total for
Above Races

6.8

1537.7

2.9

204.5

0.0

7.9

Source: CDC, STD Surveillance (2017)
It turns out that the teen pregnancy and abortion rate317 in the US is the highest of all
industrialized nations when you account for all races (88.5). If you only look at US
whites ages 15-19, their rates (38.1) are actually lower than those of New Zealand (55.9),
the United Kingdom (51.3), Canada (45.4), and Australia (45.0). Indeed, US whites’
teenage pregnancy and abortion rate approaches Norway’s (31.9). A more truthful
comparison would ask why the pregnancy rate is so high for African- (110.4) HispanicAmerican (109.7) teens. As Males points out, these groups have high rates of poverty
compared to teens in other Western nations, where minority teens also have high birth
rates. High birth rates in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand
largely can be explained by their higher proportions of impoverished minorities as well.
“If the United Kingdom or Sweden had the same demographics as the United States, then
the United Kingdom and Sweden would have teen pregnancy rates much closer to that of
the United States.”318 We could surmise that a white teenaged woman may be less likely
to experience an unintended pregnancy than black or low-income adult women. “Until

317

Pregnancy rates per 1,000 females. The information is taken from Males, Teenage Sex and
Pregnancy, 116.
318
Males, Teenage Sex and Pregnancy, 116-117.
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we confront the root cause of poor family, maternal, infant, and child outcomes, the
United States will continue to lead developed nations in poor outcomes.”319
To address the charge from Rector et. al. from chapter two that premarital sex
could lead to depression, Males has noticed that the data surrounding a link between
depression and premarital sex has been fudged by associating rape with voluntary sex.320
Moreover, instead of teens reporting negative sexual experiences consistently, most of
the teens have reported sex as both negative and positive, something that adults could
readily agree with. Throughout other places in Europe, 15 and 16-year-olds having sex is
normal and there are no sudden cases or depression throughout Europe. Our puritanical
attitudes about youth sex may actually be the cause of depression when young people
have sex.
In the end, Males argues that it does not matter whether we preach abstinenceonly or comprehensive sex education because “teen pregnancy is a product of the adult
mores and economic system a nation imposes on its young people, not a technical matter
for better instruction and moral cajoling to fix.”321 The causal chain is that social
problems lead to teen sex. And because of teen pregnancies, that, in turn, could reinforce
the social problems for the next generation. As Males has shown, the social context in
which the teens are in is part of the causal chain that leads to the problems of teenage
sexuality such as unwanted pregnancies and STIs.
I agree with Males on his view that teen pregnancy is mainly a result of
socioeconomics rather than simply a lack of morals or adolescents are prone to risky
319
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behavior. He has convincingly shown that there is a correlation between the poverty and
the teen birth rate. I also agree that many young people do learn their values from adult
behaviors. After all, “[i]t is not what schools teach or preach, but how adults act—toward
young people, toward our own sexuality—that is the pivotal issue now demanding
attention,”322 but one can ask how these adults gained their values. Of course, they have
learned it from observing other adults, but Males does not consider how new values are
introduced or how people switch to value something contrary to what they originally
valued. Indeed, Males mentions that it does not matter whether we teach abstinence-only
or comprehensive sex education because the results will still be the same as long as the
community is consistent with their practices. This is a remarkable claim: PSE and LCSE
are the same as long as everyone in the community does the practice! Recall the goal for
LCSE: unwanted negative consequences and if PSE can do it, then that is an ethic we
should embrace, which suggests an inherent problem with LCSE as I will show later in
the chapter. But I think the major key is what sort of values people should have regarding
sex education. There may be many factors, but I think a major component is education,
specifically how these values deal with one’s identity. Males even suggests that education
plays a key component:
Teenagers have a practical right to accurate, explicit information necessary to
consent to or reject relationships with peers and adults as well as the science to
prevent unwanted consequences. Sex education should not be evaluated by the
narrow criterion of whether it ‘delays teenage sex’ or ‘prevents teen pregnancy,’
but by its success in imparting practical knowledge. A school mathematics
curriculum is successful if it teaches a student to do math, not by whether the
student later uses it to discover a brilliant new theory or to cheat on taxes. Health
education and clinics for young people should not be branded failures or
successes depending on whether the teen birth rate in their bailiwicks rises or
falls.323
322
323
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Indeed, for Males, a good sex education program imparts practical knowledge. I agree,
but I would further claim that a better sex education program also helps students gain a
sense of their values and how it plays in their sexual identity, and how to formulate their
sexual identity. And while I agree with Males’s solution that “[r]edistribution of financial
resources and restoration of education opportunities and public services commensurate to
those Baby Boomers availed back in our day are by far the most critical needs,”324 a key
component is helping students understanding their sexual values, which is missing in
LCSE.
3.4.4. The Psychological Factor

Psychologist Robert Epstein’s research leads him to how we treat adolescents and he
makes a striking claim: “If a young person can pass one or more tests demonstrating that
he or she knows about the risks of sex, knows about birth control, is physically and
emotionally mature, and so on, then he or she should be exempted from laws that may
restrict his or her sexual behavior.”325 Epstein argues that throughout history, people have
treated adolescents as adults. In fact, “adolescence” as a category did not really exist until
the early 1900s. “Adolescence as we characterize it today—as a distinct and separate
period of life filled with angst and rebelliousness—is, quite simply, a fairly recent
phenomenon in human history.”326 The transition was from childhood to adulthood even
throughout the world.327
324
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Recently, however, teens have become infantilized through laws and our culture
is reflecting this. Thus, by extending childhood beyond puberty, we have artificially
made teens immature. “By 1933, with all young people forced to attend school and many
forced out of the job market, the idea that all young people were incompetent was firmly
embedded in American consciousness.”328 So when adolescents enter the “adult world,”
they do not know how to act because society has been infantilizing instead of slowly
giving them responsibilities, increasing their competency, which would help them gain a
sense of being an adult. Nowadays, teens are immersed in “teen culture” where they have
many restrictions and if they do have a job, it is usually a poor-paying or demeaning job.
Over time, more and more laws have been written to limit teens’ behavior. Figure 1 from
Epstein shows this.

learning together in the same room, which was the standard. For example, the Jesuit college of Caen in the
1600s had class registers having a mixture of students ranging from ages nine to twenty in various classes
and at a school in Châlons, they had students from ages eight to twenty-four. Many students also completed
their studies by their early teens. Age hardly meant anything in terms of education. Young people as well as
adults were mixed in a wide range of professions. “Ability, need, and opportunity were the forces that
determined where young people turned up; age seemed to be completely irrelevant” (pp. 28-29).
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Figure 1: Graph depicting laws restricting teen behavior overtime.

Critics could argue that adolescent physiology is causing their risky-behavior. Hence, the
need for laws restricting their behavior. Epstein counters by responding that rather than
the brains causing the turmoil, perhaps it is the turmoil and culture that shaped the brain.
“When we raise young people so that they transition smoothly and swiftly from
childhood to adulthood, the turmoil that typifies modern adolescence is absent—and so,
presumably, are the neural correlates of such turmoil. But when we raise teens to be
angry, withdrawn, or rebellious, their brains must reflect those states of mind. In other
words, the teen brain is, by necessity, every bit as much of a cultural creation as
adolescence itself.”329 The problem is that our society sees teens acting out, and thus
concludes that we need to put more restrictions on them. Epstein, however, suggests that
329
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maybe the reason they are acting out is because we are placing more restrictions on them.
By immersing teens into “teen culture,” teens get more and more infantilized and are seen
as immature and incompetent. We hold them back, and so they act out. Epstein and his
colleague, psychologist Diane Dumas, have come up with 14 areas of competency such
as interpersonal skills, handling responsibility, leadership, and have given these tests to
both teens and adults. Their results showed that teens were as competent or nearly
competent as adults in all 14 areas. Three competencies—love, leadership, and problem
solving—showed that adults outscored the teens, but the mean scores between adults and
teens were not that significant—a difference of less than 5 percent.330 When it came to
the sex component, “adult means were slightly larger than the teen means (although,
again, the differences might not be real) because the differences between the scores were
so small that one could not trust the differences as being real.”331
In all areas of competency, American adults estimate far below what the actual
level of teens’ competency level. In America, teens are more in touch with other teens on
average—65 hours a week—compared to four hours a week in preindustrial cultures.332
Teens imitate each other, and they do not get to be around adults. In countries where
adolescence has not yet emerged, many teens are around adults. There have been many
accomplishments of various thinkers when they were teens, and these accomplishments
happened before the twentieth century, before the time when adolescence emerged. In
many industrialized countries, however, teens learn virtually everything from other teens,
which have, in turn, been influenced by adults, media, laws, and our culture at large,
which gives the messages that teens are not adults, and therefore not competent. Many
330

Cf. Epstein, The case against adolescence, 156.
Epstein, The case against adolescence, 156.
332
It could be more because of social media.
331

197

adults, then, infantilize teens because they expect teens to (mis)behave in certain ways
and therefore conclude that teens are incompetent. The relationship between adults and
teens are conflictual because many adult treat teens like children. It becomes difficult to
respect someone if that person infantilizes you and treats you like a child.
Epstein’s solution is to have a competency system where teens have the full
rights, responsibilities, and privileges that adults have. Certain programs such as Outward
Bound give wayward teens extra responsibility by putting them under enormous
challenges in the wilderness. The teens rise to those challenges and these positive
changes carry with them to the real world.333 Epstein also notices that military schools—
which primarily focus on troubled teens by giving them military discipline—“tend to
produce short-term behavioral effects and, sometimes, a long-term dislike for authority,
whereas schools that give young people meaningful training and real responsibility
produce better outcomes.”334 Meaningfulness has to be key, and the meaning has to be
tied up with something that people care about. This is why “high-end” military schools
such as the United States Military Academy at West Point produce outstanding results
because the students are not treated like children. Rather, they are taught to be strong
leaders and so the teachers place high demands on the students, demands that are
meaningful to the students.335 In other words, when teens are thrown into adult roles, they
act and feel like adults. However, Epstein notes many psychologists’ studies that
conclude that intelligence peaks around age fourteen, and that “teens also had the
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potential to achieve a high level of emotional maturity between ages eleven and
fifteen.”336
Epstein’s solutions seem promising, and he realizes the change is not going to
come overnight. Rather, he proposes a gradual process: “The bottom line for the
foreseeable future, we’ll almost certainly have to continue to award most rights
automatically at certain ages. This means that young people who have not already earned
certain rights through testing before age eighteen will gain them automatically at some
point. Age, in effect, will have to continue to serve as a substitute for competency—a
weak stand-in to be sure.”337 His websites have many tests to determine competencies,
adultness, and whether one is an extended childhood.338 The overall point, however, is
that incompetency may not be an essential factor within adolescence, but could be a
symptom to the culture that expects them to be incompetent. Even if Epstein’s analysis is
too strong in that adolescents should be treated as adults in every aspect, I take his
analysis to be applicable in sexuality specifically. Thus, while I have no stake as to
whether adolescents are competent in all aspects, I would agree with Epstein (along with
previous authors I have mentioned) that adolescents are competent to make sexual
decisions given the responsibilities and skill sets they acquire.
3.4.5. The Emotional Factor

Psychologists Hessler and Katz have empirical data supporting a link between
dysfunctional emotional styles of regulation and risky behavior (such as drug use and

336

Epstein, The case against adolescence, 165.
Epstein, The case against adolescence, 340.
338
Robert Epstein. “Competency Inventories.” (Accessed November 20, 2018.)
http://drrobertepstein.com/index.php/tests.
337

199

risky sexual behavior). “Adolescents who lack skills for dealing with their emotional
experiences may be more likely to engage in risky behaviors in an effort to deal with their
negative affect or block out their feelings.”339 Developing emotional competence is a
route that one could avoid risky behaviors such as risky sex, where the participant has no
concern about the self or the consequences of the actions. For Hessler and Katz, there are
three areas of emotion-related skills collectively known as emotional competence:
emotion regulation, expression, and awareness. Why do adolescents engage in risky
behavior? “Adolescents who are not in tune with their emotions or do not have an outlet
to express emotion may have limited resources for getting over their negative feelings
and turn to risky behaviors as a way to alleviate strong emotions.”340 If emotional
incompetence is associated with risky behavior, one feature of sex education must be
ways of encouraging emotional competence. Their conclusions are striking: “During
adolescence having fewer sexual partners was associated with a greater ability to regulate
anger and sadness…Greater anger emotion regulation during middle childhood was
associated with fewer sexual partners during adolescence.”341 Without emotional
competence, adolescents may use sex as a way to get over negative emotions, which can
lead to a greater number of sexual partners.342 This may initially support Rector’s claim.
However, “[w]hen youth have difficulty regulating sadness, they may attempt to fill the
emotional void and sense of loneliness by searching for a connection with others through
sex. Given the important psychological and health-related risks associated with having
multiple sexual partners, the results point to the importance of understanding how
339
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regulation of specific emotions affects psychosocial adjustment.”343 Thus, having risky
sex may not lead to depression or sadness. If anything, it could be the other way around.
Hessler and Katz conclude: “Based on the current findings, one emphasis of such
programs should be on building emotion regulation skills for handling anger. In addition,
increasing youth awareness of their emotions (particularly anger) and their comfort
around expressing feelings in appropriate ways may help protect them against different
forms of risky behaviors.”344 Adolescents may lack emotional competence, but it could
stem from their upbringing. After all, there are many adolescents who can manage their
emotions and there are many adults who cannot. What these conclusions show is that a
sex education program must also include ways to build the skill of emotional competence
so that adolescents can learn how to display their emotions in an appropriate and healthy
way as they grow older.
Instead of seeing adolescents as a problem to be controlled, a better approach is to
see them as emerging adults where we normalize their experiences instead of dramatizing
them.345 For example, Bay-Cheng offers an analogy: when toddlers learn how to walk or
crawl, they are gaining a mobility toward increasing independence. Adults, however, do
not restrict their mobility, but adults also do not let toddlers have free reign to go
wherever they wish. Instead, adults change their environment so that toddlers can explore
their mobility under safeguarded measures. In fact, adults praise toddlers for walking and
crawling instead of shaming them. Bay-Cheng argues that same should happen for
sexuality. “Adults’ facilitation of children’s development in any domain is not equivalent
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to an abdication of adult authority, nor is the freedom to experiment with sexual
expression and relationships the same as a sexual free-for-all. Instead, measured and
well-reasoned steps must be taken to balance sexual safety with sexual exploration.”346 If
adults can play a positive role in not only teach adolescents about their sexuality, and also
see adolescents as emerging sexual beings, then explorations in sexuality would be seen
as normal instead of an inherently risky enterprise. This is not to say that sexuality is
without risk, but the risk would be seen as an understandable outcome of sexuality in
general regardless of age rather than from seeing adolescence itself as the problem.
*

*

*

The overall problem, critics of LCSE say, is that adolescents do not have sexual
competence because they are not fully autonomous and they are constant risk-takers. I
have given five factors to suggest that adolescents could potentially be sexually
competent. But what does it mean to be sexually competent? Palmer et. al. has
constructed four criteria to capture sexual competence: “contraceptive projection, selfperceived consensuality (equal willingness of both partners), self-perceived autonomy
(not due to external influences such as alcohol or peer pressure), and self-perceived
acceptable timing (i.e., that it occurred at the ‘right time).”347 Although the study was
done to determine when students had their first sexual encounter, we can use these four
criterions to form a sex education class that would enhance and help students develop
these four criterions. Contraceptive projection is a feature that LSCE focuses on. The
remaining three, however, could be emphasized, which shows a limitation of LSCE. The
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remaining three features will be discussed in the remaining chapters, which means that a
sex education program must go beyond liberal-consequentialism. Before I move to
another type of program, I want to suggest some more limitations of LCSE.

4. Commonalities between Paternalistic and Liberal-Consequentialist
Sex Education
Despite the differences, and despite the critiques of LCSE from paternalists, there are a
few commonalities between the paternalistic and liberal models. The overall theme
between them is that there is a top-down approach in engaging sexual behavior. For the
paternalist, this come from the authority (of either parents, the state, the schools, or
scripture). For the liberal-consequentialist, it comes from the social structures that are still
within place and never challenged. The difference between PSE and LCSE is not that
former does not give students sexual information and the latter does not. Rather, PSE
does not give students sexual information: authoritative individuals who forbid students
having that information. LCSE, on the other hand, restricts students’ knowledge due to
the never-challenged social institutions, customs, and cultural pressures in society. In
both cases, there is still something “external” to the students whereby they cannot get
accurate sexual information. I will go over specific commonalities.
Commonality 1: They both focus on certain outcomes and how to prevent these
outcomes: unintended pregnancies and avoidance of STIs.

Their whole focus is on something negative: the avoidance of something, which is not
unimportant. The reason, however, that many people engage in sexual activity is not for
the avoidance of something. If that was the case, then people would not engage in sexual
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activity, or only do so solely for reproductive purposes. Indeed, any positive outcome has
been missing in sex education as part of the discourse. It is as if sex education is only
focusing on reducing risk, but sex education should also consider ways that can enhance
one’s health and sexuality. Louisa Allen, professor of critical studies of education at the
University of Auckland, has done several surveys and interviews with adolescents,348 and
these adolescents complain that current sex education has been de-eroticized, too clinical,
too mechanical, or within a strict moral framework. Kendall notes that when she
observed public schools comprehensive sex education programs, the curricula ignored
moral, social, emotional, and relational outcomes and that the advocates for these
programs usually argued for the effectiveness of the sex education program based on
health outcomes that could be methodologically measured.349 Indeed, these students were
seen as rational agents that would learn the sexual information whereby their behavior
would change based on new information. What these young people call for is an
explanation of emotions within relationships, teenage pregnancies, discussion about
homosexuality, abortion, but especially about how to make sexual activity pleasurable as
an insight to make them understand themselves as sexual beings. Most people have sex
either for pleasure, to form some emotional bond, or some positive outcome. It would
make sense for a sex education program to discuss these issues.
Moreover, while the focus has been to avoid the negative consequences
(unintended pregnancies, STIs, abortion), the education hardly focuses on what to do or
how to handle the situation if it actually does happen. Paternalists argue that adolescents
348
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16-19 in New Zealand. The details are in Louis Allen. “‘They Think You Shouldn't be Having Sex
Anyway’: Young People’s Suggestions for Improving Sexuality Education Content.” Sexualities Vol. 11,
No. 5 (2008): 573-594.
349
Kendall, 131.

204

are not ready for sex. Their sexuality has not been fully formed. But if that is the case,
then why do young people seek out sexual information? If young people are seeking for
this type of information, they already see themselves as somewhat sexual beings. Both
PSE and LCSE show that sexuality has been a way to modify sexual behavior and
anything outside of the norms of society is deemed perverse rather than focusing on the
agent’s decisions. Sex education has been instilling an ideology that makes individuals
conform to a normed pattern of “proper” sexual behavior and sexual desire. In short, just
like PSE, LCSE is has been a way to influence behavior through a sexual ideology. After
all, “being responsible” in the context of sex has been largely defined in terms of
delaying sexual relations until marriage. There is still something inauthentic about these
frameworks in that the ideals are external to the agent rather than coming from the agent.
Commonality 2: Engaging in Sexual Preparedness is Side-Stepped.

Both the paternalistic and liberal models suggest that one should not engage in sexual
activity until “one is ready.” Yet, they differ about when that proper time is. For the
paternalist, it is (usually) marriage. For the liberal-consequentialist, it is when one is
mature enough to handle the consequences of sexuality by avoiding risky behavior. When
people do not protect themselves or their partners from infections or disease, then they
are “not ready” to have sex. However, the discourse around readiness for sex is a
peripheral issue. Again, the focus is on preventative measures for both models. It seems,
however, that the foundation to engage in sexual activity is a sense of sexual maturity, a
sense of who one is as a sexual being, or a willingness to understand what it means to be
ready. Yet, neither model emphasizes this. Or if they do, they suggest that the right time
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is a proper moral mode of conduct (e.g.., within marriage, within a committed
relationship, when the couple involved are in love). It is also suggested in LCSE but
stated implicitly. The social rules are not challenged and if the social rules suggest that,
for example, sexual encounters are (more) permissible within marriage, then implicitly
sex outside of marriage is considered not (or less) permissible. Learning what it means to
be sexually prepared cannot happen on one’s own; one cannot simply just figure out what
it means to be sexually prepared.
By focusing on what to avoid as does the paternalistic model, proponents of the
liberal-consequentialist model ignore or discount any positive attributes to sexuality–such
as what it means to be in a healthy sexual relationship, how intimacy (if any) is connected
with sexuality, or how a positive aspect of what it means to be a sexual being can be
integrated into one’s well-being. A major element missing in LCSE—as well as PSE—is
the positive moral dimension of sexual interaction.
In most of the sex education curricula described in section 2.4, there is hardly any
discussion regarding forming, maintaining, or dissolving a relationship. The entire focus
is simply reducing the risk, and this means abstinence or using contraceptives. They do
have a component on delayment strategies, but for the purposes of reducing unwanted
consequences. It is as if learning to figure out when one is ready is something that
students have to figure out on their own. But without any guidance or direction, they can
be lost in determining what to do or how to start. Sex education must also include ways to
determine how one is sexually ready.
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Commonality 3: Implied Heteronormativity in Sex Education.

In our culture, marriage is the normative culmination of the romantic relationship, which
implies that marriage is the most moral intimate relationships people should be in. This
institution implies many norms and institutions: heteronormativity, singlism,350
monogamism, and coupledom351 to name a few. If marriage is the model to follow, then
other forms of relationships are outside of this moral model entirely. Applying this to sex
education, “sex education is implicitly (and also, for the most part explicitly) about
producing ‘normal’ (hetero)masculinity and (hetero)femininity and that these are core
categories in the regulation of the social world.”352 By refocusing on simply what to
avoid, LCSE does not change the essence of sex education, but only affirms it, or at least
does not challenge the heteronormative structure such as: enforcing gender rules about
females as gatekeepers of sexuality and males as sexual pursuers, deemphasizing female
pleasure, targeting minority youth (such as Blacks and Latinos) by reaffirming the
stereotypes of their sexual promiscuity, enforcing a marriage-modeled type of
relationship (and the closer to marriage, the better), centering heterosexuals as the prime
relationship, “and, ultimately, places blame for social ills on young women who are asked
to bear the brunt of all subsequent social problems if they engage in sexual activity, either
because they wanted to, were forced to, or felt compelled to for reasons other than their
own sexual desire.”353
350

The stigmatization of single people with the exception of a transcendent purpose such as
religious traditions that value permanent chastity and virginity over marriage.
351
The notion that people ought to couple up. Being single is considered low on the totem pole of
relationships and in life in general. If marriage is considered the normative culmination of the romantic
relationship, then being part of a couple is a route to reach that culmination.
352
Nicki Thorogood. “Sex Education as Disciplinary Technique: Policy and Practice in England
and Wales.” Sexualities Vol. 3, No. 4 (2000): 426.
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Fine and McClelland, 321.

207

Any discourse that only discusses risk assessment leaves the issue of the
heteronormativity unchallenged. It also leaves in place the economic and cultural
differences between how men and women are treated in terms of gender norms. As an
analogy, Worth the Wait has a lesson suggests that no contraception is absolutely reliable
in preventing pregnancy and STIs and that it does not mitigate emotional problems.354
After the lesson, a question asks the student “how do you feel about contraception?” With
the background of this lesson, the student may assume that contraception is not that great
nor reliable, which is not true. However, the student may hold on to the idea because the
lesson—and perhaps the educator—expects the student to write down “contraception is
not that reliable.” Analogously, students may just write and hold views on what is
expected of them based on what the parent or teacher wants to see. They may hold
various positions and values in place without question, which can leave the structures
unchallenged and not question the norms, which makes the students into passive
participants in these sexual norms so that the students will subdue to these values rather
than actively accepting these values, or even challenging these norms.
More specifically, Hlavka has noted that through feminist scholarship, “traditional
gender arrangements, beliefs, and behaviors reinforce women’s sexual subordination to
men.”355 Moreover, “[h]eteronormativity discourses consistently link female sexuality
with passivity, vulnerability, and submissiveness, and male sexuality with dominance,
aggression, and desire.”356 Without challenging the current structure, LCSE reinforces a
patriarchal society: encouraging male power and dominance and female submission and
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Scott & White Sex Education, Worth the Wait, Lesson 6.10.
Heather R. Hlavka “Normalizing sexual violence: Young women account for harassment and
abuse.” Gender & Society 28, no. 3 (2014): 339.
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Hlavka, 339.
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passivity. If men are considered, “by nature,” aggressive and powerful—and young
women overwhelmingly depict boys and men as natural sexual aggressors—then their
violent nature as well as their overwhelming urge and desire to engage in sex is also to be
expected. Women also learn that their sexuality is not their own but for males, and that
they must withstand male aggression against their bodies. Men were seen as unable to
control their sexual urges and women were taught to acquiesce, but this was considered
natural and part of the normal routine of sexual interaction.357 Thus, sexual harassment,
assault, coercion, and even violence is considered normal for young women and as
something that is part of their everyday experience. This problem generates the sexual
double standard where young women are under pressure to control their sexual reputation
and manage their sexuality.358 These norms become so ingrained into people’s thinking
that young women even criticize other women for making sexual assault claims and
engage in victim-blaming.359 Culturally, since men were natural aggressors, it was the
women’s job to say “no” and if she did not, she was complicit in the assault. The rules are
set up where if any woman was in a situation where she was sexually assaulted, it was her
fault for not saying “no” either through weakness or by being naturally passive.
Moreover, the focus of LCSE is to mitigate unwanted consequences, namely STIs
and unwanted pregnancies. With the latter, however, it focuses on those that are
heterosexual. Thus, LCSE privileges heterosexuality thereby embraces heteronormativity.
By not giving same-gender attracted students attention and fair education, LCSE marks
those students as “other” or “deviant” or perhaps even “perverse.” It is important to point
357
Cf. Hlavka, 344. As an example, a thirteen-year-old woman described her interaction with her
male classmates: “They grab you, touch your butt and try to, like, touch you in the front, and run away, but
it’s okay, I mean . . . I never think it’s a big thing because they do it to everyone.”
358
Cf. Hlavka, 350. I will go into more details of this problem in Section 5.
359
Cf. Hlavka, 350.
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out that throughout this chapter, I have not mentioned those in the LGBTQIA+
community. The focus has always been on preventing unwanted consequences. In a
sense, LCSE has a limited ethic of harm-minimization: we can sexually act how we want
as long as we prevent unwanted consequences and respect everyone’s basic rights. But
without a robust sex education, the values of a heteronormative culture are still in place
and discussions of LGBTQIA+ individuals are ignored, disvalued, or not considered as a
serious topic for discussion.
Commonality 4: Limiting Knowledge According to the Model’s Goals.

Part of the irony with the liberal discourse is that there is a sense of distrust about what
adolescents will do sexually. The desires cannot be sufficiently contained through an
abstinence-only program. Thus, the schools, parents, and the state must instill values and
preventative measures to make sure that when—not “if”—the adolescents engage in sex,
there are no unintended consequences. The discourse of this model is, “it’s best not to
have sex, but if you do, here are ways to prevent negative consequences.” It looks as if
LCSE has more openings in terms of what to teach adolescents and how adolescents can
fully express themselves sexually, where LCSE opens up the discourse to permit broader
forms of sexuality, but this is only superficial. LCSE provides narrow options or ideas of
what it means to be a sexual subject. Carlson points out that liberal discourse has
played on a linguistic playing field in which abstinence had to be promoted as the
ideal as that a discussion of condom use, for example, had to be presented as
something young people needed to know in case they ‘slipped up’ and had sex.
Progressive sex educators, consequently, were working in an abstinence discourse
that limited what it was possible to say or think about sexuality and the ‘problem’
of adolescent sexuality. 360
360

Carlson, 124. Indeed, at least in the United States, the discourse revolving around sex education
has been “abstinence-only” (a form of PSE), or “abstinence-plus” (a form of LCSE), where students learn
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Adolescents themselves are not invited to be part of the discussion of what they want in a
sex education class. On top of age discrimination, excluding adolescents from the
discussion presents problems where adolescents cannot develop critical thinking skills,
moral reasoning, or how to negotiate relationships.361 Indeed, “[a] decided conservative
victory was that ‘comprehensive’ sex education atrophied, coming to increasingly
resemble abstinence-only programs. The term no longer implied the integrated K-12
course of instruction SIECUS had recommended. ‘Comprehensive’ had become a code
for programs that stress abstinence but also teach about contraception.”362 Even if LCSE
has a broader scope than PSE, the former seems to be just an extension of the latter! If
LCSE’s program is to be effective to contrast PSE, it must move away from the paradigm
of PSE and establish itself on its own terms. LSCE still endorses the traditional family,
and most of the information revolves around sexual plumbing, sexual hygiene, and
forming relationships within the context of a marriage-like framework. Even though
LSCE may endorse personal choices, the choices are more legitimate if the choices match
the framework of the traditional family. We can see this in the curricula that I have
mentioned in section 2.4: none of them discuss LGBTQIA+ issues nor challenge
heteronormative assumptions.
Notice with these commonalities above—especially commonality number one—
they both have the same goal: to avoid unwanted outcomes. They even have the same
reasons: because there would be harm otherwise. The difference is how to establish who

about contraceptives and avoiding unwanted pregnancies, but abstinence is strongly emphasized. In both
cases, abstinence is the preferred norm and is the common term between them. “Comprehensive sex
education” has slowly lost been changed into “abstinence-plus.”
361
Cf. Bay-Cheng, “Ethical parenting of sexually active youth,” 140.
362
Irvine, 188.
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is being harmed. Here, the difference is telling: PSE considers society is harmed if
adolescents are allowed to engage in sex; LCSE considers adolescents are being harmed
if they engage in sex without the proper behaviors. They may have different internal
goals within the educational program, but they are working within the same paradigmatic
model. Have there been difference between PSE and LCSE after the Supreme Court case
of Obergefell v. Hodges? I will consider this in section 5.2.
*

*

*

Despite the commonalities with PSE and LCSE with their flaws and limitations, LCSE is
preferable. For one, LCSE model offers students a better grip of sexuality and what sort
of choices to make in one’s life instead of having someone else doing the deciding for
them, which makes the students’ decisions more genuine since the students will be
deciding themselves what they want instead someone else making the choice for them.
Having the students decide on their own sexuality gives them an enriched life because
they can know what they want through their choices and values instead of being forced to
choose something that may go against their own values and experiences. Moreover, the
students will have a better understanding of sexuality and what sort of choices to make in
one’s life instead of having someone else doing the deciding for them, which gives the
students a better introspective view on what he or she wants.
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5. Why the Liberal-Consequentialist Model is Limited

However, in addition to the commonalities with PSE, LCSE has problems on its own.
Problem 1: A Focus on Outcomes Ignores an Internal Aspect of People’s Sexuality.

These internal problems suggest that LCSE is too limited because of its focus on the
consequences of sexuality. Of course, the consequences of sexuality have importance, but
the value of sexuality should not solely rely on the consequences of actions. As
mentioned before, both PSE and LCSE focus on decisions that are more outcome-based
rather than educating students how to develop an internal process of making those
decisions. In other words, an “internal” aspect is necessary because one’s sexual
subjectivity cannot simply come about by avoiding negative consequences. A good sex
education would do more than just a negative consequentialist ethic: it would talk about
the positive aspects of sexuality and also discuss various sexual identities and expressions
to legitimate sexual minority’s experiences, which can help undermine heteronormativity.
The focus that LCSE has concentrated on is health, but sexuality is much more than that.
LCSE is missing the sexual interactions and sexual experiences which means that the
content of sex education must contain values. Even though the goal of LCSE is to help
students exercise their own sexual values, LCSE does not help students develop their
values. If anything, students may simply repeat the same values as their culture and
believe that those values are their own without critical scrutiny.
These values, however, are not myopic as PSE would suggest. Psychologist
Sharon Lamb says it best: “a focus on health sets up curricula for facts-based learning
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that appears to have no moral dimension with regard to how students might behave with
one another…This kind of sex education depends on social skills training, a kind of
education that focuses on practice rather than understanding, and that practice leads to
better choices.”363 Just looking at the outcomes of health is not enough for a robust sex
education because it ignores the moral dimensions on how people interact with each other
sexually. As a crude example, imagine learning martial arts or dancing without a partner.
Of course, it is possible, but learning these activities with someone is more effective
because the interaction with another person brings in an interaction that is sorely needed
in sex education. This interaction is key to understanding each other and moral thinking
where the students can immerse themselves around sexual issues rather than just learning
on how to avoid unwanted consequences. Lamb argues that more is needed than just the
facts of sex, and avoidance of unwanted outcomes: “A truly democratic education
produces a democratic citizen. That is, democratic ethical education should not only point
students inward, to develop moral arguments for their beliefs and opinions, but outward
to develop moral practices toward the people with whom they will have sex, talk about
sex, and influence sexuality.”364 LCSE does not provide any development of moral
argumentation, but simply asks the students to exercise their values unreflectively.
Students may think they are acting from their own values, but because there are no
challenges to their culture, people still have the same heteronormative values instilled in
them. Thus, no person is forcing people to have particular values. However, a
heteronormative culture is still intact, and those values are “forced” in people subtly.

363
364

Lamb, Sex Ed for Caring Schools, 37.
Lamb, 17.
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Adolescent self-determination is crucial to help young people become adults
where they learn the responsibilities of their decisions, which mean that building and
training autonomy is crucial in sex education, something that should be directly taught
but is only regarded as a peripheral issue in PSE and LCSE. To understand consent to sex
(which is a vital component in sex education), then one must have self-determination in
significant sexual matters. If one does not have self-determination in significant sexual
matters, then one cannot consent to sex. Indeed, advancing sexual health means to get rid
of the inequalities and disparities so that autonomy, well-being, and self-determinacy can
be formed. This, in turn, can help build relationships. To build self-determinacy is to
increase their competence, their confidence, and their understanding of their internal
decisions rather than following societal expectations or parroting what their peers says—
which is what high school students usually do. Indeed, many young people believe they
are expressing their own values, but it is mostly a reflection of what their peers and
culture tells them. By encouraging young people to express their own views, they will be
more in tune with what they feel, which will increase their sexual health and well-being.
Research has shown that decision-making skills is not something that is developed simply
through maturity and age, but through explicit and attentive training.365 In other words,
decision-making needs to be trained through guidance rather than letting the skill develop
on its own. Without the training, the skill is not developed which can stunt the person.
Self-determinacy is a feature of autonomy and deontology, a topic that I will consider in
the next chapter.
365
Support for this claim may be found in the following sources: Edward W. Cassidy and Dana G.
Kurfman, “Decision Making as Purpose and Process,” in Developing Decision Making Skills, ed. Dana G.
Kurfman, (Arlington, Virginia: National Council for the Social Sciences, 1977), 1-26; B. Fletcher and
George Wooddell, “Education for a Changing World,” Journal of Thought 16:3 (1981): 21-32; and H.
Simon, “Problem Solving and Education,” in Problem Solving and Education, eds. D. Tuma and R. Reif
(Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, 1980).
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Problem 2: Sexual Norms and Values Are Assumed and Not Questioned.

A benefit of LCSE is that people may practice any form of sexual activity as long as there
is a reduction of risk and everyone involved in consenting. However, it is perfectly
legitimate within the liberal tradition to critique another’s sexual behavior. After all, in
the liberal tradition, people are allowed to critique others’ behaviors; sexual behaviors
should not be an exception. How far can one go in the critiques? Under the liberal
tradition, if I am doing an activity or engaging in a lifestyle that I enjoy but it is neither
popular nor considered normal, Mill contends that others are allowed not only to reason
or educate me on my “misbehavior,” but they can express their arguments and ideas and
reason with me to show me why my lifestyle is foolish or wrong short of forcing or
coercing me. But why is this a problem? In other forms of behaviors, we would expect
this. In sexuality, however, things get more complex.
Suppose Blair wants to remain abstinent until marriage for whatever reason. She
looks at contemporary America and sees many people engaging in sexual behavior that
she deems inappropriate. On the one hand, she could disapprove of people’s sexual
actions, but in the end, she says that it is their lives and as long as they are not harming
anyone else, it is their choice. On the other hand, suppose we have another student,
Morgan, and like Blair, wants to remain abstinent until marriage for whatever reason.
Morgan also looks at contemporary America and sees many people engaging in sexual
behavior and deems it inappropriate through disapproval. Moreover, Morgan explains to
everyone why their actions are inappropriate and gives various reasons to explain why
abstinence is better for the people involved and that engaging in sexual behavior is
perverse, foolish, or just plain wrong. Just how far would the “various reasons” be? It
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could be simply giving arguments, or handing out pamphlets. But what if Morgan shames
someone for their perceived sexuality? A common mode of shaming someone’s sexuality
is slut-shaming, particularly—and exclusively—toward women.
Slut-shaming is a major problem. Through slut-shaming, women’s sexuality is
deemed non-virtuous if she is seen as having too many sex partners, as having sexual
feelings, and sexually active (and is considered worse if she is doing so indiscriminately
or without a serious relationship). Thus, because she is not sexually acting in genderconforming ways, she ought to be ashamed for being sexual. These activities do not have
to be overtly sexual, but can be performances that marks her as sexual: violating dress
codes, requesting sexual information, violating sexual norms. Slut-shaming is a
normative claim that calls into question what is deemed inappropriate behavior—which
constitutes and informs heteronormativity—and there are historical, cultural, and social
underpinnings by deeming someone a slut. For example, in 2014, the Pew Research
Center summarized various findings about online harassment. Young women (ages 1824) have experienced harassment at disproportionally high levels.366 Because slutshaming has been a way to criticize another woman’s sexual activities, the liberal
tradition could find slut-shaming as perhaps morally problematic, but still permissible.
After all the liberal tradition invokes freedom of speech—even offensive speech—as the
hallmark of a liberal society. So slut-shaming, even though it is offensive, is permissible

366
See Maeve Duggan. “Online Harassment.” Pew Research Center: Internet, Science & Tech.
September 21, 2015. (Accessed November 20, 2018.) http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/10/22/onlineharassment/. For example, “26% of these young women have been stalked online, and 25% were the target
of online sexual harassment. In addition, they do not escape the heightened rates of physical threats and
sustained harassment common to their male peers and young people in general.”
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in the liberal tradition,367 which makes slut-shaming consistent within LCSE. Both
Blair’s and Morgan’s positions and actions would be morally acceptable not only to have
in society, but also implicitly shown that Morgan would not be challenged. If so, students
may come away with the idea that they are both acceptable positions. Or at least students
are taught that Morgan’s position is a respectable position to hold implicitly in the
classroom. Even if teachers do not allow it in the classroom, the heteronormative claim is
not questioned. With LCSE focusing on preventing unwanted consequences, nothing
prevents people from slut-shaming each other outside the classroom. A better sex
education program would consider this problem so that people’s character is such that
slut-shaming is not considered a viable option.
Slut-shaming has deeper ramification in society. Slut-shaming reinforces gender
norms for both sexes which can limit people’s sexual autonomy. It is what social
scientists Emmerink et. al. have termed the “(hetero)sexual double standard,”368 which
entails slut-shaming and policing sexual standards.
Endorsing the sexual double standard can lead to negative sexual effects. For
men, in particular, there has been a relationship between endorsing the sexual double
standard and acceptance of dating violence and rape culture.369 Moreover, men are still
expected to meet the masculine ideal, even if that person is gay. As journalist Rachel
Hills puts it in her book The Sex Myth, “[a] gay man can now be a ‘real man,’ but a ‘fag’
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It is an open question whether Mill himself would consider shame as a technique to persuade
others. Nevertheless, within a typical liberal tradition, using shame as a technique to influence others is
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still cannot.”370 In other words, men are expected to have high sex drives, to not be
emotionally sensitive, to seek out sex, not to be vulnerable to other men, and not to
display and feminine qualities. The (hetero)sexual double standard is heteronormative in
that there are no discussions of LGBTQIA+ individuals, or if there are, they are implicitly
considered deviations of the norm. They may not fit the gender or sexual norms, but they
are still expected to perform the sexual standards as Hills points out. The information that
both men and women obtain from sex education classes, even under LCSE criteria, are
gendered. For example, when it comes to abstinence as a choice, the messages are mainly
geared towards girls: “decisions whether or not to have sex are made by girls rather than
by boys, and that girls are responsible for circumnavigating and preventing sexual
abuse.”371 This message puts young women in a passive position. Endorsing the sexual
double standard for women has been associated with poor sexual functioning and lower
sexual satisfaction.372 If young women are ingrained into thinking they have to be
passive, it becomes harder to take ownership of one’s sexuality, which could potentially
be harder saying “no” to sexual activities they do not want. However, if they decide to
become sexual, they get judged for having sex.
Men, however, have the luxury for displaying their sexuality. The sexual double
standard, therefore, makes it harder for women to have sexual autonomy and agency.373 A
study showed that students considered a man’s responsibility as knowing what or what
not to do during sex. If the man does not know, then it challenges his identity as a man,
370
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and his social status. Thus, the script is heteronormative in that men ought to know about
sex while women ought to know about protection from sex exploits. 374 To date, there are
not many studies investigating whether LGBTQIA+ individuals follow the
heteronormative script. But the results would be helpful either way. If they follow the
heteronormative script, then that suggests that our culture is invested in heteronormativity
which makes sexual minorities performing a script that they are not comfortable with. If
they do not follow the heteronormative script, then they have broken out of that
institution (which is why they are pro tanto criticized) and their interactions and thinking
patterns could be insightful for everyone to show how to have healthy relationships and
not following any institutional expectations.
In the overall scheme of things, LCSE does not challenge any social or political
structures or institutions. The status quo is the assumed position to hold. Rather, the
purpose is to help each individual obtain personal satisfaction, but educators would miss
the chance of changing the social structures and assumed biased sexual attitudes. By not
critiquing the status quo, heteronormativity will still be in place. Not following the sexual
norms could be seen as a failure or the feeling that something is wrong with them since
they do not desire the norms. For example, alternative relationships or being single or
divorced could be seen as a failure.
If sex education was just looking at the facts, one could judge and value some
forms of sexuality as negative. Under LCSE—and PSE for that matter, it is permissible to
judge sexual actions, behaviors, or even ideas because the sexual market of ideas is open
to all, and anything that one disagrees with can be scrutinized and criticized. Again,
LCSE could endorse sexism and heteronormativity by not challenging a patriarchal
374
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system. Adolescents are just starting to get acquainted with sexuality and they may not
have any direction on how to approach it except for various norms that they are familiar
with. They are familiar with these gendered norms, which can pressure them to follow
these norms, which can start their romantic and sexual lives negatively.375 They may not
even be aware of other ways of expressing their sexuality, or that other ways of
expressing their sexuality even exists. After all, a liberal state and liberal freedom does
not necessarily mean living an examined life. A sex education that does not endorse slutshaming would thereby critique PSE, but also LCSE as well. There must be another sex
education program that goes beyond LCSE. Thus, LCSE—while it has many positive
attributes—must be rejected as well.
A better society is where people do not feel shameful about their sexuality, where
they have a better education on sexual matters, and the mores reflect sexuality in a
positive pluralistic light rather than a universal one-size-fits all notion. A better society
would be one that is closer to having comprehensive sex education.
We may think that heteronormativity has vastly diminished after the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), the case that legalized same-sex
marriage nationwide. As an example, the California Healthy Youth Act of 2016 states
that:
All instruction and materials in grades K-12 must be inclusive of LGBTQ
students. Instruction shall affirmatively recognize that people have different
sexual orientations and, when discussing or providing examples of relationships
and couples, must be inclusive of same-sex relationships. (EC § 51933(d)(5).) It
must also teach students about gender, gender expression, gender identity, and
explore the harm of negative gender stereotypes. (EC § 51933(d)(6).)376
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Indeed, the act also requires that the intent of the law is “to provide pupils with the
knowledge and skills they need to develop healthy attitudes concerning adolescent
growth and development, body image, gender, sexual orientation, relationships, marriage,
and family (EC § 51930(b)(2).). Moreover, the Act also prohibits sexual health classes
from promoting bias against anyone on the basis of any category protected by Education
Code § 220, which includes actual or perceived gender and sexual orientation.377
And while the Obergefell decision has helped fight against heteronormativity,
there are still cultural ramifications that still keep heteronormativity in place. Bernstein
has called this the “assimilationist dilemma:” as same-sex marriage begins to resemble
opposite-sex marriages, same-sex relationships will eventually assimilate to the norms of
heterosexuality. However, if they do, they begin to lose their salience of a gay or lesbian
identity. If so, it could usher in a “post-gay” world.378 Same-sex couples would have to
assimilate such that they gain the same rights and legal protections of marriage that
opposite-sex couples have had. While the Obergefell case has pro tanto challenged
heteronormativity, Bernstein suggests that in a broader context, heteronormativity can be
reconstituted by shifting how sexual and gender norms are redrawn.379 As mentioned
before, LGBTQIA+ may still display expected gender roles and what is deemed
appropriate ways to display masculinity or femininity. Even if these expected traits could
be queered such that they challenge the expected norm, the worry is that an expected
norm may still be embedded into our culture. In short, the Obergefell decision may have
pro tanto challenged the current standards and expectations of heteronormative
377
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performances, but the rubric of heteronormativity is still intact since heteronormativity
can be shifted and redrawn. In essence, then, there is no major difference between PSE
and LCSE except who is being harmed, but it is still within the same rubric of social
norms and accepted sexual customs of heteronormativity. This is not to say that this
mitigates the difference—after all, LCSE has advantages than PSE—but the framework
of both models are one and the same. Both the liberal and paternalistic models claim to
produce sexually responsible citizens. Overall, they focus on preventing negative
consequences, they just differ on how to prevent it. In the end, however, both models fail
at giving students what they want in sexual education, and most importantly, information
of what it means to be a sexual subject.

6. Why Both LCSE and PSE Models must be Rejected.

The problems of LCSE are deep. As a review, LCSE represents a way to instill and
promote the “right” values and behaviors. This model is limited by focusing on
consequences. A proper sex education cannot come down to the avoidance of something,
which was also a limitation of the paternalistic model. A positive aspect of sexuality must
necessarily be included in sex education. Without a positive aspect, students will only
learn how to think of sex negatively (meaning what to avoid). This is not necessarily a
bad thing, but sexuality needs to be discussed in a positive light since sexuality is also
pursued for the sake of pleasure, intimacy, and overall happiness and well-being. As an
analogy, imagine an education surrounding culinary arts but their focus was on how to
avoid bad tastes or incongruous foods. This type of education would be so limited in what
the culinary arts could do. If the students only learned the negative aspects, they could
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not know other possibilities of any positive tastes. Now imagine if a student explored
different foods and paired two new foods together in a new way. Teaching what foods
can do in a positive way opens up new avenues for culinary students. The same could be
said with sexuality. Students want to learn new and different avenues of sexuality and by
doing so, this opens up new avenues about what different types of sexualities there are.
LCSE claims that students can act based on their values, but the values that students learn
from their culture is that sexuality is already marked as risky, dangerous, and negative.
The values that students have, therefore, are already laden with negative features and the
choices they engage in will reflect those values. Thus, the values they “choose” to
express are not really coming from them but from societal expectations.
Another feature is that heteronormativity is still in place. Tolman’s work show
that when young women have sex, the narrative is typically that the sex “just happened:”
“‘It just happened,’ then, can also be understood as a cover story. It is a story about the
necessity for girls to cover their desire. It is also a story that covers over active choice,
agency, and responsibility, which serves to ‘disappear’ desire, in the telling and in the
living. But ‘it just happened’ is much more than a story told by yet another girl to
describe her individual experience.”380 Tolman’s description of young women’s narrative
of “it just happened” is a way to show that the sex that happened seemed more
mechanical rather than agental. It was almost as if they had sex simply to get it over with,
as a rite of passage to their social group rather than from their own sexual desire.381 This
tells us that there is no space for young people, especially young women to discuss or
explore sexual desire, because their sexual agency is erased. “Sex is reduced to a
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biological act that needs to be achieved and the feelings, emotions, and bodily responses
to it seem to be secondary.”382 Again, it speaks to the potentials for slut-shaming, which
feeds into heteronormativity, but also that young people, especially young women have a
harder time saying “yes.” The thinking may be that if there is no “no,” then the only
alternative is that it is a “yes.” This false dilemma is still harmful in that people may be
engaged in sexual acts that they are not sure they want to do, but they may not even
realize they did not want because they did not say “no.” With the discourse focusing on
avoiding risk, sex education has been about managing risk and issues of pleasure are on
the periphery.383 This discourse sets up a dichotomy where safe practices are better, but
since pleasure is not mentioned, pleasure has been associated with unsafe practices. The
result is that women may feel disconnected to their sexual desires.
As an example of adding a positive element to sexuality, honest communication
and negotiation is key to a healthy sexuality. If the focus was on simply avoiding
negative consequences, then the focus would be ways of how to communicate “no”
toward unwanted sexual advances, which is a good thing. But there is no discussion or
teaching moments on how to say “yes” toward sexual advances. It is as if learning how to
say “no” is the teachable moment, but saying “yes” is either everything else or something
that students need to figure out on their own. However, saying “yes” needs to be taught.
Negotiation with a sexual partner is key to using contraception. This means that
adolescents must have the skills for honest communication for their needs and wishes.
Simply gaining the skill of saying “no” does not help students make tough decisions, but
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defers the decisions onto another authoritative figure.384 Studies, however, reveal that
many adolescents fail to discuss these issues, particularly women, which can make them
more vulnerable when their partner is resistant to use contraception.385
Part of the curriculum of both PSE and LCSE models so far have been a negative
consequentialist view. I have shown why the negative aspect is limited. In fact, this ethic
could alternatively have been called “liberal-negative-consequentialism” where the focus
is on preventative measures or negative liberty. A positive dimension is missing.
International organizations such as the International Planned Parenthood Federation,
World Association for Sexual Health, and the World Health Organization call for a more
comprehensive sex education that not only discusses avoiding harms, but also sexual
enrichment and fulfillment.386 International Planned Parenthood Federation “further
advocates for a case-by-case approach to balancing individual youths’ developmental
needs and sexual rights and their particular circumstances, rather than applying a uniform
set of standards or prohibitions regarding sexual behaviour.”387
But I also want to show why the consequentialist ethic is also limited. The
consequences of sexuality are important, but one should not focus one’s sexual behavior
strictly on the consequences, even on a positive account. If so, all of sexuality would be
regarded as a means-end route where the end is either the avoidance of something, or
perhaps something positive (such as pleasure, or an emotional connection between the
people involved). The activity itself along with the self relating to another is an important
feature of sexuality, but a consequentialist account does not address this. Because the
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intricacies and dynamic complexities of a sexual relationship are part of the engaged,
ongoing feature of the activity, and so one should not just focus on the aftermath of the
sexual engagement.
Moreover, the current comprehensive programs do not go far enough. As
mentioned before, 22 states have implemented refusal skills in their sex education
programs. The problem is that this still puts in place heteronormative gender roles: men
are the aggressors and women are the gatekeepers. With teaching refusal skills, it
reinforces these roles in that men perhaps need to be more aggressive and women need to
be stricter with their refusal. Without challenging the gender roles, it really puts the onus
on young women to refuse. Under this rubric, men or challenging masculinity is still put
in place.
A proper sex education would do more than just a consequentialist ethic. It would
teach the positive aspects and how the students could choose these aspects from
themselves based on their own values. In other words, sex education needs to develop
students’ sexual autonomy. Moreover, instead of teaching refusal skills only, a better sex
education would teach both partners to pay attention and ask whether to proceed or not
and to acknowledge whether the other person wants to proceed or not. In other words, sex
education needs to teach about consent. Since LCSE does not focus on that, LCSE is
insufficient. For these reasons, LCSE must also be rejected as well as PSE. The next
chapter will consider another model which will avoid the disadvantages of both models,
but hold on to the advantages of both, as well as forming a new way to educate sexuality.
The next model will discuss sexual autonomy, from which emerges consent.
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Chapter Four: The Liberal-Deontological Model

With the disadvantages of the paternalistic and liberal-consequentialist models discussed
in previous chapters, we must have an ethic that is centered not on outcomes, but
psychological motivations; not on external behaviors, but on internal choices of the agent.
If a good sex education focuses on the internal psychological motivations, there could be
diverse types of relationships in which the students’ choices could be acknowledged
rather than the assumed normative heterosexual, monogamous type. Moreover, a good
sex education would make sure to prepare the students so they know what to expect,
which includes discussions surrounding consent and forming/acknowledging sexual
boundaries. These features bring forth a new model of sex education: the liberaldeontological view.
Liberal-deontology shares the same liberal features as liberal-consequentialism in
that everyone chooses what sort of life one wants based on one’s desires, goals, values,
and ends to achieve. Since each individual is going to have different values and goals, the
resulting society will end up being pluralistic. One way to manage the pluralism is
through a consequentialist ethic: simply allow the diversity since it increases potential
good consequences if the harm does not outweigh the good, which was covered in the
previous chapter. The deontological portion is to manage the pluralistic values and goals
by focusing not on the actions external to the agent, but to respect the person’s
autonomous decision because the person is an agent who is free to make decisions.
Because of this, the agent’s freedom is paramount and interfering with the agent’s
decision ignores the agent’s autonomy. Any interference with anyone’s autonomy needs
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justification. If any paternalistic interference is to be permitted, it is generally restricted to
cases in which the agent is not deemed to be autonomous with respect to decisionmaking. Combining the liberalism and deontological ethics forms a liberal-deontological
ethic which forms the basis of a new model for sex education free from any social
utilitarianism, but rather champions individual sexual rights. Moreover, sex education
teaches adolescents to police themselves: self-control replaces social control.
The goal of this chapter is to focus on a sex education model that hones in on the
autonomy of the individual. I argue that liberal-deontological sex education (LDSE) is
better than the previous models. In section 1, I will first explain liberal-deontology by
focusing more on the deontological aspects. The liberal aspects were covered thoroughly
in the previous chapter and thus will not be discussed in this section. In section 2, I will
apply liberal-deontology ethics to sex education, which focuses on consent. Because this
is a new model, not many states have a focus on this ethic; however, new laws have
recently been enacted.388 Additionally, I will investigate new curricula that focus on
consent as the central mode of sex education. Overall, I will show that this model has
advantages over the previous two (PSE and LCSE) models. In section 3, I will look at the
advantages and disadvantages of LDSE, a perspective I believe has some significant
shortcomings. Finally, in section 4, I will outline my position on autonomy and consent
and show that autonomy and consent are a legitimate justification for a good sex
education, but they are not the foundation. In the end, I will argue that LDSE has
limitations which require us to develop a new model of sex education.
388
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1. Foundations of Liberal-Deontology

A note before I start. While I use deontological ethics, I do not solely rely on Kant. He
may have an influence considering he is the paradigm example of deontological ethics.
However, I am looking at deontological ethics broadly. My focus is to look at autonomy,
self-determination, and treating people with respect as the main focus of deontology. And
while I may use Kantian language, I will not rely on Kantian ethics such as the
Categorical Imperatives or acting for the sake of duty.
The liberal-deontological view focuses on autonomy. We have our own personal
sovereignty and self-determination, which implies that the choices I make form what sort
of life I want to have based on my own values. Anyone intervening in my life decisions is
acting paternalistically towards me which would be primae facie wrong. Moreover, one
must consider other people have their own personal sovereignty and life decisions which
shape the way in which they lead their lives based on their values. As separate
autonomous beings, we recognize we must leave each other alone to pursue our goals
even if we disagree on the life plan or the values of the other. Autonomy, then, includes
thinking about others with respect to their autonomy. The obvious exception is the nonconsensual harm of another autonomous being.389 We can say, then, autonomy not only
means respecting people’s decisions, but realizing those decisions are personal
outgrowths of their autonomy.

389
What about humans that are not autonomous? We have proxies toward those who cannot make
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decisions for them. The question is whether adolescents can make sexual decisions for themselves. I have
already argued that they can in the previous chapter.
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Furthermore, autonomy is acting on one’s own principles rather than following
external constraints. Each person accepts these principles through critical self-reflection
through which everyone legislates the moral law for themselves. Through Kantian ethics,
to act freely is to act autonomously, or according to the moral law I give myself instead
of the dictates of nature or social conventions. Moreover, to act autonomously means to
act with authenticity meaning the action comes from people’s own active will whereby
they reflectively endorse the action or motive rather than passively parroting an action.

2. Applying Liberal-Deontology to Sex Education

We can now formulate the liberal-deontological sex education model. Critics of a liberal
sex education have suggested that a value-free sex education is not worth pursuing or
impossible. LDSE assuages these worries by encouraging students to formulate their own
values, and suggests that sexual autonomy—which assumes sexual self-determination
based on personal sexual values—is paramount.
2.1. Autonomy in Sex Education

The first step is to introduce autonomy to the students: the ability to maintain and
enhance self-control and the ability to make decisions about how to act since autonomous
agents act in such a way where they act from their will and not letting their inclinations
take over. Thus, developing sexual autonomy helps students develop control over their
sexual behavior and make decisions regarding that behavior. In the context of sex
education, students are taught to be free from pressures and other people’s influences so
that they make choices that are truly their own. Therefore, part of LDSE would not only
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teach students how not to fall into the pressures of their peers or social expectations but
also to be independent and foster sexual autonomy. A good example of this is the Dutch
“Spring Fever” program that is aimed toward children ages 4-11. The program teaches
young people age appropriate knowledge, methods, and skills for sexual contacts they
will have later in life. The program has had positive results and is internationally
known.390
Proponents of PSE and LCSE claim they are helping adolescents make decisions
to benefit their physical and mental health. These models shape and focus on adolescents’
behaviors and not their motivations, at least not directly. The major flaw of the previous
models, however, is that they focus on shaping the external factors of the adolescent, and
not the internal or psychological intentions directly. Sex education in the past has been
heavily influenced by behavior modification: if there was a problem that students needed
to know sexually, the way to fix that is through changing sexual behavior.
The problem lies with a given mismatch between the external behavior and their
internal psychology. If students are competent enough and internally desire sexual
activity, but do not engage in it because outsiders have told them they are not ready,
students may withhold sexual activity despite an internal desire to engage in it. When
authoritative figures such as educators, policymakers, and parents influence students’
behavior through proscriptions, this results in students parroting behavior instead of
genuinely behaving from their own internal motivation. For example, forcing students to
perform a certain behavior1 when they would rather do behavior2, (or, at least, avoid
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behavior1) is prima facie denying the students’ autonomy, and thus not respecting the
students’ personhood. By letting students discuss and explore what it means to engage in
behavior2 (but not necessarily do behavior2), students gain rational growth and can more
fully understand what engaging in certain behaviors mean.391
The liberal-deontological model, however, focuses on the student rather than on
the educator. Thus, the educator teaches students the process of forming the moral law
such that they can act on it, thereby helping students internalize the behavior into a
principled motivation derived from their own internal psychology rather than forcing
students to behave a certain way from an external source. Autonomy is the key because it
is the students who make their own choices but, more importantly, the choice is made and
imposed by them and not for them allowing them to be their “own person” instead of
conforming to the external source. By focusing on autonomy, sex education will revolve
around adolescents choosing why and when to engage in sex. LDSE will therefore
maximize autonomy by providing access to as much information as is available to the
students to show these choices of sexual activities are possible when chosen freely,
privately, and without harm to others.
I contend that learning how to authorize and commit to various values is better
than taking on values that are given by others because adolescents will eventually learn
and endorse what Steutal and de Ruyter have called “the principle of sexual selfdetermination” which states “every adult person should be accorded an equal right of
391
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sexual self-determination, that is, equal freedom to arrange one’s sexual life according to
one’s own values, beliefs and preferences.”392 This principle also holds that we have a
duty to not infringe on anybody else’s sexual freedom. A corollary of this principle is that
we must respect other adults’ rights to sexual self-determination which consists of two
components: one is having the right attitude, where people accept different sexual goals
and a plurality of motivations to reach these goals with a deep aversion to those who
violate other’s sexual self-determination. The second component is having a certain
capacity to apply their principles in particular situations to determine which acts are
violations of sexual self-determination.393
After developing these deontological duties, the teacher can then delve into
specific case studies to bring forth various values that the students have developed
specifically particularized for them, though still having the deontological values as the
foundation. For example, every student would develop the deontological value of selfdetermination and respecting other people’s choices. Student A may eventually develop
the value of having a traditional relationship that entails no sexual engagement until after
marriage; student B may develop the value of having sex only within the confines of a
loving relationship; and student C may develop a value where consent is the only rule
when it comes to sexual engagement. A way to help the students hone in on what values
are right for them is to practice various scenarios and issues so that they will have a
clearer understanding of their values by exhibiting what desires to fulfill.
Finally, another important feature of LDSE is to make the adolescents critically
authorize certain values that they themselves must discover. The failure of doing so could
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lead to adolescents following behaviors without knowing why or even refusing to follow
certain behaviors out of rebellion. When students have a better sense of how they feel and
desire regarding sexuality, they are more in tune with their own identity, gender, and
relationship preferences. This knowledge allows them to act more authentically with how
they feel instead of performing social-conforming identity, gender, or relationship
preferences.
2.2. Consent in Sex Education

In sexual relations, taking into account another person’s autonomy is to have a deeper
understanding of consent. Learning about sexual consent is essential to a good sex
education. While it may seem obvious that consent is morally necessary for any sexual
activity, we must first ask about the nature of consent, how it comes about, and whether
there are distinct types. Before doing so, I will first briefly explain the two accounts of
the nature of consent. The first is the attitudinal account which states consent is given by
having a mental attitude. Consent is therefore a psychological attitude toward that act.
The second is the performative account which states consent is given by communicating
(either verbally or non-verbally) and intending to do the act. Considering the various
arguments for both sides, I do not have a particular stance as to which side is better;
however, students might. One way to have the students discuss the issue is to bring up
various case studies and see where the consent lies (either in the person’s mind or in the
communication itself). Because the issue of consent mainly focuses on what counts as
consent, or what the conditions are for consent and whether those conditions are met, I
will primarily focus on those issues.
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2.2.1. Consensual Minimalism
The first type of consent is what is known as consensual minimalism.394 Under this view,
the necessary395 and sufficient conditions for what counts as consent is a voluntary
informed agreement. The best representatives of this view are Mappes,396 Wertheimer,397
and Steutal and de Ruyter. In short, this position entails no coercion, deception, or
incapacitation may take place.398 Otherwise, the action is unethical. At minimum,
provided the people involved give permission to the sexual act, then the sexual act is
morally permissible. According to Mappes, sex is morally impermissible if at least one
person involved in the sexual activity treats the other as a mere means, whereas morally
permissible sexual relations comes about when the participants have made a voluntary
informed agreement. To undermine the other’s voluntary informed consent means that
one coerces, deceives, or takes advantage of the other’s desperate situation.
Another way to look at consensual minimalism is to say that it is contractual.
Raymond Belliotti argues that the
nature of these [sexual] interactions is contractual and involves the important
notion of reciprocity. When two people voluntarily consent to interact sexually
they create obligations to each other based on their needs and expectations. Every
sexual encounter has as its base the needs, desires, and drives of the individuals
involved. That we choose to interact sexually is an acknowledgement that none of
us is totally self-sufficient. We interact with others in order to fulfill certain
desires which we cannot fulfill by ourselves. This suggests that the basis of the
394
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sexual encounter is contractual; i.e., it is a voluntary agreement on the part of
both parties to satisfy the expectation of the other.399
While a voluntary agreement with another person is necessary for consent, to say the
agreement is contractual makes it seem like the sexual relation is more of a business deal
rather than a reciprocal agreement of fulfilling needs and expectations. However, Belliotti
does mention that this contract is based on the expectations of fulfillment of reciprocal
needs and desires. Moreover, there is a guide of reasonable expectation, and this is what
the sexual contract entails: we are to help fulfill our sexual needs and desires and, in
return, there is an implicit expectation to help fulfill the other person’s wants and needs.
I consider consensual minimalism insufficient. The next subsection will explain
why and provide introduction to the next model of consent.
2.2.2. Consensual Idealism
The second type of consent is known as consensual idealism.400 Under this position,
representatives argue that consensual minimalism is necessary, but not sufficient for the
sexual activity to be ethical. Rather, there is a moral requirement that people ought to
acknowledge and be responsive to each other’s needs, desires, and feelings.
Representatives of this position include Keppler, Pineau, and Estes. Keppler argues that
another way to treat a person as a mere means—besides exploitation, coercion, and
deception—is “any conduct intended to achieve the purpose of treating that person as an
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object and not at the same time as an intrinsically valuable moral subject.”401 An example
from Keppler is a couple who has been dating for a while and are sexually attracted to
each other. They both want to have sex but during the act, he makes no attempt to please
or satisfy her. After orgasm, he rolls over and falls asleep. In this case, the conditions for
consent minimalism were met, but this is not an ideal sexual act. In a way, the man is still
using the woman as a means to reach his sexual end. As Keppler puts it, “[o]ur moral
obligations to our sexual partners surely do not end with their voluntary informed
consent. Closer to the truth is that they begin there. We have an ongoing obligation to be
respectful and considerate of our sexual partners’ needs.”402
Pineau considers the heteronormative problems that we have discussed in Chapter
3, section 5. To mitigate this problem, Pineau suggests that our sexual relations should be
based on another model rather than the contractual model Belliotti suggests. She suggests
that sexual interactions are more like communication. Part of the Kantian ethical
obligation is to take the ends of others as our own. Each person in the sexual encounter
has an obligation to help the other seek his or her own ends. Doing otherwise is to risk
acting as if one is acting out of sync with the partner’s ends as one’s own, and thus acting
without the other’s consent. Since the people involved must constantly communicate with
each other, Pineau has called this the “communicative model.” Thus, Pineau’s model of
consent suggests that “if a man wants to be sure that he is not forcing himself on a
woman, he has an obligation either to ensure that the encounter really is mutually
enjoyable, or to know the reasons why she would want to continue the encounter in spite
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of her lack of enjoyment.”403 If we are going to take the other’s ends as our own, then we
have not only a moral obligation to treat the other ethically, but an epistemic
responsibility to know what those ends are, and how to obtain those ends for the other
person.404 In the contractual model, there is no obligation except to fulfill the ends of the
contract: the people involved cooperate in order to obtain the end. The communicative
model, however, treats cooperation as an end itself where the communication itself makes
the interaction worthwhile.405 This model, of course, means that we would need to teach
students how to obtain these communicative skills, which means that they need to have
communicative tools such as intuition, sympathy, charity, and sensitivity.
Another theorist to consider is Yolanda Estes who agrees consent is a necessary
condition for moral sexual behavior yet adds two additional criteria: “each sexual partner
exhibits concern for the other’s interests and needs insofar as their wellbeing includes and
extends beyond their sexual wellbeing” and “each sexual partner attend to the other’s
desires.”406 Starting with the first, without attending to the other’s interests and needs, the
sexual interaction could undermine wellbeing. She points out that “sex without desire
results in sensual or emotional dissatisfaction at best and physical or psychological
403
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trauma at worst.”407 If there is no interest in the partner’s needs and desires, Estes argues,
then there is no concern for the partner. Not paying attention to the partner shows lack of
mutual respect. In shorter, non-committed sexual relationships, it becomes more
imperative for clearer, explicit, and specific communication.
Estes’ second criterion is attending to the other’s desires, interests, and needs,
which can contribute to general well-being. Mutually respectful sex occurs within a
context of mutual consent, desire, and concern. To know what the other person wants,
there must be some form of communication, though not necessarily verbal, which
provides the partners enough knowledge to determine there is a reasonable, reciprocated
consent and an understanding of each other’s concern and desire.408 This means we ought
to take the time and communicate what the other person desires in order to mitigate any
misunderstandings:
We can take time to gain some sexual knowledge of our partner by proceeding
cautiously and unhurriedly in the initial stages of a sexual relationship. This
increases the chance of correctly interpreting and addressing expressions of
consent, expectation, and desire. Before, during, and after sexual interactions, we
can solicit more explicit, specific expressions of our partner’s thoughts and
feelings; observe our partner’s reactions carefully; and reflect diligently on what
we hear and see. This enhances the possibility of reciprocal consent, concern, and
desire while improving our sexual technique and our opportunity for a repeat
performance.409
Consensual minimalism alone provides no immunity to moral reproach. Insofar as people
show a respectful regard for a potential sexual partner, we cannot ignore our partner’s
desires. Consensual idealism, on the other hand, specifically makes sure that the other
person not only wants to have sex, but perhaps enthusiastically if they can. Thus, in pop
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culture, we often hear that there must be “enthusiastic consent” before any sexual
relations to proceed.
One problem with consensual idealism is that it seems false that having no mutual
desire or exhibiting some care or concern entails that the act is unethical. For example,
sex workers, those who have sex to maintain the relationships (aka maintenance sex), and
those who have sex purely for the sake of reproduction would not meet this criterion. We
can even imagine a stereotypical long-term married couple where one person asks
whether to have sex or not, and the other person unenthusiastically responds: “yeah sure.”
In each of these cases, there is no enthusiasm, and they want an end for which sex is a
means to reach that end.
Another problem with consensual idealism is that some of the features set too
high of a standard. For example, suppose there is a new couple and they want to have sex.
We can even assume that there is strong chemistry, and they consent to having sex.
However, once they start, there is a bit of awkwardness: they see each other naked for the
first time, one of them may be self-conscious, they fumble during sex, which makes the
experience sub-par, and perhaps one (or both) are thinking not directly about fulfilling the
desires of the other, but more on the mechanics of sex, which detracts from their
enjoyment. Both are disappointed when they end. Yet, they want to give it another round
at a later time. It seems that they did not mutually try to satisfy each other’s desires, nor
did they exhibit concern for the other’s sexual well-being. This is not the ideal sex act—
which would be where both partners enjoyed the act and exhibited skill—but it does not
make the act unethical.
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Finally, another problem—which relates to the last—is that people, especially
when they are novices or feel uncertain about sex, may not know what they want. They
may engage in various activities for curiosity, experimentation, or simply “just to try it
out.” There is no mutual desire to be had since one is not sure what sort of desires one
has. I consider this topic to be especially pertinent since this dissertation focuses on
young students who are novices with sexuality: younger people are still figuring out their
own sexual well-being, which includes what sort of values and boundaries they are
comfortable with. If consensual idealism is the standard to reach, then very few young
people actually consent. Instead, their experiences must be taken into account, which
suggests that consensual idealism is an inaccurate consensual model. They may not
enthusiastically say “yes” because they are not sure what they are enthused of, but they
still want to have the sexual experience for the reasons mentioned above.
2.2.3. Affirmative Consent

The assumed position of most sexual consensual theorists has been “no means no,” which
has the intuitive appeal that if someone does not want to engage in any sexual encounter,
one simply must say “no” or show a “no” through body language. Let us call this the
standard model of consent, which has had some criticism lately. First, a lack of “no”
translates as “permissible to proceed.” As Pineau has pointed out, male sexuality has
been seen as aggressive, whereas women’s sexuality has been seen as passive, where sex
just happens to them.410 In the standard scenario, a woman may not feel comfortable
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Thus, when we read men as being aggressive and females beings passive, it is best to read this as
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engaging in sex, but might also feel uncomfortable saying “no.” Women are taught to
acquiesce to sex: they do not actively choose to have sex, but they do not actively choose
to not have sex either. Or if she does say “no,” a man may try again until the “no” is no
longer in play. The second problem is if consent is contested, it puts the onus on the
victim (usually the woman) to prove she said “no.” The default is that we are all
consenters and to opt-out, we say “no.” However, since women are considered passive,
she may fear saying “no” and stay silent to avoid the repercussions of a “no.” Thus, one
implication of the standard model is that the silence means “yes.” The standard model,
therefore, would consider this case as consensual sex.
Opposed to the standard model is an affirmation model, sometimes known as the
“yes means yes” model.411 Under this framework, both partners must obtain a “yes” from
each other. The “yes” to opt-in, as it were, can be verbal or non-verbal, where some type
of communication is necessary for the sexual encounter to be ethical.412 The affirmation
can be highly regulatory, such as a contract, or it could be broader where the people must

aggressiveness as a masculine trait and passivity as a feminine trait. No matter one’s biology or sexual
orientation, people seem to be socialized into these traits that corresponds to their given gender.
411
Although see Gruber to show that these terms are not synonymous. I would further Gruber’s
point by saying that the affirmation model is sometimes equated to mean “enthusiastic consent.” However,
this is different than affirmation. To affirm sex is to actively agree to having sex; to enthusiastically consent
to sex suggests that people involved do not just affirm sex with a “yes,” but very excitedly to do so.
Enthusiastic consent seems to go further than affirmation since being enthusiastic to do something not only
means that I agree to do the action, but that I am excited about the action. Affirming to do something does
not necessarily mean I am excited about it, but I am willing or happy to do it. Another way to put it is
enthusiastic consent is a resounding “yes!” whereas affirmative consent could be a simple expression of
“yes.” See Aya Gruber. “Consent Confusion.” Cardozo L. Rev. 38 (2016): 415-458.
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Many proponents of the “yes means yes” model qualify the sex as “lawful” rather than
“ethical.” However, I am looking at this from an ethical point of view. Indeed, some lawyers have
contended that the ethical prescription of affirmative consent is just, but to have the law or government
involved would not be. See Alan Dershowitz. “Innocent until Proven Guilty? Not under ‘Yes Means Yes.’”
The Washington Post, October 15, 2015. (Accessed November 10, 2018.)
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be aware of the context and perhaps simply stop and ask.413 The validity involved can
range from “enthusiastic consent” to paying attention to non-verbal bodily cues to
determine whether to stop or to continue. Simply missing a verbal “no” or physical
restraint does not automatically constitute consent.
Many proponents find the affirmation model better because the partners involved
need to be in tune with each other’s wants and needs. Obtaining the “yes” ensures that the
people know each other well, or at least have a conversation414 about what the other’s
wants and needs are. Therefore, this model seems to be tied up with consensual idealism.
However, I do not see this being incompatible with consensual minimalism. One can still
obtain a “yes”—even enthusiastically—without explicitly focusing on the other’s wants
and needs. Consensual minimalism and idealism tells us the content of consent where the
focus is on the ethical portion of consent; the affirmation model tells us when it is
permissible to proceed by focusing on how a token consent can be communicated. In
short, consensual minimalism and idealism tell us what consent is; affirmative consent
gives us the conditions to make consent valid. The affirmation model suggests that there
are at least two people involved in making the decision instead of one doing the
instigating and the other being the instigatee. Moreover, the onus is now on both actors to
ensure there was a “yes” rather than relying on a proof there was a “no.” This model does
not erase all the problems of whether someone consented or not, but it does get rid of
various defenses used by aggressive men to prove there was consent: “She didn’t say
anything so it was ok,” “She kissed me back so it was ok to go forward,” etc.
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A common critique against affirmative consent is that the “yes” must be entirely
verbal. By requesting a “yes” for each progression of the sexual act, the pleasure could be
mitigated thereby making the sexual act not as enjoyable. After all, part of what makes
sex pleasurable, according to the critique, is what is unsaid. Constantly stopping and
asking for permission can disrupt the flow of sex and perhaps make the sexual act
awkward. Schulhofer, on the other hand, offers a way to have affirmative consent without
a constant disruption. He notes that “the absence of any sign of unwillingness is a
common way to communicate receptivity in the context of gradual, increasingly intimate
sexual foreplay, at least absent circumstances that might suggest fear or impairment.”415
Schulhofer’s solution is to understand consent as contextually sensitive, which can
include silence and passivity. And while silence and passivity by themselves are not
treated as consent, “they are forms of conduct, and all of a person’s conduct should be
taken into account.”416 Thus, Schulhofer defines consent as performative rather than
merely verbal417 and thereby argues against a “yes means yes” consensual model.418 The
point, however, is affirmative consent changes the default in that a “yes,” and not a “no”
415
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Below is Schulhofer’s definition on p. 669:
(a) “Consent” means a person’s behavior, including words and conduct— both action and
inaction—that communicates the person’s willingness to engage in a specific act of sexual penetration or
sexual contact.
(b) Consent may be express, or it may be inferred from a person’s behavior. Neither verbal nor
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in the context of all the circumstances to determine whether the person has consented.
(c) Consent may be revoked any time before or during the act of sexual penetration or sexual
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willingness before the sexual act occurs.
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Two points: First, this is not to say that Schulhofer argues for the traditional model. His
problem with “yes means yes” is based on the surrounding myths and strawman arguments against this
model such as this model would be too stringent and unromantic. Second, it is ironic that Schulhofer is
known as one of the foundational sources for affirmative consent even though he, himself, does not endorse
it.
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or silence, must be the moral transformation that moves from a duty to restrict oneself to
interfere with another person’s rights toward permission to engage with the other.

3. Problems With the Liberal-Deontological Model

Consent has been, for the most part,419 a necessary condition for sex to be ethical.
However, one major problem with the liberal-deontological model is that it has an
assumed heteronormativity, specifically with the male bias of the validity of consent. The
problem is not consent itself; rather, the problem is the exercise of consent and the way it
has been thought about in society favors males and adheres to traditional gender roles. In
other words, the validity of consent does not challenge the status quo of traditional
gender roles. If the validity of consent does not challenge the status quo, then the validity
of consent—affirmative consent—could still advantage males and disadvantage females
by embracing (or at least, lacking a challenge) of traditional gender roles.
To support this claim, a study showed that the traditional sexual script—that
males have sexual agency and females with sexual passivity—are in place even if
autonomy was taught.420 Even if the couple endorses gender equality, women still
associate sex with submission. Why is this important? Fetterolf and Sanchez remark that
sexual agency and autonomy are important predictors of sexual functioning and sexual
satisfaction for both men and women.421 However, women may make choices to avoid
negative consequences due to the sexual double standard and not because it is coming
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from their genuine desires and wants. If society values various choices and disvalues
others, everyone’s choices will signify what kind of people they are. If people make a
choice that society deems unworthy, everyone will judge them as unworthy. If people
make a choice that society deems kind, everyone will judge them as kind. And if people
make a choice that society deems shameful, then everyone will judge them as shameful.
If society already adheres to traditional gender roles, then teaching autonomy will not
challenge the status quo and thereby presume heteronormativity. I will focus on consent
to show how.
Much feminist work has suggested that consent can be manipulated or coerced,
especially in a patriarchal context. A “yes means yes” campaign is better than the
standard model, but does “yes” actually mean “yes?” Could the “yes” also be
manipulated or coerced? If women need to be convinced to give the “yes,” then we seem
to fall back into the problem that we had before. Women need to be “won over” whereby
the men “work a yes out” so that they can change the “no” or silence to a “yes.” In other
words, there is no major change to the problems I have mentioned before. “Working out a
yes” could be seen as an extra step to manipulate a “yes” out of a person. The problem,
therefore, is that the affirmation could be compatible with the traditional gender norms
and that obtaining the “yes” is “merely a more administrable, sanitized, and legalistic
form of the ‘traditional’ sex script in which men are sexual proponents and women are
gatekeepers.”422 If so, then consent must be looked at from a broader social context, and
that women’s consent must be seen within a patriarchal context. Anderson points out that
the standard model makes the verbal “no” imperative on the victim (usually female). The
defendant (usually male) is not required to say anything; he can continue if there is
422
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silence because there was no resistance. 423 With affirmative consent, the focus may be on
the woman’s autonomy but, again, nothing is necessary coming from the man. Either
way, it is up to the woman to give the signal whether the sexual engagement can proceed
or not.424 Thus, gender stereotypes are still upheld in that women are the gatekeepers of
sexuality and men must find the right combination to unlock the gate. Men just need to
“work out a yes” if needed. If there are no changes on how the genders relate to each
other, the institutional system is still in place which has the process favoring men,
whereby men could manipulate a “yes” to continue with the sexual transaction instead of
simply thinking silence is a “yes.” As Hlavka puts it, “[p]lacing responsibility on women
and girls to ‘just say no’ and excusing boys and men as they ‘work a “yes” out’ works to
erase institutional and structural responsibilities.”425 It is just one extra move needed, but
it is still within the framework that favors men.
Pineau also looks at the legal structures of rape and argues they are biased against
the victim because the legal structures set up gender stereotypes, specifically those which
favor males. In cases of rape, physical injury is often the only criterion that is used for
evidence for a sexual act that is nonconsensual. Thus, if there is no evidence of physical
injury, sexual assault is mistaken for seduction. In fact, if there was no physical injury, it
is presumed that it was consensual. It assumes that “yes” is the default. It is her fault if
she did not say no.
To spell this out, let us see what sort of assumptions are in play here. Recall that
traditional models can lead to victim-blaming that I mentioned in chapter two, section
4.1. In US culture, we often see that the responsibility to do something about rape falls
423
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squarely on the women who are endangered, rather than on those who have the authority
to impose sanctions on their attackers. For example, there are a lot of self-defense classes
made for women, and many protective weapons (e.g. mace, pepper spray) are provided. It
is understood that it is mainly to prevent any assault that would befall upon the woman.
But by doing so, there is not much said about the assaulters. Indeed, they are often
pushed away where the focus—and usually the responsibility—falls upon women. Since
there is no cultural change in how men ought to behave, the possibility that women may
be assaulted or attacked is considered the default mode when they go about in the world.
The phenomenon of the-possibility-of-being-attacked is the center of their interactions
and they must choose carefully on how to interact with other people and where to go.
However, these prevention strategies actually restrict choice formation: women’s choices
in where to go, when to go, whom to go with, and how to move about in the world in
general are limited by the threat of violence. A woman might have chosen to go to a
friend’s house or take a walk in a park but the threat of violence counters that choice; or,
worse, a woman might cave on her commitments to certain values or beliefs because of
such limitations on actions and behaviors. These limitations could undermine her
autonomy if she lives in a culture of violence against women, which is a culture that has
already institutionalized women to the point where they are less free, and therefore less
autonomous, than men.
A sex education that does not challenge the status quo essentially has the
markings of PSE. As a case study, Kendall witnessed comprehensive sex education
programs to see how these programs dealt with rape and sexual violence and noticed that
teaching autonomy contradicts the overall message on how to be safe within

249

comprehensive sex education. The educators emphasized that it is never the victim’s fault
and emphasized that if the person was incapacitated by drugs or alcohol, and sex
occurred, then it was rape no matter if there was verbal assent, which suggests that the
woman was not responsible for her own rape. On the other hand, the educators also
provided advice on how the woman could avoid dangerous situations such as not walking
home alone at night, taking her drink with her so that it would not get drugged, and being
overtly clear in her intentions towards aggressive or insistent partners (looking directly
into his eyes and stating her position clearly). Now, even if women did not follow this
advice, it was not her fault. By this point, students respond back by asking what if she
was acting or dressing in a certain way. Would she at least be partially responsible? The
educator emphasized that it is not her fault. The students are noticing a conflict however.
If it was not her fault for being assaulted, then she should not be held responsible. Yet, by
taking extra precautions, it suggests that onus is on her to make sure she is not assaulted.
By not taking these extra precautions, then she may be “asking for it” and is thereby held
responsible for her actions.
While we could interpret these episodes as patriarchal examples of victimblaming or woman-gets-what-she deserves mentality, Kendall notes that the students are
bright enough to see the conflict, which is why they are pushing back against the
educator. Since individual behavior is related to individual rational decision-making and
not to social, political, or economic factors, “[a] core assumption of CSE [comprehensive
sex education] programming was, in fact, that students as rational actors could fully
control, and were therefore fully responsible for, their own decisions and actions.”426 But
when it comes to the discussion of women’s safety, our societal narrative is where the
426

Kendall, 211-212.

250

women’s choices can make her “ask for it” yet it is never her fault. Whether this is
because the students see the contradiction or whether it is because of patriarchy, these
episodes mark a clear problem with sex education from a deontological point of view. If
autonomy entails that one intends to act in a certain way, then given the mores of society
or the way the sexes are treated, then it could potentially be the woman’s fault. This
shows a huge problem with basing sex education on autonomy alone since in every stage
up until the discussion of rape, comprehensive sex education programs emphasized
individual responsibility and individual decision-making where one has control over
one’s actions and is held responsible for those actions.
To present it as a dilemma:
1. The woman is acting and deciding individually, thereby whatever she decides, she
takes full responsibility because she is an autonomous being.
2. What happens to her as a victim of rape is not her fault.
What is the deontologist to do? They cannot reject either horn of the dilemma,
which exposes something missing with the deontological view. Because of our social
double standard, women may sacrifice sexual autonomy to fit in our social norms, which
suggests that LDSE does not challenge the status quo. By focusing on the individual and
the individual’s responsibility, LDSE misses the power dynamics in relationships and in
society.
Kendall notes that without the discussion of power, violence, and social roles, the
students could not reflect on the gendered assumptions that women are held responsible
for their safety, whereas men’s responsibility is hardly mentioned.427 “Ironically, in our
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indiscriminate portrayals of teenage girls as sexual victims, we may be failing to teach
them about genuine sexual autonomy and consequently ensuring that they will be
victims.”428 The educators talked about how women need to be careful to avoid getting
raped, but did not talk about men being potential perpetrators, the social gendered norms,
or how men need to be active in consent rather than simply getting consent. Simply
thinking about sex education as autonomy and consent alone is insufficient.
In short, under PSE, rape is wrong and the way to avoid rape is that women must
behave in appropriate ways (meaning gendered ways). For a liberal sex education (both
consequentialist and deontological), women must be effective rational consumers in the
sexual marketplace to make the right decisions about their behavior.429 In a sexist society,
however, both men and women may choose the norm because that is the “right” choice,
and they may be rewarded for making the right choice. The choice is to produce overall
outcomes (consequentialism) or to determine oneself and exercise one’s autonomy
(deontology), but without questioning the status quo of gender norms and the sexual
double standard, women may “choose” the status quo because it is considered the “right”
decision.
If the status quo is that men are culturally pressured to be the sexual aggressor and
pursuer and women are pressured to be sexually passive and reluctant, then there is no
sense that they are both being genuinely free where they can mutually respect each other
which is what is presumed in the liberal model. Under this framework, therefore, women
rapes happen when the perpetrator is drunk and the victim is not. The curriculum is still gendered in that
women need to held accountable (by being safe) yet the educators do not talk about men controlling their
drinking.
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are the sexual gatekeepers and they are “hard to get.” They play it off as being coy, but it
is really a pretense because they really want sex; they just do not want to appear to want
it. Thus, “no” can mean “yes” under the standard framework. Men are meant to “unlock
the gate” and their aggressive tactics are ways to do so, which is a form of seduction. If
aggressive tactics are a form of seduction, then sexuality, as understood in our society,
assumes aggressive sex. Sexual assault, then, is normalized, if not romanticized.
Based on these assumptions, we can see that aggressive sexuality from the
arguments given above is considered normal; “normal” sexual intimacy is under the
framework of heteropatriarchy since they support male domination.430 The responsibility,
therefore, lies on the woman because she is in control as the gatekeeper since men cannot
control themselves but, by doing so, the system sets women up for failure. The
assumption is that there is a negotiation on “saying no” to sex between rational adults and
that they are equally empowered. The individual who says “no” can convince the other
by using a “firm and friendly” voice.431 But does this actually work? Very unlikely. There
is a power dynamic about the negotiations of sex. There is not much space to “say no”
when the partner is aggressive by convincing her to say “yes.” Indeed, it seems more
expected for women to encounter aggressive sexual demands from men. If she did not
say no, then she “went along” with the sexual encounter, thus making the action
consensual. Part of this structure brings forth the myth: male aggression and female
reluctance are normal parts of seduction. This mythology has propagated certain beliefs
in our culture in such a way that make consent seem contractual: people should keep their
sexual agreements they make; sexually provocative behavior, taken to a point, generates
430
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an agreement; and male and female sexuality make their agreements in such a way where
they cannot back out.
Robin West has argued that traditional consent has mainly been for the benefit of
the male.432 It is possible for a woman to have consensual, non-coercive, non-forceful,
non-criminal sex, yet harmful sex. These harms, however, may be hard to discover. Many
women consent to sex even when they do not desire it, and it is usually not pleasurable.
So then why do they engage and consent to sex if they do not desire it or if it is not
pleasurable?433 Through several vignettes, she reveals how engaging in sex multiple
times under this context can be harmful: her self-assertion and self-possession is
weakened, her integrity is lessened, and, most importantly for our discussion, her
autonomy is drained. In these experiences, having consensual but unwanted sex over time
can take a toll on her. Since it is wrong to act in ways that cause (unjustified) harm to
oneself or others, not all sexual activity engaged in under conditions of voluntary
informed consent is morally acceptable. Moreover, even if a “yes” was obtained, the
“yes” could have been worked out through aggressive tactics.
Finally, another assumption of heteronormativity in LDSE has to do with
contracting STIs. Biologically speaking, the receiver of a sexual act is also more likely to
contract an STI from the partner than vice versa, thus women are in a more unfortunate
situation in that they are more likely to contract STIs and more likely to receive shame
432
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for the contraction. Kendell reflects how contracting STIs reflects people’s choices. Since
contracting STIs is considered shameful, everyone judges that person as shameful
because that person chose to have sex and is therefore responsible for contracting the
STI, which is viewed as the “stain” linking that person to an undesirable characteristic,
such as irresponsible sexual behavior.434 If students contract STIs, for example, not only
would the STIs cause physical health problems, but the STIs—which came about through
the students’ choices—would also affect how the students think and feel about
themselves435 and are viewed in society.
It is estimated that more than half of the US population will contract an STI in
their life, and that one out of two sexually active persons will contract an STI by the age
of 25.436 The stigma against STIs, however, is staggering. “By not addressing the stigma
associated with STIs, sex educators increase the chances that adolescents, particularly
girls and marginalized youth, will not seek treatment for, or speak to others (including
doctors) about, STIs.”437 Even if the STI can be cured or managed, one still associates the
person as degraded or fallen, especially if the person is female and gay if the person is
male. They pay a higher “price” to have sex because of a harsher stigma attached to them.
Any adolescent (or a person of any age even) who achieves an unwanted result is
considered as an agent who failed to think rationally through proper decision-making or
planning. Anything unwanted (such as an STI or a pregnancy) is believed to be easily
preventable. Part of the stigma, however, is that “good” students are also seen as rational
434

Cf. Kendall, 137. This discussion deals with STIs, yet this could also deal with a slew of sexual
choices such as promiscuity, chastity, or other aspects of sexuality which deviate from the norm. The
choices that students make, especially regarding choices that society deems shameful, reflect back onto the
student’s conception of who they are.
435
Cf. Kendall, 137.
436
American Sexual Health Association. “Statistics.” (Accessed November 11, 2018.)
http://www.ashasexualhealth.org/stdsstis/statistics/
437
Kendall, 138.

255

agents because they can calculate the risks involved and only engage in the activity if the
risk was minimal.438 Therefore, those who contracted an STI are “unwise” students and
justifiably deserving of ridicule.
In short, LDSE’s focus on autonomy does not challenge the status quo: both men
and women may think they are acting with self-determination, but they are not challenged
by investigating how their culture structures their ideals in which gender information is
portrayed, dispersed, and reinforced. Men and women are part of the culture where they
listen and respond to each other’s strategies and criteria to get a sense of what is
considered “normal,” which gives everyone a certain expectation of how to respond
sexually based on what they know from their peers or presume to know what their peers
are doing. Any other sexual, gender, or relationship expressions may be erased. Because
traditional norms are easily accessible to many students, alternatives are shut down which
could lead to many students believing that their lived experiences are not the right
representation of permissible behavior or experiences, and that they ought to follow the
heteronormative script. Or they may “choose” to follow the standard model without
realizing other options.

4. My Position: Consent and Autonomy in Sex Education

Even if we had a sex education to maximize choice and autonomy, there is still the
problem of gender inequality as mentioned in the previous section; maximizing choices
do not assuage the problem. Even though autonomy and choice should play a role in our
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sexual and intimate lives, it should not play the central role for there are other values such
as love, trust, and generosity.
We would think that increasing choice and autonomy would give people
(especially women) the tools and skills they need to fight off subordination. Philosopher
of education Paula McAvoy responds to the notion of sex education as maximizing
choices. She argues that increasing choice does not help when there is already gender
inequality. Indeed, in some cases, women could be choosing their own subordination:
“actions that look like a sexual choice making may actually be an attempt to gain social
status. [Some women want] acceptance from their communities and fear social exclusion,
but they are operating within social structures in which the path to acceptance comes
through the approval of men.”439 Teaching how to be autonomous and to make choices
will not change the choices that are available to some women.440 Indeed, women may
make choices in a society with gender inequality not because they desire the content of
the choice, but because they want to avoid the social stigma. Just focusing on consent
may help people obtain permission from others in order to engage in sexual activity, but
sexuality is more than just intercourse. Displaying oneself as a sexual being and having a
sexual identity are also part of sexuality. Focusing on consent is not sufficient to help
people formulate and create what sexual identity they have or whom they could be.
Rather, they are simply falling in line with the status quo.441 With a hypersexualized
market where heterosexual male behavior is privileged, the sexual stereotypes are hardly
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challenged. In short, “[i]gnoring this inequality and simply telling students to be
individual choice makers will disadvantage girls and advantage boys.”442
The way out is to develop a nuanced view of sexual autonomy and thereby sexual
consent. In this section, I offer what I take to be a helpful advancement to capture the
complexities and nuances of sexual activities, especially for young, inexperienced people.
I will start by looking at various accounts of autonomy and offer where I stand in the
debate. Next, I will look at the complexities of sexual consent and offer my position.
Toward the end, I hope to convince the reader that sexual autonomy and sexual consent
are insufficient for sexual activity, and that other principles must have a foundation that is
not based on deontological or consequentialist considerations, but on a type of virtue
ethics.
4.1. The Scope of Autonomy

Meyers distinguishes local autonomy from programmatic autonomy. Local autonomy is
the capacity to decide in particular situations. It is where the agent asks, “what do I want
to do now?” and then decides from there. Programmatic autonomy, on the other hand, is
the capacity to decide major life issues through asking oneself “How do I really want to
live my life?” regarding major life decisions, such as the decision to have children, to
dedicate oneself to a career, to stay home, or travel the world. Meyers argues that
oppressive socialization hampers programmatic autonomy but not necessarily local
autonomy.443 For example, oppressive socialization (which, for instance, might value
marriage or motherhood over a career or financial independence) may truncate the range
442
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of options that girls consider to be viable, thus interfering with their programmatic
autonomy. They may nevertheless have strongly developed critical reasoning faculties
that allow them a high degree of competency to exercise local autonomy skills. Thus, in
this society, many young women may not be fully autonomous in how they want to live
their lives with limited programmatic autonomy, though they may have episodic local
autonomy.
If agents are capable of local autonomy but not programmatic autonomy, they
have autonomy only to a degree. If there are oppressive constraints, then human
flourishing will be mitigated. Under oppressive constraints, we can have local autonomy,
but minimal or no programmatic autonomy. Therefore, to have programmatic autonomy,
we must get rid of oppressive measures. Since increasing human flourishing is inversely
proportional to oppressive measures, and oppressive measures are inversely proportional
to programmatic autonomy, we can therefore say that human flourishing is proportional
to programmatic autonomy. In other words, the more programmatic autonomy one has,
the more one has the opportunity to flourish. Likewise, the more one can flourish, the
more programmatic autonomy one has. With the discussion of flourishing, we must
discuss virtue ethics since it seems to be proportional to programmatic autonomy.444 With
the notion of uplifting autonomy where we can flourish sexually, we are going beyond
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the minimal level of what sex education programs can offer. I will talk more about virtue
ethics in sex education in the next chapter. For now, I do think LDSE can offer sex
education some redeeming qualities. I will go over the various aspects in the following
sections.
4.2. Personal Autonomy

When discussing personal autonomy, there is a distinction between procedural and
substantial autonomy. Procedural autonomy means that an agent is autonomous when that
person can freely choose an action. This view seems to be the most common, but this
conception suggests that it does not matter what the action is or what kind of being the
agent is. The content of people’s desires, values, preferences, and beliefs are irrelevant.
All that matters is that the agent makes a choice through, at the very least, some critical
reflection. Procedural autonomy is based on how the decision was made.
The other view is the substantivist form of autonomy. The substantivist form is
more robust and is packed with a stronger view of what it means to be autonomous. If a
choice is made under certain conditions and/or the agent is of certain type, then we can
say that the agent is autonomous. The choice is not based on subjective criteria, but also
on some “external” criteria. Morten Ebbe Juul Nielson explains why:
formal conceptions of autonomy that are meant as action-guiding are said to be
so, but it remains unclear why. If one launches a formal conception of autonomy
and adds that “autonomous choice should be respected,” we would like to know
why. If choice is not linked to some sort of value—for instance, to a conception of
human flourishing—it is hard to see why we should respect it. Formal
conceptions of autonomy, then, stop short of providing us with reasons.445
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The quote suggests that for any form of autonomy to be substantial, it must be because
autonomy is either grounded or part of human flourishing. Substantive autonomy
enriches the agent because it could maximize autonomy or further the conditions of
autonomy. The necessary conditions for an action to be consensual are voluntariness,
being informed, and having competence. However, for substantive autonomy, a choice
must also foster the conditions for flourishing. The quote from Nielson suggests that for
any form of autonomy to be substantial, it must be because autonomy is either grounded
in, or part of, human flourishing, however we may define that. From Nielson, we can say
that if people are flourishing, then they are substantively autonomous. And to be
substantively autonomous requires a link to some value that people ought to aim for. If
not, then people are not substantively autonomous. Therefore, there is something
underlying substantive autonomy, and what underlies it is some sort of virtue ethical
consideration in order for the autonomy to get off the ground.
One concern I should briefly note is what does a flourishing human look like in
the sexual sphere. Does flourishing mean commitment and intimacy? Is it just about
pleasure? Because I am taking a pluralistic approach, I think there are multiple answers to
this question and it depends on the person’s desires, needs, and the relational dynamic
that the person has with others on a sexual, intimate, and interconnected level. Since this
topic deals with virtue ethics, I will consider how sexuality and flourishing are related in
the next chapter.
There are problems with procedural autonomy. How could such a theory explain
such deleterious activities such as selling oneself into slavery, the deferential wife who
wishes to be subservient to her husband, or anyone that has effectively internalized
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oppressive norms and treats those norms as their own ends? Can we really say that those
ends are really their own? Specifically, with internalized oppressive norms, what if
society is structured in such a way that we are not really autonomous, but we think we
are? Stojar remarks:
Despite the apparent advantages, however, feminists should be cautious about
adopting a purely procedural account of autonomy. In certain cases, even
preferences satisfying the standards of critical reflection that are required by
procedural accounts would still be regarded as nonautonomous by many
feminists. This is because such preferences are influenced by pernicious aspects
of the oppressive context. They therefore attract what I call the feminist intuition,
which claims that preferences influenced by oppressive norms of femininity
cannot be autonomous.446
Mackenzie and Stoljar are skeptical that procedural autonomy can do the work of
filtering out “pernicious aspects of the oppressive context.” Thus, the “feminist intuition”
is that “preferences influenced by oppressive norms” cannot be autonomous. The choices
we make are really “adaptive preferences,” meaning that our desires and preferences
change based on our surroundings. More importantly, adaptive preferences are choices
that are made in response to them, even if the surroundings are not the greatest, or
oppressive. Thus, the choices we make may not be beneficial. Indeed, it can be
detrimental to the self, even if we think it is a beneficial choice. For example, we may,
according to the critic, consent to sex work or pornography not because this agreement
was a full expression of our self, but perhaps because of economic hardships. For a less
extreme example, a woman may “consent” to being a dutiful housewife but only because
the society she is in expects her to not only have a future of being a dutiful housewife but
also enjoys doing so.
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Can we, then, still consent in a genuine way? Well, if society is patriarchal, then
no. If we cannot make a difference between desires that are our own and desires brought
about through oppressive norms, then we cannot, among other things, know the
difference between desires that are our own, and desires that come about through
oppressive norms. In that case, it is difficult to ascertain whether a decision is made
through our autonomy of because of our socialization. In short, the critique of procedural
autonomy is it is based on what the agent prefers without any obstacles, even if the
agent’s preferences could be oppressive or adaptive. Performing these adaptive
preferences relies on subordination and oppression, which do not count as autonomous.
Therefore, procedural autonomy is insufficient to describe what counts as autonomous.
Munro illustrates this problem with a sexual case:
Imagine, for example, a woman who has sex with her male partner, not so much
because she wants to, but because she knows that he wants her to. In the absence
of overt coercion or deception, this would be condoned and normalized as an
unproblematic instance of consensual sex under a minimalist approach. But under
this more ambitious consent-plus model, that conclusion would have to be
postponed pending an investigation of the context of, and motivations
underpinning, the intercourse. If the woman complied because she loves her
partner, values their relationship and knows that responding to his sexual
advances is important to its health, this may be a legitimate expression of agency,
reflecting her endorsement of the benefits that accrue to her as a result of the
exchange. By contrast, if she complied because she fears she cannot survive
financially without him or is afraid of his (as yet unthreatened) retribution in the
event of rebuttal, her involvement emerges as self-alienating, undertaken in
pursuit of an unendorsed benefit, and thus problematic. This approach continues,
therefore, to track the expectation of reciprocal benefit but, unlike more
minimalist analyses of sexual agency, it interrogates the context of decisionmaking to ensure actual rather than assumed subjective value.447
Notice that under procedural autonomy, the woman in question is autonomous because
she made her decision freely, meaning without any external coercion. She also made the
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decision with some critical reflection. However, since she is still oppressed, procedural
autonomy is insufficient for consent to emerge.
Under substantivist autonomy, the woman is not autonomous because she has not
met the normative conditions for autonomy. These conditions typically identified by
philosophers include choices which have criticizable moral contents, or that people’s
psychology hooks up to the world in the right way. Whatever the case may be, the
content of people’s preferences and values must correspond to some objective criteria of
what is good for people. In other words, substantive autonomy is value-laden and
oppression is never valuable.
Substantivist autonomy, however, has a few problems. For one, there is a
conflation between personal autonomy and moral autonomy—which is self-determination
regarding how one ought to act. If substantive autonomy provides normative constraints
on when people are autonomous, then, under this rubric, people are autonomous only if
they make the moral, correct choice. But that is the conflation: being autonomous does
not necessarily mean being moral.448
With the problems of both procedural and substantivist autonomy, is there another
route that keeps the advantages and discards the disadvantages? Diane Meyers offers a
route known as weak substantive autonomy. Weak substantive autonomy has normative
constraints, but not on the contents of people’s preferences and values. Meyers’ account
suggests that agents must have autonomy competency, meaning there must be a
collection of skills and capacities so that individuals reach self-realization whatever this
may mean for each individual. It is a skills-based view of autonomy. The agentic skills
448
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that Meyers has in mind include introspection, communication, memory, imagination,
analytical reasoning, self-nurturing, resistance to pressures to conform, and political
collaboration. Meyers sees self-realization as crucial to self-respect. If traditional gender
socialization compromises women’s capacities to achieve full autonomy and damages
their self-respect, this kind of socialization is oppressive. 449
Meyers further asks whether all desires deserve the same weight. After all, if
desires come about due to their oppression because they are actually adaptive
preferences, should those desires be given credence? If yes, then we seem to be feeding
into the oppression. If not, then we would ignore those who have those desires, which is a
form of disrespecting them. Meyers’s answer is not all desires have the same weight. If
the desires come about autonomously—meaning through the exercise of skills of selfdiscovery, self-definition, and self-direction—then those desires should be given more
weight over desires which have not been critically reflective because they are built into
the social norms and expectations. So, the content of the desires is not the focus, like to
those who endorse substantive autonomy, but neither is the lack of external constraints.
Rather, it is whether those desires were acquired or endorsed autonomously and, for
Meyers, if the acquisition or endorsement came about through competent skills.
I endorse Meyers’s version of weak substantive autonomy when applied to sexual
autonomy. To be sexually autonomous, certain skills are needed, such as the way to know
when one is ready, communication, the courage to say “no,” the ability to accept a “no,”
and emotional intelligence. These skills, however, seem to be to virtues (either moral or
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intellectual).450 Fine and McClelland point out that sexual agency includes skills such as
asking for help, negotiating risk, engaging in critical analysis, and pursuing pleasure.451
Therefore, various virtues are needed to be robustly sexually autonomous. This means
even improving LDSE by introducing a more nuanced view of autonomy does not solve
the major problems of LDSE. And as argued at the beginning of this section, there is
something undergirding my view of sexual autonomy. Simply having procedural
autonomy is insufficient. Furthermore, since another explanation explains a more
nuanced view of autonomy—namely the virtues—we need another ethical theory to
ground autonomy, namely virtue ethics.
4.3. Moral Autonomy

Moral autonomy focuses on how people ought to act and their willingness to perform
those actions. I consider Christine Korsgaard’s notion of self-constitution to be applicable
for this discussion. Consider the Kantian notion of doing an action in accordance with
duty versus doing an action for the sake of duty. Kant would consider the latter as having
moral worth. Likewise, people act and live in accordance with certain principles, but
there are those who act and live based on principles that are their own by endorsing such
principles. For Korsgaard, the latter is what it means to be morally autonomous in what
she calls self-constitution. We endorse certain principles by reflecting on and legislating
them as if they were universal laws given to ourselves. We thereby forge ourselves into
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morally autonomous beings through critical reflection. Korsgaard explains: “What makes
an action mine, in the special way that an action is mine, rather than something that just
happens in me? That it issues from my constitution, rather than from some force at work
within me; that it is expressive of a law I give to myself, rather than a law imposed upon
me from without.”452
The moral self, therefore, is developed rather than just a given, and this includes
various desires and preferences. One view I am arguing against is the view that all our
sexual desires and preferences are fixed by our human condition. What we sexually know
or desire is either obvious or revealed to us through introspection and experience. Sex
education, then, just fills in the blanks by simply revealing what we already desire. I
argue against this view because some desires and preferences can and do change. To take
an easy example, a young woman may desire to be passive in her sexual and relationship
life. She may acquiesce to what her partners want and she does not actively suggest what
pleasures she enjoys. Let us say she then undergoes a transformation whereby she
becomes more active, more communicative, more in tune with her body and her
emotions, and empowered in her sexuality and relationships. Her desire to be passive
changes into an active constitution regarding her sexual interests. Likewise, a male may
desire and prefer to be dominant and hold onto the traditional masculine roles
unreflectively. After learning how those values can be heteronormative, which is not a
flourishing value, he may desire to change those traditional male roles. These desires are
not based on biology, but on morality and the social structures informing those desires.
This idea will be expanded in chapter five, but for now, I will say our emotional
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responses are partially informed by our beliefs. If those beliefs are challenged or
changed, then our emotional response may change as well. With my examples above, if
people are living in an oppressive culture, their beliefs will exhibit oppressive ideas and
their emotions will express and conform to their ideas and beliefs. If the oppression was
revealed as wrong, then those beliefs, along with the emotions, may change.453
What I suggest is that sex education is not only an education that “fills in the
gaps” of sexual ignorance. It is true that people may be ignorant about their sexual
ignorance: often people do not even know what they want, or the best way to live. In
those circumstances, they would therefore need some guidance and ways of seeing other
views and perspectives to see that their default lifestyle may not be the best. Moreover,
learning these different views is not just “trying out” various stances—although this may
happen at first to see what people ultimately want. The sex education I am advocating,
rather, is a change in which people have gained new habits, new virtues, a new
framework because they have understood and managed their desires rather than simply
following their assumed desires from their culture. Autonomy, by itself, may help
students recognize other modes of sexuality and relationship styles, but they may still
choose the heteronormative default. What is needed is a way for students to incorporate
these ideals whereby they endorse—and not simply live in accordance—with various
principles.
As an example, someone who may be on a diet will go through various means to
achieve the desired result: managing calorie intake, exercising more, etc. As soon as the
453
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result is achieved, people will stop dieting and go back to their pre-diet lifestyle.
However, as many people can testify, their old habits take over and the results they
achieved are lost. But then there are those who go through changes in their diets, yet they
maintain their diet lifestyle even after achieving those initial desired results. Eventually,
these newly acquired behaviors have become habituated and ingrained in their character
to the point where people may not consider these new behaviors as external to
themselves, but now as part of their character. They have taken on a new lifestyle to the
point where they may not even consider what they are doing as “dieting” but rather
simply a new way of living and being healthy. This dieting example is similar to
Korsgaard’s self-constitution in that the former dieter was dieting in accordance with
dieting principles, and the latter dieter was dieting by endorsing dieting principles.
I argue the same could be said with sexuality and relationships. To help students
gain control of their sexuality, resist pressure, and gain a sense of who they are and not
just what they do, they need to be educated on forming their character and what type of
sexual person they can be, or ought to be, rather than simply learning the tools to choose
or simply having a foray of knowledge. As sex educator Douglas Kirby has noted,
“Ignorance is not the solution, but knowledge is not enough.”454 If we look at the data,
imparting more knowledge is not enough for agents to spring into action.
Many teens, especially young women, feel compelled to engage in sex when they
are not ready.455 Teaching only consent could help students know appropriate sexual
454
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relations and that it is ethical to do so, but may they desire otherwise. One assumption is
that teaching consent could help prevent sexual violence. However, teaching consent—or
simply knowing how to give and receive consent—may not be sufficient to produce
ethical sexual agents. Even if people know about consent and knew how to give and
receive consent, they may not care to follow through. They may still think they are
entitled to someone’s body and hearing “no” does not have any effect psychologically. If
students engage in token-consent behavior, but internally would rather have sex without
consent or do not care about consent, the deontologist—especially of the Kantian kind—
would still find this permissible.456 After all, these students have the good will to engage
in token-consent behavior and even pass the categorical imperatives. And yet, there is
still something off-putting about people who do not care about consent. To make
someone care about consent, something more is needed than just modifying behavior.
The focus must be more internal psychologically and must pertain to that person’s
character instead of just focusing on the person’s will, as the Kantian would have it.
Consent education is still teaching what to avoid and not the positive aspects of sexuality.
But how do we teach students to be sexually autonomous that also promotes a good
character?
Corngold has championed a curriculum that promotes autonomy and not just
facilitate it. Corngold suggests that promoting autonomy is to shape character as opposed
to be neutral. As he puts it, students
need to develop the self-esteem, self-confidence, and willingness to assert their
rights and basic interests in their relationships with others, and to resist
sexually’, 31% said that they had ‘done something sexual they really did not want to do’, and 33% said that
they had ‘had oral sex to avoid having intercourse’” (“Autonomy-facilitation or autonomy-promotion,” 67).
456
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unsolicited and unwanted sexual advances. Developing and reinforcing these
psychosocial capacities is particularly important in a world where the popular
media screams ‘Sex!’ from every corner; where peers reinforce the message that
‘Everyone’s doing it!’; where bullying is omnipresent; where new technologies
facilitate exploitation; and where ‘giving in to sex’ is often perceived as a
necessary precondition for love and social acceptance.
The preceding discussion suggests that a sex education curriculum that
adequately protects children’s and teens’ basic interest in becoming sexually
autonomous individuals must attend to their cognitive and psychosocial
development. Sex educators must present a range of up-to-date, accurate
information about the mechanics of sex and reproduction, the effectiveness of
various forms of contraception (and instruction in their use), and the medical risks
associated with different sexual activities. They also must provide students with
information about their susceptibility to being bullied and cajoled into sexual
activity before they are ready for it. And, beyond that, they must help and
encourage students to develop the emotional strength, as well as the critical
thinking and social skills necessary to resist coercion…because sexuality is an
area in which they are particularly susceptible to manipulation, exploitation and
abuse, sex education must do more than transmit information. It must be
‘comprehensive’ not only in the cognitive sense, but also in the sense that it
encompasses the emotional and volitional capacities required for sexual selfdetermination.457
I agree with Corngold’s assessment. Going farther, Corngold seems to offer reasons why
autonomy is good beyond simply making an agreement with a partner. The type of
autonomy Corngold promotes has certain features (e.g. self-esteem, self-confidence,
courage, recognizing coercion) and these features uplift autonomy to a “thicker” type. To
promote this type of autonomy means that there is something undergirding that autonomy
considering the promotion of an ideal requires a foundation for that ideal. Autonomy—
and sex education for that matter—is not value-neutral. That being the case, then at least
one value is promoting a “thicker” autonomy458 derived from various values where one
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cannot be neutral or impartial. Thus, consent is a necessary condition for the sex act to be
moral, but not a sufficient one. A thicker account of autonomy assumes some virtues are
necessary. A thinner account is not enough; the context and characteristics of the agents
need to be considered.
4.4. Relational Autonomy

Another limitation of LDSE is that it revolves around an abstract agent who simply wants
to satisfy sexual urges. It is an atomistic view of the self, which was already covered in
chapter one. Relational autonomy, on the other hand, understands and recognizes that our
lives and choices are involved in a complex web of relationships. We are who we are
because of our relationships with other people. Individualistic autonomy values and
emphasizes independence, but the reality is that our lives are interconnected and instead
of being completely independent, we are inter-dependent because of our connections.
Decisions are made mutually instead of atomistically.
As mentioned in previous chapters, sexual pluralism is the idea that many people
in a given society have many different sexual modes of behavior based on their sexual
values which could be incommensurable with each other. As shown in chapter one,
sexual pluralism is better than sexual homogeneity. Our sexual rights do not need to
clash. Rather, our interests, needs, and desires intersect and we can move forward when
all participants gain. This notion is at the heart of affirmative consent where both people
say yes because they want to engage in the activity together. Sexual pluralism not only
captures everyone’s desires and values, but it squares with everyone’s freedom to choose
conception of autonomy he wants to promote. Perhaps, like me, he is aiming for a weak substantial form of
autonomy.
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how to live their sexual lives. Yet, there must be a way to explain why we can choose to
endorse or reject values of our society. Relational autonomy can explain how we can
choose our values within a society rather than strictly independently. Our commitment to
values are made in terms of interpersonal relations and mutual dependencies. Our values
are formed relationally rather than independently. Therefore, relational autonomy is the
best way to accommodate sexual pluralism.
Autonomy is not just something that arises from the self. Our desires or
inclinations can go against autonomy as Kant thought, but what is often ignored is how
heteronomy can also arise from others and how the self is treated by others. Heteronomy
is not just an internal obstacle, but an external one as well. Male dominance is one sort of
heteronomy from this interpersonal aspect. If one is being controlled, or is vulnerable
because one cannot act freely because of this dominance, then one’s autonomy is
undermined. Women would more likely have to be submissive to gain self-protection in
their surroundings, and submissiveness is in tension with autonomy. If the autonomy is
diminished, the dominated person may give up on certain wants and desires and
acquiesce to the dominator.
Our autonomy comes in terms of degrees rather than a simply assuming everyone
is autonomous due to some certain quality about humanity. Within a sexist, racist,
heteronormative society, oppressed groups may have less autonomy than the majority
because they have less opportunities to fulfill their freedom. As an example, could
autonomy have a male bias? Marilyn Friedman argues that it does. Through male
dominance, female autonomy is threatened:459 “[w]hen men’s aggressiveness and
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physical forcefulness is bolstered by social norms that legitimate their dominance,
women are systematically subordinated, a consequence that cannot but have an effect on
women’s desires, fears, values, commitments – indeed their very characters.”460
Friedman suggests autonomy should not have a “one size fits all” encampment
that embraces all in the same playing field. For her, since we depend on other people, we
also cannot simply be an atomistic individual. Rather, autonomy comes in degrees
because an agent’s capacity for critical reflection may operate at multiple levels of
sophistication depending on the agent’s constraints such as institutional systems that
privilege or take advantage of social structures in place, or one’s educational background.
Being autonomous is not just an individualistic enterprise, but it is also developed
by how well people can flourish. The more they can flourish, the more autonomous they
are. However, flourishing is dependent upon the social and community structures that can
enable one to live a good life. Therefore, autonomy is partially based on the social and
community structure. If our social circumstances change, so does our autonomy.461
However, what if the community embraces homophobia, transphobia, sexism, racism, or
any form of oppression? While answering that question is beyond the scope of this
dissertation, I do think that homophobia, for example, is a vice and that anyone who is
homophobic has a defective character. Homophobia obviously oppresses those with
same-sex desires, but homophobia is harmful to those with opposite-sex desires. Coming
from Blumfeld, homophobia locks people into rigid gender roles that can inhibit different
460
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forms of unique self-expressions. People, especially men, cannot show care or feelings to
those of the same sex since it is seen as a threat to their masculinity. Moreover,
homophobia blocks of contributions from the LGBTQIA+ community thereby blocking
any pluralistic attitude toward all forms of sexual and romantic expressions. Instead of
seeing them as fellow humans who happen to have different sexual desires, homophobes
have a limited view by seeing them as a threat and thus must be treated with either fear,
shame, ostracization, or derision.462
4.5. The Complexities of Sexual Consent

With these different positions of autonomy in place, where do I stand in terms of
consent? I consider consensual minimalism too low of a standard. After all, this seems
congruent with the traditional model of “no means no.” However, consensual idealism
may be too high of a standard. For example, sex workers and those who have sex purely
for the sake of reproduction, would not meet this criterion. In both of those cases, they
both want an end and they may also both see sex as a means. For the sex worker, it is a
monetary good or service; for the person who wants sex for the sake of reproduction, it is
a child.463 The issue becomes complex if the people involved do not know what they
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want or need: many adolescents are sexual novices and may not know what arouses them,
what they sexually like or dislike, or what boundaries they have.
Let me bring in an example from Pineau who discusses a young woman going on
a date with someone. She feels an attraction to him and believes that he feels the same
way about her. She goes out hoping there will be mutual enjoyment with mutual interest.
However, the mutual and reciprocal interest is not realized. She feels immense pressure
to have sex with him, though she does not want to have the kind of sex he does. The man
uses aggressive, coercive tactics to have sex with her. She is having trouble disengaging
his body from hers, and wishes he would just go away. But she feels stuck because she
feels afraid to say “no” lest his aggression become more violent. Instead, she goes along
with him just to get it over with. He does not even notice she finds the encounter
disagreeable, and probably still would not have changed course if he had. He
congratulates himself for his aggressive tactics in that they paid off. She, however, does
not feel quite right with the experience.464 This woman described by Pineau could also be
someone whom Robin West describes in her vignettes: a woman engages in sexual
activities with a man for economic sustenance, or to lessen some violent outburst.
Specifically, West claims if a woman constantly has to engage in sexual activities that

be said with having sex purely for the purpose of reproduction. In both cases, trying to fulfill desires may
be minimal or nonexistent, but there are still needs that one ought to consider.
Sex work is already a controversial topic. There are philosophers who argue that treating sex
workers as objects automatically denies them their humanity. I take it that exploited sex work is unethical.
The question is whether all sex work is exploitive. I will assume that it is not, but defending that is beyond
the scope of this dissertation. I am merely assuming that one can treat sex workers as sexual beings in
which the purpose is to have sex with them, but one can simultaneously treat them as if they have dignity
and respect.
464
Cf. Pineau, 465-466.

276

she does not desire nor find pleasurable, even if done with consent, then autonomy could
be drained. For simplicity, let us call this woman Monica.465
The issue becomes more complex after considering Emily Nagoski’s discussion
regarding the latest scientific research of sexual responses and how they vary between
males and females.466 Let me briefly bring up three differences and suggest how these
differences make consent more complex. The first difference discusses sexual
concordance which is the (mis-)match between one’s subjective sexual response and
one’s physiological sexual response. For example, if you say that you are aroused, and
the machines detecting your physiological responses suggest various sexual responses
(e.g. blood flow, penis erection, vaginal fluid), then we have a one hundred percent
sexual concordance. In the literature, men typically show a concordance fifty percent of
the time whereas woman only show a concordance ten percent of the time. In the case of
women, they will say they are not subjectively turned on, but their physiological
responses suggest otherwise.
The second difference has to do with various systems in play when it comes to
sexual arousal. There is the sexual excitation system—which Nagoski calls the sexual
465
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accelerator—and the sexual inhibition system—which she calls the sexual brake. Every
person has this, and some accelerators and brakes may be more sensitive than others. The
sexual excitation system notices relevant information in the environment so that one can
be aroused (e.g. partner’s appearance, ways your partner makes you feel, novelty). The
sexual inhibition system notices relevant information in the environment to suggest good
reasons not to be aroused (e.g. stress, body image, trauma history, relationship conflict,
sleep deprivation, reputation).
On average, men appear to have a more sensitive sexual accelerators and women
have more sensitive sexual brakes.467 Nagoski discusses that when we want to turn our
partner on, we often think that we just need to press the accelerator more. However, since
women are more likely to be attuned to their brakes, they may need to release the brake
pedal so that sexual arousal can initiate. Simply turning people on is not merely a matter
of touching or caressing, but setting up a context where they are comfortable and already
set in a situation where they could be easily aroused. Or, as Nagoski puts it, “arousal is
the process of turning on the ons and turning off the offs.”468
Finally, the third difference involves the genesis of sexual arousal. We often think
of sexual arousal happening spontaneously: sexual arousal appears out of nowhere, and
we want to have our sexual desires fulfilled, which Nagoski calls the spontaneous sexual
arousal. This narrative is so strong that we assume it is a universal human condition.
However, Nagoski points out that spontaneous arousal typically works with maybe
seventy-five percent of men and fifteen percent of women.469 Conversely, other people
typically have response sexual arousal, which is when arousal arises after the accelerator
467
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has been pressed and/or the brake pedal has been released. In other words, the person is
in a state of arousal in response to a context that fosters sexual arousal. This form of
arousal occurs in roughly five percent of men and thirty percent of women.470
With these factors in play, consent becomes complex. For simplicity, let us call
this woman who has these typical responses Tonya. If Tonya’s sexual concordance
happens ten percent of the time, she may not be psychologically sexually aroused, but she
may be physiologically aroused. How would she be subjectively aroused? Here is where
the other two features are helpful. If her brake pedal is on more than the accelerator, then
it seems having more acceleration would hardly work when releasing the brake pedal
would be more efficient. Now, to release it, she would either have to self-release or
someone else would have to help her release it. In short, Tonya would have to get turned
on through manual or external stimulation. The motivational push also hinges on the last
feature: the responsive sexual desire.
If Tonya’s sexual desire is responsive rather than spontaneous, then it seems she
typically becomes aroused as a response from external sources rather than a spontaneous
genesis. Thus, her experience is such that she is more likely to engage in sexual relations
from an external source where the context is set up just right and she is nudged to have a
sexual encounter. This is not to say it should happen all the time, but if Nagoski is
correct, then the typical woman would respond to sexual initiation from her partner. In
Tonya’s experience, she has a hard time initiating sexual encounters because she may not
currently be in the mood, but she could be, given the right physiology (i.e. possible
sexual non-concordance) and right context (i.e. release of brake pedal) from a good
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external source (i.e. responsive desire from her partner as opposed to someone with
aggressive sexual tactics). In this sense, perhaps a playful nudge, a soft persuasion, a
positive pressure,471 or a helpful sway would be ethically permissible. With these
complexities and context, I will admit that there may be no problem with consent being
positively brought out. Indeed, if we could imagine an ideal society without any unethical
sexual actions, the helpful sway may still be unproblematic to bring forth ethical sexual
conduct.
Perhaps what makes this experience more accurate, and more complex, is that of
high school female students. Most high schoolers are novices when it comes to sex and,
for many young women, discussing and thinking about sex, especially sexual pleasure, is
still taboo. Thus, many young women in high school may not know what their boundaries
are—what sort of pleasures they have, what they desire, what they are willing to do, or
what they may not want to do. At the beginning of many sexual experiences, Tonya as a
high school student may feel awkward at first. However, she may have hope either that
the present experience or future encounters will be better, which may lead her to engage
in sexual acts even though she may not feel sexual desire or pleasure based on the
persuasive tactics of her partner to bring her to a heightened subjective sexual arousal, or
at least to release her sexual brakes. In short, she consents to sex because of the context
which enables her to build her arousal mechanisms, and thus increases her desire, at
which point she consents.
With Nagoski’s discussion in mind, I claim Tonya’s experiences are ignored in
the philosophical literature, which instead primarily focuses on women, such as Monica,
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as manipulated actors in the encounter. To show how, suppose we had a young woman
going on a date with a man. The date seems wonderful, and both parties seem to be
enjoying themselves. Later that evening, the man tries to initiate some sort of sexual
contact. He is not doing it aggressively, but he is making his intentions known. The
young woman is not against having any sexual relations with him, but she does not desire
having sex right then. He displays more arousal techniques. She may experience feelings
of awkwardness, stress, vulnerability, self-consciousness, joy, pleasure, detachment,
connectedness, and nervousness. Moreover, she may feel unsure because part of her
enjoys the experience, and another part of her is hesitant to engage.472 At some point, his
efforts to arouse her succeed in acquiring her consent to initiate the next level of sexual
intimacy, even if she remains unsure of herself. During the sexual act, she continues to
consent, but she is dissatisfied with the experience: maybe his technique is
unimaginative, and to be honest, he half-heartedly focuses on her. It is an awkward
experience, but she tells herself that if they continue to see each other, his technique
could improve, they will be more familiar with each other’s bodies, and overall, that
things may get better. This is not the worst sexual experience that she has had, but it is
certainly lackluster. Eventually, however, this woman starts to feel more at ease and
relaxes. She can slowly get into the flow of the sexual experience, even if it was not
enjoyable from the beginning. She may not be in the mood or turned on, but she could be
if she sees some potential in future encounters, or she may be aroused throughout the
sexual encounter. She may consent to the act, even if she is presently not aroused. Or, to
make it even more complex, her lack of experience may mean she does not know what
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turns her on, so she may be confused as to whether she is aroused or not, but she still may
consent nevertheless.
West would consider that the woman I just described was Monica’s experience.
But the experience easily could have been Tonya’s. Indeed, the higher standard may be
asking too much because that is not how desires typically function. There may be
differences between how the sexes initiate sex but, as Nagoski’s work stipulates, these
differences do seem to have some biological basis.473 Specifically, Nagoski points out
that it is normal to feel ambivalence around sex, and that a stimulus can hit the
accelerator and brake pedal simultaneously, particularly if the person has learned that
sexuality is a threat. For example, inexperience could be considered a “threat” of sorts in
that people may experience being turned on, but not be quite sure if they should
continue.474 We can compare this to inexperienced dancers who may accidentally step on
each other’s toes, say “sorry,” and continue dancing, with everyone still enjoying
themselves.
I suggest that West and Pineau are conflating Tonya’s and Monica’s sexual
experiences, and that there are three missing components that can help show the
differences. First, Monica’s autonomy and integrity could weaken, but her motivations
vary. Monica’s motivation was to avoid a scenario, whereas Tonya wants to approach a
scenario. How do we explain this? A study from Impett et. al. shows how the motivations
of engaging in sex with a partner when one does not specifically desire the sex are
important. In this study, there are two types of motivations: approach goals and avoidant
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goals. Approach goals are goals that one pursues to reach a positive outcome, whereas
avoidant goals are those one pursues to avoid a negative outcome. In the sexual domain,
approach goals could be seen as obtaining pleasure, helping a partner obtain pleasure, and
increasing or maintaining relationship satisfaction. Avoidant goals could be avoiding:
sexual or relationship conflict, a partner’s loss of interest, or sexual tension. The study
suggests that when someone consistently pursues avoidant goals in their relationship,
they are more likely to experience a breakup, find the relationship dissatisfying, or are
less satisfied with their sexual experiences over time. In short, consistently pursuing
avoidant goals can be detrimental to maintaining relationship satisfaction.475 Monica has
avoidant goals whereas Tonya has approach goals.
Second, Ann J. Cahill has understood the nuance between coerced sex and
reluctant sex. Cahill considers the sexual experiences motivated by avoidant goals to be
“unjust sex,” since it is not explicitly sexual assault because there was consent, but the
situation did not present the woman with any ideal options. In fact, the woman is
presented with a dilemma in which she may choose sex because it is the least bad of the
options.
So, what is the marker between sexual assault and the “grey area” of unjust sex?
Cahill states that “sexual assault entails a sexual interaction where one person (the
assailant) either overrides the will of another (the victim) or exploits the situation wherein
the victim’s will is inoperative.”476 Unjust sex, the sex that is in the grey area, would be
where consent was given reluctantly, where the woman may have had a split will during
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which she was hesitating, reluctant, and less than willing.477 Could this description help
make a distinction between Monica’s and Tonya’s experiences? In both scenarios, the
women are hesitating, reluctant, and may have a split will. They are both unsure of the
experience. However, the difference is that Monica is less than willing, yet feels she has
no choice but to consent.478 Tonya may simply be willing, more than willing, or taking a
chance and choosing to engage in the sexual interaction. She may also feel unsure, but
she has the option to opt-out if she wishes.479
Third, the women in both types of experiences are sexual agents, but expressed
differently. My influence also comes from Cahill who states:
A robustly intersubjective sexual interaction is imbued with each person’s sexual
agency, while at the same time it constructs that sexual agency (not from scratch,
of course; but the interaction makes a contribution, whether slight or substantial,
to the ongoing becoming of that agency). A sexual subject does not merely have
sexual agency prior to any given sexual interaction, as a kind of freestanding
capacity or resource; rather, both the existence and the quality of that sexual
agency emanates from sexual (and other) interactions…For me, agency in general
is both deeply embodied (and thus profoundly affected by bodily interactions with
other subjects, specific environments, objects, and discourses of inequality) and
fundamentally, not peripherally, intersubjective.480
In a way, Monica’s sexual agency is reduced to the man’s sexual agency in an
unethical way because her contribution to the sexual action is an afterthought, as a way to
cross off the checklist of what counts as consent. Again, it is worth quoting from Cahill:
The nature of that contribution, the way which it matters, is also crucial, and here
I would argue that agency is in play in a particular way: that is the woman’s
agency is deployed only to be used against her. Or, to be more precise, the
woman’s agency can be deployed only to facilitate a specific sexual interaction
whose content (that is, the particular acts that will make up the interaction) is
predetermined and remains largely unmarked by the specific quality of the
477
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woman’s sexual subjectivity. Her sexual agency is employed in a weak way, as a
mere accreditation of the sexual interaction that is being offered to her. Because
her agency is merely providing a kind of ethical cover to the interaction being
offered, the interaction itself does not enhance either her sexual agency (that is, it
does not empower her to become more knowledgeable or forthright about her
sexual needs, desires, and interests in the context of this particular relationship)
nor, most likely, does it broaden her sexual subjectivity by creating more
possibilities. In this sense, the interaction most likely does not contribute
positively to her sexual becoming or flourishing. Thus, her sexual agency is
hijacked, used not to forward her interests, but in fact to undermine them,
particularly those interests that are related to her always-developing sexual
subjectivity.481
On the other end of the spectrum, Tonya’s agency is not based on present desire
but in the hope for future pleasurable encounters. Her interests are not ignored, but taken
as a factor to consider. Her experiences may be treated with respect, but they may also be
treated with reckless indifference or with ignorance. There may be confusing moments,
but this is largely due to the ongoing relationship she has with her partner, her familiarity
with her body and her partner’s body, whether she is comfortable or awkward, whether
she is stressed, etc. Nevertheless, she may continue to act in the hopes that it may get
better. Overall, she may be able to sexually flourish. In some cases, she enjoys the act, in
others, she may find the experience wanting, but she does not consider the act violent or
assaultive, nor does she regret or even consider it “unjust”, unlike Monica’s experience
who cannot flourish. If, over time, Tonya feels consistently unsure about her sexual
actions but still consents, it is possible that she would slowly lose her sexual well-being,
and that the act would increasingly become “unjust sex,” in which case, she may end up
like Monica.482
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To sum up this section, there are a plurality of ways to look at consent, but the
addition of looking at how desires and arousals function biologically requires us to take
this reality into account. Therefore, I call my position “consensual realism.”483 The
realism is not looking at the principles of consent first and applying them to the
experiences of people. Rather, we start by looking at Tonya’s experiences, which include
her desires, interests, and biology. Consensual realism is above the minimal standard and
above what Ann Cahill calls “unjust sex” since any sexual action within that field would
be unethical. Moreover, consensual idealism is too rigid in its principles that it ignores
the context and how well the people know each other. With that, my position lies
between consensual minimalism and consensual idealism, which is where Tonya’s
experiences lie.
What makes this complex is that Tonya’s experience will change depending on
the context, but the context will inform, whether the interaction is ethical or not. For
example, suppose Bob is with Tonya and they are in tune with each other’s bodies and
can easily read each other’s body language. Let us also suppose that they have been in a
relationship for a long time; the background of the relationship would give them the
experience and context of how to engage in a sexual way that is fun, exciting, and caring.
Since Bob and Tonya have known each other for a while and know how to turn each
other on, it is almost as if they can do it automatically (not monotonously) to gain
pleasure for themselves and for each other. Because they know what they are doing, the
context suggests that there is a low bar to hurdle. Therefore, they may affirm each other’s
consent, even to the ideal realm, and they can do so easily.
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Now let us suppose Tonya and Jess. They are at the beginning of their sexual
relationship and so they have not yet developed the experience of what turns them on,
what their limits or boundaries on what is appropriate are, or what they can do to enhance
the experience rather than it leading to awkwardness. Because of this context, there is a
higher bar to hurdle. Both Tonya and Jess have to put in extra effort for a mutual
enjoyable sexual encounter, which could mean to check-in with each other, to be more
sensitive to the reactions and body language of each other, to display a more caring
attitude to make everyone more comfortable, and to communicate beforehand to ensure
each other’s boundaries, or at least to have a good certainty that pleasure will not be
diminished.
Finally, as another example, Tonya may be of two minds about a sexual act, even
if she completely trusts a long-term partner. Suppose Tonya has been seeing Kim for
quite a while. They trust each other and enjoy being with each other. They have had a
sexual relationship that is both satisfying and pleasurable. Kim suggests trying a new
activity that is somewhat adventurous and risky (e.g. anal sex, swinging, bondage, or a
threesome). Tonya has never thought about the activity except in the abstract. Part of her
never thought she would want to participate in it, but she has never categorized the
activity as an absolute “no.” So when Kim expresses an opportunity to try out this new
activity, Tonya is not quite sure. The hesitancy, however, is not from her not wanting to
do it, but from the idea that she has never thought about wanting to do it. And so Tonya is
partially intrigued, curious, and game to try it out. At the same time, she is not completely
sure since she is dismayed at the request, worried that the negative consequences could
outweigh the benefits, and made to be in a vulnerable position. Tonya decides to do it
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even if she is of two minds. Notice that this does not equate to having second thoughts.
Having second thoughts entails regret or going along with the activity “just to get it over
with.” Being in the state of two minds, on the other hand, means she is actively going
along with the activity and says “yes” to the activity, but the “yes” is not an excited one.
Let me be clear. Tonya is not being coerced and manipulated into the activity. The “no”
can easily be used without awkwardness. The “yes” that Tonya states is still active. The
phenomenon of being in two minds comes about by the novelty of the activity, which can
have a combination of excitement (incentivizing her to do the activity) and uncertainty
(which makes her skeptical to do the activity). If, on the other hand, this was repeated
over time and she said yes just to go along with the flow, or if she felt like she had to say
“yes” just to avoid awkwardness or to relieve pressure, then, in line with West, she may
become like Monica over time.
Moreover, I agree with the affirmation model of consent as well. My response to
Schulhofer is to agree “yes means yes” does not have to fully be verbal; people can still
have affirmative consent through body language, knowledge of the relevant facts, and the
context of the situation. It is true that this is harder to interpret than a verbal “yes,” but the
way to correctly read the body language is to be more aware of the relevant facts of the
context and people can gain this through education and experience. In a way, it is a type
of phronesis to correctly acknowledge when someone is saying “yes” non-verbally,
where they have enough knowledge to make good judgements about sexual matters.484
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Having phronesis is to see how desire manifests itself in the occurrence of the sexual act
such that the partners recognize desires in the other. It is also knowing that context where
both people are comfortable as possible is key such that both partners are willing to
proceed rather than a total ignorance of the other. Otherwise, sexual encounters risk
becoming “unjust.”
However, we must be aware that there is an ambiguity between actual wants and
what others perceive as wants which creates a potential for conflict because some people
are better at correctly interpreting situational cues than others. Resistance should always
be taken as a sign that a sexual invitation is not wanted unless the parties involved have
negotiated a different understanding. This is more practical than the approach of
requiring parties to receive verbal consent at every level of sexual intimacy because
people communicate in both verbal and nonverbal ways. Making a sexual pass at
someone and being turned down is not sexual coercion unless the initiator refuses to
understand it by persistently making sexual overtures. Taken together, this is what makes
sexual consent so complex: it is not just a “yes” or a “no” for many encounters. Indeed,
when most people have sex, we hardly explicitly garner a “yes” or state a “no.” Instead,
we are searching for clues and giving clues to see if it is ok to proceed or to slow down,
or to stop. Most sexual initiations happen non-verbally, and this is important to know and
address. If many sexual interactions happen non-verbally, then we need to teach consent

•
That a lot of women do not have an orgasm easily. As many as 80% never come
during intercourse, so the man with sexual phronesis will have some tricks up his sleeve.
•
That a woman does not necessarily get turned on just by looking at you.
•
That women’s desires are complicated.
•
That women need you to notice their needs and desires, so they can trust you:
THEN they are more likely to give you good sex on a long-term basis.
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that is based on giving/receiving clues. And yet, if it happens non-verbally, we also need
to be taught how to use their words comfortably when the time comes.485
Generally, when people ask if they desire to do an activity, the question is
presented as a single option (“do you want to do x?”). The question seems innocuous in
that it is asking what listener’s preference or desire is. However, the implicit subtext is
that the asker is really saying “I want to do x, do you?” and if the asker is male, the power
dynamic adds pressure to say a “yes” or makes it hard to say “no.” To mitigate the
pressure and to make the choice to say no as comfortable as possible, we should make it
clear that a choice is presented rather than a single option. By presenting the question so
that the listener can make a choice, (e.g. “do you want to do x or y?”), the listener has full
decision-making power, even to say “no.” Sarah Super, a rape victim in St. Paul in 2015,
talks about how giving people a choice in which they are presented options can mitigate
sexual violence. It is where saying “yes” and “no” are easy to say without the sense of
awkwardness or confrontation. I would add it would also mitigate pressure to have sex as
well, thus making consent more genuine. Super explains in her IgniteMPLS talk486 that a
better choice model is to present one or more options, offer an opt out as a choice, and
validate all choices. When a speaker asks a question to a potential date (e.g. “would you
like to come home with me tonight?”), the speaker is asking a question, and the receiver
can say “yes” or “no.” However, the utterance is not just a question; the speaker is giving
a performative utterance where the subtext exposes the speaker’s real preference behind
the question, namely the receipt of a “yes.” By giving at least two options, it takes away
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Cf. Alice Dreger. The Talk: Helping Your Kids Navigate Sex in the Real World. (CreateSpace
Independent Publishing Platform, 2016), 55.
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See IgniteMPLS. “Sarah Super—If Not, That's Okay, Too,” YouTube Video. Feb. 26. 2017.
(Accessed June 1, 2017.) www.youtube.com/watch?v=GYHUcFwh6hs&t=.
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the asker’s preference and the pressure is mitigated. Why is this important? It is because
when men ask this question in our social context, they have the power and they may not
be aware their implicit request can put pressure on the woman to say “yes.” Women,
however, are much more hyper-alert to being powerless.487
While choice and autonomy are important, especially regarding consent,
autonomy should not be the sole focus of sex education. McAvoy suggests that a sex
education curriculum must help students recognize they are sexual beings within a larger
context rather than just beings who are capable of having sex. Also it should be noted the
status quo values in society are structured in a way to position men and women
unequally. Moreover, students need to recognize that all sexual experiences, whether
long- or short-term, are “moments of interdependence and thus require those involved to
understand their moral obligations to others, including above all concern for the other’s
well-being.”488 To know what clues to search for, or how to give clues requires
experience; after all, that is what phronesis comes down to. However, in sex education
for high school students, we cannot simply teach them to go out and experience sexual
encounters. Like most classes that deal with real-life scenarios, we give them guidelines,
case studies to help students think about consent—which many schools and states have
endorsed—and tools so that they can face sexual encounters in the “real world.” The next
subsection will focus on case studies to show how they can be helpful in teaching
consent.
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Sarah Super. Personal discussion with the author, June 14, 2017.
McAvoy, 492.
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4.5.1. Case Studies on Consent

Case studies are helpful in providing the students opportunities to think about certain
issues which have been problematized. I suggest Mappes would be the foundation for
sexual consent which claims consent happens when the participants make an agreement
that is voluntary and informed. The educator could bring up many case studies to hone in
on what makes an action voluntary and informed. Mappes also suggests what makes an
action unethical is if the agreement came about through deception, coercion, or taking
advantage of a desperate situation. Again, the educator could bring up case studies to
determine what exactly deception and coercion are or how to tell if a situation is
desperate. Keppler and Estes—who endorse consensual idealism—build upon Mappes’s
work to suggest consent is not sufficient using case studies to suggest why. The students
could grapple with these cases to see if consensual idealism is needed or if consensual
minimalism is sufficient.
Since I endorse consensual realism, the class would have to go through many case
studies and examples just to get a better sense of the typical female’s (such as Tonya’s)
experiences, which may include her pressures, why she may feel pressured, her
uncertainty, her willingness, and her (un)certainty. The students could talk about whether
sexuality and relationships are meant to aim for an ideal, or if sexual encounters just need
to be “plain sex”489 and anything more is up to the individuals.490
489

Term comes from Alan Goldman in his article, “Plain Sex.” Philosophy & Public Affairs
(April, 1977): 267-287.
490
Even though my program aims toward high school students, a possible way to help teach
consent to elementary students is to have them sit in a circle. The teacher states each student is allowed to
hold their neighbor’s hand. They are told if they do not want to, they do not have to, but both students are
allowed to hold hands if and only if both students want to hold hands. The purpose of this exercise is to
help students learns about their boundaries, their desires, and their sense of control. Why is this important?
Many young children are bombarded with messages from their parents that if they see relatives, then they
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Lamb suggests giving students many case studies and exercises to problematize
the notion of consent to make the students reflect on sexual choices. She suggests talking
about consent and drug use as an example, particularly alcohol. Most sex education
programs hardly talk about alcohol and sex or, if they do, it is information that is a
blanket statement about teen abstinence.491 For example, a common claim is that if any
alcohol is introduced, consent is automatically void. Yet, impairment through alcohol
comes in degrees. This then raises questions of whether consent can come in degrees as
well, and what this would look like. Other questions to address could include how
impaired does a person have to be in order for consent to be void, whether one could tell
if the other is drunk, or if both people drank alcohol yet both requested condom use, does
this implicate some impairment for consent?492 Another case study could ask what
constitutes coercion and pressures. Does an ultimatum to a partner such as threatening to
break up count as coercion if she does not have sex with the other partner? These and
many other case studies come from Harvard University in the hopes of helping students
understand what is considered appropriate and inappropriate by discussing it with other
students. Some examples come from the Unequal Partners, Vol. 1 lesson plans. One
looks at consent situations by presenting vignettes and asking the students whether the

ought to hug their elders. But with this classroom example I suggested above, the students are now in
control of what they want rather than being moved externally to be affectionate with another. Another
benefit from this exercise is that the students can then discuss what they wanted and what they did not
want, which will help them develop a sense of agency. Moreover, for the mismatched students (where one
student wanted to hold hands but the neighboring student did not), the rejected student may feel dejected.
Being dejected is an unpleasant experience and the common response—which has been the narrative of our
culture—is to assuage the dejection. However, my example could change the narrative where being
rejected should take priority, meaning that students will have to learn that being rejected is part of the
consensual process and that they ought to respect other people’s decisions not to hold hands. Over time,
they may learn to respect people’s autonomy and agency, especially with their sexual decisions as they get
older. Moreover, perhaps people will react due to peer pressure and this exercise could help them not only
see the pressure but also fight against it.
491
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people involved in the vignettes were able or not able to consent. Doing so could help the
students ask themselves (with guidance from the educator) whether the situation they
could be in is considered consensual or not (either receiving or giving).493
By letting the students take charge of the discussion, LDSE shows respect to the
adolescents. Sex education programs have withheld information for fear of what
adolescents would do with this information. However, by doing so, these programs do not
support the students’ right to autonomy in their choices by not informing them, and these
choices could make a difference in terms of their health and self-affirmation of who they
are. For example, in 2000, the Kaiser Family Foundation494 as well as Douglas Kirby,495 a
major researcher of sex education curricula, separately made claims that the sex
education that students were receiving was either irrelevant or misleading. For example,
many abstinence-only programs left out any information about how to use birth control
and how to protect oneself from any STIs. The students are left without any knowledge to
make decisions, especially those who are already having sex. 496 Instead, LDSE lets
students take charge of their own sexuality by helping them develop their autonomy,
which is key in the making of informed decisions. Indeed, Santelli et. al. has argued that
it is unethical to withhold health information from adolescents by taking a “human
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rights” approach to sexual health information arguing governments have “an obligation to
provide accurate information to their citizens.”497
The hope with these case studies is to make people—particularly men—more
aware of their partner’s wants and needs. It is very possible that unwanted sexual
encounters do not always result from malice, but from being unaware of the partners’
wants. The way to correct this is to pay attention to various signals, become more
sensitive to these signals, and spring to action based on these signals. When a man makes
a mistake, he may be sincere, but he is being insensitive or careless of his partner’s
signals. The examples from Keppler, as mentioned above, are good to show the need for
being sensitive to his partner's needs. “Yes” does not necessarily mean “yes” and various
cases need to be brought up to make things clearer for the students and to make sure they
are thinking critically.

Conclusion

I have looked at the various positions about autonomy and consent. I argue that in terms
of sex education, weak substantive autonomy is best. Thus, we need to help students
develop agentic skills so students can critically reflect on their decisions. I also argue we
ought to aim toward programmatic autonomy in sex education. Thus, we need to teach
issues of oppression and how to recognize and dismantle it. I further argue that applying
Korsgaard’s notion of self-constitution is helpful to endorse moral principles. Thus, we
need to teach students various sexual values and help them understand what it means to
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endorse these values rather than living in conformity with them. In terms of consent, I
argue for consensual realism, and using case studies to help students hone in on what
standard they consider too low for themselves and encourage conversation so they and
their sexual partners will be on the same page. I also argue for affirmative consent, which
looks at the complexities and nuances of sexual arousal and desire. Thus, we need to use
case studies to help students understand the complexities and nuances of various people’s
sexual desires, arousal states, and pleasures. Moreover, getting a better understanding of
the science of sexual desire and arousal would be extremely helpful to give the students a
fuller understanding that sexual desire and arousal is not universal, which demonstrates
there are many different varieties. The aim should be to show how sex education can help
them reflect on their own sexual accelerators, sexual brakes, and the context that could
encourage sexual desire.
All of this is well and good, but as mentioned before, if I am arguing for some
substance—even a weak kind—behind consent and autonomy, then there is a foundation
behind autonomy, which goes beyond deontological ethics. In other words, deontological
ethics is insufficient for sex education; we will need another type of sex education in
which I consider a feature that is missing in all three models: the care of the sexual self,
which means to formulate a sexual subject. In other words, previous models do not treat
the adolescent as a sexual subject. What is a sexual subject? Tolman describes it as “a
person’s experiences of herself as a sexual being, who feels entitled to sexual pleasure
and sexual safety, who makes active sexual choices, and who has an identity as a sexual
being. Sexual desire is at the heart of sexual subjectivity.”498 To be a specific sort of
sexual self brings with it a range of virtues, qualities, and dispositions. Therefore, to
498
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formulate sexual autonomy, one must formulate a sexual subject with the right type of
virtues and dispositions. Being autonomous is not just self-determination, but selfdetermination in the right way by having various autonomous skills and virtues.
Based on this assessment, LDSE is also missing a dimension of how one becomes
a sexual subject, and not simply an agent who has sex.499 People do not simply want
knowledge of the facts, but what to do with those facts. They want the know-how along
with the know-that. Students need more than just the empirical, scientific facts; they want
to know how to handle relationships, how to communicate with potential romantic
partners, and how to recognize good and bad sexual encounters. Moreover, many young
people describe sex that “just happens” whereby their sexual agency is abdicated. This is
not to say that sex was nonconsensual, but that there was no discussion nor negotiation as
to what the people wanted or what boundaries they had or what they were expecting from
the outcome. They did not think about how to assert their boundaries nor how to find out
the other person’s boundaries. They just knew that there was an outcome (e.g.
intercourse) and they are letting the flow of events sway the outcome without the people
involved actively doing anything.
With these positive features in place, students are implicitly asking how to
determine how to navigate their relationship expressions and their sexual lives based on
their values. And yet, while autonomy plays a role, it is not enough. They are implicitly
asking for “the capacity to feel connected to sexual desires and boundaries and to use
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To illustrate, Moran recounts a fourteen-year-old Kansas girl complaining about her sex
education: “They just tell us to prepare ourselves emotionally, but they do not tell us what it means to be
emotionally prepared” (234). Or to put it another way from Peggy Orenstein, “Girls now live in a culture
where, increasingly, unless both parties agree unequivocally to a sexual encounter, there is no consent—
only ‘yes means yes.’ All well and good, but what happens after yes?” (Orenstein, 3).
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these to make self-directed decisions.”500 This, therefore, implies that they want to form a
character that can embrace certain dispositions, attitudes, desires, and preferences where
they can feel these features are their own. This cultivation means that students must
undergo a formation project on themselves through constant practices, trainings,
activities, and disciplines. It is what I will call “taking care of the sexual self,” which is
the theme for the next two chapters.
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Chapter Five: The Áskēsis Model

In the last chapter, I mentioned how LDSE left out important elements for a good sex
education: a notion of a sexual subject, a robust understanding of consent, a route where
students gain a sense of maturity over time but also be critical of their sexual culture as a
way to inform themselves as having a sexual identity that will shape them into healthy
sexual adults, and a development of a virtuous sexual character. For students to
understand what it means to be a sexual subject, they must be aware of themselves and
others in their sexual context. Their sexual identity will be informed by different
environments and—as we saw in chapters two and four with the work of Emily
Nagoski—different biological formations, meaning that sexual desires, actions, and
behaviors will not be the same for everyone else. By understanding the plurality of
different sexualities, students will learn not only of other sexual identities, but of their
own.
Let us recap the problems and the advantages of the previous models. Under PSE,
one major advantage was their conception of a relational self, which tries to capture a
sense of morality that includes relationships, emotions, mental aspects of a sexual life,
and respecting others. Moreover, PSE promotes a specific direction and guidance for the
students by promoting not only the ends of sexuality, but also developing a character to
reach those ends. However, the advantages do not make up for the major disadvantages,
which includes a very rigid and highly ideological authoritative sexuality education. The
rigidity is so strong that other viewpoints are not accepted, which makes PSE not only
embrace heteronormativity, but does so with gusto because it is the only type of value it

299

promotes. The education is a top-down model, meaning that since morality is based on
authority rather than engaging with the students, the students’ sexual education is limited.
For LCSE, the major advantage is that it focuses on empirical evidence and health
issues rather than an imposed moral force from authority. Since this education starts with
the students, the students are encouraged to try and understand the different values of
people. However, the encouragement does not go far enough due to the implicit
heteronormativity in this model, which limits knowledge of what students could know.
Moreover, by mainly focusing on avoiding negative consequences, LSCE ignores
positive aspects of sexuality such as relationships, sexual preparedness, and pleasure.
LDSE’s major advantage is that it gives the students a growing sense of autonomy
and encourages respecting people’s sexual choices. However, the major problems have to
do with the notion of autonomy itself. The focus on the individual takes away the context
of the dynamic relationship whereby relational autonomy seems to be a better fit for a
sexual dynamic. Furthermore, LDSE implies heteronormativity in the United States by
never questioning the default values of society. For example, if male sexuality is favored,
then consent programs are going to teach that obtaining a “yes” is the only way to
proceed. Men may learn that obtaining a “yes” is all they need. But consent is only a
necessary condition of ethical sexuality. What is missing is a robust view of autonomy
and that means that there is another foundation for ethical sexual behavior than simply
procedural autonomy.
Both liberal models had at least two things in common that marked their
disadvantage: one is that they assumed a liberal model of education where the students
are consumers of sexual values and they get to choose those values. However, since most
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people do not typically question the norms that society has given them, most people will
simply “choose” the social norms that they already have. By having a pedagogy that
remains neutral to the social conditions and institutions, the dominant cultural norms
remain unchallenged which sets up heteronormativity as the default value. Two, sex
education programs are missing teaching about the sexual subject. Sex education needs to
refocus on how to teach young students to be sexual subjects in addition to learning about
sexual facts and information. In order to understand the problem with sex education
currently, we must see how students have conceptualized sex as it has been given to them
in their environment, and these conceptualizations have to do with the mechanics of sex,
such as what sex is, how to employ safer sex, how to prevent pregnancies, and how to
avoid STIs. However, young adolescents do not always employ this knowledge into
action.501 Louisa Allen has noted this knowledge/practice gap. Young people
conceptualize sex and their sexual practices in such a way where they think of themselves
as developing sexual beings. The problem, however, is not with young students thinking
about sex or about applying sexual knowledge in practice. Rather, the gap has to do with
the failure of sexual educators capturing and teaching the complexities and the nuances of
sexuality to their students. Moreover, the students did not even recognize that there was
this conceptual gap. Thus, they may think that the limited knowledge they have about sex
encapsulates all or most of sexuality and anything outside of what they know is an
improper form of sexuality and relationships. Their limited conceptualizations may limit
other valuable norms that could potentially be realized. This conceptual gap limits their
knowledge within an assumed heteronormative framework.
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The typical presumption is that teachers see students as not knowing the material
initially. The educators then fill in the gaps whereby the students take that new
knowledge and apply it to their lives. However, young students already have some idea of
what sex is. Thus, the starting point of sexual education must not be the idea of young
students not knowing about sexuality. Rather, we should already start with the
proclivities, knowledge, needs, and interests of the students. To do so would be giving a
voice to the students—which will encourage and acknowledge their agency—rather than
prescribing to the students an external voice informing what they should do and know.
By starting where the students are at, a sex education program will legitimately formulate
a program that builds on the students’ needs and desires. By mentioning new avenues of
sexualities, relationships, and modes of sexual selves, new questions and possible ways
of being sexual arise because the students can now explore and think about them.
Otherwise, the students would not have or know the opportunity to explore what sort of
lifestyle fits with them and how other people’s lifestyles are respectable. Moreover,
focusing on such a limited view of sexuality perpetuates not only norms that one ought to
follow, but this “knowledge” constitutes the students’ perception of sexuality as negative.
For example, the previous models construct a knowledge that sex is made for
reproduction, and that pregnancy is a very easy process. Thus, according to students’
perceptions, sex should be something to avoid, or sex is something to be reserved for
reproduction, or at the very least, sex should be limited in order to not go against the odds
of becoming pregnant. Opening more doors on sexual knowledge would benefit the
students such as: sensuality, sexual empowerment, and sexual diversity.
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Since the educator would presumably have knowledge of different sexual
lifestyles to express, the educator would be able to speak in a way that is useful or
effective for the students’ work of transformation, which may open up dialogue where
different forms and expressions of sexuality are at play. The students would be more
engaged in what it means to be a sexual being with this new model. The “gap” would be
not as wide because the students would internalize new forms of sexual diversity, and
there would be no shame, guilt, or embarrassment to give to others or to give toward
oneself.
With a concentration on anatomy and biology, students want more than just
biological mechanical facts. They want knowledge of “what to do” with these facts.502
People must learn how to take care of the self in a general way, which includes emotions,
their place in the world, and relationships with others. Taking-care-of-the-self model, or
what I will call the áskēsis model, will incorporate all of the advantages from the
previous models, and try to remedy the bad as some models have already done.
The goal for this chapter is to develop the áskēsis model of sexuality education
and explain what it means to take care of the self. The focal point of this model would
concentrate on the subject and thereby produce subjects taking care of their sexual self.
By developing this line of thought, care of the self would be a new avenue in sexuality
education, providing a new discourse on one’s sexuality, instead of teaching the
avoidance or mechanisms of sexuality.
The philosophical foundation I use is áskēsis: exercises, practices, or training for
self-discipline so that people guide themselves to be better human beings. This chapter
will break into four sections. In section 1, I will first explain áskēsis as a moral
502
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foundation and how the self can be developed from áskēsis. Moreover, developing
áskēsis within sex education will incorporate various features, which will also be
discussed. In section 2, I will look at contemporary figures who have interpreted áskēsis
as a means to develop and train the self. These figures are Martha Nussbaum, Iris
Murdoch, and Michel Foucault supplemented with Richard Shusterman. These figures
will set the stage for applying áskēsis to sexuality education for the next chapter.

1. Áskēsis as a Moral Foundation

What is áskēsis? I find Maria Antonaccio’s description helpful:
Askesis can refer to a wide range of practices that human beings undertake in
order to form themselves in relation to an ideal good. In the history of Western
thought, for example, askesis has been associated with practices related to
education or intellectual formation, athletic and military training, spiritual
formation (as in the famous exercises of Ignatius Loyola), and even the process of
artistic creation. In each case, the root meaning of askesis denotes some sort of
formation discipline, an attempt to shape or form the self according to an ideal of
goodness or excellence. As the diverse examples just noted suggest, ascetic
practices may be more or less demanding depending on their particular goal.
Some may be strenuously renunciatory (e.g., with respect to human desires for
food or sex); others may focus on the redirection of natural human energies
toward new ends (as in education). In either case, askesis involves a disciplined
effort to impose a degree of form on the flux of human impulse, to shape human
energies according to some ideal of the good.503
Áskēsis—or what I have loosely captured from Foucault as “taking care of the self”—is
more than just learning about ideas and facts in an objective manner; it involves also
incorporating them and making them principled actions in order to improve oneself.504
Sex education is not just about behavioral modification, or for the public good to have
healthy citizens. It is also not just to make individuals have self-restraint or self-control of
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their own desires. Rather, students would actualize their own creative sexual
individuality whereby they have a positive affirmation of who they are as sexual beings.
A good sexuality education must include the emotions, exercises, practices, and activities
to take care of the self. As a way to exemplify this, I will offer three analogies: the
athlete, the musician, and the philosopher.505
The athlete has to practice and gain skills to be considered a good athlete.
Depending on the sport, these skills consist of passing the ball, shooting the ball into the
desired goal, running drills, memorizing plays, conditioning the body, and engaging the
activity in a timely manner. One practices to play well, which is to say, to try and perfect
various athletic techniques. One does so for training so that one can use this talent for the
“real” competition. The training is a way to make one better at the activity of athletics.
Relating to practices of the self, one who does not form a self is analogous to an athlete
who never practices and watches from the side lines. In other words, one must become a
certain kind of being by cultivating and creating the self. Áskēsis is the route to develop
this self so that people can continually cultivate the self.
The musician must also practice and gain skills to be considered a good musician.
These skills consist of practicing the instrument, getting a feel to be with others playing,
playing drills, and forming muscle memory that is associated with the musical piece. Like
the athlete, one practices for the purposes of training so that one can use this talent for the
“real” thing. By performing these skills well and correctly, one becomes good at being a
musician. Like the athlete, one who does not form a self is analogous to a musician who
does not play. Neither the athlete or the musician are reduced to techniques however. The
505
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good athlete has a feel for the sport such that they can perform the athletic feat well; the
good musician has the experience, muscle memory, and the ability to tell whether the
performance is done with grace or if the performance sounded formulaic.
The philosopher must also practice and gain skills to be considered a good
philosopher. These skills consist of cultivating intersubjective dialogue with other people,
developing critical thinking skills, developing writing skills, learning the techniques of
argumentation, gaining a heightened sense of other perspectives and how one is involved
in these different arguments, and raising critical questions. The purpose is to become
good at philosophy. Unlike the athlete or musician, the philosopher is not training so that
she can perform for the “real” thing. Rather, the training itself constitutes the “real” thing.
The line is blurred between training and the “real” thing. Perhaps the closest thing we can
say is that graduate school is the training, and becoming a professor/professional writer is
the “real” thing. However, this is not to say that one is not a philosopher until one
completes grad school. One can still philosophize and be a philosopher by having the
skills mentioned above. Likewise, one is still an athlete or a musician even if one does
not make it into the professional circuit. The training of the self is ongoing competition,
or a never-ending recital. There is never a point where you stop being a self. The
practices and the rehearsals will forever be ongoing where there will be no ultimate
recital. Indeed, they will be blended where you cannot make a distinction between the
practices and the recital. But just like any rehearsal or practice, people will make
mistakes. And since there really is no distinction between practicing and “the real thing”
in life, people will often make mistakes in life.
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What does it mean to go through training? We practice and discipline ourselves so
that we can do the activity well in the right way. Habituation is not enough: people need
to improve themselves to form a better character. Habits are character traits that are
repeatable, but people can have good or bad habits. Practices, on the other hand, are
habits people repeat such that people improve and make themselves better. The practices,
disciplines, and the trainings will always be formulas for improvement. It seems odd that
one morally trains or practices to become worse off or to become stagnant in the activity.
Training intends to develop certain dispositions and habits and we do that by
accomplishing the tasks and practices that correspond to the activity. In the athlete,
musician, and philosopher, there is no ultimate end goal to achieve; rather, they are
constantly striving to become better versions, an “upgraded” version of who they are.
Likewise, I suggest, the same could be said with the self.
The influence of deontological and consequentialist ethics focuses on moral
development as overcoming those moral failures, as if one lowered oneself morally and
the way out is to be active to get back to a normal stasis. The whole enterprise of áskēsis
however, is go further than simply staying at a normal stasis. It is to morally enhance
oneself not only for the purposes of staying out of moral failure, but to improve oneself.
Many of the Hellenistic philosophers who employ the notion of áskēsis consider
the training as a form of therapy by noting that we are both student and teacher of our
selves. We are the patient and the physician to receive and give the prescription to our
selves. We are therapists to ourselves, to cure and to take care of ourselves. By focusing
on being a better version of ourselves by teaching but also learning from ourselves, we
can become “good at” being a self, a subject.
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The biggest feature of being “good at” being a self is similar to how one becomes
good at athletics, music, or philosophy: they are all active in their pursuits of becoming
good in their talents. Taking care of the self has the same active principle. Part of áskēsis
is to “transform true discourse, the truth, into ethos,”506 where the aim is selftransformation: to become other than what we are by creating new possibilities, new
forms of life. By focusing on the self in a more active way, we would not be vulnerable to
certain weaknesses. However, by becoming “good at” being a self, we are not just
developing a specific talent; we are developing an entire character, an entire subject to
place value in those activities.
Assuming that these people did these activities because they are passionate about
them, and they find meaning and worth in these activities, the athlete, musician, and
philosopher place value in these pursuits, and these values form an “organized” self
rather than a passive, or fragmented self which, in turn, help create virtuous subjects. This
is not to say that if people miss out on the training, they are doing something immoral,
but they will be more enriched and fuller human beings, much like learning how to read
and write makes people fuller human beings, or getting engaged in athleticism makes
them fuller human being. Without developing these features, people will not flourish as
human beings.
One of the advantages with this model is that we do not start with what a human
or, more specifically, what a sexual human ought to look like. Call this the “Ideal
Picture,” in that it suggests we start with some ideal we ought to reach. Rather, we ought
to start with where people are at: we start with the ethics of the situation by looking at
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what people do instead of starting with what a metaphysical picture of sexuality or human
relations look like. Starting with where people are at will reveal various possibilities of
sexual expressions and positive outcomes.
One thing we should note about the training is that we cannot do it theoretically.
We cannot get better at our craft, our athletic abilities, or our talents if they remain idle.
Even thinking about what to do is not enough. If we practiced our musical abilities
simply by thinking about the notes, this is not real practice. Undergoing training means to
go through the experience and mentally see the notes in front of you. The same is said for
training the self. We have to go out in the world and experience ourselves amidst the
world in order to improve ourselves. Epictetus says that philosophers should not just be
contented to learn, but to practice and train oneself.507 But the training is for improvement
and not just simply to ingrain some character trait. The same, I will argue, can be said
with the sexual subject.
Our modern view conceives of sexuality in moralistic discourse. For the ancient
Greeks, however, sexual conduct was regulated as a mode of life. Consider how most
people think of going on a diet: people undergo some rigorous training in order to
achieve a goal, but as soon as that goal is achieved, the training is over and people go
back to previous routines. Áskēsis is more rigorous. The training is not for proper
motivations, but to seek out a way to live the good life. In the sexual realm, “[o]ne
conducted oneself ‘properly’ in sexual matters neither because the law enjoined one to do
so, on pain of punishment, nor because of ideas about deep-seated conceptions of evil
(which would no doubt bring its own punishment in another life). Since the point of
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philosophy was not abstract thought alone, but thought in the service of good living, good
sexual conduct was a question of the rather loose principles of training oneself.”508
Áskēsis is internalizing various discourses as part of our character such that the exercises
are ready at hand, always at our disposal.509 We are armed with the memorized truths of
the discourses and put them into practice.510
Students never had the opportunity nor the skills to reflect on who they are in the
sexual realm. In a way, the students “have not been active participants in their own
formation.”511 Because our current discourses about sexuality limits our sexual
expressions, we have been unable to recognize and exert our own power. First, we must
understand what it means to be a subject, a full-fledged self. What features about caring
for the self could be given in sex education? Carlson writes: “This might be considered
an individual project, but it is also, in its most democratic forms, a collective public
project of education as upbringing—or paideia—in which the young are ‘produced’ as
subjects of particular forms of democratic sexuality and desire, which also means as
active subjects of their own desires.” Encouraging students to see themselves as sexual
subjects would give students a positive perspective from which to form their sexual

508

Alec McHoul and Wendy Grace. A Foucault primer: Discourse, power, and the subject. (NY:
NYU Press, 1997), 93. My emphasis.
509
Foucault notes that various Hellenistic philosophers had various analogies to grasping these
discourses: Plutarch compares the discourses like medicine that is always supplied for us to protect against
the vicissitudes of existence. Marcus Aurelius sees discourses like a kit that a surgeon has always nearby.
Seneca notes that these discourses must be grasped and never let to, to cling to it and attach it to one’s
mind, “making it part of oneself” and “by daily meditation reach the point where these wholesome maxims
occur of their own accord.” It is not to rediscover one’s true nature, but to absorb a truth through teaching,
reading, advisement and to assimilate the discourse so thoroughly that it becomes a part of oneself. As
Foucault puts it: “one does not rediscover a truth hidden deep within oneself through an impulse of
recollection; one internalizes accepted texts through a more and more thorough appropriation” (Michel
Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, Ed. Paul Rabinow. Trans. Robert Hurley. (New York: The New
Press, 1997), 100-101).
510
Cf. Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 102.
511
Justin Infinito. “Jane Elliot Meets Foucault: The Formation of Ethical Identities in the
Classroom.” In Journal of Moral Education Vol. 32, No. 1 (2003): 71.

310

selfhood.512 Caring of the self informs us on the how, why, and ways to continually
activate our lives, which requires exercises and practices; it is an active constitution of
the self rather than just a passive quality. When applied to sex education, making oneself
into a sexual subject is a necessary condition for having a sexual lifestyle with wellbeing.
As mentioned in chapter four, I embrace weak substantive autonomy, which
suggests that there are some virtues as the foundation of my sexual ethic. Minimally, I
embrace the skills-based virtues that I mentioned from Meyers. Recall that Meyers’
account self-realization is to reach autonomy competency, which is to have various skills
and capacities such as introspection, communication, memory, imagination, analytical
reasoning, self-nurturing, resistance to pressures to conform, and political collaboration.
Meyers sees self-realization as crucial to self-respect. Without having these agentic skills,
people would not be living autonomously. And living without autonomy is to live a life
without well-being. I suggest that achieving autonomy competency is practicing áskēsis
and the specific skills are the specific practices so that we can live well. Therefore, there
must be a standard to help us determine what it means to live well and live badly.
Whether we look at virtue ethics or moral psychology, we eventually have to face the
question of our human nature. Human nature has been the standard to determine how to
live well. If we live up to our nature, then we can live well.513
The issue is complex, but even without a definition of human nature, I still
suggest that there is one because there are good and bad ways to have a (sexual)
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relationship. Even with a wide variety of sexual interests and sexual activities, people
generally prefer some things over others. We are not complete tabula rasae as Locke put
it. With a wide variety of sexual and gender expressions, there are many ways people can
flourish via their (sexual) relationships, but there are also many bad paths to take as well.
Someone who prefers a life of pedophilia would not live a good life because one is
desiring a sexual encounter that one should not have.514 Our human nature constrains
what sort of sexual choices are good and bad, but there is a wide variety of sexual desires
and choices that many people could have. There also many ways one could live badly via
sexuality: pedophilia and hebephilia are a couple examples. However, there is a diversity
of living well, even if the desires aim toward opposite ends: having a desire for same-sex
relationships or opposite-sex relationships is just one example. They are both equally
valid ways that can constitute living well.
The training of the sexual self forms character in the sexual realm, which
constitutes the ability to fulfill sexual desires and needs. Formulating a sexual character,
fulfilling sexual needs and desires constitutes flourishing. Without the ability to fulfill
sexual needs and desires, flourishing becomes more challenging and perhaps
insurmountable.515 For example, if someone is gay and wants to fulfill sexual desires, but
lives in a society or a time period where being gay is considered against the norm, then
this person could not flourish, even in the Aristotelian sense. I suggest that if some sexual
desires, sexual expressions, gender expressions, or relational attitudes could not be

514
Some psychologists will go so far as to say that the desire is not bad; it is the action that is bad.
However, I think having various desires could be detrimental to one’s well-being. Someone who constantly
desires to eat feces seems to limit that person’s well-being, even if that person does not act on it.
515
Those who want remain virgins or abstinent are also fulfilling their needs as a sexual being as
long as those needs are coming from within rather than from an external source.

312

fulfilled or expressed because of some external constraint, then those people who have
those sexual desires could not flourish.
Of course people can flourish without having their sexual desires or expressions
fulfilled, but I suggest that this would be a rarity, in the same way as a person without
friends could possibly flourish, but that would also be a rarity. Does this mean we should
fulfill all of our sexual desires? No. Within the realm of virtue ethics, we would say that
would be intemperate. There are at least two ways people ought to avoid when it comes
to sexual desires to remain temperate. First, sexual desires cannot consume people’s
character. In other words, the desires should not be so strong, or so numerous that they
overtake other important things in people’s lives. And two, pursuing sexual desires must
be done for the right reasons. The reasons are that pursuing sexual desires can either
promote virtue, or not promote vice516 where people can engage in their desires with the
right people in the right time in the right way. Is foregoing our desires detrimental to
developing our character in the sexual sphere and thereby inhibit flourishing? It depends
what those desires are. Something superficial like engaging in certain sex positions seems
516
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like a desire that does not need to be fulfilled. People can still flourish without engaging
various sex positions. But what about something more concrete that pertains to people’s
identity such as having same-sex relations, pursuing multiple relationships at once, or
engaging in kink behavior? Are those behaviors merely desires to fulfill, or do those
behaviors pertain to people’s identity and character? I will not go into the details about
what constitutes people’s sexual identity since that is beyond the scope of this
dissertation, but I suggest that if people cannot fulfill a desire that pertains to their sexual
or relationship identity and orientation, then it would be extremely difficult to flourish.
Care of the self, learning how to make oneself into a sexual subject, within sex
education will incorporate at least five active pursuits, and these pursuits are part of the
advantages extracted from previous models. These active pursuits are: (1) learning about
sexual health, (2) a self that is not completely atomistic, (3) learning and respecting
different sexual values, (4) understanding sexual autonomy and consent, and (5)
additional components of sexual subjectivity. With this in mind, I will analyze five active
pursuits of áskēsis.
1.1. Learning about Sexual Health

The Netherland's philosophical approach to sex education is: “Young people have the
right to adequate sex education so that they can make well-informed choices about
sexuality and relationships.”517 From a young age, students learn about the mechanics of
sexual and consensual boundaries so that they can easily talk about sex at a later age
without awkwardness. While I think it is important that students learn about the
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mechanics of sexuality, such as pregnancies, STIs, reproductive systems, and
consequences of their actions, it is not the whole story. Being a sexual subject must
include discussions about interactions with others. Sex education, therefore, is not just
about how to thwart unwanted pregnancies and STIs, but also positive aspects such as
pleasure, care, and fostering healthy relationships. As Lamb puts it: “[i]n addition to the
lessons on protection (contraceptives) disease, and whether or not to have intercourse,
there might be lessons that focused on pleasing the other person, taking care of and caring
about the other person, and even a discussion of the ideal of mutuality in sexual
relationships.”518 Sexual health would include discussions of sexual pleasure. After all,
sexual pleasure is the main motivation why people have sex. By discussing pleasure,
students may understand not only healthy ways to achieve pleasure, but that not obtaining
pleasure is a concern for both partners.
1.2. A Self That is Not Completely Atomistic

Drawing from Lamb, the social nature of sex is that “our own choices affect other
people.”519 Although they have different focuses, both liberal forms of sex education
focus on personal freedoms, autonomy, and making one’s own choices, but they forget
that sexuality is also social and it involves other people. Therefore, being a sexual subject
does not mean we learn sexuality by ourselves. Rather, we understand that we can have
preferences and desires, but acting them out does affect others. A good sex education
curriculum does not just focus on personal preferences, individual decisions, and
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exercising our sexual autonomy, but also “to focus on the other person or other people in
their relationships and in the world around them to whom they have an ethical
responsibility.”520 The goal is not just to avoid sexual harm toward others, but to actively
engage in caring attitudes toward sexual partners, which means this model includes care
for others.
In a broad way, caring for the other means to make sure that the other is attended
to, and that we have sufficient awareness and concern of what the other aspires toward. In
Kantian language, caring for the other would take the other’s ends as one’s own. I am
transformed by caring for the other, and I adopt the other’s goals as my own because I am
aware of the other’s humanity. Caring involves identifying with the other person. We
have to be aware of our own desires and how that impacts others. Through reflection, we
must consider these:
● “Just because I feel or want something doesn’t mean I can assume the other
person wants it too;”
● “They may want to be close but not necessarily have sex in the way I am
imagining it in my mind. I need to know what they are imagining also.”
● “I need to be aware that sometimes we start to go along with something and then
we are unsure and don’t know how to stop it. I need to be on the lookout for these
signs and take responsibility for getting more information to know if the other
person feels okay with what is happening. How do I know they want to do this?
Am I okay with it too?”521
Both people are involved to figure out what the partners want, which means they need to
have the skills to communicate and know what it means to be involved with that person
and be sensitive to read each other’s non-verbal cues.
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1.3. Learning and Respecting Different Sexual Values

The Netherlands has made progressive strides in accepting consensual sexual diversities:
“The Netherlands has come far in the acceptance and equal justice treatment of lesbians,
gays, bisexuals and transgender people. The country was first to accept people of the
same gender to marry.”522 Other students’ viewpoints and values can be conflictual.
These different values, however, should not be seen as a threat but as different ways of
considering what is important to each individual. If values are pluralistic and important,
then we will recognize different forms of sexuality. The educator would ask questions to
open up discussion to help students understand differences of values and different forms
of sexuality that many people have. One of the goals of this education is that students will
experience and understand value pluralism as they leave the school setting and head for
college or career aspirations. By opening up to new sexual information, students will
learn that what they value is not the defaulted norm, but a value among other values. Of
course, these values have limits: consent is a necessary condition, for example.
Other educative techniques students would benefit also include: respecting sexual
differences, improving sexual negotiation skills, and dispelling the desire to sexually
shame others. Many students learn what is considered “normal” sexuality through their
culture and any deviation from the norm is not only considered wrong, but the students
will be seen as immoral just for believing that certain sexual “perversions” are
unproblematic. Thus, especially with younger students, their answers will typically
follow what social conventions hold. Because the students would typically answer
unreflectively as part of socials norms, the educator would question the students’ answers
522
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to see why the students believe such a position. Students who are answering
unreflectively may not be consistent with what they feel, think, or how they behave. I
argue that this inconsistency is due to the restrictive and heteronormative structure of
current sex education. As an example, our cultural norms suggest that a promiscuous
male as not problematic, whereas a promiscuous female is less valuable. These views and
norms perpetuate sexual stigma (especially against women) and continues an
asymmetrical relationship between the sexes of society. Moreover, one may view these
women with a sense of disgust because of the taboo that women who engage in this sort
of activity are not acting properly. The educator would have to have a technique of
speaking that allows the educator to be effective for the students’ work of transformation
and to dispel these ideas.
For another example, suppose students hold onto an essentialist aspect of
sexuality. Because the educator teaches what it means to take care of the self—and this
means to teach pluralistic aspects of sexuality—the educator would play devil’s advocate,
by deconstructing what the student presumes. This may open up the dialogue where
different forms and expressions of sexuality are at play, and students take on a discourse
that is represented as to how they can take care of themselves through different forms and
expressions. Here is where phronesis can make a difference. It is worth quoting Heyes in
full:
The inculcation of phronesis, which is the foundational moral formational task of
sex educational virtue ethics, requires the teacher to articulate which virtues are
present and absent in students’ moral reasoning about relational and sexual
decision-making within situational particularity. As the teacher listens to and
reflects on the students’ reason-giving about certain imagined decisions, naming
and distinguishing what virtues are present or absent, he/she models in dialogue
with the students what it means to have practical sexual wisdom. As students
become more conversant with the language of the virtues and the sorts of practical
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entailments they might carry, they grow into sexual phronomai through their
increasing acquaintance with the process of moral reasoning...they grow
acquainted with traditional forms of morality encapsulated in the virtues, whilst
being empowered to make their own choices and respect others’ choices as they
face nuanced sexual and relational decisions.523
Because of the educator, the student may realize that there is not simply a
sexuality, but rather many sexualities and these sexualities are formed because of culture,
experiences, relationship dynamics, and different meanings that are attributed to sexual
desires. Being honest with themselves gives them a sense of what emotions are being
displayed rather than what they should feel as part of the normalized discourse.
Overall, the educator helps the students taking care of themselves by questioning
the social forces that the students presume what sexuality is, or what it is supposed to be
so that the students will achieve what it means to be sexual subjects by practices of the
self. Through áskēsis, people may reform and expunge the false beliefs, which in turn
will expirate the emotion associated with the false belief. Through these exercises, people
will begin to take charge of themselves and develop the self. Overall, áskēsis can help
break down what many adolescents consider “normal” sexuality. 524 To regard sex
education that incorporates a care of the self, we would have to imagine a discourse
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where sexuality was not centered around what is forbidden, permitted, or considered
valuable or immoral, but more about the self, how to take care of the self, and how to live
a sexual life based on the subject’s terms rather than external influences. We will see that
sex education is not just about gaining information, but about character and the formation
of character.
By honing in on what the students aspire to be, they will endorse various values
which can help them understanding that endorsing values takes on a certain identity. The
education will be inclusive so students can know a diversity of sexual experiences. They
will gain knowledge of sexual minority groups and understand how certain inequalities
exist by normalizing and emphasizing certain norms. A good sex education program,
therefore, would facilitate spaces to have diverse healthy sexual identities. The students
would promote their own discourse and be faithful to themselves instead of following the
norms of societal pressures. The role of the educator would facilitate the students to be
honest with themselves, and encourage students to express themselves without any sense
of fear, embarrassment, or restriction. A good sex education program would not fall back
on any heteronormative assumptions where social and cultural norms become the
fallback position.
The decisions that students make will be influenced by their values, the strength
and sincerity of those values, and the emotional response to possible sexual activity.
Values and emotions are intertwined. Thus a good sex education would discuss emotions
and how to develop a good emotional response to the situation.
When attempting to make a personal decision about whether to engage in a sexual
activity or to use a specific contraceptive, they usually operate spontaneously and
emotionally rather than coldly and calculatingly. Even when questions of morality
enter the picture, the quick, first reaction based on feelings about the matter can
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outweigh the unemotional facts of the situation…To the extent that questions of
morality concern very important matters for adolescents like whether to engage in
a first sexual experience, or to initiate sex with a new partner, or to take steps to
avoid an unwanted pregnancy, more emotional, less reasoned, and more selfinterested thinking would probably prevail.525
The emotions, however, have to be particular to the students so they can feel in tune with
the activity they are doing and feel the pleasure that comes with the activity instead of the
type that PSE typically produces such as fear, shame, and guilt.
1.4. Understanding Sexual Autonomy and Consent

Students must understand that they are responsible for their actions and that others
deserve dignity and respect. Acquiring consent should not just focus on avoiding
consequences (such as punishment), but also showing care and respect for the other.
Exercising the will is not just about limiting themselves with self-restraint and control but
is also a positive affirmation where individuals learn to seek out different sexual modes
of living based on what they desire. After all, being autonomous is self-determination
rather than being pressured and determined from the outside. Something as simple as
saying “no” and positively affirming the “no” would be an example. Moreover, being
autonomous is what I would consider weakly substantive, which was detailed in the last
chapter. Many social scientists have rethought what it means to exercise agency when it
comes to sexual encounters. Albanesi, for example, has done qualitative research with
adolescents’ sexual agency and has noted that sexual agency “rarely follows a cognitive
awareness that it would be a good idea to be in control of one’s destiny. Instead, we see
more haphazard approaches to these negotiations that only start to make sense when we
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bring emotional commitments...a personal emotional attachment to a specific sense of
gender identity.”526 As an example, Albanesi remarks that a young woman, Shari, enjoys
satisfying her sexual desires and displays her sexuality by playing up her sexual
confidence. Her pursuit of her sexual desires fits her identity as a confident woman.
Another young woman, Claire, acquiesces to what her parents want and her parents want
her to be abstinent until marriage. Her agency is not as strong, or even absent, than
Shari’s agency. Thus, Shari has a stronger sexual agency which constitutes her sexual
subjectivity.
Applying autonomy and consent to sexuality, students ought to learn how to have
a strong sense of sexual agency. “Without a strong sense of sexual agency, teens will be
unable to assert and protect their sexual interests...Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that an
adolescent girl who does not know about the positive aspects of sexuality, or does not
believe she has a right to a sexual voice, will be able to advocate very effectively for
herself sexually, including the ability to ‘just say no.’”527 Sexual autonomy means
developing sexual agency: the courage to say what you want, a developed phronesis
about sexually relating to another person, and being in control of yourself instead of
letting the inclinations or social norms dictate what you should do. Students who see
themselves as sexual beings in a positive light can be more active in their agency and are
likely to negotiate sexual situations (e.g., condom usage) than those who see their
sexuality negatively. Agency constitutes sexual subjectivity which can provide selfworth, empowerment, positive decision-making, and successful relationship
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negotiation.528 And finally, sexual consent from a deontological point of view lowers the
standard of what could be considered good consent. The minimal account for consent,
under LDSE, is consensual minimalism; to go above the minimal account would be
considered supererogatory. However, I embrace an account that is above the minimal
account—consensual realism—which is not “beyond the call of duty” but simply what is
expected in sexual encounters. Heyes explains why a virtue-ethical angle is a better
approach than a deontological one: “A rights-based approach centralizes discourse about
what is legally afforded to citizens while the communal dimensions of sexuality opened
up by the virtue ethical approach centralizes the discourse of how best to act, not just
legally, in the realm of sexuality.”529
1.5. Developing Sexual Subjectivity

Finally, áskēsis is a way to develop sexual subjectivity. Michelle Fine’s influential paper
reveals how adolescent sexuality has been conceptualized and associated with
“victimization and danger.”530 Sex education has been characterized as suppressing
female sexual desire, promoting female sexual victimization,531 and privileging married
heterosexuality over other practices. The result is the construction of the adolescent
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woman as a sexual victim rather than a sexual subject in her own right.532 While risk
reduction in sex education is important, developing sexual well-being533 is also important
in sex education too. Heyes also concurs when he suggests that simply teaching legal
consent as moral pedagogy in sex education is insufficient. To supplement LDSE, Heyes
calls for “sex education working towards the flourishing of the individual and society
must form in young people the ability to think ethically about sexuality relationships and
confront the complex dynamics that they entail.”534
As mentioned in the previous chapter, I endorse weak substantive autonomy. To
teach autonomy formatively, we must draw upon various virtues as well as teach students
to pay attention to the context. However, this component is very complex. I have
therefore decided to develop this feature into its own section in section 2. I do this
because I think the previous four features (sections 1.1-1.4) come from previous models
(i.e., PSE, LCSE, and LDSE). Sexual subjectivity, however, is an additional feature that
is hardly mentioned in sexuality education. Developing sexual subjectivity will consist of
developing additional components beyond what the previous models recommend or
imply. Moreover, áskēsis is about training, but we often have the experience that
sometimes we do not want to train. Practicing sometimes is not enjoyable because it can
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be tedious, or it is because it is not the “real” thing. So how do we get over the hump of
not wanting to practice? What is the motivation to do the training? That is a topic that
raises psychological questions I do not have enough knowledge to adequately answer.
But I will offer some methods from various philosophers in the next section that can get
us on the path of not only what sort of training one can do, but ways to motivate
ourselves to undergo training. To show these new components and methods, I will use
three thinkers to develop a holistic framework of what it means to take care of the self.

2. Three Components of Sexual Subjectivity

I understand sexual subjectivity similar to Deborah L. Tolman characterization:
Sexual subjectivity means having a sense of oneself as a sexual person who is
entitled to have sexual feelings and to make active decisions about sexual
behavior. It is the opposite of “it just happened,” which is how many adolescent
girls describe their sexual experiences, and has been identified as one of the only
“stories” girls can tell about their sexual behavior. The phrase “It just happened”
is passive rather than active; it literally has no people in it, not one who is
responsible or accountable. Being a sexual subject is the opposite of being a
sexual object – rather than solely being the target of someone else’s desire, a
sexual subject has agency, that is, she has her own desire as a compass and
actively negotiating her sexuality. Sexual subjectivity offers an alternative to and
denaturalize is the idea that it is normal for girls not to be only sexy but also to
acknowledge and be acknowledged as legitimately sexual beings. 535
We generally consider sexuality as a given, where it just happens to people. This way of
thinking leads people to be passive regarding their sexuality: we wait for our sexuality to
happen, simply accept what comes and, for the most part, display our sexuality with what
was given to us. Notice that under this picture, people do not have to do anything with
their sexuality. We are docile and do not contribute to the formation of our own
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sexuality.536 A consequence of this view, especially in view of heteronormativity, can be
more restrictive for women. Many women are expected to be passive participants of their
own sexuality and relationships, with the exception that if they do not want to have sex,
then they intervene in the flow of events. Otherwise, they just “go along” with the
sequence of events. They are active when it comes to denying consent, but passive when
it comes to engaging in sex, in their pleasure, and in their boundaries.
While I find Tolman’s characterization compelling, I find it too dichotomous.
Recall Tonya from the last chapter, section 4.5. Her experiences were not completely
active, but they were not completely passive either. Depending on the context, her
experiences may not be troubling as Tolman characterizes it. After all, sexual arousal and
desire is not binary but ambiguous. Since some of Tonya’s experiences were not
completely active, she must therefore be completely passive, but that is simply not true.
Is Tonya a sexual subject? It is tough to say. Perhaps she is on the way, and she may
develop her subjectivity through áskēsis. We may or may not consider athletic or musical
people as athletes or musicians respectively. If they are, we can consider them athletes or
musician even if they are not professionals. If they are not, we would not consider them
as completely non-athletic or non-musical. They are still training and disciplining
themselves to become better. In the same way, perhaps Tonya is still undergoing training
(that is, if she is indeed training) to become a sexual subject. But I would not characterize
her as Monica: someone who is sexually passive and closer to being a sexual object.
Tonya has a direction and she has a sense of her sexual desires and how to acquire them.
It may not be in the realm of the full communicative model that Pineau was suggesting,
536
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but Tonya’s experiences are still active and hence, on her way to well-being. If we can
imagine sexual subjectivity as a spectrum, Tonya is certainly closer or heading toward the
sexual subjectivity spectrum, as opposed to Monica who is more passive in her
experiences.
Since the notion of áskēsis is an ancient Greek term, it is understandable to see
what the ancient Greeks had to say. However, I do not find it necessary to adopt their
complete regimen on being healthy, let alone being sexually healthy: their prescriptions
are out of date, and the specific rules may be considered superstitious or superfluous.
However, the form or the idea of áskēsis is still important: training oneself to become a
better human being. Therefore, I will be using contemporary interpretations of the
ancients to help decipher what it means to go through áskēsis and to adopt various
attitudes, exercises, and different conducts of behavior to become a better human being.
The most effective way to train someone is through an instructor. In the same way a
coach or trainer can help an athlete, the teacher can train the student. Different athletes
have different ways of improving their athleticism. Thus, the teacher must be dynamic in
order to train the student well. Since the teacher must reach out toward each student, the
teacher must use different forms of arguments that pertains to each particular student.
Moreover, the teacher must apply these methods differently. Different therapies work for
different people, and some people may be ready for the next step in the application
whereas others may need more work. A good teacher, like a good doctor, will know when
to apply the treatment.
Just like real therapy, áskēsis is to have a self-transformation of the self—an inner
transformation of our attitudes—through our choices of living a certain way, a way of

327

wisdom on how we fit in the world. Sexual subjectivity will consist of various
components. While the list is not exhaustive, the additional components I will consider
are (1) sexual emotions, (2) the sexual mind, (3) and the sexual body. All of these
component will constitute a sexual identity. For each of these three components, I will
rely on three contemporary philosophers who interpret áskēsis differently. The main
pattern behind the concept of áskēsis is that philosophy heals human diseases, and these
diseases are produced by false beliefs and bad habits. The way out of these false beliefs
and bad habits is a therapy to help dispel them. Philosophy heals the soul in the same way
a doctor heals the body. Living a painful life is a not a healthy life. Likewise, living an
impoverished life is not a good human life. To understand how to live a good sexual life,
I will first describe each of these components by utilizing a philosopher’s interpretation
of áskēsis, then I will apply each of these three to sex education in the next chapter. This
is not to say that each philosopher is meant to apply to just one sexual component. These
three sexual components will cross over into each other and the exercises of one
component could very well be applicable to the remaining two. Nevertheless, for
simplicity and emphasis, I am going to use a philosopher for each sexual component. The
interpreters I use will be Martha Nussbaum, Iris Murdoch, and Michel Foucault
supplemented with Richard Shusterman.
2.1. Martha Nussbaum: Emotional Áskēsis

One way to take care of the sexual self is to have healthy sexual emotions. In our culture,
people are sometimes ashamed of their sexuality, especially young women, those
attracted to the same sex, or those who are transgender. To fit in, they may ignore what
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they are feeling, or ignore the emotions completely, especially young men, which
suggests that their sexual emotional attitudes are not reflecting some truth of what they
genuinely feel. Therefore, an important feature of sex education is to align the emotions
to the truth, meaning either to genuinely express what they feel rather than appearing to
have social expected emotions, or that they know the truth of various topics and which
can change one’s beliefs about that topic thereby influence and change the emotions. The
truth, in this case, is that heteronormativity is wrong, that consent is a major foundation
for sexual relations to be ethical, that each individual has different sexual and relationship
wants and desires, etc.
Moreover, the emotions are valuable insofar as they commit oneself to perform
ethical actions. For example, in virtue ethics, to have a virtue is to be disposed to do or
avoid an action and take pleasure or pain in that action. How do we train the emotions?
Aristotle notes that the best way to train the emotions is to start early in life so that the
virtues will be habituated early on. Another plan is that our political institutions need to
be challenged so that they are discouraged from bad forms of character. This is all well
and good, but what about those who are already grown up, and are currently living in a
society that does not have these revised political institutions? Here, Nussbaum turns to
the Hellenistic philosophers for their therapy and I will be using The Therapy of Desire to
develop this component.
Before I investigate Nussbaum’s analysis of emotions, a preliminary note is in
order. Nussbaum’s theory is well-known for embracing the Cognitive View of emotions,
that is, the essential feature of emotions is that they consist of complex thoughts.
However, I find her viewpoint too strong. While embracing or having an alternative
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theory of emotions is beyond the scope of this dissertation, I still use Nussbaum’s theory
because she has a theory on how to train the emotions and that this training is a form of
therapy. At the very least, while I may not embrace the full cognitivist view of emotions,
I do embrace the idea that emotions involve with how we feel about what we perceive
(which includes memory or projected futures), that they are typically affective responses
to our beliefs, which includes our values, and that our emotions are trainable, especially
when we are younger. Another theory that has some promise is the Perceptionist View
from Christine Tappolet. While I am not committed to either position, I think the therapy
from Nussbaum could apply to both viewpoints.
The training I acquire from Nussbaum is that our affective responses can change
if our beliefs change. We may think that our emotional reactions are simply reactions
about what is happening in our environment. However, our emotional reactions stem
from what we believe is true.537 For example, if I am walking in the woods alone and I
happen across a bear, my beliefs were I thought was alone and that bears are dangerous
creatures. Thus, I will naturally be afraid. The fear can be an evaluation (which
exemplifies the Cognitive View), or a perception of danger (which exemplifies the
Perceptionist View). Or if I just found out I won the lottery, I will be elated with
excitement. The excitement stems from my beliefs that my matching ticket corresponds
to the winning ticket, any matching means one has just won the lottery, and that I am the
owner of the winning ticket. If, however, I look closely and it turns out that I made a
mistake in the numbers, then I will feel depressed. The truth of what happened changed:
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my matching ticket no longer corresponds to the winning ticket, and I am not the owner
of the winning ticket. Me discovering the truth in these matters seems simple. But what
about complex examples? I may be disappointed that my presidential candidate lost an
election because I have beliefs and values about what is considered just and an
advancement in society and the opposing candidate goes against what I believe and value.
I may be angry that social injustices are not being rectified because I have beliefs and
values about how people are being mistreated and the social institutions are not doing
anything to help.
Regardless if the beliefs have propositional content (i.e. the Cognitive View) or
whether the beliefs are perceptions of value (i.e. the Perceptionist View), my use of
Nussbaum does not commit me to embracing her theory of emotions since her therapy
could work in weak cognitive or hybrid theories of emotions. Since I hold the view that
emotions and beliefs are connected, I can still apply Nussbaum’s therapy even if I do not
embrace her theory of emotions. In short, I embrace Nussbaum’s training of the emotions
while not fully embracing her theory of emotions.
Nussbaum uses the Hellenistic philosophers to inform how to live the good life,538
and she looks at various philosophers based on their view of the emotions. The therapy

538
This section on Nussbaum is valuably informed by Stan Van Hooft. “Philosophy and the care
of the self: A literature survey.” Sophia 41, no. 1 (2002): 89-134. The details of the Hellenistic philosophers
emerge from the philosopher’s foundation. From there, we can see different types of therapies. Epicurus,
for example, argues that the good is pleasure and the absence of pain. Here, Epicurus relates the good
(pleasure) with the truth. Our bodies tell us what is naturally good while social conventions give us false
goods because society has given us mistaken beliefs of what is good. Epicurean therapy is to expunge these
false beliefs by using reason. Training was to learn these arguments and self-criticism as a way to gain
spiritual care.
The Skeptics saw their goal as to overcome the negative effects of our negative experiences by
simply denying the truth of any belief. The hope is that by denying the truth of our beliefs, the experience
would be less distressing because the experience may not be true. There is no good in life. However,
Nussbaum argues that without a commitment to something, our range of emotions becomes short-shrifted
and we end up a very solitary life.

331

that Nussbaum recommends comes from the Stoic idea that philosophy is akin to
medicine; it is a cure for certain mental ills that one has: “[p]hilosophy heals human
diseases, diseases produced by false beliefs. Its arguments are to the soul as the doctor’s
remedies are to the body.”539 However, the medicine does not come from an outside
source. Philosophy is a way to discover how to retrieve the medicine from within. We
cannot be passive patients, but must become our own active doctors to effect the cures for
our troubled souls. “Philosophy’s medical function is understood as, above all, that of
toning up the soul.”540 The mind is like a muscle that needs shaping and the shaping must
appeal to each particular student and not just for a general audience. In the same way, a
doctor must treat each particular patient and not discuss health in general to all patients.
The task of medical philosophy “requires delving deep into the patient’s
psychology and, ultimately, challenging it and changing it.”541 Medical philosophy
probes into the patient’s inner world. Some of the tools that the medical philosopher uses
are examples, narratives, appeals to memories and imagination so that the pupil will look
at her life critically.542 The views that they currently have have been shaped and molded
by the society they live in and by a lack of inner shaping. To be “cured” of bad beliefs,
one needs philosophy and argumentation. However, Nussbaum argues that Hellenistic
philosophy rejected two types of argumentation still widely recognized in philosophy
today: deductive arguments deriving conclusions from first principles, and dialectical
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arguments which proceed by calm questioning. The argumentation that Nussbaum
recommends is more action-based: the cure is disclosing the truth, but the truth is
revealed by careful thinking which would align (or even expirate) the emotions
properly.543 The educator must delve into the patient’s inner world through gripping
examples, techniques of narrative, appeals to memory and imagination such that the
students are motivated to investigate their whole lives. The narratives could be about how
other people in parts of the world (such as the Dutch) have expressed their sexuality in a
healthy way and show how. Perhaps the educator could have the students interact with
those that are sexually different to help the students make connections with others that are
not like them. Or the educator gets to know each individual student well enough such that
the educator can find ways to tap into their inner world.544 “In short, what philosophy
needs, practiced in the medical way, is an account of complex human interactions of a
philosophical kind”545 such that the educator has a variety of tools to help the student
train their emotions: imagination, narration, appeals to community, appeals to friendship,
rhetorical and literary forms.
The emotions are informed by beliefs. To “correct” the emotion, one must correct
the beliefs and investigate whether the values are conducive to our well-being. Thus, the
therapy would drive out false beliefs by using reason since these false beliefs could
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inform our emotions. 546 In many ways, this therapy is a precursor to modern
psychoanalysis, but the major difference is that modern psychoanalysis does not have a
normative idea of health. The áskēsis that Nussbaum endorses pushes the patient toward a
flourishing life.547 Modern psychoanalysis works until the patients have accomplished
their desired goal. A therapy from Nussbaum’s account, however, would be toward some
objective goal. The teacher would not just deal with the false beliefs, but with the
emotions associated with those false beliefs. Correcting the emotions requires philosophy
because “passions such as fear, anger, grief, and love are not blind surges of affect that
push and pull us without regard to reasoning and belief. They are, in fact, intelligent and
discriminating elements of the personality that are very closely linked to beliefs, and are
modified by the modification of belief.”548 The common theme, according to Nussbaum,
was that proper thinking was to cut through the distortions of our muddled thinking and
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live life better. The way to do this is to investigate the emotions and focus on what our
emotions are telling us.
Some truths, however, are not something that I discover on my own. I need a
teacher to help me realize these truths. Moreover, it is not just any teacher that will do.
The teacher needs to have the acquired knowledge of the truth and not just hokey
solutions in order to appease the student. Sometimes, students are wrong and a good
teacher will correct the students. This is because “truth delivers freedom from the tyranny
of custom and convention, creating a community of beings who can take charge of their
own life story and their own thought.”549 Thus, the teacher would not simply accept
students’ preferences as unassailable, but the teacher also would not ignore the
preferences either. The delicate balance the teacher must do is to engage with the students
to see if those preferences are truly theirs, or if they are simply reflecting what society
expects of them. The teacher engages in an extensive inquiry and brings up sexual facts
to help challenge the students, but not disregard the students’ positions.
One consideration is that a rational person would ideally take the information
from the educator and be thankful for the correction. However, this often does not work.
People generally do not like to be shown wrong, even when the correct knowledge is
beneficial. Our emotions can be so invested into the belief that any threat to that belief
can be a threat to our identity. Since some of our beliefs give us a sense of who we are,
any threat to that belief can make the foundation of our identity shaky. Thus, questioning
someone’s cherished belief may be perceived as threatening one’s identity. Adolescents
may feel not only having their identity threatened, but also shut down in expressing what
they truly feel and believe. There is a delicate balance of accepting students’ thoughts and
549
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values, and also challenging them when needed. Educators require phronesis in teaching
and there is no specific formula since the particulars of the class, students, the dynamics
and comfort of the students’ engagement with each other, the personality of the class, and
other contextual factors.
A sex educator who works in this vein is psychologist and educator Sharon Lamb
who has focused on designing sex ed curricula. She notes that prompting the students to
decide how to handle issues helps foster a democratic education: a good educator would
structure the classroom so that everyone is comfortable expressing their thoughts and
feelings about the matter but also feel comfortable challenging each other. The prompting
will benefit students by asking them to imagine others’ situations and aspects of their
lives that they may have never thought of. Instead of thinking about the issues
theoretically and from a purely emotional state, students are encouraged to think about
their emotional responses and where those responses came from and see if those
emotions came from their belief. If not, then the students may have to further investigate
their emotional response and engage in various practices to work on how or why they
have developed their emotional responses. By having the students investigate their
emotions and beliefs and the connection, they are undergoing áskēsis by working on
improving their emotional attitudes that can contribute to their well-being.
Al Vernacchio, a sex educator, encourages his students to think about sexuality in
a philosophical way. He does not talk about what it means to have sex until everyone has
the basics: conversing about values and norms, talking about what “sexuality” means,
helping students understand their bodies, and learning about gender as both a biological
and a social category. It is from there that the class can move on. Vernacchio states: “We
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know each other; we’ve practiced listening to one another; we’ve had our first few
awkward and heated discussions. We can handle this now.”550 Vernacchio helps students
distinguish between facts, opinions, and values. Opinions can be informed or uninformed,
but they cannot true because “that’s how [students] feel.” They must understand the
process on how they have formed that opinion and see if it is worth anything. Through
this investigation, students distinguish between facts, opinions (beliefs), and values (how
they feel). Again, it requires delicate teaching experience and a good community of
students so that everyone trusts one another and can talk openly. This important
distinction helps students notice that their opinions are not simply feelings, but based on
some (justified) belief. Without the justification, the emotion may also be baseless as
well.
A worry is that each answer would be acceptable based on the students’ answers
as long as the beliefs are internally consistent. However, relativism is not the answer.
Going back to the doctor analogy, a good doctor will help cure the patient but the
doctor’s expertise should give way to help the patient get better. Nussbaum suggests that
“[j]ust as a doctor does not urge the patient to experiment with alternative medications, so
the teacher does not encourage cognitive pluralism.”551 By knowing the truth, one can see
whether one’s social or political situation is being oppressive or not. Emotions are
contributed by our beliefs that have come about from society. Since the emotions are
mainly informed from society, using áskēsis would help us rethink the beliefs from
society which, in turn, would inform our emotions, which in turn would help us rethink
our beliefs. By discussing and arguing with the student, the medical philosopher can help
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the students think deeper to see the hidden beliefs that they may not realize unless it is
brought out because of the medical philosopher.
So how can one do that? Nussbaum suggests that one must spend time with the
pupils so that one can get to know them, sharing their lives and entering into it.552 While
the sex educator cannot do this logistically because of practical considerations, the
educator can facilitate narratives and stories such that the students can recognize
themselves in them. During this time, the educator can talk about various people that are
or were similar to the students’ life experiences. These narratives would have to include
similar ages, backgrounds, and situations to make the students care about the story. All
this time, the educator must still listen to the student with kindness and respect so that the
educator can get a sense of what the student has experienced. Over time, students may
discover that they were actually full of frustration, anger, excitement, or shame after
reflectively thinking through with these narratives.
One question we can ask Nussbaum is why go through these deep exercises of
changing emotions? Perhaps one reason why people cannot let go of beliefs is because
the emotion is usually too entangled with the belief. As Nussbaum points out, “many, if
not all, of the passions rest upon beliefs that do not spring up naturally (if any beliefs do
this), but are formed by society. They are, in fact, part and parcel of the fabric of social
convention; they should be criticized as the rest of that fabric is criticized.”553 However,
the more one is emotionally involved with the belief, the harder it is to let go of that
belief. As an example, there are many anti-vaccinators in the USA and a study has shown
that even if given evidence that vaccinations do not cause certain maladies such as
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autism, the anti-vaccinators will not budge: they still hold on to the idea that there is a
causal connection between vaccinations and human maladies, and even holds onto that
belief more forcefully.554 Even getting more involved in that person’s life may not do it.
Having only one discussion will not do it. Simply focusing on that person’s belief will
not entirely cut it, because that person may still hold on to that belief. The more
emotionally one is entrenched in that belief, the more one’s identity is at stake.555 Thus,
to really drive at changing one’s belief, one must aim more at one’s identity and pinpoint
the mental aspects of that person. To this, we turn to another figure that show a path: Iris
Murdoch.
2.2. Iris Murdoch: Mental Áskēsis

The second component of sexual subjectivity I discuss is the sexual mind, which would
include sexual self-efficacy, and sexual self-reflection. The exercises would be such so
that people can mentally train themselves to be more sexually and mentally aware of their
sexual self, to have mental sexual preparedness, and to have self-entitlement to sexual
desire and pleasure. I will be using Iris Murdoch as interpreted by Maria Antonaccio to
explain this concept.
Training the sexual mind does not mean performing exercises to ready oneself for
sex; rather, it is to discipline oneself and engage in mental exercises so that one can
perform what to do in a sexual situation (e.g. to engage in sex, to refrain from sex, to
554
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courageously say “no” or “yes” to sex, etc.). Murdoch argues that freedom does not
simply mean exercising the will, nor necessarily a lack of constraints, but to
progressively “see an object clearly” which can be in an endless, yet progressive, task.
What she means stems mainly from The Sovereignty of Good. Murdoch argues
that in order to act well, we have to see clearly: pay attention to the facts without having
our ego interfering in it. The moral life is not just about choice but about attending to
someone properly. We may be biased in how we see people. But to see people as they
really are and to go beyond our biases, we must take on a just and loving attitude, which
is also how we can become better moral beings. The moral work is the continual activity
of building up and adjusting our picture of the moral character of people and things in the
world.556 This process is not a huge leap at any given movement, but gradually comes
piecemeal where we can see someone in a just and loving way and overcome the self.
This process is what Murdoch calls “freedom.”
Morality is connected by seeing the world and individuals in a certain way
through self-reflection. The example that Murdoch provides is a mother, M, and her
daughter-in-law, D. “M finds D quite a good-hearted girl, but while not exactly common
yet certainly unpolished and lacking in dignity and refinement. D is inclined to be pert
and familiar, insufficiently ceremonious, brusque, sometimes positively rude, always
tiresomely juvenile. M does not like D’s accent or the way D dresses. M feels that her son
has married beneath him.”557 All of this is going on in M’s mind. M is thinking that her
son has married a silly vulgar girl. However, while M is thinking about this, she is
“capable of self-criticism” and undergoes self-reflection about her attitude of D.
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Eventually, M’s attitude toward D alters. M’s behavior, however, does not change, but it
could change because of the new attitude and she may undergo an internal struggle. “The
mother reflects on factors that may have influenced her (e.g. her own conventionality,
prejudice, narrow-mindedness, and snobbery) and makes the effort to bring a ‘careful and
just attention’ to the object which confronts her. And as she ‘observes’ or ‘reflects’ on D,
motivated by ‘love or justice’, she finds that her ‘vision’ of D alters: D is ‘discovered’ to
be ‘not vulgar but refreshingly simple’, ‘not undignified but spontaneous’, and so on.”558
We can see that there is a switch where M now sees D in a respectful caring way.
If M does this continually, and can do this in other aspects of her life, she is working on
her moral life. “The moral life, on this view, is something that goes on continually, not
something that is switched off in between the occurrence of explicit moral choices.”559
What is required is a reorientation, a refocus, a new way or attitude of looking at the
world by looking at things which are valuable and paying attention to the good. The way
to do this is through a loving attitude, but for the sexual realm, I would simply call it care
and respect.
In Murdoch’s case, the will is to be trained, much like obedience, in order to have
loving regard toward another person.560 In other words, Murdoch’s áskēsis is not about
will power, but about seeing the world in a new way, having an attitude, such that your
will is already directed toward moral choices. Murdoch’s call is to “unself” where one
brackets the “fat relentless ego” and see the world and others as they really are to
overcome the ego. The ethical exercises were meant to purify the psyche of its selfish
desires and reorienting its energies toward the world and others. Instead of a universal
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theory, the task is to form a particular self by ethical practices such as developing a
loving attitude by shifting our focus away from the ego. Moreover, a loving attitude is not
just a temporal discernment, but a moral change from within, such as purifying our
desires. Thus, “the purpose of áskēsis is to cultivate moral sources that help to reorder the
selfish desires and passions of the egoistic consciousness.”561 By giving oneself a certain
direction, one moves toward a perfected way of situating oneself in relation with others
and see the world in a just way.
For Murdoch, the supreme object of our attention is the good.562 Explaining what
the good is to a class of sex education students goes beyond the purpose of sex education.
Nevertheless I still find Murdoch’s philosophy important in that the practices she
endorses—loving attitude, for example—helps people have a clearer vision of the world
they are in, and they see, for example, that people are more interconnected than they
thought, especially in the sexual realm, and that they can see the reality of sexual/gender
identities by paying attention to them rather than putting on categorical assumptions of
what sexuality and gender are or ought to be. I will go over various exercises for taking
on a loving attitude, but in general, how to change students to have a loving attitude
cannot rely on the teacher alone. Murdoch uses Plato’s Allegory of the Cave as an
example of how moving outside of the cave is similar to gaining a loving attitude. But the
question is how do you help students get out of the cave? The most we can do is show
them through various narratives, techniques, and discourses. Educators can use a variety
of tools to help students leave the cave, but because each student is different, there is no
overarching magical tool to get every student to leave the cave with one formula. A
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narrative may work with one, an argument may work with another. But the overall goal is
to get students to pay attention to others by “unselfing” and get the “fat unrelentless ego”
to diminish, which will help one produce morally good acts. Since unselfing helps us see
others as they really are, meaning that everyone is interconnected rather than atomistic
individuals, our actions will be more inclined to see that what we do will affect others.
Murdoch’s view of áskēsis is for us to change our current moral perception into a
different moral vision rather than simply willed decisions. The change is a gradual
process of our moral outlook than just a change in our mental faculty. Indeed her moral
project is not just about moral choices, but about building up a moral character with a
moral outlook such that we are constantly paying attention to the real. This requires
creating good habits, strengthening attention, cultivating good desires, and weakening
bad desires.
2.3. The Later Michel Foucault: Bodily Áskēsis

Traditional philosophers are typically one-sided in that they focus on non-bodily features
such as the mind, the soul, or something that is closer to being immutable. Doing so,
however, de-emphasizes the body because the body can “get in the way” of true work.563
The body, it seems, is nonessential. However, I argue the body is an important feature of
living the good life, and more importantly, living a good sexual life. If we perceive the
world through the body, then surely one must philosophize about the body and notice
how the body gives an important contribution to take care of the self.
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Foucault has a nuanced philosophical understanding of “care of the self.” For him,
care of the self was his view of áskēsis whereby we train and shape the self through a
“stylistics of existence,” an aesthetic concern of how to exist, an intensification of the
subject, rather than live in a rational order of nature—as Nussbaum concluded, or live
toward some standard of goodness—as Murdoch would have it.
To start, why Foucault? Foucault is notoriously a controversial figure. To bring
him into an applied area could raise suspicions for the reader. I would like to assuage the
reader’s worry by bringing different focuses of Foucault. There is an early Foucault and a
later Foucault. The early Foucault would be the author of such works like Discipline and
Punish, Madness and Civilization, and Birth of the Clinic. In these works, Foucault’s
notion of the subject is not some autonomous being that has some inherent nature. Rather,
we become subjects through various discourses and networks of relationships of power.
We are not first individuals that emerges onto the scene, and then power structures break
up the self. Rather, subjects are a result of and constructed through norms and power
structures of social life. Subjects are contingent rather than innate.
The later Foucault would be the author of the three volumes of his History of
Sexuality, the lectures in the 1980s, and various interviews toward the end of his life.
Here, he views the subject as a way of “forming a relationship with oneself.” This
awkward phrasing means “care of the self” according to Foucault. It is to undergo
áskēsis, to properly care for oneself and to do that, one must engage in various disciplines
and practices, to work on oneself. Rather than seeing the subject as adhering to a set of
roles and rules, the subject is part of negotiated practices that is continuous on the other.
Especially when applied to the sexual realm, Foucault termed “care of the self” as a way
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of gaining a sense of subjectivity by focusing on sexual body-esteem, sexual
somaesthetics, and bodily sexual pleasure. The subject is not simply a result of discourse,
but can take on a “critical attitude” where one undergoes problematization so that the
subject can work on itself to constitute a moral being. Allen notes that an ethics of
pleasure deriving from Foucault can help young people as sexual subjects whereby young
people are viewed as individuals with a positive and legitimate sexuality rather than a
problem to be managed.564
The writings of the later Foucault are sometimes called his “ethical turn.” In his
late life, Foucault admits that his earlier work had emphasized that the subject was
formed through power relations and discourses. His focus, now, is on the subject as it is
both constituted and self-constituting. “[E]thics, or the subject, is not thought of as the
other of politics of power…Soon, he maintains that this problem of the subject, and not
that of power, is his main concern…From the eighties, studying the techniques of
existence encouraged in Greek and Roman Antiquity, Foucault let a different figure of
the subject appear, no longer constituted, but constituting itself through well-ordered
practices.”565 I will draw upon his early works, but my focus will be on the later Foucault.
In his early works, Foucault introduces ways in which society holds onto views
and values by normalizing them through power structures. Our values and views are
shaped through imposed discipline norms (normalization) by “the deployment of force
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and the establishment of truth.”566 Normalizing encourages subjects to engage in certain
practices that are deemed proper. The behaviors are determined where the subjects are
encouraged to repeat these behaviors. Eventually, these behaviors are seen as “normal”
and immune from any criticism. These norms are (per)formed through various power
structures in society. Power must be understood
in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in
which they operate and which constitute their own organization: as the process
which, through ceaseless struggle and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or
even reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another,
thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and
contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in
which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is
embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various
social hegemonies.567
Applied to the sexual realm, we see what is considered sexually normal in our
society and we regulate our behavior so that not only do we match our sex lives to the
norm, but also so that we can manage the way others perceive ourselves and how others
perceive us. All of these discourses, institutions, and forms of power train me how to be
me. The norms enforce the line between what is considered proper and responsible
sexuality and what is considered perverse or punishable. By doing so, our self-image gets
reinforced by the standards of society, which become so strong that those who deviated
from the norm become ostracized or even killed. The standards tell us not only what we
cannot do, but what we must do in order to have a “normal” sexuality and a normal
sexual life. Thus, sexuality is not only repressed, but also demanded of us. Society
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defines, enforces, and regulates what sexuality and relationships ought to look like. One
outcome is that certain sexualities and relationships are considered more valuable than
others and those that are not valuable ought to be shunned or seen as shameful.
To further this idea, Gayle Rubin has famously noted that certain sexual acts form
a hierarchical system of sexual value: marital, reproductive heterosexuals are at the top,
followed by unmarried monogamous heterosexuals. Next would be the solitary
heterosexual. Stable, long-term lesbian and gay male couples are gaining respectability,
but promiscuous lesbians and gays are barely above the bottom of the hierarchical
pyramid. The bottom of these sexual castes are transsexuals, transvestites, fetishists,
sadomasochists, porn models, sex workers. As one goes higher on the hierarchy, the
people are considered mentally, emotionally, and socially stable where they gain
institutional support and reap in the benefits. As one goes lower on the scale, there is a
presumption of mental illness, criminality, economic sanctions, and disreputability.568
These low activities are considered self-destructive patterns, emotional aggression, or
immaturity. The discourse we learn from each other and society forms the idea that sex
within the confines of marriage, love, and reproduction is considered “good” and
“normal” sexual activity. Any sex that is unmarried, promiscuous, nonprocreative is
deemed “on the fringe,” “abnormal,” or “unnatural.”
Young people are especially susceptible to these messages. They want to fit in
with their peers so they follow along and accept these disciplines believing they are
merely natural dispositions. Moreover, the discourse encourages them to follow these
norms by rewarding “proper” sexual and relationships outlets and punishing “abnormal”
or “unnatural” sexual and relationship outlets.
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In his later works, Foucault offers some insight on giving a hermeneutical account
of the subject. “[F]or Foucault subjectivity is not some thing we are, it is an activity that
we do.”569 By forming a subject rather than discovering a pre-existing essence, the effort
is to become a certain kind of individual, “to give a distinctive form to one’s life, to
shape, deepen, intensify and cultivate the relationship of the self to itself.”570 It is to
become not a person, but a kind of person, where one can cultivate the self: creating an
art of making oneself. “This ‘cultivation of the self’ can be briefly characterized by the
fact that the art of existence—the techne tou biou in its different forms—is dominated by
the principle that says one must ‘take care of oneself.’”571 Not only is taking care of the
self an art of life—an art of existence, but there seems to be a moral obligation toward
oneself (and implicitly toward others as well, as I will show).
In the context of Foucault’s project, our subjectivity is “what we make of
ourselves when we devote ourselves to taking care of ourselves.”572 However, this
confusing statement suggests that Foucault does not seem to have a foundation for his
account except the self simply. What Foucault means is that one transforms oneself by
creating an art of making oneself as opposed to transforming the self to any ideal.573 It is
the activity through which the people take on this dynamic relationship to themselves that
establishes who they truly are. Otherwise we start to accept a static, fixed idea of who and
what we are and then we are inclined to neglect the development of our active
relationship, which is the real life and heart of subjectivity. Indeed, ethics for Foucault
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does not come from codes of conduct or system of rules that constrains behavior and
actions; rather, subjectivity is a performative truth where one persuades oneself to make
oneself by devoting oneself to take care of oneself. To perform this, it seems that not only
is one doing the action, but one is also becoming the being to perform the self that is
doing that action. Rather than assuming that facing hardships allows me to discover my
true qualities, my true self, I need to recognize that actively facing hardships is what
makes me into a certain kind of self.574 Moreover, taking care of the self is not desired to
get back to a lost self or to liberate an undiscovered self. It is rather to self-create and get
a self to emerge that was not originally given.575 This practice is to “transform their
existence into a kind of permanent exercise.”576 But this is not just simply a solitary
exercise; it is a social practice. It takes “the form of an attitude, a mode of behavior; it
became instilled in ways of living…It thus came to constitute a social practice, giving
rise to relationships between individuals,”577 which entails not only an art of existence,
but a moral obligation for self-examination. Foucault notes that “[t]he practices of the self
must enable one to get rid of all the bad habits, all the false opinions that one can get
from the crowd or from bad teachers, but also from parents and associates. To ‘unlearn’
(de-discere) is one of the important tasks of self-cultivation.”578 The point is to change
the views that people have for the better. It will not be an easy task: practices of the self
will be a permanent battle whereby people will gain skills and courage for their
lifetime.579
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Moreover caring for the self is an inherent social practice, taking place within
some organized institutional framework. By taking care of the self, we care for others
which could, in turn, inform the self. In an interview, Foucault states:
In the abuse of power, one exceeds the legitimate exercise of one’s power and
imposes one’s fantasies, appetites, and desires on others. Here we have the image
of the tyrant, or simply of the rich and powerful man who uses his wealth and
power to abuse others, to impose an unwarranted power on them. But one can
see—in any case, this is what the Greek philosophers say—that such a man is the
slave of his appetites. And the good ruler is precisely the one who exercises his
power as it ought to be exercised, that is, simultaneously exercising his power
over himself. And it is the power over oneself that thus regulates one’s power
over others…the risk of dominating others and exercising a tyrannical power over
them arises precisely only when one has not taken care of the self and has become
the slave of one’s desires.580
Thus, there is an ethical relationship not because it is strictly about caring for others, but
because care of the self is a way to limit and control power, specifically one’s own
power, and not be a slave to one’s desires. People cannot simply withdraw from human
society to establish a consistent self. A better way would be “standing back from the
activities in which one is engaged while still pursuing them, so as to maintain the distance
between oneself and one’s actions that constitutes the necessary state of vigilance. The
aim of the care of the self is not removal of oneself from the world, but preparing oneself
as a rational subject of action for the events of the world.”581 The activities are exercises
practiced by referencing situations that the subject may have to confront. So the exercises
are not inactions. On the contrary, they encourage us to act and they constitute us as the
true subjects of our actions. We do not remove ourselves as isolated beings in the world,
but to enable us to situate ourselves within it rightly. Care of the self is correlated with
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caring for others. To possess the virtues and to possess care, one must be disposed to
practice the virtues and to show care. By acting appropriately, one must have knowledge
of what to do, and this requires practices and exercises in a social context.
Remorse for what you did to others is also a way to take care of the self. It is not
finding or revealing who we are, but to explore what the self is. It is not a solo journey
because we are in complex relationships with others. Thus, we rely on others’ feedback
when we create and engage in our own practices and techniques to form our ethical selfunderstanding. Caring for the self means I can ask myself various questions like:
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●

“Am I doing what I really want to do, or am I doing it because it’s expected of
me?”
“Is this normal, or do I desire this?”
“What is the best and the worst that can happen to me if I do this?”
“Am I safe emotionally and physically?”
“Does anyone know where I am and who I’m with?”
“Have I done something like this before and felt bad afterwards?”
“How do I know that the other person will treat me with respect and concern?”
“Have I thought about safe sex?”582

Notice the first two are reflective so we are aware of ourselves rather than acquiescing
along with someone else’s desires or passively engaged in the activity. The self develops
one’s own goals through practices of the self rather than embracing the goals of society.
“Make freedom your foundation, through the mastery of yourself.”583 Ladell McWhorter
writes an autobiographical defense of Foucault and she talks about taking care of the self.
It is worth quoting her fully:
If I seek to become a being who is incapable of becoming anything new, I seek to
become something other than my capacity to become. If we want to oppose
normalization, we should develop disciplinary practices that don’t aim at stasis.
Our style of existence should be an openness to becoming—which is to say, an
affirmation of freedom. If we want to oppose regimes of sexual normalization, to
find ways to live lives not bound by the identities and values those regimes
582
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enforce, we have to become people who affirm our freedom in our very existence.
We have to become people who dare to give ourselves over to the process of
becoming new, becoming different, becoming other than what we are. That
becoming is both our goal and our practice, one and the same.584
One intensifies one’s relation with oneself, which Foucault described as
“techniques of the self” where the purpose is to “constitute the self as an ethical subject
more than to transform the self according to a universalist and naturalist norm of
wisdom.”585 To cultivate the self, Foucault argues that one converts the self through selfexamination, exercises, practices, and form a relationship with the self, where the self is
enriched with new achievements, skills, and a new attitude of the world. Conversion of
the self does not mean that “one must [...] devote oneself entirely and exclusively to
oneself,” but that “one had best keep in mind that the chief objective one should set for
oneself is to be sought within oneself, in the relation of oneself to oneself.”586
As an example from today’s standards, abstinence is regarded as a duty, otherwise
there is an immoral tinge if one performs fornication. While learning about features such
as abstinence and procedures to avoid unwanted outcomes are a necessary condition for
sex education, it is not a sufficient condition. Yet Foucault points out that in ancient
Roman times, sexual abstinence was not regarded as a duty nor was the sexual act
represented as an evil.587 Rather, it was to valorize and moderate sexuality for oneself
rather than give a prescribed list of moralistic dos and don’ts, a rigid set of rules or
norms, or even a sense of morality. Throughout time and with the addition of
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Christianity, the “flesh”588 will replace the “body” as the source of temptation and sin.
For the Stoics, controlling one’s desires was an exercise of self-mastery. But this was not
within the framework of what was permitted or forbidden. Rather, it was a style or a
mode of being, an aesthetics of existence. Even holding onto one’s virginity was
disconnected from a sense of purity. One held onto one’s virginity because of a choice to
hold on to a form of existence, a way to practice self-control. Eventually, the
individualistic forms of self-control by the Romans and Stoics would be co-opted by
some of the Christians as an absolute moral claim by suggesting that any form of
sexuality that is not productive or procreative is deemed sinful.589 To regard sex
education that incorporates a care of the self, we would have to imagine a discourse
where sexuality was not centered around what is forbidden or permitted, or what is
considered valuable or immoral, but more about how to rule over the self, and how to
take care of the self. Instead of “losing one’s virginity,” why not see it as gaining sexual
pleasure and fulfillment?590
To have a sexual education that has a discourse about the care of the self in the
way that Foucault describes is a way for the subject to get involved in sexuality that
forms a new sense of sexual “identity” where one is not thinking about oneself as a being
that happens to engage in certain practices, but as a sexual being that becomes what one
is sexually because of these certain practices. By working through different discourses
and exchanges of power, one will become a subject and have a relationship of oneself
with oneself. If the subject does not have any agency and power to determine a
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relationship, one cannot undertake to invent new relations or modify existing ones in an
ethical manner. One could not be “freed up”, as it were, to engage (or abstain) in sexual
activity in a way that is taking care of the self. Rather, by becoming a sexual subject, one
would be performing pure creative activity instead of reacting to power forces.
One problem with Foucault’s “ethical turn” is that he “describes this conversion
in terms of an intensification of subjectivity rather than a universalization of
subjectivity.”591 When Foucault talks about pleasures and desires, he seems to focus
mainly on the body. Antonaccio argues that Foucault puts more emphasis on the practices
of self-formation over content while ignoring a normative background.592 Ethics,
however, is usually concerned with some normative basis that captures the boundaries of
all those who have moral consideration. Even with the development of áskēsis,
Nussbaum and Murdoch rely on some universal or cosmic order to lead the practitioner
toward an ideal state or to live in accordance with an ideal state. Foucault, however, does
not have this. Rather, Foucault’s “ethics” deals with “the elaboration of a form of relation
to self that enables an individual to fashion himself into a subject of ethical conduct.”593
One goes through áskēsis not to perfect oneself with some higher good or cosmic whole,
but to make oneself “into an oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain
stylistic criteria.”594 While Foucault’s focus on the body is important in contrast to
previously mentioned philosophers’ emphasis of non-bodily features, Foucault’s problem
does not seem to have a foundation for his account except simply the stylistics of the self
which does not give us much of a standard or criteria. The way to supplement Foucault’s
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lack of normative background is to inform it with a philosophy of the body that makes the
body central to an art of living, yet has a normative background. To this, I turn to Richard
Shusterman’s notion of somaesthetics. Shusterman picks up where Foucault diverges into
extreme territory. I use Shusterman for two reasons: one, Shusterman has a normative
theory whereas Foucault does not, yet Shusterman uses Foucault as examples; and two,
since Foucault is arguing for an “aesthetics of the self,” Shusterman’s theory is perfect
for discussing an aesthetics of the body.
The normative theory that Shusterman aims for is pleasure, but not the crude or
superficial type that Foucault suggests with his extreme personal ideals.
Pleasure, even when identified with pleasurable feelings, cannot be simply
identified with blind sensation because the very enjoyment of sensation depends
on the context or activity that shapes its meaning. The glass of (even mediocre)
wine that Foucault condemns to everyday banality can be the site of intense
pleasure, even spiritual joy, when framed in the proper sacred context.595
For Shusterman, pleasure can open us to new experiences and to other people,
where the experiences can be so powerful that they can transform our desires and redirect
our life.596
Advocating the body as an especially vital site for self-knowledge and selftransformation, Foucault argues that self-fashioning is not only a matter of
externally stylizing oneself through one’s bodily appearance but of transfiguring
one’s inner sense of self (and thereby one’s attitude, character, or ethos) through
transformative experiences. Central to this experiential transformation, according
to Foucault, is the experience of bodily pleasures.597
Contra Foucault, pleasure should not be the focal point of sex education, and yet
sexual pleasure needs to be discussed. Allen is also skeptical of making sexual pleasure
the marker of a “successful” encounter:
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If [sexual pleasure] is the ‘new’ measure by which young people might judge
themselves competent or incompetent and experience their subjectivities limited
accordingly (the ‘old’ measure being the successful negotiation of ‘safer sex’).
Instead of forging space for open discussion of sexual pleasure and the idea that it
might be legitimately experienced by younger people, its introduction seems to
impose the same old disciplinary shackles. These limitations are enduringly
female and male gender-normative and heteronormative.598
In other words, students already know that pleasure is already understood as the basis
why people engage in sexual activity even at a minimal level. The worry is that if
pleasure is the basis of sexual activity, then sexuality is interpreted as being reduced to
pleasure. Doing so essentializes sexuality, which is what I want to avoid since sex
essentialism can reinscribe heteronormativity. For example, Allen notes that pleasure
constrains masculinity in that men may simply focus on their pleasures or work on their
various techniques to draw pleasure out of their partners.599 Young women are also
expected to achieve orgasm, and that her partner drew an orgasm out of her. If not, then
she is pressured to fake it if pleasure does not organically happen.600 Moreover, by
making pleasure the main motivator of sexual activity, it ignores other possible
motivations, possibly subsuming them.601
The point is not simply to gain pleasure to maximize intense sensations.
Somaesthetics is also meant to correct our bodily performances by improving certain
directions of our body. One can see this in various movements such as dancing or zazen
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his sexual release” all signify agency over one’s pleasure. “I gave him/her an orgasm” signifies agency and
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sitting. Shusterman also uses the Feldenkrais Method and the Alexander Technique as
examples of involving different ways to perform the body in order to correct bodily
performance so that one can live life more functionally and pain-free. We must condition
our body, or sometimes we must pay attention to what the body really wants and go with
the flow with the body. We have to bodily condition ourselves, and correct ourselves to
get rid of our bodily bad habits and use the body as a site for bodily awareness, and not
simply go through an unconscious trial and error to correct ourselves.
Certain practices and exercises reshape our minds as well: “Such somaesthetic
discipline (evident in yoga and Zen meditation but also in Western practices such as the
Feldenkrais Method and the Alexander Technique) involves, of course, a significant
degree of intellectual askesis as well.”602 By focusing on our intellectual bodily
consciousnesses, our knowledge and performance improves what we are doing. Of
course, this includes sex since the partners involved are experiencing their own interests
and pleasures as well as ways to maneuver their own bodies so that each gains interests
and pleasures as well.603
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Shusterman, Body Consciousness, 44.
The problem with Foucault’s somaesthetics, as Shusterman sees it, is not the analysis of
Foucault’s theory, but the pragmatic or ways to perform the body. Shusterman argues that Foucault mainly
prescribed S/M homosexuality as well as violent drugs so that one’s pleasures can be jolted away from the
ordinary banality of life. Foucault has stated in interviews that he would take drugs to get the extreme
pleasures out of it, even if it killed him. Because of these extreme recommendations, Shusterman sees
Foucault as a reflection of our culture on bodily pleasures: “Our culture’s constant lust for ever greater
intensities of somatic stimulation in the quest for happiness is thus a recipe for increasing dissatisfaction
and difficulty in achieving pleasure, while our submission to such intensities dulls our somatic perception
and consciousness” (Shusterman, 39). It is a constant need for hyper-stimulation where the senses are
overloaded just so that one can feel normal and alive, where we can see this in substance abuse and other
psychosomatic problems such as self-mortification.
While Shusterman’s critique of Foucault has some merit, he seems to focus more on Foucault’s
personal endorsement of homosexual S/M practices, and the pleasures of taking drugs. The question,
however, is whether Foucault meant that this recommendation was for everyone, or simply for himself.
Even though Shusterman suggests that this is not just Foucault’s personal problem, and that our culture
agrees with intense pleasures as the way to have somatic consciousness, I do not think one ought to blame
Foucault for our culture’s need for intense bodily pleasures, which is not to say that focusing on the sexual
body is to simply learn about the body to increase pleasure, or ways to manipulate the body to make it more
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By having a good body image, one will be more comfortable with the sexual act,
and thereby gain more pleasure. Being present at the moment during the sexual act is a
way of getting lost in the moment. If people are worried about the body, then they are not
“in the moment” and the experience is ruined or blunted. If this is repeated, they may
avoid sexual activities or sexual experiences altogether. Challenging the oppressive
nature of the body involves a somaesthetic diagnosis of the body as well as the feelings
associated with the bodily habits. The diagnosis also includes ways and techniques that
limits the body from institutional backgrounds which can formulate various methods
inculcating them so that these oppressive measures can be overcome. The body is shaped
through institutional powers, such as norms of bodily health, beauty, ways of movement,
and even our categories of sex and gender are constructed in a way to reflect and sustain
social forces.
With the theoretical foundation in place, how can we apply áskēsis to sex
education? The next chapter will address that issue and will analyze each component
addressed in this chapter: the sexual emotions, the sexual mind, and the sexual body.
These will be developed using áskēsis.

attractive. Rather, it is to see oneself as a sexual being, which includes being more aware of one’s body and
being comfortable with it.
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Chapter Six: Applying the Áskēsis Model to Sex
Education
In the last chapter, I discussed áskēsis as a theoretical ethical foundation. I looked at three
components of áskēsis through three contemporary philosophers. In this chapter, I will
apply áskēsis—what I have also called “care of the self”—to sex education, where we
can adequately call this type of education “care of the sexual self.” In section 1, I will
apply áskēsis to sex education and formulate what it means to be a sexual subject by
investigating the three components of sexuality. These components will correspond to the
figures previously mentioned in chapter five, section 2: the sexual emotions, the sexual
mind, and the sexual body respectively. With these three components, people will have a
richer understanding of their sexual identity, which can inform people becoming sexual
subjects. In section 2, since I will be championing the áskēsis perspective of sexuality
education, I will consider various objections to the áskēsis model and respond to those
objections.

1. Applying Áskēsis to the Three Components of Sexual Subjectivity

How can we apply “care of the self”? We can start by noticing that—especially in grade
school— there is a presumption in our culture and society at large of heterosexuality,
monogamy, and the gender binary—the notion that there are only two genders. Any
relationship that is against this norm is silenced. So what is the solution? The educator
could discuss various sexual desires and behaviors, different relationship styles, and
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different genders to see what the student thinks about them. It is worth quoting Denis
Carlson at length:
In a democratic form, care of the self would remove sex education from the realm
of either morality (in terms of prescribed codes of moral conduct, associated with
dos and don’ts) or normalization (in terms of establishing and privileging a norm,
with those who do not fit the norm labeled abnormal, deviant, and dangerous). By
reframing sexuality education as care of the self, it becomes possible to engage
young people in a dialogue on what is caring for themselves, and what is not.
How do they take care of themselves so that they do not enter into abusive
relationships? How do they care for themselves by knowing how to protect
themselves when they engage in sexual relations? How do queer youth practice
caring for themselves in an often hostile school and family ethos? How does care
of the self translate into caring for others? How does care of the self involve
resisting objectification and subjugation of the gendered body? These all become
thinkable questions and problems when sexuality education is reframed as the
study of sexuality as it is produced within a culture—how it gets talked about, in
what terms, according to what fears and problems; how it is related to class, race,
gender, sexual orientation, and ability differences; and thus how it is implicated in
a cultural politics. There will be no easy answers to the new questions and
problems made thinkable and imaginable through such cultural studies of
sexuality. But they do suggest responses that are consistent with a pedagogy of
equity and social justice. Sexuality education in this sense is still a form of health
education. It is just that health education as care of the self takes on a significantly
different meaning, linked to a different pedagogy.604
In many cases, people engage in sexual practices without knowing exactly what
they want or what these practices mean. Sex education based on the care of the self
would acknowledge the experiences of the students as they seek to “empower” their own
lives and to make their own sexual choices, regardless, in theory and in practice at least,
of what these choices are. The choices can be sexual behaviors (e.g. remaining sexually
abstinent or becoming sexually active) and sexual formations of how they see themselves
as a sexual being (e.g. hetero-, homo-, bisexual, monogamous, open, masculine,
feminine, queer, etc.) whereby students are empowered to make a range of sexual choices
through information and practices instead of being formed by authority.
604
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Now that we have looked at different interpretations of modes of áskēsis in the
last chapter, I will apply áskēsis to the three sexual components just mentioned. By
developing these three components, through áskēsis, people can have the ability to
transform and aim toward the ideal sexual subject. In each component, I will provide
examples or case studies of how to undergo the training to understand others and oneself.
Moreover, the training will indirectly challenge heteronormative assumptions. The
ordering of these sexual components is not indexical. I am following the same ordering as
was presented in chapter five.
1.1. Áskēsis as Developing the Sexual Emotions

The first application of care of the self is to the sexual emotions from Nussbaum. The key
is to analyze the students’ beliefs and values regarding sexuality. For example, is there a
sense of disgust when aberrant sexualities are mentioned? Is there a sense of affirmation
when certain displays of relationship dynamics are at play? The educator’s role is to seek
out what type of answers the students give which will reveal what the students may
believe or value.
As mentioned in the last chapter, I do not embrace Nussbaum’s full cognitive
theory of emotions, but there seems to be a strong connection between our emotions and
beliefs. Furthermore, our beliefs assent to what we consider to be true or valuable. If what
we assent to be true or valuable influences our emotions, then it is imperative that we
have true beliefs (both about content and about values). The educator’s role is to
investigate whether the things that we believe are indeed true or valuable and indirectly
help expunge the bad emotions that are associated with the ideas and values of negative
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or mistaken thinking regarding sexuality and relationships. Examples of negative
thinking regarding sexuality and relationships could be that sex should only perform in
gender conforming ways, that people ought to present themselves as the masculine or
feminine ideal, or that sexual and relationship performances ought to fit with social
expectations. If people have these ideas and values but act otherwise, they may feel
anxiety, shame, guilt, embarrassment, and disgust. Getting rid of these emotions and
replacing them with positive emotions will help students develop their attitude toward
different forms of sexuality and relationships in a positive way. And expunging the
negative emotions can be done by re-evaluating ideas and values, or shifting how to think
about what we are feeling. I will offer two examples of áskēsis of the sexual emotions.
1.1.1. Emotions Toward Others

In a sex education class, a good educator brings up topics in order to normalize
discussions about sexual and relationship styles rather than associating those topics with
shame or guilt.605 As an example, there are many people who are disgusted by
homosexuality, polyamory, and transgender and intersex people. We can ask the students
to see why they are filled with disgust and, through inquiry, the foundation of their
disgust would come down to what they value. These values have normative import where
the students believe it has a wide or almost universal claim. Through áskēsis, students
need to see what they believe and value and see if there is any basis to those values. If
they find there is no basis for the belief, they will have the tools and skills to eventually
discard that belief and have the correct emotional response. Overcoming these barriers
works best when students can actually engage with sexual minorities instead of thinking
605
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about the issue abstractly. By engaging with people who do not fit the sexual norm, the
students may see that people’s sexual and relationship preferences are not threatening,
which would help change the belief, which would thereby change the emotion. In the fall
of 2013, I taught a one-credit honors class targeted toward freshmen. The class was about
sexualities and relationships that were outside the social and hence, moral norms. In one
of those weeks, I assigned readings that discussed polyamory. A large majority of the
students found the practicing appalling, and could not see any value of it. The following
week, I invited a polyamorous guest speaker to be part of the class discussion and to
answer students’ questions. The students asked wonderful questions and really wanted to
know more about polyamory. The interactions were concrete, and the students could get
involved with another person who was polyamorous instead of simply engaging with the
idea of polyamory. The following week, I asked the class what they thought of the
presenter and polyamory in general. It was almost unanimous: the class considered
polyamory as a legitimate mating style and not something to be shunned. I then suggested
to the class that when we think about ideas abstractly, we often judge those ideas
compared to the social norms. After all, critiquing an idea is not harmful if no one holds
the idea. But now that they meet a person who not only holds the idea, but affirms it as
part of her lifestyle, the students can see the idea in action and not just abstractly thinking
about the idea.
I ask the students to ponder what sort of prejudices we have had in the past. Many
of them say same-sex relationships. I ask them to consider what sort of ideas we hold
true, but could be considered prejudicial in the future. And I ask if judging people who
are ethically non-monogamous could be a prejudice. Most agree, even if they prefer to be
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monogamous. In a way, these students were undergoing áskēsis: by thinking about
polyamory, for example, the students discovered that they may have had an unjustified
prejudice against it thereby believing the practice to be wrong. They were slowly coming
to terms that polyamory could be a legitimate type of mating orientation or relationship
structure. This realization may expunge their disgust or negative attribution toward
ethical non-monogamy.606 Perhaps if they hear about polyamory either through friends or
the media, they are not so quick to judge. Indeed, they may be more comfortable talking
about the issue, or befriend those who are polyamorous. And if the disgust is expunged
and replaced with a sense of justice, they may quickly call out those who do judge those
who have different mating orientations. This exercise could possibly be done with those
who are transgender: I would invite someone who is transgender; the students have a
discussion with the person. This generates a discussion and they possibly recast their
beliefs about transgender people as those who are legitimate members of society. By
seeing a person who affirms that alternative relationship or sexual mode of living,
students may see someone exercising their sexual self and expunge the prejudicial belief,
which, in turn, can help expunge the negative emotional response.
Could students learn about different expressions of sexuality, gender, and
relationship styles but still embrace heteronormativity? Through my program of
discarding heteronormativity and keeping pluralistic values, it seems unlikely.
Familiarizing people with those outside the sexual and relationship norms disturbs the
heteronormative framework. By disrupting the heteronormative framework, people will
subtly see embracing heteronormativity as a negative trait. And áskēsis is a way to
606
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recognize the negativity of that trait, and also undergo various disciplines to undermine
heteronormativity.
1.1.2. Emotions Toward Oneself

What about thinking of oneself as a sexual being? How does that make people feel?
Many women feel uneasy about their sexuality, especially with their genitalia. Meredith
Chivers, a psychologist and a leading investigator in female sexuality research, recalls
that “[i]n a second-year human sexuality course, her class was shown close-ups of
genitalia on a huge projector screen. A naked penis provoked no reaction. When a vulva
appeared, however, the room erupted into a disgusted ‘Eeeeeeeew!’ Chivers looked
around. The repulsed squeals were mostly coming from women.”607 This is just one
example, but there are many other ideas that people hold that can make them feel
frustrated, disgust, ashamed, or judgmental, particularly those who do not fit the social
standard of what a body is “supposed” to look like, such as transgender or intersex
people. How do we change these emotions so that people can have a healthier attitude
toward their own bodies and desires? What are some skills that students can have for
them to work on themselves to gain healthier sexual emotions? Emily Nagoski offers
strategies by suggesting we develop our meta-emotions, which are “[n]ot what you think
about it [one’s sexuality], not what you believe about it, not what you’ve been told about
it, not what it’s like, what you do, or even what choices you make—all of those are
influenced by how you feel about it, but it’s the ‘how you feel about it’ part that’s the

607

See Sarah Barmak. “Building a Better Female Orgasm.” The Walrus. May 23, 2017. (Accessed
August 30, 2018.) https://thewalrus.ca/building-a-better-female-orgasm/.

365

key.”608 I take Nagoski’s framework compatible with Nussbaum’s. For Nussbaum,
emotions stem from beliefs. Meta-emotions—which are still emotions—also stem from
beliefs. The schematic would remain: how we feel about what we feel may stem from a
belief structure.609
To start, psychologists have theorized a concept known as “sexual scripts.”
Sexual scripts are patterns of normative sexual or romantic behaviors. These behaviors
can be gendered. For example, as mentioned many times in this dissertation, a common
sexual script is that women are coy and passive when it comes to sex whereas men are
aggressors and pursuers of sexual activity. To unlearn this, Nagoski suggests we start
with what sort of sexual scripts we have learned and to be aware that the scripts have
informed what we considered the sexual standard. This may be challenging since we have
taken many of these scripts for granted, and we may not even realize that they are scripts.
Since sexuality is pervasive in society and in the political sphere, certain beliefs can
become institutionalized and more difficult to face or challenge. The best way to
recognize what the sexual scripts are is to recognize different cultural attitudes toward
sexuality and relationships. That way, there is a comparison from one’s own culture to
others. As an example, the No Shame Tumblr movement on the Internet helps people see
that shame is an emotion that unconsciously is associated with sexuality, particularly with
women, and critiques this association by criticizing the social conditions surrounding
sexuality, especially toward purity culture and gender norms.610
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Next, Nagoski suggests that we recognize the difference between what these
sexual standards are that we learn from society and what we are experiencing. If these
two conflict, then, in general, the standards are wrong. Moreover, everyone has picked up
different sexual standards and everyone has different experiences. The next step is what
Nagoski admits is the challenging part: it is to enjoy your sexuality despite what the
standards have been telling you. The way to do this is to have a descriptive attitude of
your own internal states rather than a normative one: “it isn’t the symptoms that predict
how much anxiety disrupts a person’s life, it’s how a person feels about those symptoms.
It’s not how you feel—it’s not even being aware of how you feel. It’s how you feel about
how you feel. And people who feel nonjudging about their feelings do better.”611 In other
words, students may believe x but their experience of pleasure or enjoyment may go
against with what x does not recommend or frown upon. For example, if people
experience enjoyment with a sexual activity, but they believe they should not do it
because it is shameful, their experience of pleasure can dampen. If people start to see that
what they are enjoying is not problematic and can be done without shame, that can
undermine the shameful beliefs, which will encourage less anxiety during the sexual act,
which will help undermine the shameful belief even more, and so on. Under a pluralistic
sexual framework, it is better to discard feeling shameful for different sexual activities
with the exception of sexual activities outside of consent.
These are just some examples of sexual emotional áskēsis, which is not
exhaustive. At the same time, these examples provide ways to tackle heteronormative
assumptions by challenging social, political, and cultural realms. My polyamorist guest
provided one route to help my students understand that other mating orientations are
611
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legitimate and that others can learn by seeing other people live their lives instead of
thinking about the issue abstractly, and Nagoski has provided meta-emotional tools to
combat any social expectations from within, which can help combat heteronormativity.
1.2. Áskēsis as Developing the Sexual Mind

According to Murdoch, people must be willing to change themselves so that they can see
others as they really are. Who are the people around us? They are people who have a
variety of different values; different sexual and relationship desires, needs, and
preferences; and different routes on their sexual fulfillment. Recall from Murdoch’s
example of M and D in the last chapter: M initially saw D as someone who should not be
with her (M’s) son. M took on a loving attitude, and eventually started to love D. A
loving attitude does not automatically entail accepting that person’s behavior. After all,
we could still love people and challenge them. Rather it is to undergo a moral
transformation to see them as they are. In the context of sex education, it is to see people
as people and not objects of sexual satisfaction, to see them as another being with
possible different values than one’s own, and to see them as having different approaches
or exercises of their sexual subjectivity. In short, a loving attitude is to see the good in
another’s sexuality. There are multiple ways to undergo áskēsis to develop a loving
attitude and I offer some exercises that also come from literature in sex educational
studies.
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1.2.1. Accepting Other’s Sexuality

To start, caring for the sexual self, along with a reframing of how we see others through
self-discipline, leads to what Louisa Allen calls “discourse of erotics:” “opening up
possibilities for young people to experience themselves as sexual subjects in positive and
self-determining ways”612 and to see and treat others as sexual subjects in positive and
self-determining ways. The discourse of erotics not only discusses pleasure, but since
care of the self implies care for others, a focus would be how to handle sexuality in an
emotional sense to understand their partners, a factor that most students say is missing in
sex education.
A discourse of erotics is a way to develop an attuned moral attention specifically
in the gender and sexual realm. By having a discourse of erotics, people would legitimate
know where the body responds to sexual pleasure and they would understand the logistics
of bodily engagement in sexual activity. People may not even know they desired until it
was revealed to them. By encouraging an open discourse of erotics, students would not
only take care of themselves by forming a sexual subject, but they would take care of the
other by understanding what other sexualities people may have that do not correspond to
one’s own. Ways of taking care of the self and of being honest with oneself may include
interviews and open discussion as Allen has done, but other forms of having a discourse
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of erotics could include journal writing, community boards, anonymous questions,613 and
discussions with health educators.
How does the discourse of erotics relate to Murdoch’s notion of loving attention?
And where does áskēsis play a role? A discourse of erotics consists of understanding
other points of view and seeing why other people have different beliefs, preferences, and
values. Even if others do not agree with them, we should not constrain them—with the
exception of harming others—but lift them up, and ourselves, by engaging in continuing
discourse so that we can understand each other and not condemn each other. Moreover, it
allows others to speak openly, honestly, and freely—much like McWhorter did—in the
hopes that others will gain some insight from the other perspective. The hope is that the
discourse would give people more flexibility and a less stigmatized view of themselves.
Shifting a moral consciousness requires people to engage with others that are different
from themselves. In a classroom setting, students not only hear from other perspectives,
but the educational setting sets up a formal atmosphere where they can learn about
different values, with the bounds being within the realm of consent and not harming
others. The key is the educator cannot shun or condemn different practices; a good
educator must express these different sexual and gender expressions and reveal them as
on par with other expressions such that it is presented as a valid expression among others.
As mentioned before, I have brought in a guest speaker to explain polyamory. Bringing in
guest speakers is helpful so that students can actually engage with another rather than
thinking about the issue abstractly. Doing so can help the students see another’s values
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“with a face” and learn from the person’s experiences and wisdom. Interacting with
others who are different and learning about their values is one element to combat
heteronormativity and is en route to developing a loving attitude. Without acknowledging
other people’s sexual values, we run the risk of reinforcing heteronormativity.
Understanding others’ sexual perspectives and values is not just about learning
people’s sexual and gender preferences, but also about what people genuinely desire and
to understand that sexual expressions are not universal. Allen notes how our current
sexual discourses have ignored or emphasized aspects of each sex’s sexuality. If the
current discourse already presupposes the students as sexual subjects, then they would be
treated as sexually embodied agents who can make their own decisions with regard to
sex. The discourse of erotics, however, can bridge the gap between different
epistemologies of people with varying sexual values and sexual assumptions. I will focus
on three ways a discourse of erotics could help people understand their own sexuality and
help others understand other sexual desires and gender expressions: the erotics of women,
the erotics of men, and the erotics of those in the LGBTQIA community.
One way a discourse of erotics could do is to focus on the erotics of young
women (something that has been ignored in sex education), and the complexities of
sexual desire for young men instead of a one-dimensional desire where men have an
expectation of how to behave sexually. For example, the traditional discourse implies that
women are passive and that their pleasures are more difficult to obtain than men. “By not
acknowledging young women as sexually desiring subjects and revealing the possibility
that sexual activity might have pleasurable corporeal outcomes, sexuality education fails
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to convey a sense of personal empowerment for them.”614 One sort of empowerment can
come from an acknowledgement that women can gain pleasure, which would elicit
women’s sexual status as positive.
Diorio’s and Munro’s analysis further supports Allen’s research by arguing that
female sexuality in our common discourse has been mainly reduced to reproduction,
which means that women’s pleasures are ignored and that women are viewed as passive
in the sex act. Discussions of pleasure in the curriculum may help not only undermine the
stereotypes of women being sexually passive, but it may also encourage young women to
understand how to receive pleasure and even demand pleasure in precise ways.615
The current heteronormative discourse can be harmful for young women because
it reinforces social standards of being a “good” woman during sex and that being sexual
is for the purposes and pleasures of men. Women are taught to be sexual gatekeepers of
sex or to dress a certain way such that women learn that sex is about saying yes or no
instead of about their own pleasures or desires. Moreover, their sexuality is meant to keep
men’s sexual desires in check and to ignore their own desires which makes women more
passive, and men perhaps more coercive. To undermine this narrative, a starting point
would be to note what sort of sexual pleasures she has for her sake rather than as a means
for men’s sake. In a way, pleasure can be an equalizing force by helping women
understand that their pleasure is just as important as men’s and that they can actively
achieve their pleasures so that the orgasm gap may close.616 By understanding these
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embodied experiences, young women could categorize their pleasures, have greater
associations of what they desire, and thereby feel more connected to themselves. In a
classroom setting, the educator could teach both sexes about the orgasm gap and suggest
that this fact leads to pleasure inequality. The men would learn that this inequality is
unfair, and women would learn that they deserve their pleasures. This understanding is
one way to dismantle the heteronormative discourse. From these discussions, the
educator can discuss how various social expectations have set up our sexual beliefs.
Current sex education programs also constitute young men’s sexuality as desiring
period without equivalent references to their partners, which may constitute young men’s
sexuality as predatory. For young men, the discourse surrounding their pleasure appears
to have more space than women. Men thereby have a sexual self as an expectation about
how they ought to behave and express their sexuality, which may not equate to their own
feelings and experiences, or they may get a sense of pressure as to how to behave.
Indeed, part of the current discourse teaches men that it is normal and natural for men to
be promiscuous, and that if they are not or do not desire to be promiscuous, then they are
not normal. More troubling is that these heterosexist norms become internalized: if young
men do not constantly feel “horny” all the time, they may feel there is something wrong
with them rather than thinking that the idea of who they should be comes from a
culturally perpetuated idea.617 Because young men are expected to fit into the
heteronormative masculine framework, young men may have a hard time saying “no” to
sexual advances. Moreover, a discourse that captures flexibility and fluidity in gender and
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sexuality creates a space for young men to express their sexuality beyond the limits of
rigid masculinities.618
Men are also considered the active pursuers (aggressors) and women are the
passive pursued (avoiders). There are hardly any positive representations of male
sexuality. “If men have little control over their sexuality (biology stereotype), and women
are vulnerable to their advances (danger stereotype), then girls need to be taught to
prevent their own victimization and to screen possible rapists and potential dates.”619 This
asymmetry positions men as sex-crazed beings, and positions women as objects of
pleasure for men. All men need to do find the right “combination” to get to the pleasure.
Either way, unfortunately, the discourse constitutes both of the sexes as objectified and
demeaned beings. To avoid this, Allen has taken surveys and interviews with students,
and I think this is a good starting point for possible exercises, practices, and changing the
discourse. By helping both sexes understand people’s actual preferences rather than
following or acting based on expectations, young people can take on a different attitude
and see people how they really are: sexual subjects instead of recipients of expected
sexual scripts.
The Dutch sexuality education program has a Beat the Macho campaign.
Marianne Cense, researcher/consultant at Rutgers, explains why the program is
necessary: “Here, situations arose in which, due to peer pressure, boys took things further
than they wanted to with, for example, alcohol and substance abuse, crime and sexual
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behaviour, but also in sports, choice of clothes or expressing emotions. Boys are afraid to
drop out of the group if they show any signs of gender non-conforming behaviour.”620
Since young men are pressured to follow hypermasculine norms, it is helpful for the
young men to be vulnerable and talk about masculinity and macho behavior. By opening
up in a small group, the young men can discuss the various attitudes, feelings, and
thoughts regarding masculine behavior. The educator must also have phronesis to balance
safe, healthy discussion, and yet challenges the students when need be.
Moreover, the Netherlands has a major program that the majority of sex educators
use: Lang leve de liefde, translated as Long Live Love. It is designed to not only help
students prevent unwanted pregnancies and STIs, but also to provide students with
communication and negotiation skills for safe sex practices. It also takes into account the
diversity of students including different cultures, value systems, ways of starting (sexual)
relationships, and differences between boys and girls. Moreover, the sex education
program offers a magazine for students that comes with a supplemental website.621 The
website offers various lessons that has the style of “choose your own adventure”
scenarios where students determine what should happen next in various sexual
encounters. The site also includes videos from real young people discussing various
issues that would appeal to young people: discussions of having sex for the first time,
recognizing and forming boundaries, experiences of starting or ending a relationship, and
how to communicate better.
Finally, the current discourse in the USA also assumes a heteronormative
framework: by focusing on women as sexual gatekeepers, it silences the experiences of
620
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lesbians. The issue is complicated, but for an obvious case, imagine a lesbian couple. Do
both of them remain gatekeepers if the heteronormative framework is true? Can one be a
gatekeeper and still initiate sexual activity? On the other hand, there are studies that
suggest that lesbian couples usually fall into traditional gender roles where one partner
adopted the roles of the other gender.622 Moreover, heteronormative discourse does not
engage with the experiences of those in the gay community. For example, there are terms
in the gay community known as being a “top” or a “bottom,” which means the giver or
receiving of sexual activity respectively. These notions and terms complicate the idea that
men are aggressors of sex, but there are gendered roles in being the top and bottom.
Indeed, the bottom is considered below the top and the bottom is the receiver. There is a
gendered element in that women are the receiver of sex and through the heteronormative
discourse, they are also below men. Do the notions of “top” and “bottom” follow the
gender roles in our heteronormative society? Or are they simply descriptions of what
various roles those in the gay community prefer?
This is a complicated topic, but a good starting point is, through a discourse of
erotics, to try and gain some insight not only those in the gay community, but also to
query various gender roles by noting how gender can be played out. Moreover, a
discourse of erotics could be expanded to those who are transgender, intersex, attracted to
those of the same-sex, asexual, and those who have different dating/relationship styles
such as polyamory, aromantics, and demisexuals. By having a discussion and
normalizing the different ways sexuality, gender, and relationships can be expressed, sex
education may formulate a pattern in students’ minds to not only accept others, but also
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to develop an attitude to work on accepting others by conversing with others and trying to
understand and possibly learn from others.
1.2.2. Accepting One’s Own Sexuality

Taking care of the self does not just give people practical knowledge to interact with
other sexual subjects but also a way to engage in their own sexual life in an honest way.
The role of the educator would also facilitate taking care of the self and encourage
students to express themselves without any sense of fear, embarrassment, or restriction.
Taking on a loving attitude also includes reevaluating people’s own sexuality in regard
for others. For example, reinforcing women’s ability and right to say “no” is not enough
if men are not also taught to “hear and understand the word ‘no’.” Men must take
responsibility for their own sexuality instead of solely relying on the women. Previous
models had relied on the notion that women need to learn how to “just say no” whereas
men can still pursue. Men are assumed that they do not have to take into account of
women’s desires. Previous models assume that men’s sexual desires and pleasures are the
standard and that their desires and pleasures ought to come first or have priority. By
having a “discourse of erotics,” however, people can develop a just and loving attitude
and not only be informed about others’ sexuality which could enhance interpersonal
relationships, but also be more aware and have positive experiences with their own
sexuality and be more aware of what they want, which, in turn, could help them become a
better active negotiator of what they want when engaging with a partner without the
power dynamics.
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Recall from chapter four where I discussed Nagoski’s discussion of sexual
concordance, the sexual accelerator and sexual brakes, and spontaneous vs. responsive
sexual desire. The expectation was that sexual concordance was close to one hundred
percent, that the sexual accelerator was the way to increase desire, and that spontaneous
desire was the default trigger to being sexually aroused. But women, on average, did not
experience those features. Therefore, women were usually ascribed as having some sort
of sexual dysfunction. However, it turns out that with the updated scientific research from
Nagoski, people were operating with the male sexual framework, which they assumed
was a universal sexuality. Undergoing áskēsis can help people question those sexual
expectations and be more in tune with their sexual embodiment.
In line with loving attention, people must be patient and compassionate with their
own sexuality and realize that it requires work. In regards to attention specifically, there
is a great deal of evidence that suggests mindfulness and meditation can be helpful. Dr.
Lori Brotto and her team, for example, has shown that practicing mindfulness is a great
way to align the mind and body, thereby decreasing the gap between the subjective
arousal and the physiological response. In other words, mindfulness may reduce sexual
non-concordance.623 Nagoski has also suggested that practicing mindfulness gives people
the skill to be more in control of their life: “[w]hat you’re ‘mindful’ of is both your breath
and your attention to your breath. By practicing this skill of noticing what you’re paying
attention to, you are teaching yourself to be in control of your brain, so that your brain is
not in control of you...What you pay attention to matters less than how you pay
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attention.”624 The starting point of paying attention and being mindful is to be aware of
your present moment. This, in turn, develops loving attention so that people are selfreflective and self-critical to be compassionate to themselves and to mark the good
elements of their sexuality which can make the negative elements not as powerful. I have
mentioned how to do so through the work of Nagoski in section 1.1.2.: ongoing loving
attention is to slowly eradicate the instilled sexual scripts we have inherited in our culture
and to not only pay attention to our own sexual and gender expressions, but to love them.
So far, I have only discussed a discourse of erotics between the different sexes,
but the discourse is not limited to just gender. A full discourse would be intersectional in
that it would include race, class, sexual orientation, transgender people, relationship
orientation, or those who break the mold of heteronormativity. Overall, sex education
would develop “self-reflective practice as well as social-skills training about healthy
choices.”625
1.3. Áskēsis as Developing the Sexual Body

The body is a medium toward sexual pleasure, but the sexualized body has also become
politicized and normalized as noted in chapter five, section 2.3. Applying this to sexuality
education, “sex education is implicitly (and also, for the most part explicitly) about
producing ‘normal’ (hetero)masculinity and (hetero)femininity and that these are core
categories in the regulation of the social world. That is, sex education is a technique of
governance in the Foucauldian sense.”626 Sexual pleasure has been associated with risk
and danger: it can lead to an increase of STIs, unwanted pregnancies, guilt and shame.
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The traditional approach perceives adolescents as not mature under the law; a Foucaultian
analysis, however, suggests that this is already part of our discourse as mentioned in the
last chapter. Different states have different consensual laws and these laws were part of
the cultural norms.627 We often talk of maturity level of adolescents because our current
discourses already presume that since they are not mature under the law, they must not
therefore be mature for sex since sex is considered a mature activity. And since they are
not mature for sex, our discourse has formulated the “problem of adolescent sexuality.”
However, the problem is not adolescent sexuality; the problem is the laws presuming that
adolescent sexuality is a problem in the first place. A better route is to see adolescents as
becoming sexual beings; they want more knowledge and education regarding their
sexuality. Sex education could be reformulated in a way where adolescent sexuality is
considered a serious category in its own right and not a problem or something to control.
A starting point would be an ethics of pleasure that gives people permission to seek out
their sexual pleasures. The pleasures would not only include the obvious (e.g. orgasm,
stimulation); it would also include applied work from Shusterman where correctly bodily
habits can bring out better somatic health, which can bring about better somatic pleasure.
Developing a sexual subject is not just seeing what sort of sexual acts people want to
perform but to see what sort of sexual being one could be and that means that the sexual
body must be included as part of sexual health and understanding sexual subjectivity.
In this section, I will focus on somatic health. “Here somatic health and knowhow are presented, much in the style of the ancients, as a prerequisite to mental wellbeing and psychological self-mastery. In short, somatics appears here at the heart of
627
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ethics’ care for the self.”628 Sex education is not simply giving propositional content; it
must also require acknowledgement of the body. Cognitive áskēsis alone is not sufficient
to make a holistic change for improvement.
1.3.1. Somatic Awareness of Others

By having a discourse of erotics, as mentioned in the previous subsection, there would be
a legitimate type of knowledge where the body responds to sexual pleasure and the
person understands the logistics of bodily engagement in sexual activity.
A good sex education will give students the opportunity to “work on themselves”
by investigating the power relations in society regarding the sexual body. Shusterman
gives a nice example of how dominant social norms can bring about somatic social norms
that perform bodily habits but can actually be oppressive. This oppression could inform
our sexual scripts. The example Shusterman gives is how women have been normalized
to eat, speak, sit, walk, and copulate in a certain way that could “both reflect and
reinforce such gender oppression.” Yet, challenging these norms are difficult because the
body has been habituated to these motions. However, “[a]ny successful challenge of
oppression should thus involve somaesthetic diagnosis of the bodily habits and feelings
that express the domination as well as the subtle institutional rules and methods of
inculcating them, so that they, along with the oppressive social conditions that generate
them, can be overcome.”629 These bodily habits are so ingrained that we may display
prejudices toward different races, genders, or ethnic groups even if we can rationally
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argue for tolerance, the visceral grip of the prejudices are strong even if we deny we have
them.
For example, many people may logically realize that being a racist is a vice. Yet,
people may unconsciously show signs of apprehension or anxiety when they are around
people of color in the United States. These feelings can go beneath our explicit
consciousness, but they resist correction because while we can call racism wrong through
argumentation, we forget to correct bodily expressions which have been ingrained with
habituation. Often, we deny we have racial prejudices because we do not realize we feel
them. Thus, not only is argumentation against the unjust social institutions needed, but so
is a method to develop a way to control or expunge these bodily feelings. Being more
aware of one’s bodily relations toward others can help ameliorate the conflicts between
others and improve one’s behavior toward others in much wider social and political
contexts. This awareness fits well with Murdoch’s criteria of loving attention since seeing
people’s goodness can help alleviate racist reactions. I will argue the same could be said
with heteronormative issues.
My first example is simply interacting with others who are sexual minorities.
People may be repulsed with transgender people, those who are same-sex oriented, or
polyamorous people. People can react against them where the result is ostracization,
harm, or death of the sexual minority. Even if people, in their mind, have no problem
with sexual minorities, people may have a somatic reaction that is harder to control. Their
body may react with contempt, disgust, or even some fetishized fascination. I do not have
a notion of what sort of somatic corrective there can be. I leave that up to psychosomatic
professionals. What I want to propose is simply being aware of what other people’s
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bodies are doing, which can be really challenging since they may not notice their own
bodily reactions. Bodily habits could be ingrained and we consider those bodily
movements as normal. It is not until we reach a point where someone points this out to us
or we feel uncomfortable with our bodily movement where we recognize a problem.
We can see this specifically with the sexes where men are taught to take up
physical space, and women are taught to take up as little space. One is example is
“manspreading” where a man will typically use up space when he is (usually) sitting in a
crowded bus or train to the point where he will not allow others to be near him, let alone
sit beside him. Women are taught to be small and fragile. Recall chapter two, section 4.1.
There, I talked about Cahill and how in a patriarchal society, women cannot travel and
move as much as men can. Indeed, through Cahill’s phenomenological analysis, women
have been habituated where they see their bodies as a threat whereby her body is seen
volatile. Women are expected to keep a close vigilance on their bodies by restricting,
policing, and hindering their movements just so that they can be safe. Any movement
outside the expected gendered space is dangerous since it can produce assailants to
approach her. Thus, she learns and maintains to keep a close vigilance of her body in
order to limit those risks.630 This, thereby, limits her autonomy by living in a culture that
presumes and sustains this threat, especially against women. Again, like before, I am not
offering any corrective; I want to acknowledge the problem and hope that others will
recognize the issue. The corrective can come from psychosomatic therapists which can
then inform sex educators.
My second example has to do with interacting with others via sexual pleasure.
Lamb notes that our discourses regarding female pleasure is patriarchal because the
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discussion makes it sound like her pleasure is a mystery. But “this belief goes hand in
hand with a belief that the good male heterosexual partner is like a technician who knows
how to bring about female sexual pleasure by being good at what he does. Thus, this set
of beliefs makes sex focus on women’s difficulties and men’s prowess.”631 Living in a
society that sees women as objects makes women protective of their bodies and makes
them look at their bodies from the outside in. Thus, if female pleasure is more
complicated than male pleasure, it becomes so through society’s views of female bodies.
Moreover, “many adult American women lack sexual knowledge and
subsequently are fully aware neither of their sexual needs nor of how to fulfill them.”632
Even if women gained more experience, that does not entail that they gain more
knowledge and awareness of their sexual needs. Because most women learn about
sexuality from peers and the media, they have already learned and incorporated many
myths, stereotypes, and false information before they become sexually active. Many
women prefer more sexual knowledge and they felt that their sexual education was
lacking. The findings from Wyatt and Riederle suggest that women feel disadvantaged
and that they need cultural and societal permission to become proactive in their sexual
health and knowledge.633
One common request that students anonymously ask for in a sex education class
relates to technique. In terms of sexual somatic knowledge, most adolescents turn to
pornography. Peggy Orenstein remarks that pornography has constrained people’s
expectations of how to perform. What they see on the screen is what they believe a good
sexual pose. “Watching natural-looking people engaging in sex that is consensual,
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mutually pleasurable, and realistic may not be harmful—heck, it might be a good idea—
but the occasional feminist porn site aside, that is not what the $97 billion global porn
industry is shilling. Its producers have only one goal: to get men off hard and fast for
profit. The most efficient way to do so appears to be by eroticizing the degradation of
women.”634 As some of the students that Orenstein interviewed said: “I watch porn
because I’m a virgin and I want to figure out how sex works” or another watches it “to
learn how to give head.”635
Women in particular tolerate feeling uncomfortable in situations where they are
forced to acquiesce to men. Society has taught us that from a young age, men’s needs,
desires, and wants overrule women’s. Since pornography is mainly consumed by men,
people may turn to it as a form of sex education, but “[g]iven that frequent consumers of
porn are more likely to consider its depictions of sex realistic, this can skew expectations
in the bedroom.”636 To counter pornography, perhaps the answer is not to block porn.
That just does not seem feasible. Instead, the educator can discuss how pornography
gives unrealistic expectations, not only of body size, but also various technique,
responses among the performers, and how the production is meant to feed into a fantasy,
which goes beyond the expectations of what actually happens in reality.
One alternative is to discuss alternative porn such as Crashpad.com—which
features genderbending and queer porn—and porn from Erika Lust—who has been in the
forefront of feminist porn. The performers do not act out in strict scripted way: they act
organically and let their pleasures be part of the experiences instead of the male gaze. Of
course, there is controversy regarding whether porn can be feminist at all, or if it is all
634

Orenstein, Girls & Sex, 34.
Cf. Ibid., 35-36.
636
Ibid., 36.
635

385

exploitive. A good educator would discuss these issues in a philosophical way and see
how the students regard alternative forms of porn. The point would be to show that not all
porn is exploitive and that it is also not displaying realistic versions of what sex looks
like. The students would be given a chance to think about how porn could or has affected
their lives, and whether they can consume it or not. The students discuss and try to learn
not only from the other side but to formulate their own approach to pornography critically
instead of passively consuming it. Moreover, a critical understanding helps clear away
the clutter of a false representation of what sexual somatic interactions can be and also
have a better understanding of sexual somatic pleasures. As Erika Lust states in her TED
Talk asking for a change in porn: “The sex can stay dirty, but the values had to be
clean.”637 What this means is that people may still consume porn ethically because there
is pleasure involved, but one must also have the right values associated with it and these
values include pleasure for both partners, a better representation of both genders having
sexual somatic pleasure so that there are no gender power dynamics, and nonheteronormative displays of porn. The goal is to help the students have a critical view of
pornography and a better understanding of their somatic pleasures that does not reduce to
a heteronormative framework.
One objection is that showing adolescents porn, especially in a public education
environment, is highly immoral. Young students are not yet 18 years old, which is the
legal age to watch porn. Showing graphic sexual content in a public school setting is also
not permissible. However, this objection is misguided. As Orenstein has shown, many
young adolescents have already witnessed pornography. Indeed, that is usually regarded
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as their first sex education. Instead of explaining or showing porn to the classroom, start
with what the students know, have seen, or have heard about in pornography. The
classroom setting is meant to question the major roles in pornography: gender roles,
sexual scripts, heteronormative assumptions, and intimate expectations. Pornography can
give the wrong message that the scenes are how the sexual encounter is supposed to look
like. How can students know otherwise if they do not have any other reference? Students
are starting to get a sense of their sexuality including the pleasures and desires. But
sometimes, especially for younger people, they do not know what they desire, what gives
them pleasure, or what gives them a sense of intimacy. For this, they may need to learn
somatic awareness of themselves. To this, I turn to the next subsection.
1.3.2. Somatic Awareness of the Self

Shusterman states: “the first step to controlling or expunging them [our prejudices] is to
develop the somatic awareness to recognize them in ourselves.”638 To have a better
attunement with their body is to know more about what the body likes and desires. When
people’s feelings are in tune with their body, their experiences can be more enjoyable. If
people do not know what their feelings are, they are disconnected from their body and
habitually they will be at a loss in the relationship with themselves. When that happens,
they can become vulnerable to outside forces and especially from other people. They may
follow with what society says we ought to feel rather than listening to the body to see if
those are the true feelings of what the body actually does feel.
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Shusterman has used the work of de Beauvoir to reveal a somaesthetic critique of
gender presentation:
Traditional fashions of feminine beauty – that highlight delicacy, daintiness,
softness, and frilly attire impractical for dynamic action – reinforce this image of
woman as a fragile, weak, and fleshly passive prey. Such fashions encourage
women to conform not only their visual appearance but also their bodily
comportment to this image of weak feminine beauty – to take the passive role in
sex, to sit or walk like a woman, to throw like a girl. In short, the established
aesthetic ideology of the female body serves to reinforce female weakness,
passivity, and meekness, while such submissiveness is reciprocally used to justify
the permanent and natural rightness of the traditional feminine aesthetic and the
“myth” of “the Eternal Feminine.”639
If women present themselves as fragile, small, weak, and passive, then men are
encouraged to present themselves as large, active, dynamic, and strong. We not only see
this in men’s fashions where their clothing can help them move about, but also in
preparedness for being in the world. Bodily presenting themselves can give a feedback
loop to assess their self-image. These bodily comportments can consist of certain poses,
gait, body language, and appearance. Using somaesthetics as a tool can show us how
bodily comportments gives clues as to how men and women endorse various gender
stereotypes. “Manspreading” could be one example. However, de Beauvoir, along with
Shusterman, agrees with Males (who was mentioned in chapter three): liberation is not
simply changing individual or small group’s ideas and bodily disciplines; it can only be
done by changing the larger situation that defines what the genders can be, which means
that the social, political, and economic conditions must change for true liberation.640 I
agree with this assessment, but to change the whole political structure, we must have a
sense of what we want to change into. Various practices can influence ideas, which is
part of the large situation. Thus, challenging practices and ideas and cultivating new ones
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can not only help challenge the existing conditions but also give us a sense of what
possible conditions there could be.
One upshot of de Beauvoir’s argument is that women would benefit if they knew
their bodies better. Allen remarks that both sexes feel disembodied when it comes to the
sexual body and sexual pleasure.641 If so, many women may have a weak ability to assent
or fully engage in sexual activities.642 Shusterman notes:
By paying more positive attention to one’s bodily experience, one can render its
mysterious processes more familiar and more understandable. As such, they can
become less disgusting, threatening, and disempowering. Imagined fearful
mysteries are usually much more frightening than familiar realities one has
explored for oneself. Moreover, given the strong psychosomatic nexus that
Beauvoir affirms, a woman’s greater knowledge of her body can be translated into
increased physical power and confidence because the debilitating clouds of
mysterious anxieties are then dissipated.643
One way stems from Nagoski. Improving how you see your sexualized body is
not what sort of sexual body you have, what sort of genitalia you have, or whether the
genitalia looks “normal,” but about how you feel about your sexual body. Embracing it
creates the context where you can be in tune with your body, which enhances sexual
pleasure. Recall that when the sexual standard and your experiences come into conflict,
then, in general, your experiences should take precedence. As Nagoski puts it, “always
assume your body is right.”644 Foucault even quotes a Roman doctor saying: “Subdue the
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soul and make it obey the body.”645 Various somatic exercises can help make our desires
externalized and explore what it means to be a sexual being: adventure, curiosity, seeking
novelty, sexual experimentation, focusing on sexual practices. Of course, the boundaries
are within consensual relationships, but in a pluralistic society, different sexual
expressions should be respected and that gives people an opportunity to see what the
body enjoys and having the body lead people to what they feel pleasurable.
Another way to be more in tune with the sexual body is sexual pleasure.
Discussion should not just talk about a generic body, meaning a body that is only looked
at from a scientific or medical point of view. Rather, the body is sensual. If the students
do not learn about sexual pleasure in a positive light, the school system and society at
large are reinforcing the idea that they are not sexual subjects, meaning they are nonsexual. Moreover, if young people are assumed to be abstinent and simply learn refusal
skills rather than positive affirmations, then it leaves young people, especially young
women, without the tools needed to identify their sexual desires. They may feel
uncomfortable to say “yes” to any sexual advances or to initiate sexual advances. They
may lack communication skills with their sexual partners which can increase their
disembodied experience. 646
By focusing on sexual pleasure, people will engage in sexual and relationship
dynamics that is more in tune with what they want. Lamb notes that this offers people a
“how-to” guide on achieving pleasure. However, Lamb’s call is that identifying pleasures
is incomplete; we must also teach lessons about shame, control, and prescribed norms
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and how those are informed by our culture.647 Thus, she suggests that since it is difficult
to teach pleasure for pleasure’s sake, she proposes mutual pleasure such that the focus is
not on mechanics but on listening what our partners like and noticing what our own
bodies like.648 While I do think it is important to talk about the cultural messages and
how it informs our notions of sexuality, students do ask for “how-to” guides and that is a
topic sexuality educators cannot ignore. However, there is a delicate balance of giving
information without being sexually explicit. How does one offer guidance to receive
sexual pleasure educationally? One route to do that is through the website OMGYes.com.
The website is dedicated to different masturbatory styles of young women whereby the
user can click on a different style and the model discusses what movements gives her
pleasure which can vary between speed, pressure, and range of motion. Even though the
images and discussions are explicit, the discussions are somewhat clinical, yet inviting.
By clicking on these different styles, people will not only learn what different techniques
there are to obtain sexual pleasure, but they will gain the know-how so that they can
perform them on themselves or with a partner. On all of the styles, the user can download
a computerized vulva and with the movements of the mouse, the user can imitate the style
that the user just learned.
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The previous example sounds too experimental or too controversial for high
school students. Thus, this issue must be approached carefully. Do students have the right
to sexually experiment? Jan Steutel suggests that they do,649 and I agree. This is not to
say that the educator could simply show the website to the students. Depending on the
jurisdiction, it may be unlawful. Thus, perhaps a way to do this is for the educator to
mention it and assign it as something to look at on their own time. On the other hand, if I
am endorsing a sex education that I consider more moral and healthy than the options
given now, then the law should follow. I will offer some piecemeal strategies on how to
do so in section 2.
1.4. Áskēsis as Developing Sexual Identity

Through these three trainings, people’s sexual identity can be formed. Students may
unreflectively have sexual beliefs which informs their identity, but undergoing áskēsis
will transform them into sexual subjects. In many ways, students have started the path of
being a sexual subject without the formal training of an educator. Learning about
sexuality does not happen in a vacuum: students have already gained information from
their environment such as peers, the media, and the internet. The information, however,
may or may not be accurate. Nevertheless, students remark that there are topics that they
wish they had known in sex education classes. By asking for positive information, they
649

“[P]arents are recommended to allow adolescents to experiment with sexual contacts, within
clearly demarcated boundaries. By giving adolescents free space, parents not only meet the adolescents’
growing need for autonomy, they also give them the chance to learn from their own experiences. In
comparison with self-reflection or imagination, experimenting with sexual contacts may be a more
effective way to discover what their preferences are and which forms of sex within which kinds of
relationships will be more or less fulfilling. It is the task of parents to make sure that this experimental
learning space is relatively safe. The risks must not be too high and possible damage should be limited”
(Steutal, 195). In a way, I consider my suggestion more approachable since the sexual contact that students
will be making is on themselves.
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are “participants constituted as subjects with agency. This positioning implies a right to
comprehensive information, so they might be self-determining in these matters.”650
Moreover, focusing on negative and protective sexuality education limits students’
understanding of themselves as sexual subjects, which may make them disengaged with
sexuality education.651 For example, Louise Allen has looked at surveys of young
peoples’ attitudes toward their sexuality education. Young people want to know more
about teenage pregnancy and abortion. Being told how to think about certain topics takes
away students’ self-determination thereby limiting their ability to make positive choices
and see themselves as sexual agents. Schools that consider students as not being sexual
subjects consider students as non-sexual, thereby needing protection.652 Interestingly,
young men want to know more about the menstruation cycle and how to make sex
pleasurable for both partners. These desires indicate that young men want to know more
about what is considered “women’s issues” perhaps so as to understand whom these
young heterosexual men are having intimate encounters with. Not only does this indicate
that young men are constituted as sexual subjects, but their desire to know more about
their partners indicates that their relationship with potential others is interdynamic and
relational as opposed to atomistic.
Young women wanted to know more about abortion and how to tell if a male was
turned on. While I am not going to commit to a side in the abortion debate in this
dissertation, many young women feel frustrated with the school’s presentation that
abortion is defaulted as immoral. These young women wanted more information, perhaps
even to know why it was immoral. Regardless, women were denied the chance to develop
650
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their own perspective and using that information as part of their ability to make
choices.653 As of this writing, thirteen states do not require parents to be notified nor to
consent to the procedure. In those thirteen states, therefore, the law sees these minors as
sexual subjects in regards to abortion: minors can make their own abortive choices thus
giving minors agency.654
As mentioned before, the educator could discuss various sexual desires and
behaviors to see what students think about them. By bringing up certain questions about
these “deviant” desires and practices, the educator can play a role in that these desires and
practices may be considered taboo, but the educator can question the students’ reactions
by investigating the reasons behind the students’ prejudices and see if the prejudices have
reasonable foundations or not. This method could help students notice how different
sexual lifestyles, desires, and practices were not part of their upbringing, but mentioning
these practices could “spark” an interest that the students may not realize until the topic
was brought up. By mentioning these topics, the students may want to consider these
topics under discussion in later adult life. Moreover, the educator legitimizes these
different behaviors as part of the discourse with the students.655 The educator not only
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shows that the students’ sexual desires and activities are also had and practiced among
adults, but also asks whether these desires and activities are problematic. To have a
discourse about unfamiliar sexual or relationship expressions is to have the students have
access to this information in a positive light. Because teachers are one factor that shape
students’ lives, this potential influence could shape the students into breaking restrictive
sexual and gender norms. The educator can help investigate the students’ reactions by
analyzing the reasons, and reasoning, behind the students’ biases. This method could help
students see how different sexual lifestyles, desires, and practices could be part of their
upbringing and possibly help the students embrace what they truly have felt but could not
explain why. The upshot is that the students would see their sexual identity as something
to activate rather than seeing sexuality as a passive thing to have.
Another skill comes from Battaly where she discusses knowing one’s sexual
orientation is tied up with virtue epistemology. Battaly suggests that people develop the
virtues of open-mindedness, intellectual autonomy, and care in gathering evidence.
Otherwise, people may ignore evidence, jump to conclusions, and refuse to consider
reasonable alternatives. Having these vices relates to heteronormativity. Battaly remarks:
Subjects performed these actions [ignoring evidence, jumping to conclusions, and
refusing to consider reasonable alternatives] because their motivations for truth
were not strong enough to overcome intellectually vicious motivations.
Heteronormativity bolsters the strength of vicious motivations, such as the
motivations to approve of the desire one finds, to believe whatever it is easiest to
believe, and to believe whatever will make one feel safe or fit in. If one were fully
virtuous, one would be immune to the pressures of heteronormativity.656
I would expand Battaly’s notion toward those who are thinking about transgender issues,
relationship styles, romantic orientations, mating orientations, and their sexual/romantic
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desires as a whole. The open-minded person would consider, rather than ignore, not only
same-sex sexual encounters, but also romantic inclinations (or the lack thereof), or
polyamorous motivations. Investigating these inclinations and being open-minded about
them means that people would be receptive to the possibility that they may have different
romantic orientations, or that they may possibly be polyamorous. Careful people would
take this evidence of these encounters into account and engage these thoughts rather than
instantly dismissing them. Doing so can help them have a better idea of the truth of who
they are.657 They may be unsure and so they could follow through with their inclinations,
and in the end, they may realize that they do not consider themselves having various
orientations.658 Students gain a wide variety of sexual and relationship styles, and
recognize people who practice these styles even if they themselves do not practice these
particular styles. This mindset will help see sexual minorities not as outcasted “sexual
others,” but to see them as people who have different expressions of the sexual
individuality and identity. Sexuality education, therefore, would also be social justice
education. It is to know and fight heterosexual norms.
Finally, one other virtue to develop is sexual resiliency. Resiliency helps one to
deal with the difficulties happening in your life, but also to easily bounce back from
troubled times. This virtue can help people handle those who are bystanders or bullies of
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sexual minorities. People may always encounter them and developing resiliency can offer
ways to get a handle of these troubled episodes. Resiliency can also help people process,
handle, and cope with any sort of trauma people may encounter. While it is not a
substitute for any serious trauma anyone may face, developing this virtue is a way to not
stay stagnant. To flourish, one must find ways to cope, handle, and adjust to stress.
Traumatic events can be very stressful, triggering, and easy to fall back into stagnation.
But this is exactly why resiliency is so important: it is a discipline to work out of a funk
and to work on the self. Stagnation means no improvement. Resiliency is a virtue that can
lead oneself out of stagnation in stressful situations and has been recommended to be
incorporated into a sex and relationship education.659
The overall picture is that áskēsis can be helpful in constituting a better sexual
self. Talking about their own sexual pleasures makes one aware of their own sexual
subjectivity and developing sexual identity.

2. Objections and Replies

Since the áskēsis model of sex education is the one I champion, I will consider and
discuss likely objections.
2.1. Doesn’t My View Encourage Adolescents Having Sex?

While my view champions adolescent sexuality, this is not equivalent to championing
adolescents having sex. Moreover, while my view does not encourage adolescents having
659
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sex, it does not thereby encourage adolescents not having sex either. Rather, it is to let the
adolescents have the education so that if they engage in sexual behavior, they are more
aware of the full array of sexuality, for their sake and for the sake of others. Specifically,
it is to help adolescents understand their sexual and gender identity, their preferences and
desires, their boundaries and limits, and recognizing their peer’s sexuality as well. Sex
education not only teaches students about consent—which was mentioned heavily in
chapter four—but also about being aware of various expectations that typically happens
in the college scene. Our culture may once have staved off sexual interactions until some
critical moment (e.g. marriage, being in a stable relationship). But there has a been a
cultural shift where young people are expected to have sex, usually by late teens or early
20s, otherwise people are deemed “not normal,”660 whereby students are expected to have
sex. In the same way where we can be condemned for being too sexual, we may also be
condemned for not being sexual enough.661 The older generation may have been critiqued
for not meeting up to the standard of sexual purity, but now we are struggling to try and
meet the new sexual standard of sexual “liberation.” But this is equally problematic. By
living up to a social standard, we have to live up to expectations that we may not feel
comfortable doing.
Is it really liberation when it is compulsory? People follow sexual scripts, which
are certain narratives and stories regarding sexuality. We incorporate these narratives into
our belief system and consider the narrative to be true. With most people, if you ask them
why they have certain beliefs about sexuality and sexual behavior, they will respond that
it is something that they have gained from their environment, their friends and family
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members, and how they were raised. These scripts are so powerful that many people will
follow them just to be part of the normal society. As an example, one narrative in our
society is that once people have been dating for a while, there is an expectation in our
culture that they have to have sex soon. Otherwise, there is something wrong with the
relationship.662
All the statistical analysis in the world can fail to uncover the role of stories in
shaping how people make decisions about sex. The same is true about pursuing
career goals, getting married, getting divorced, and numerous other important
decisions in life. People don’t do things because they’re a collection of variables.
People don’t act in certain ways simply because they’re male or female, or
because they’re 20 years old, or because they’re white or because their parents got
a divorce. Nor do they meticulously weigh the costs and benefits of different
action strategies before moving forward. Rather, people pay attention to—and live
out—compelling and attractive stories. Marketing experts figured this out long
ago; it’s taking social scientists a bit longer.663
These sexual scripts inform not only appropriate sexual goals to achieve but also plans
for particular types of behaviors and plans to achieve those sexual goals: “the right thing
to say at the right time, what not to do, who leads, how to hook up, where they should go,
who should bring the condom, what’s too much to ask of someone, etc.”664
These sexual scripts are mainly learned from peers, family members, and the
media.665 Regnerus & Uecker hypothesize that if Cosmopolitan articles suddenly
endorsed sexually conservative values, then millions of young women would look at
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these new ideas with a new consideration.666 These sexual scripts become
institutionalized where there is no one single entity or person that authorizes what the
script is or ought to be. To ask why we are doing it this way, the answer is traditional: it
is just how it has been done. Even individual people report that they do not find the
sexual scripts fitting with their enjoyable experiences, but that they feel powerless to
challenge the script667 because to question these scripts is to invite a stigma.
Current sex education may try to change the scripts, but it does not get to the
baseline psychology of people. “Scripts change; altering psychology and the baseline
economics of relationships is not so easy.”668 What we need to remember is that sex
education should not simply be about reproduction or infections; it is also about people’s
identity, which includes their psychology, emotions, and bodily representations. My
program aims to change not just the sexual scripts—after all, many sex education
programs aim to do just that—but also to challenge the deep embedded
heteronormativity, which informs our culture and baseline psychology. It is not an easy
task, but I take my program to be more accurate in facing the challenge than simply a
surface-level change of just changing any of the scripts. To suggest that my program
encourages young people to have sex still falls in line with heteronormativity.
2.2. Logistical Complications: Implementing Áskēsis into Sex Education

The second objection discusses the logistics of my favored perspective. If my perspective
proposes more of an individual investigation into one’s personal interests, desires, values,
and formation, a potential worry is that how can that practically work if there is a class—
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a group—setting where the educator must accommodate everyone and cannot focus on
idiosyncrasies of individual students? This complaint, however, could also apply to other
topics. No matter what the subject, some students will immediately understand the
material, others will lack the understanding and would like to spend more time on the
material, and some others will find the pace of the class reasonable.
Admittedly, the ideal education would be a one-to-one interaction between the
educator and the student so that the educator can help with the student’s individual and
unique developmental goals and sexual values. Practically, however, there is a class
setting, which involves a group dynamic. However, the classroom, group dynamic can be
advantageous. Because the nature of sex is interpersonal and interactive, learning about
one’s sexual subjectivity can come about through discussions and interactions with other
people. By learning about other values and other views, one comes to learn more about
one’s own sexual values and mores instead of merely reflecting within. Of course, the
educator can develop ways to hone in on particular students’ development: writing
assignments or journal summaries, for example. The point is that one does learn more
about oneself in a community of others, and the classroom can help develop that
discovery.
One way to aim toward this progression is to have specific teachers teach specific
elements in sex education instead of one person doing the work.
Presently the sex education and STD/HIV curricula are often taught by faculty
with little training in this area. As a further modification, ‘‘sex education’’ could
be split into a coordinated social studies component (ethics, behavior and
decision-making, including planning for the future) and a science component
(human reproductive biology and biology of STDs, including pregnancy and STD
prevention), each taught by trained teachers in their respective field.669
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This division of responsibility could help teachers take on less responsibilities so that
they can teach their classes more effectively, and also help the students see the
complexities and nuances of sexuality.
Another concern has to do with the relationship between the teacher and the
student. There is a delicate dynamic between them: the teacher has the authority over the
class. With that authority, there may be a worry that students may not reveal what is
really on their mind. After all, there is a different type of relationship between a teacher
and a student and, say, therapists and patients. Patients can speak their mind freely
without judgement; students, especially in a high school setting, may not feel comfortable
speaking their mind freely.
I believe this critique can easily be managed. There is no necessary connection
between teachers being in authority, and students being able to speak freely. It really
depends on the class, the students in the class, and the teacher. It is very contextual and a
good teacher will be able to maneuver these different dynamics so that there is still
control and structure in the class, yet make the environment feel safe and comfortable so
that everyone can speak their mind freely. Of course, the class dynamic depends on the
class size, the personality of the class, how comfortable the students are with each other
and the instructor, and whether the instructor is qualified to teach the material. It is
challenging but it can be done. Al Vernacchio, a popular sex educator in Friends’ Central
School in Wynnewood, Pennsylvania, has set up a classroom dynamic to make everyone
feel comfortable. Indeed, if there are going to be professional sex educators, they will
presumably be trained in not only teaching the material, but also making the classroom
dynamic comfortable for everyone. Moreover, in schools where there is no set teacher to
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teach sex education, schools could easily hire outside qualified educators to teach sex
education. These can be peer educators, people from various reproductive organizations,
people in the medical field, and people who are in social/cultural studies and have a
major interest in gender and sexuality. Ideally, we should have a program to have
qualifications to become a sex educator which would include not only information but
also how to handle the interpersonal classroom dynamics.
2.3. Why Not Update Previous Models?

A second objection comes from LDSE. If the goal is to obtain a sexual self, then why
could LDSE not help achieve that? After all, autonomy is based on individuals’
preferences, but one could argue that the more aware one’s preferences and desires are,
one is more autonomous. Why not just develop autonomy, which could in turn, develop
the sexual subject? Thus, according to this objection, why not just develop LDSE instead
of forming a whole new perspective of sex education?
To respond to this objection, we must review what the áskēsis sex education has
that the other perspectives do not have. What are the disadvantages of the LDSE
perspective and how does the áskēsis perspective fix that? The LDSE perspective is
missing the sexual subject. Sex education needs to refocus on how to teach young
students to be sexual subjects in addition to learning about sexual facts and information.
In order to understand the problem with sex education currently, we must see how
students have conceptualized sex as it has been given to them in sex education. Typically,
these conceptualizations have to do with the mechanics of sex, such as what sex is, how
to employ safer sex, how to prevent pregnancies, and how to avoid STIs. However,
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young adolescents do not always employ this information into action even if they know
the material. As mentioned before from Allen at the beginning of chapter five, there is a
gap between knowledge and practice.670 LDSE does not focus on the sexual subject. Yes,
there is a subject, but this subject is an autonomous being, a consenting person, not a
sexual subject. The difference is that for LDSE, they presume that sexuality is akin to
clothes: one can “try on” sexual mores or attitudes, but the “real” person is behind the
sexual identity. The features of who a person is are simply contingencies of that person.
Within the liberal framework, our race, religion, nationality, culture, and background are
added-on features. But what we really are is an abstract generic person. The same applies
with sex and gender: we are not our sex or our gender but we are individuals who just
happen to have a sex or a gender. In other words, there is no sexual subject; it is a person
who has a sex, a person who has a gender, a person who engages in sex, or a person who
happens to have a gender or relationship expression.
Instead, I am arguing that there is nothing behind the sexual identity; people’s
sexuality constitutes their (sexual) identity rather than sexuality being an accidental
feature of one’s identity. People simply do not have a sexuality or a gender; they are their
sexuality or gender (among other modes). If sexuality and gender was a feature like
LDSE presents, we would not feel anxiety when our sexual expressions mismatch our
feelings of our sexual expressions. If there was a mismatch, and we are not really our
sexuality, then we simply discard this sexual expression for another one. But that is not
true. Our sexual, gender, and relationship expressions are not simply preferences; they
are a major component of us that we cannot discard.
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Another emphasis in LDSE is rational decision-making since this ethic
emphasizes autonomy and consent. Emotions and reason have historically been rivals and
that narrative can still be assumed in LDSE curricula. Indeed, Lamb points out that some
sex education curricula have looked at emotions as interfering with rational decisionmaking, or that arousal is merely a sensation rather than something that could go hand in
hand with a feeling of closeness and desirability for another person.671 If one only focuses
on autonomy, the emotions may be ignored. For example, adolescents need to know what
to do when they have a lustful feeling. However, under the autonomy view—especially
coming from Kant, lust is seen as uncontrollable, irrational, or “unladylike” for young
women.672
Finally Moran and Males point out that the sexual behavior of adolescents
depends on the social environment that they are in. The goal, then, is not to have sex
education strictly in the classroom, but to change the social environment such as
socioeconomic policies and the structural institutions that bring about social inequalities.
There are many ways to do that, but my focus is on the educational aspect. Admittedly, it
is going to be a slow process because educating everyone from a bottom-up procedure is
slow. And yet, my model does tackle social injustices by having the students think about
them and questioning them whereas the previous models assume or never question the
social injustices.
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2.4. Familial Obstacles

The fourth objection has to do with the idea of adolescents learning about their sexuality
that could make parents uncomfortable. Here, the educator must straddle a fine balance
between how to get the students engaged to work on their sexual transformation and
education as well as respect the parents. This is a tricky problem but there are various
solutions. First, this is a practical problem. Suppose there was a meeting between the
educator, the parents, and the school board to find some common ground. The schools
and parents presumably see adolescent sexuality as a problem and that must be reined in.
There are only three possible options. First, one could go along with the values of the
schools and the parents. However, doing so would undermine the point of a sex education
that would help students work on themselves and to take care of themselves. Following
the traditional values of the schools or parents would also go back to the traditional
discourses of the paternalistic or liberal models, which I have already shown to be
problematic.
The second option is defiance. The educator recognizes the values of the schools
and parents, but rebels against them and teaches the students based on sexual practices on
taking care of the self. This would not be a viable solution because of the blowback from
the parents and schools. Educators could very well lose their jobs, licenses to teach, and
could never be a positive influence on the students.
The third option seems to be the only viable solution: a long-term goal where one
eventually influences the schools and parents that their views of sexual values are limited,
and that a way for the students to take care of themselves is a way for the students to
understand what it means to be a sexual self, and that having a sexual self is not a
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problem. Of course, this will initially be conflictual, and because these values are not
entirely private, this debate would eventually move into the public and political arena.
Ideally, teachers and education administrators ought to work with the parents so that the
parents will be part of the discussion. Having the parents involved will help the
administrators and educators factor in the values of the parents so that they can include
the wide diversity of cultures and values. Moreover, a dialogue between parents and
administrators could potentially initiate a dialogue between parents and their children. It
may be awkward at first, but at least they are developing their communicative skills
slowly by talking to each other about sexuality. Over time, the family dynamic will be
fruitful so that parents will be more interactive and happier to engage in frank sexual
conversations rather than passively wait for the child to start asking questions or to not
even engage in conversation at all. It will not be an overnight solution. It will be a longterm, slow, methodical dialogue. But the process will hopefully move the discussion to
the students taking care of their sexual self.
2.5. Political Obstacles

Finally, a fifth objection discusses the motivation for state support of my perspective. If
the state’s focus is preventative measures, the state may not have further interests beyond
that. My proposal argues that not only should the schools have the responsibility to be
factually accurate, but they must go beyond that to give a more holistic approach to the
student’s well-being. As an analogy, I will use the English language and literature.673
Many states are invested in having their citizens being competent with their mother
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tongue. However, the state will not go to the lengths of promoting life-enhancement
opportunities, for example, through literature. Literature can give people the opportunity
to think broadly, to use their imagination, to see how other people could live their lives,
or perhaps critically think about various characters, plots, and the like. In short, literature
could be life-enhancing given the many benefits literature can have. If the citizens want
to do that, they must do so on their own time (i.e., it is not the responsibility of the state).
The same could be true with sex education. The responsibility of the state is to prevent
unhealthy people. Thus, sex education would very likely closely align to LCSE or
perhaps LDSE. A care of the sexual self goes beyond the responsibilities of the state
since teaching about sexual pleasure, developing áskēsis, and forming a sexual identity is
life-enhancing which is not the responsibility of the state.
To respond to the objection, the current comprehensive sex education still focuses
on preventative measures rather than promoting sexual subjectivity. But I argue this is not
enough. Even if everyone would agree that a basic comprehensive sex education is best
and that we could minimize unwanted sexual consequences, there would still be the
problem of heterosexist discourse which would reinforce heteronormativity. To solve this
problem, we need to revamp discussion revolving consent, the relations between the
different genders, and an open discussion about different sexual mores, practices, values
and desires. Including these topics will help dismantle heterosexist norms by questioning
the norms of social practices. Society would benefit by not discriminating people for not
practicing the norms.
Moreover, they would make society more diverse and care of the self would
perhaps concentrate not on what is expected but on what Mill called “experiments of
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living:” developing one’s subjectivity to the fullest without interference in whatever one
does, no matter how eccentric, as long as one does not harm others.674 The majority wants
everyone to be normal (when a good person is following expectations formed by what
other people do). However, doing so because it is tradition or custom is not taking care of
the self. Indeed, there is no engagement with the self if one unthinkingly follows the
typical normative discourses. The educator could teach students that different sexualities
and relationships that are against the norm would not be considered “weird,” “deviant,”
“perverse,” or “unnatural.” Rather, one thought could be, “that person/those people are
expressing their sexual subjectivity(-ies).” By changing the discourse, the students see
other sexual subjects as not merely tolerant or permissive, but as taking on a sexual self
and having a sexual literacy: a full-range knowledge of sexuality for one’s sexual wellbeing. The care of the self perspective, or what I have called the áskēsis perspective,
addresses the problem of heteronormativity and can give a holistic account of sexuality.
Fighting heteronormativity, I argue, is what a good state should sponsor. Many regard
sexism and racism wrong. Any laws that combat sexism and racism are good.
Heteronormativity is akin to sexism and racism in that they are prejudicial biases or
systemic injustices. Therefore, laws that combat heteronormativity are also good, which
is the responsibility of the state.

Conclusion

Overall, sex education is not just about “the facts of life,” but about constituting student’s
character so that they care for others, and for themselves. Eventually, students will know
674
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what it means to be a sexual being. The knowledge/practice gap that Allen has shown
above fails students’ sex education. My argument, however, restructures sex education
where the content is in terms of a positive experience rather than behavior modification.
By focusing on the sexual subject, sex education does not just try to modify
behavior, but it gets to the root of the behavior which I would consider someone’s
character. Morally speaking, to change someone’s character is to help them achieve
various virtues or avoid various vices. The virtues and vices will not only inform one’s
character, but also their behavior. Therefore, I take character development to be a missing
feature in sex education. I consider áskēsis as a route to help people gain knowledge of
who they are as sexual beings, which also encompasses other features of identity such as
gender and different relationship styles. Providing the tools to help the students become
more aware of their identity, desires, needs, boundaries, can help overcome the sexual
scripts. Moreover, I suggest that these practices can get to the root of people’s
psychology so that people can follow what they consider is best for them rather than
following expectations or norms.
Of course, the limitations of this dissertation are that there are no exact details or
specific formula of áskēsis. It is hard to give a specific recipe since individuals are
different from each other and different methods, techniques, and practices vary. I leave it
to developmental psychologists, moral psychologists, social workers, and public health
officials to work out the details and offer specific practices. However, I offer a humble
start for a different path for sex education that I consider more accurate in a pluralistic
society. The starting point is áskēsis applied to sex education, and since most sex
educators are sociologists, psychologists, and social workers, they have their specific
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skills and trainings to make educational theories more applicable. They are key to making
curricula and my hope is that áskēsis is a key factor when making sex ed curricula. My
project is to offer not only another route for sex education, but to offer a different
capacity on how to achieve goals that I consider healthier, moral, and more fruitful to
students’ need for a better sex education.

411

Conclusion

After looking at various sex education programs and their ethical methodologies, I have
concluded that our current trajectory of the sex education programs in the US is
detrimental to our well-being. This dissertation has argued that the current approach to
sex education is misguided and that the focus on character development is key to develop
healthy sexual people. Character development via sexuality is complex and requires
further research. And while this dissertation asks for a humble broad revamping of our
sex education programs, this concluding chapter investigates further research possibilities
to pinpoint various revamping in the particulars of educating people about sexuality, or
possible routes to develop people’s character via sexuality. Before we look at where we
could go, it is best to first reflect where we have been. What arguments have been
presented? What is the narrative of the debate? And why is character development the
best route for sex education?
In adolescent sex education, the contemporary debate has developed into two
camps: the paternalistic view and the liberal view. While the debate has been entrenched
in morality, religion, and politics, I argue that both sides of the camp have been too
focused on actions and behaviors of adolescents and have assumed a heteronormative
background.
I started in chapters one and two by investigating the scope and character of
paternalistic sex education. In chapter one, I framed paternalism into “thick” and “thin”
paternalism. “Thick” paternalism is the idea that since people’s non-rationality can drive
people away from the good, they require direction. Therefore, it is permissible for a
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ruling body (e.g., parents, the state) to interfere with people’s autonomy for their own
sake. I argued against “thick” paternalism by questioning the “thick” paternalist
assumption of a universal good. Moreover, interfering in people’s autonomy is too
forceful whereas various guidance, direction, and education is a more appropriate
response.
I therefore endorsed “thin” paternalism for the rest of the dissertation and
presumed a plurality of goods of what people value. Moreover, adolescents have a sense
of agency and we should start where they are at. They are slowly given responsibilities in
life, yet they still need a structure to understand the injustices and heteronormativity of
the society they live in. “Thin” paternalism embraces the idea that students need guidance
through education to help them develop their agency and autonomy. Students may have
various values which need to be scrutinized and either developed or discarded.
I investigated various reasons for the immorality of adolescent sexuality and
concluded that they all fail. These reasons not only support a heteronormative framework
but also embraced unsupportive reasons for embracing adultism: the notion that since
adults are superior, they have the ultimate say in not only how adolescents ought to act,
but also setting up the framework and boundaries that restricts adolescent autonomy and
expression. This prejudice needs to be discarded and we ought to see adolescents as
developing into adults rather than immature adults or overgrown children.
In chapter two, I investigated various ethical theories within paternalistic sex
education, and any assumptions the supporters have. These ethical theories included
natural law theory, deontology, consequentialism, and virtue ethics. I conclude that the
paternalistic model of sex education is inadequate: proponents either presume too much,
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too little, take a heteronormative stance, or inadequately address why adolescent
sexuality is a problem. Moreover, by investigating the various justifications for
paternalistic sex education, the reasoning come from ideology rather than evidence-based
criteria.
After revealing the faults of paternalistic sex education, I next investigated and
analyzed the arguments and presuppositions of what I call the liberal-consequentialist
model by applying J.S. Mill’s On Liberty to formulate a liberal-consequentialist sex
education. I used Mill to build the case for a comprehensive sex education program that
helps mitigate negative consequences such as unwanted pregnancies and STIs. I then
argued that adolescents, in general, can have competence to consent to sexual relations by
offering support from legal, socioeconomical, psychological, and biological sources. And
while liberal-consequentialist sex education is an improvement, this view fails, however,
because it focuses too much on behavioral outcomes and presupposes traditional gender
norms. There is more to sexuality than simply avoiding negative consequences.
Moreover, this view presupposes the heteronormative claims and does not critically
challenge them.
The next position may help mitigate these problems by giving an education that
focuses more on students’ autonomy, self-determination, and values rather than what
society already values. Moreover, since autonomy will be the center of this education, the
issue of sexual consent played a prominent role. In chapter four, I called this view liberaldeontological sex education. This view is an improvement over the previous two theories:
it analyzes what it means to be autonomous and to consent. I embraced weak substantive
autonomy which holds the idea that to be autonomous is to have agentic-skills such as
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introspection, communication, memory, imagination, analytical reasoning, self-nurturing,
resistance to pressures to conform, and capacity for political collaboration. I also
embraced consensual realism: that we need to pay attention to the context, the longevity
of our relationships, the biological structures of the genders, and the reality of what is
happening in the context of the ongoing relationship instead of an idealized universal
goal that ignores gender power dynamics. However, there are still striking problems: for
one, LDSE embraces heteronormativity in that it does not fully challenge the underlying
gender structures and social norms. Rather, LDSE assumes them or only questions the
non-consensual aspects of heteronormativity. It may emphasize that consent is important
and that sexual interactions are unethical unless there is consent, but it does not fully
investigate the gender power structures. Another problem is that to make consent and
autonomy more robust and above the minimal standards, we need an explanation and
justification for this robustness, which comes about through the character of the agents.
This explanation, however, is not within the liberal-deontological method since the
foundation goes beyond the scope of deontology. Therefore, we need another method and
another development of sex education.
In chapters five and six, I offered my formulation of what sex education ought to
be which I refer to as the care of the sexual self: a sense of oneself as a sexual person who
is entitled to have sexual feelings and to make active decisions about sexual behavior,
where it is the opposite of “it just happened,” a passive rather than active agent. I use the
notion of áskēsis to explain sexual subjectivity. Áskēsis has been associated with
practices related to education or intellectual formation, athletic and military training,
spiritual formation, and even the process of artistic creation. In each case, the root
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meaning of áskēsis denotes some sort of formation discipline or an attempt to shape or
form the self according to an ideal of goodness or excellence.
Using áskēsis helps the students actualize their own creative sexual individuality
and has a positive affirmation of who they are as sexual beings as long as it is within the
framework of consent and not harming others. A good sexuality education must include
the emotions, exercises, practices, and activities to take care of the self. I do so by
applying áskēsis to three sexual components: the sexual emotions, the sexual mind, and
the sexual body. I rely on three contemporary philosophers who draw upon the ancient
Greeks to focus on áskēsis, to train oneself to become an improved human being. I
conclude that by applying áskēsis such that people can formulate a sexual subject and
build a character that is more in tune with one’s sexual, gender, and relationship
expressions.
Assuming that my arguments are sound, where do we go from here? This
dissertation is not meant to revitalize sex education in the abstract, but to call for a new
public discourse such that sex education can be updated and improved at the practical
level. Further research is necessary but with áskēsis as the foundational starting point for
an ethical sex education, my hope is that different disciplines will further these inquiries
and offer suggestions to implement áskēsis into the curricula. Educators, psychologists,
and public health officials are usually the people who teach sex education. They have the
skills necessary to teach young folks sexuality on a practical level. I can only offer some
suggestions and hope that people in those disciplines or other philosophers can add robust
content to sex education curricula. The suggestions I offer are not core elements of
áskēsis, yet they should not be dismissed from a good sex education. Further research
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would include more developments in the education and psychology of áskēsis as well as
applying áskēsis to the disabled. I will take up each in turn.

1. Further Research in the Education of Áskēsis
In chapter six, I mentioned various activities that students can undergo to develop their
sexual emotions, sexual mind, and sexual body. The activities were meant to help
students have a healthy attitude toward their sexuality and develop ways to be more
aware of others’ sexuality. While I offered various routes and specific recommendations,
it is not an exhaustive list. My recommendations were based on either personal
experience I have had in the classroom, various readings I have encountered, or various
websites I have stumbled upon. However, there are many different ways as to how
students can undergo áskēsis to have a healthier attitude toward their sexuality. Perhaps
my specific recommendations may or may not work for some students, but other
possibilities may work that I have not considered.
Character development is a broad field and áskēsis has multiple routes in varying
degrees for different people. In the much used analogy from Aristotle, achieving
eudaimonia is like an archer hitting the target: there is one way right way to hit the target,
but many ways how we can miss the target. This is an apt analogy, but I consider the
standard as too high. I read Aristotle as saying that it is the archer hitting the bullseye. I
think of my program as hitting the bullseye as the ideal way to flourish and perfected
sexual áskēsis. However, this ideal is rare and it would be asking too much to say that if
people are not hitting the bullseye, they are not adequate sexual beings. Instead, I think an
archer hitting anywhere on the target as variations of well-being. The bullseye would be
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the best and the highest achievement of well-being, whereas the rings outside the bullseye
would have lesser forms of well-being, but not enough to dampen a good life.
There is a good life, the bullseye would be the best life. However, there are many
ways people can go wrong. This would be analogous to the archer not hitting the target at
all. There are obvious ways where we can miss the target. Analogously, embracing
heteronormativity or ignoring consent would be a few examples. But there are ways to
help the archer at least aim for the target. Analogously, it would be a robust education
with character development. And yet, we can offer further instructions to help the archer
hit the bullseye. Analogously, it would be specific training that I mentioned with
Nagoski’s work or Allen’s discourse of erotics.
Of course, my suggestions are not the only ones. Sex educators may have other
ideas and strategies where heteronormativity is undermined and developing a sexual
subjectivity is a central ethic. By collaborating with other sex educators and those who
focus on moral education, teachers may benefit by learning from each other, testing ideas,
and engaging a dialogue to see what various methods there are. Educators need to
collaborate to test which ideas, methodologies, and exercises work to help students retain
the material. The complexity is to see which exercises develop a moral education in the
students and in the sexual realm. But with a rich network of sex educators who focus on
moral education and character development, a sex education focusing on character
development will be more accurate and robust. Further research requires a full
collaboration of moral psychology into developing a sexual subject.
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2. Further Research in the Psychology of Áskēsis
Psychologists could supplement sex education by offering ways how to do áskēsis. Sex
education can benefit through psychological research by investigating exactly how and
what various practices people can do to acquire well-being. I mentioned that in chapter
five, áskēsis is about training and practicing. However, training and practicing can feel
tedious. How can psychology help people get over the hump of not wanting to practice? I
stated that I do not have knowledge to answer this question but psychologists might.
Wanting to practice or pushing people to practice touches upon the psychology of
motivation and behavior. How does motivation work? One could hold a Kantian notion
where motivation is purely rational. People respect the moral law and perform their duty
through categorical imperatives. On the non-Kantian route, people perform various
actions through hypothetical imperatives to reach another end. In either case, people
rationally see what sort of end they want to achieve and rationally deliberate about how
to get there. Another method could be the empirical-emotive route where motivation is
done through our emotions and we empirically see what end we want to achieve and
reason is simply the instrumental method to figure out how we can achieve that end.
I suspect that there is a combination of both or that various people have different
motivational factors that play a role. I also suspect that reason and emotions work
differently based on socioeconomics as we can see with the work of Mike Males.
Different educators will require different tools to teach their students and they will need
to rely on the latest research from psychology.
One major component, which would benefit sex educators and students, would
analyze the notion of (sexual) empowerment. I see sexual empowerment having at least
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two aims: one, a therapeutic aim. Empowerment is a way to have someone back to a
baseline of normality after a traumatic or troubling experience. It is so that the self does
not remain stagnant but can still be active. Two, an enhancement aim. Empowerment is a
way for people to go beyond their baseline and take charge of their life in a robust way.
Let me briefly offer some insights of each.
2.1. Therapeutic Empowerment

When the self is fragmented or needs repair, one main reason is because the self went
through emotional trauma. An outcome of emotional trauma can be very detrimental to
people’s psyche and is a destructive feature of their well-being and self. Thus, in order to
achieve well-being, the self needs to be empowered. When using the term
“empowerment” in a therapeutic sense, I mean when people take hold of their life and
direct it so that the trauma does not consume them. It is to recover the self that went
below the baseline. Repairing the self does not mean to return to the state prior to the
trauma. Áskēsis in sex education opens up new questions: How do people repair the self
after being ridiculed or ostracized for practicing a sexual activity that is not part of the
majority? How can people “move forward” after a breakup or a divorce? How do people
“pick up the pieces” after being rejected when they reveal to close loved ones that they
are gay? Or for more troubling traumas, how do people handle abuse or assault without
constantly breaking down? We can start with the simplest exercises that virtually
everyone will experience in their romantic lives: heartbreak and rejection.
Youths need to practice dealing with rejection in sex education programs. While I
am no expert on how to handle heartbreak and rejection, psychological research would
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benefit by learning more about this topic and even routes on how to overcome heartbreak
and breakups. They are not universal answers and some of the strategies may work better
with others, but still, offering these tools to students will help them in their future
rejections. There is, of course, relationship therapy and counseling, but formal
psychological help may not be necessary until absolutely needed. Considering that
heartbreak and rejection are inevitable in life, it would be advantageous for students to
learn basic skills for dealing with heartbreak and rejection. Furthermore, formal
psychological help is expensive; many students and young people may not afford such
services. And psychological appointments can take weeks, sometimes months to finally
seek psychological evaluation. At which point, the negative emotion may have already
been mitigated or in some circumstances, people cannot wait that long to overcome
heartbreak. Moreover, on many campuses, psychological help is only offered for one
semester.
One tool that psychologists have used that is central to getting over a relationship
dissolution involves identity change. When people are involved in a relationship, their
self-concept and their self expands. With the relationship dissolving, the process is
slammed into reverse and people are forced to redefine who they are, as “we” returns to
“me.”675 Returning to the “me” would be beneficial for students to know how to do that
and I take áskēsis as a route to work on the self and recover back to the baseline. At the
same time, this period of adjustment provides opportunities for personal growth and
development.
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What about serious trauma like relationship violence? There is a strong link
between serious partner abuse and socioeconomic status. “Men who have lower incomes,
lower-status jobs, or are unemployed are more likely to use physical violence against
their partners.”676 Moreover, Fletcher et. al. cite studies that shows neurotic individuals
were more likely to be physically aggressive when they were very stressed. The negative
effects of being neurotic were gone when stress levels were low. This applied to both
genders. The conclusion is that relationship violence is more likely to be explained by
relationship context and external factors such as socioeconomics rather than simply a
lone individual using physical violence on another.677 The solution is to provide a better
relationship context instead of focusing on lone motivations of individuals as well as
finding routes to solve socioeconomic inequality, which will require political and legal
means. The external factors are long-term solutions, but what about those who are
suffering right now? Counseling and therapy may more likely be highly recommended to
recover from relationship violence.
While I do not know how trauma counselors help victims of relationship violence,
the typical route is to help the victim to return to their baseline. The self needs some
repair. I think that this is a good starting point, and I also suggest that áskēsis can go
further. One feature we saw from Murdoch’s perspective of áskēsis is to not simply
return to the baseline after a moral infraction, but to go beyond the baseline and improve
oneself.
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Since trauma is transformative of the subject, returning to a prior state is
analogous to forgetting about the trauma. Áskēsis can be used to motivate the self by
channeling the trauma to formulate a new self. If sex education discussed repairing the
self, new questions (and answers) would open up about how to deal with trauma and
solutions to the trauma. In a way, it is not simply “picking up the pieces” and moving on,
but reconfiguring those pieces to formulate a more robust resilient self. The conventional
discourse we hear in our culture does not spend a lot of time about how to overcome the
trauma or if it does, the focus is more on taking care of others by making them
comfortable to pass the troubling time with families, friends, and counselors. There is
sympathy with the other, advice on how to handle the situation, or a way to distract the
other through various activities. The point is to make sure that the self does not relapse
into a traumatic state and the way to do that is to make sure that the trauma does not
overtake the self. All of these are important, but the self still needs repair. Of course, we
often hear that “time heals all wounds,” and instead of focusing on moving on and
starting over, why not seek a way for the other to get a positive, working, enriched self?
While our discourse makes sure that the self does not fall below a certain threshold, why
not focus on certain avenues for the self to work above and beyond the threshold to
formulate a new self so that there is no easy potential to relapse into a traumatic state?
2.2. Enhanced Empowerment

Depending on the extent of the fragmentation of the self, what people could do is
establish a sense of what it means to be “reconnected” so that they are whole again and
empowered to take care of themselves. To become a subject, they must still engage in
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practices of the self so that they can not only “get back on track,” but to take committed
actions and decide what sort of self they can become. One way to do this is to construct
certain narratives of the self in order to take care of the self. If not, the self becomes
stagnant and passive and remains in either a traumatic state or remains in a potential state
of trauma, ready to be activated. To work out of this problem, certain practices are
helpful such that if certain ills come their way, they are resilient and empowered and can
resist further fragmentation.
How can people prepare for this? The solution cannot be to go back to their
original self, but to take care of the self so that they are no longer stagnant. Briefly, there
are three characteristics that are helpful: resilience, courage, and empowerment. And
while I do not have details of what certain exercises there could be or go through an
analysis of what those three features are, my dissertation has indirectly brought forth
these characteristics.
The virtue of resilience is to “bounce back” after troubled times and perhaps learn
from that experience so that people do not fall back into the same pattern of falling down
again. Broadly, resilience is to adapt to the new traumatic circumstances that could have
set them back. Ways to build resilience seem generic: makes plans and carry them out,
view themselves positively, makes connections with other people, looks for ways to
achieve self-discovery, nurture a positive view about themselves, and take care of
themselves.678 While these are good strategies, the question is how do we do each of
these things? The list needs to be tailormade and students would benefit learning how to
build resilience in troubled times. The challenge, however, is that students may not feel
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the need to build resilience because, for the most part, going through high school is not a
traumatic change where they get “knocked down.”679 However, the exercises I have
mentioned in chapter six may build resiliency indirectly. If we looked at the psychology
of resiliency, we could learn how to cultivate it and indirectly think of other exercises that
could build resiliency vis-a-vis sexual subjectivity.
For courage, I remarked that McWhorter described her situation when she was
afraid to confront the General Assembly. But she moved forward: “We must learn to
deploy technologies of power without fear or shame. For those of us who’ve seen
ourselves as powerless, learning to use technologies of power means changing some
pretty basic aspects of ourselves, which means that learning to use technologies of power
can be an ethical áskēsis.”680 It is taking on a new mode of life. While the psychology of
courage is new, courage is related to other virtues such as confidence, self-respect,
vulnerability, and integrity. Developing courage is not a lone virtue to build but depends
on and relates to other virtues. And while this sounds complex, there can be various
exercises to build courage. While I do not have specific exercises, psychologists and
others character developers might. The spillover effect is that these exercises may build
up other virtues. Building up the other virtues may make it easier to be courageous since
the intricate web of virtues can give us the momentum to be courageous in different
contexts. One example is to not be a bystander when an injustice is happening. I imagine
that people may not stand up to injustice not because they agree with the oppressor, but
because they have the habit of not interfering or they are filled with akrasia. Building
courage, therefore, can help overcome the temptations of being a bystander and to fight
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for justice as well as building courage to overcome from a fractured self to an integrated
self.
For empowerment, the self gives a way to take an active pursuit of one’s choices
in order to formulate a self beyond repair. The therapeutic significance is to not hold onto
a static self, but face the former self, face it honestly and courageously, and understand
what sort of self one can become. A problem, however, is whether someone may feel
empowered, but objectively has diminished well-being. Empowerment, however, is a
complicated topic but briefly, I would suggest that Zoë Peterson’s view is correct:
empowerment comes in degrees rather than all-or-none.681 We must pay attention to both
the subjective perception of empowerment and the objective criteria of well-being. If
people can express themselves sexually in a sexually strict environment, then the people
may feel empowered. It could be the case that they are diminished in well-being, but their
feelings of empowerment should still be taken into consideration.682 If we ignore people’s
subjective perception, they may feel invalidated, which is the opposite of empowerment.
If these people are told that they should ignore or distrust their own sexual desires and
pleasures, then they may lose out on a sense of what empowerment may be. At the same
time, we must also be aware that the activities people are doing can be detrimental to
their well-being, even if they subjectively see no problem with the activity.
Empowerment, therefore, is multidimensional: one can be empowered in time t1 under
context x, but not quite empowered at time t2 under context y. No one is completely
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empowered in the same way no one is completely flourishing; just like well-being,
empowerment is a lifelong goal that we all approach.
Further research requires psychological and philosophical analysis of these three
characteristics. What exercises can people do to build those characteristics? How do these
characteristics relate to further formation of the sexual subject? The educator’s role can
give students exercises to build students’ comprehension and skills to handle emotional
distress. Emotional distress can lead to a fractured self. But part of taking care of the self
is to say, “I want to be someone else because the self I have is self-destructive.” The
baseline, in some situations, can still destructive after traumatic experiences and moving
beyond them would benefit people’s well-being.

3. Further Research in Áskēsis for the Disabled
I have focused on different forms of gender, relationship, and sexual expressions that
goes beyond the heterosexual, monogamous, married-for-life framework. I have also
discussed how socioeconomics plays a role in sex education and that to solve the
problems of unwanted pregnancies, we need to address the inequalities. These
demographics briefly touched upon race and class. However, there is one demographic
that I have not touched on: the disabled. Disability studies is a fairly new field in
philosophy compared to other demographics that I have mentioned. Sexuality and the
disabled is even more novel and addressed scantily in disability studies. The issue is
complex because the standard discourse we hear in ethical sexual relations is consent. As
I have argued, my view of consent rests on weak substantive autonomy. Depending on
the disability, can the disabled be autonomous let alone autonomous in the weak sense?
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For those who are physically disabled, the answer is easy: yes they can definitely be
autonomous.
Briefly, there are two frameworks of disability. We can see the disability through
a medical framework: being disabled means that there is some sort of bodily impairment.
The body is not working according to its function. For example, being deaf is a disability
because ears are meant to hear. Having cerebral palsy is a disability because muscles are
meant to coordinate to the user’s will. Therefore, modern medicine is to help cure or
diminish the disability such that people can live a qualitative life. A criticism of the
medical framework is that it focuses on the disabled’s limitations such that people must
adapt to social standards. This criticism has brought forth a social constructionist
framework: being disabled is more of a stigmatization from society than simply an
individual malfunction. The systematic barriers and being excluded from society bring
forth the notion of disability.
I take áskēsis to accommodate both views. Tolman has argued that with
subjectivity, being a subject, as opposed to an object, means that people have a voice and
that they care about what happens to themselves, to their health, and to make decisions
about themselves without being pressured or overpowered by others’ needs or
thoughts.683 Disabled people can do this and different techniques and exercises will be
different for each individual. The issue is even more complex since different exercises
and techniques may be appropriate or not applicable depending on the disability. When it
comes to physical disabilities, for example, áskēsis would have to fit according to the
disability. Depending on the muscular or neurological disorder, áskēsis would have to be
tailormade for each individual. This will not be an easy solution but with further
683

Tolman, passim.
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developments in disability studies, it is possible. Moreover, helping students think about
disability issues in general helps mitigate the possibility of ableist tendencies and
structures in our society. In the same way that áskēsis can help people develop a
respectful notion of different sexual values, so too could áskēsis help students accept
those who are disabled.
For those who have mental disabilities, áskēsis would be more challenging. Those
who are disabled are marginalized and stereotypically seen as asexual. But those who
have mental disabilities still have sexual desires. There could be áskēsis for those who are
mentally disabled, but I would leave that up to professionals and philosophers who work
in disability studies. Moreover, there could be many case studies that philosophers,
educators, and students could think about. Case studies such as: 1) the famous case where
a husband had sex with his wife who had Alzheimer’s.684 Is this ethical? 2) should those
who are disabled have sexual surrogates to fulfill their sexual needs since they have a
harder time accessing sexual partners? This question also relates to whether sexual
desires are needs. And 3) what about two adults who have Down’s Syndrome but they
want to engage in sexual activity? The last question can also make consent more complex
which adds more critical engagement with the disability community.

The project of revamping sex education cannot happen with a lone individual; there must
be a collaboration of educators, public health officials, psychologists, sociologists, and
philosophers. As sex education is also a political issue in the US, different ideologies will
684
Eugene Volokh. “78-year-old Iowa Legislator Is Prosecuted for Having Sex with His Wife,
Who Was Suffering from Alzheimer's.” The Washington Post. December 11, 2014. (Accessed January 17,
2019). https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/12/11/78-year-old-iowalegislator-is-prosecuted-for-having-sex-with-his-wife-who-was-suffering-fromalzheimers/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.967013b155fd
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spread. However, we cannot remain neutral on this territory. On the contrary, we must be
engaged in order for change to happen. These further research enterprises are not
exhaustive. In my mind, they are the next set of questions to ask and analyze that may
leave the pure bounds of philosophical investigation. And while other disciplines are
needed to help develop further research to add more knowledge and exercises for sex
education curriculum, the tools of philosophy are still necessary for taking care of the
sexual self.
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Appendix 1:

Here is a sketch of what a good sex education syllabus could look like:
Human Sexuality Syllabus
Course Description:
Sexuality is a big topic rife with discussion and controversy. Rather than simply lecturing
about the content of sexuality, the purpose of this course is to talk about it, and this
means that material will be presented, and you, the students, will engage with the
material and discuss main ideas or questions concerning the materials presented. This
course will provide a scientific understanding of the historical, biological, psychological
and social/cultural influences on human sexuality and its expression. We will consider
human sexuality across the lifespan. This course provides information about sexual
identity, orientation, and how changing sexual attitudes are influencing the culture. We
will also cover the media’s impact on sexuality, information about the biological and
psychological causes of sexual dysfunction and their treatments, and the prevention and
treatment of sexually transmitted infections.
We will not just talk about sex, but also about relationships, making healthy
choices about what you want, how society can influence what we want, and the values we
hold regarding sexuality. Sexuality is an integral part of physical and psychological
health. Therefore, educating ourselves on relationships and sexuality is an integral part of
health education.
Beliefs about Human Sexuality and Sexuality Education
1. Sexuality is part of each person’s total being.
2. Clarity about one’s values and goals can lead to behavior that is consistent with
personal standards.
3. Effective decision-making, communication, and conflict management skills
increase the quality of relationships.
4. All persons should be treated with respect, regardless of sex, race, class, age,
religion, or personal beliefs.
5. It is wrong to take unfair advantage of others, to exploit or to pressure them to do
things against their will or values.
6. Everyone should be aware and sensitive of the impact their behaviours and
actions may have on others and society.
7. Sexuality includes and focuses on the self-worth, respect and dignity of the
individual.
8. People should be responsible for their behavior and its consequences.
9. Sexuality education is an ongoing process.
(Partially taken from Sexuality Education: A Curriculum for Adolescents by Wilson and
Kirby, Network Publications, and the Canadian Guidelines of Sexual Health Education,
Public Health Agency of Canada)
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Course Goals:
The purpose of this course is to introduce the student to the historical, biological,
developmental, and relational aspects of human sexuality. We will especially focus on the
philosophical underpinnings and the ethics of sexuality, and ways to help you formulate
your sexual values to inform a sexual self. The activities that we will do in class are
meant to develop skills to take care of their sexual self. To achieve this end, we will
discuss what it means to take care of the self so that one can formulate what it means to
be a sexual being. Caring for the sexual self will be part of the background of this class
although new information and discussions will certainly inform, modify, and supplement
new ideas of your unique sexual self. Listed below are the particular objectives to
formulate a way to care for the sexual self in the areas of knowledge, emotions, identity,
the will, and the body.

Learning Objectives:
Knowledge: Students will be able to:
● Summarize the historical and religious understandings of human sexuality
● Summarize the basic biological and arousal aspects of the reproductive system
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● Understand how sexual development changes over the lifespan
● Understand the biological and psychological differences among heterosexuals,
homosexuals, bisexuals, and intersexuals
● Understand the different types of sexually transmitted infections and the effects
on the body and society
● Understand to biological and psychological reasons for sexual dysfunctions
● Identify ways sexuality education can be integrated into various content areas in
the schools, communities, and one’s personal life.
● Identify important topics from your surroundings and suggest implementation
strategies pertaining to sexuality.
● Explain the physiological and psychosocial processes involved in human
reproduction.
● Interpret the significance of family planning and explain effective methods of
contraception.
● Define and use correct vocabulary terms needed to communicate about human
sexuality effectively.
● Understand pregnancy and prenatal life
● Understand that sexuality affects the genders differently.
● Understand different sexual orientations, gender binaries, relationship styles, and
various ways that one can perform one’s sexuality.
● Identify power structures in society that can inform and regulate one’s sexuality.
● Recognize that sexuality is pluralistic and one’s values regarding sexuality may
also be pluralistic.
● Describe characteristics of healthy and unhealthy romantic and/or sexual
relationship
● Demonstrate sexual consent and explain its implications for sexual decisionmaking, including how drugs and/or alcohol and affect the ability to give or
receive consent
● Compare and contrast situations and behaviors that may constitute bullying,
sexual harassment, sexual abuse, sexual assault, incest, rape and dating violence
● Describe potential impacts of power differences (e.g., age, status or position)
within sexual relationships
Emotions: Students will be able to:
● Investigate their own particular emotions toward various sexual acts, relationship
styles, their own sexual orientation, and if their emotions align with what they
know.
● Identify and interpret positive physical, mental, and social factors that influence
one’s sexuality.
● Distinguish why one has emotional responses to various ideas.
● Understand how one’s environment and social structures informs one’s beliefs,
which in turn can inform one’s emotions.
● Investigate various structures in society, politics, religion, and the media to see
how they inform one’s attitudes toward sexuality and relationships.
● Describe a range of ways to express affection within healthy relationships
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Identity: Students will be able to:
● Describe the importance of having a positive understanding of diverse sexual
behaviors and attitudes, so as to develop an endorsing attitude toward sexual
diversity.
● Develop the freedom to examine and talk about sexuality issues through
individual or group processes.
● Describe why education for sexuality is a lifelong process, which does not end
with a course in sex education.
● Consult, communicate, and refer people to valid sources of sexuality information.
● Perform one’s sexuality that is in tune with the rest of the components.
● Understand assumed sexual and relationship positions in society and perform the
actions that is authentically one’s own rather than parroting the assumed
positions.
● Use the discussions to actively form a self that is in tune with the other
components.
● Understand that social pressures from society can inform one’s sexuality.
● Obtain a sense of well-being.
● Discriminate between life-enhancing sexual behaviors and those that are harmful
to self and/or others
Moral Will: Students will be able to:
● Formulate and interpret one’s personal values in relation to the conflicting value
systems of others.
● Compare and contrast existing sexual roles and values with those of the past and
the projected future.
● Develop tolerance and justify the need to teach controversial sexuality topics.
● Understand that one’s sexual values may not be the same as others do.
● Perform actions that is in tune with one’s sexual self.
● Be mentally aware of one’s sexual self to have sexual mental preparedness.
● Discipline oneself and engage in mental exercises so that one can perform what to
do in a sexual situation.
● Have an accurate perception of the truth at hand so that one can know how to act.
● Perceive others as self-determining sexual subjects.
● Develop a critical mind to question the assumed positions regarding sexuality and
relationships.
● Know how to care for their potential partners and build healthy relationships.
● Develop decision-making skills and the ability to negotiate that falls in line with
one’s values.
● Demonstrate effective strategies to avoid or end an unhealthy relationship
● Demonstrate effective ways to communicate personal boundaries as they relate to
intimacy and sexual behavior
● Demonstrate respect for the boundaries of others as they relate to intimacy and
sexual behavior
● Describe strategies to use social media safely, legally and respectfully
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Body: Students will be able to:
● Reflect on the joy, pleasure and other positive aspects sexuality has on one’s life.
● Understand that pleasure is a major component and motivation for sex.
● Pay attention to one’s body and see how the body reacts toward relationship,
sexual, or other intimate connections.
● Perform actions that is in tune with one’s sexual self.
● Understand how social pressures inform how the body is conditioned to perform
in such a way.
● Understands that one’s experiences can transform one’s desires and therefore
redirect one’s life.
● Condition the body to break the associations of bodily responses to guilt and
shame that is associated with sex or other types of relationships that are not the
“norm.”
Assignments:
1. Compare/Contrast Paper: Students will write a paper in which they compare and
contrasts exactly 10 things they learned in the class that is new and different from
what she/he believed before coming into this class. The student will document
what their past misconceptions were and what the new understanding is. The
student will find at least three professional sources references in which they use to
further support what they learned. THIS IS NOT A PAPER WHERE YOU
SHARE YOUR POLITICAL IDEAS. This is about what you have learned and
how research supports it.
2. Survey: Before class, we will take a survey to see where you stand on various
issues on sexuality. When each section or topic is complete, we will take another
survey to see if you have changed your mind and you will report why you have
changed your mind.
3. Sexuality and Relationship Journal: Your journal is an organizational tool that can
help you stay on task and up to date with what you have learned in class. These
journals are meant to help you develop your own values regarding sexuality in
accordance with one’s self.
4. In-Class Workshops: We will do in-class assignments and work on various
activities together and discuss the meanings of our answers.
5. Exams: There will be three exams.
Purpose behind syllabus:
● Lower the level of teasing, harassment, and ridicule of LGBTIQ students. This
means to say something to counter the language when you hear it. Moreover,
offer a counter-criticism or offer words of encouragement for all minority
students.
○ By not saying anything when teachers or students hear things like, “that’s
so gay” or “faggot,” the teachers and students are complicit in endorsing
an environment where belittling LGBTIQ students is tolerable.
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○ This can create a climate of fear, hate, and violence if school leaders do
not stop this.
Mention positive role models of LGBTIQ persons.
Invert heterosexual norms in subtle ways. Say things like “partner,” “significant
other,” “sweetie,” instead of “husband,” “wife,” “boyfriend,” or “girlfriend.”
○ Don’t ignore patriarchal, sexist, homophobic remarks from students,
faculty, or staff.
○ Don’t assume that all staff, students, and family members are
heterosexual.
Include books and articles about people who are gay/lesbian and those who
practice different relationship styles.
○ Include the contributions of those who are not part of the sexual or
relationship norms. Understand that what is considered normal would not
make sense unless there was also something already abnormal.
■ Queerness is not a natural state of being but produced as a contrast,
as that against which normalcy is established.
■ Norms produce queerness.
○ Doing so is a conscious-raising activity which would help educate students
and faculty about the complexities of identities.
Speak positively about LGBTIQ friends and family members.
○ Allow Gay-Straight Alliances.
Overall, don’t disregard the critical examination of the dominant
power/knowledge regimes associated with heterosexual identities. By omitting
that, one can contribute to social inequality and injustice.

Topics to Cover:
Values and Morality:
1. Values and Morality, Cultural Considerations, Pluralism and Particularities
2. Contraception and Abortion
3. Commercial Sex
4. Sexual Subjectivity/Sexual Empowerment
5. Purity and Virginity
6. Legal Issues
7. Sexual Well-being
8. Sexuality and the Media, curricular Topics and Development - What do the ads
imply?
Biology:
9. Female Sexual Anatomy
10. Male Sexual Anatomy
11. Sexual Arousal and Response
12. Sexuality in Adolescence
13. Sexuality in Adulthood
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14. Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth
Identities:
15. Gender Identity and Roles
16. Sexual Orientation
17. Intersexuals
18. Non-Monogamies
19. Independence and autonomy
20. Body Image
Relationships:
21. Attraction and Love
22. Relationships and Communication, Negotiation Skills, and Relationship
Dynamics
23. Ending Relationships
Behaviors
24. Sexual Behaviors and Fantasies
25. Sexual Dysfunctions
26. Atypical Sexual Variations
Personal Attitudes and Safety
27. Sexual Coercion and Sexual Assertiveness
28. Flirtation
29. Pleasure and Consent (Body and Will)
30. Shame and Guilt
31. STIs
32. Impact of Drugs and Alcohol on Sexuality
Texts:
Possible texts for educators:
● The basic skeleton will be Tools for Teaching Comprehensive Human
Sexuality Education by Dominick Splendorio and Lori A. Reichel. This
book follows the guidelines of NSES (National Sexuality Education
Standards)
● “Filling in the gaps” will be following the guidelines from SIECUS
(Sexuality Information and Education Council of the United States) taken
from: http://www.siecus.org/_data/global/images/guidelines.pdf It meant
to supplement the basic skeleton.
● Various activities from It’s All One: Curriculum and Guidelines.
● Various activities from Our Whole Lives.
Possible texts for students:
● Lang levede liefde (Long Live Love)??
● S.E.X., second edition: The All-You-Need-To-Know Sexuality Guide to Get
You Through Your Teens and Twenties by Heather Corinna.
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● Oh Joy Sex Toy Graphic Novel online
● Come as you are by Emily Nagasaki
Relevant Web sites:
● Alan Guttmacher Institute: http://www.agi-usa.org/ teen pregnancy and sexuality
information
● Sex Information Council of the United States: http://www.siecus.org/
● American Social Health Association: http://www.ashastd.org/
● CDC’S Adolescent and School Health Information (DASH):
http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dash/
● Sexually Transmitted Diseases Center for Disease Control STDS:
http://www.cdc.gov/nchstp/dstd/dstdp.html
● Gay, Lesbian and Straight Network (GLSEN): http://www.glsen.org
● Gay, Lesbian, Transgender Association: http://www.unlv.edu/studentserv/GLBT/
● Answers Teen Health and Sexuality Questions http://www.iwannaknow.org/
● Planned Parenthood, Ask the experts, provides accurate information to teens
www.teenwire.com.
● Planned Parenthood, resource pertaining to family planning and sexuality
education: www.plannedparenthood.org
● Go Ask Alice, This resource provides answers to a variety of health questions
including those pertaining to human sexuality:
http://www.goaskalice.columbia.edu
● Office of Women’s Health, information site for young women’s health issues:
http://www.4girls.gov
● Transgender Network International, information site for transgender adults
www.tgni.com
● Queer Resource Directory www.qrd.org
● Scarlateen. An independent, grassroots website dedicated to sexuality education.
www.scarlateen.com
● Sex,etc.org an information about sex web site written by teens for teens
www.sexetc.org
● Smarter sex site dedicated to college students www.smartersex.org
● I Wanna Know. Site of the American Sexual Health Association for answers to
sexual questions: http://www.iwannaknow.org
● Youth Resource. Website by and for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
youth. http://youthresource.com
Resources for Sex Education
● Coinna, Heather. S.E.X., second edition: The All-You-Need-To-Know Sexuality
Guide to Get You Through Your Teens and Twenties. A very comprehensive book
about sexuality, relationships, gender roles, sexual preparedness, and sexual selfesteem. Very pluralistic and inclusive.
● Easton, Dossie. The Ethical Slut. The “bible” of open relationships and
polyamory.
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● Hills, Rachel. The Sex Myth. A journalist looks at the sex myth—the systematic
idea that we are disgusting if we are attracted to people of the same sex, or if we
have “too many” sexual partners or if we are not monogamous. But it also tells us
that we are failing if we are not sexually active, if we have too few partners, or if
we are not sufficiently sexually “skilled.” We are all slut-shamed and prudeshamed. Instead, let people be, which means we need to be free of the sex myth.
● Joannides, Paul. Guide to Getting it on. A behemoth of a book. Over 1150 pages
of information about everything you can think of about sex. Illustrations abound.
Great resource material.
● Jones, Tiffany. “A Sexuality Education Discourses Framework: Conservative,
Liberal, Critical, and Postmodern,” in American Journal of Sexuality Education
Vol. 6, No. 2 (2011): 133-175. A good article that looks at every type of sex
education practiced in America.
● Lamb, Sharon. Sex Ed for Caring Schools: Creating an Ethics-Based Curriculum.
A psychologist wants to create a sex ed program based on caring.
● Males, Michael. Teenage Sex and Pregnancy: Modern Myths, Unsexy Realities. A
sociologist investigates teenage sexuality and shows that the myths we hold about
them are actually stigmas against race and class. Very insightful.
● Marino, Patricia. “The Ethics of Sexual Objectification: Autonomy and Consent”
Inquiry 51 (2008), 345 – 364. A philosopher makes the case that being sexually
objectified is not that bad. In fact, we sometimes want to be sexually objectified
because we gain more pleasure out of it.
● Moen, Erica Oh Joy Sex Toy. An excellent online graphic novel where she mainly
reviews sex toys, but she also discusses pregnancies, birth control, and has guest
comic panelists. www.ohjoysextoy.com Probably NSFW.
● Moon, Alison. Girl Sex 101. A sex ed book that covers everything about women
(both cis- and transgendered women). Many illustrations, various techniques to
learn, and building a “road map” to enhance your own particular pleasure.
● Nagasaki, Emily. Come as you are. A book that explains the intricacies of
women’s sexuality by looking at the science and explains them in laymen’s terms.
In the end, she argues that all types of female sexuality are normal no matter your
drive, biology, or preferences. You do you! Very informative.
● http://noshamemovement.com/ A site dedicated to young people’s early sex
education and how that made them ashamed of sex, their bodies, and their
hardship to sexuality. This site looks at their stories to show how to overcome the
shame and that people are not alone in the shame.
● https://www.omgyes.com. A very educational, very informative website
sponsored by the Kinsey Institute to show how various women achieve pleasure
and orgasm through masturbation and touch techniques. Various women show
you exactly how to touch their vulvas with specific patterns, pressure, length of
time, and various movements. After which, you can download the apparatus and
practice the same touch by using your mouse.
● Schalet, Amy T. Not Under my Roof. A sociologist looks at American and Dutch
sexual values. Americans see adolescents as hormonal and not ready for sex until
they are autonomous, meaning when they leave the home. The Dutch look at
adolescents as leading into adulthood, and they regard sexuality as something that
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adolescents may engage in, but only if they are ready, meaning when they can
understand their own sexuality.
Sexplanations on YouTube. The fabulous Dr. Lindsey Doe talks about sexuality
in a humorous, yet informative way. Stay curious!
Tanenbaum, Leora. Slut! Growing Up Female with a Bad Reputation. A journalist
tackles slut-shaming and how there is a double standard regarding sexuality with
young adults.
Taoromino, Tristen. Opening Up. A great beginner’s guide to polyamory and
open relationships. She breaks down different categories of open relationship
styles and gives various case studies to show how people practice that particular
style.
http://uncutting.tumblr.com/tagged/genitals+of+the+day. Studies show that many
people, especially women, are dissatisfied with the appearance of their genitalia.
There has also been a correlation between this dissatisfaction and an unhealthy
approach to sexuality. Therefore, this site helps to break down the barrier by
showing pictures of various genitals from various people from their own
submissions. Anyone can submit. By exposing the complexities, the various
shapes and sizes and colors, and the different distributions of skin, the hope is that
there is no ideal look of what genitalia is supposed to look like. Everyone has
their own particular look and it’s completely normal. Definitely NSFW.
http://uncutting.tumblr.com/post/132306988299/clitoral-hood-coverage-chartupdated-edition Same as above but with different looks of clitoral hoods. NSFW
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